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著者別名	吉水 千鶴子
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## Reasoning-for-others in Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka thought\*

Chizuko Yoshimizu

### 0. Introduction

One of the most controversial issues in the history of the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition was whether the followers of this system might legitimately set forth a propositional thesis and formulate a logical proof for the purpose of demonstrating to others Madhyamaka doctrines such as dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and the lack of the self-existence (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all things in ultimate reality (*paramārtha*). In the seventh century, the Madhyamaka master Candrakīrti responded to the view that the Mādhyamika should accept the general rules for dialectical discourse proposed by the Buddhist logician Dignāga (fifth–sixth c.), which supposedly became authoritative soon after Dignāga's main works, the *Nyāyamukha* (hereafter NM) and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (hereafter PS), came into circulation. In the first chapter of his *Prasannapadā* (hereafter Pr), Candrakīrti attempts to defend the earlier Madhyamaka interpreter Buddhapālita's (ca. 500)<sup>1</sup> use of consequences (*prasaṅga*),

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while criticizing the interpreter Bhāviveka (sixth c.),<sup>2</sup> who followed Dignāga in maintaining that proper argumentation requires a formal inferential proof consisting of a thesis (*pratijñā*), a reason (*hetu*) and an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*).

The philosophical statements regarding ultimate reality made by Nāgārjuna (second c.) occur primarily in the form of negation. For instance, in the initial verse of his *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* (hereafter MMK), he declares the non-origination of all things by negating the four alternatives of the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*),<sup>3</sup> i.e., origination from self, from another, from both, or from no cause. What Nāgārjuna repudiates is the origination of things postulated as real entities by his substantialist opponent. As the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (hereafter VV), ascribed to Nāgārjuna, states,<sup>4</sup> the Mādhyamika's negation can be compared to a magically created person warding off another magical person in a magic show, because what is to be negated is a mere superimposition and therefore from the Madhyamaka viewpoint non-existent in reality. Since the object of negation does not exist, a negating subject cannot exist either. Accordingly, the Mādhyamika does not positively establish anything at all, and only indirectly demonstrates on the conventional level, for instance, the tenet of dependent origination through the negation of superimposed origination. It is in this sense that the Mādhyamika is said to have no thesis of his own (*svapratijñā*).

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improve the present paper and for her most valuable comments.

<sup>1</sup> For Buddhapālita's dates, Kajiyama (1987) has given "ca. 470–540." Cf. also Saito's (1988) proposal for ca. 370–450 and Khangkar's (1991) proposal for ca. 230–330.

<sup>2</sup> According to Kajiyama (1987), ca. 500–570. Krasser's recent research (see Krasser 2012) suggests a post-Dharmakīrti date.

<sup>3</sup> For the tetralemma used by the Mādhyamika, see, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1977: 34ff. and 2000: 109–112 n.5.

<sup>4</sup> VV 23 (Johnston and Kunst 1978: 57, Yonezawa 2008: 256, cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 119ff.): *nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṛṣṭam / pratiṣedhayeta yadvat pratiṣedho 'yaṃ tathaiva syāt //*; VV 63 (Johnston and Kunst 1978: 79, Yonezawa 2008: 316): *pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit / tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eva\* tvayā kriyate //*. \*Johnston and Kunst reads *eṣa*.

Candrakīrti, citing the well-known VV verses,<sup>5</sup> distinctly states in his Pr that the Mādhyamika does not have any thesis of his own.<sup>6</sup>

Nāgārjuna's recommendation to abstain from disputation and assertion is considered to have its roots in early Buddhist thought: the person seeking release from *saṃsāra* is strongly advised to avoid adhering to a particular philosophical view (*dr̥ṣṭi*, Pāli: *diṭṭhi*) or asserting one in a debate (*vāda*), for such adherence is an obstacle to liberation (*nirvāna*). For instance, one repeatedly encounters warnings against disputation in the oldest part of the *Suttanipāta*,<sup>7</sup> which suggests that even during the earliest phase of the doctrine, Buddhist monks had opportunities to participate in public or private debates and that some of them had taken up the challenge.

However, with the dissemination of Dignāga's views on logic among Indian Buddhists, neither Bhāviveka nor Candrakīrti could afford to distance themselves from the scene of dialectical debates. It was necessary to employ effective tools that would be able to verify Nāgārjuna's teachings and to deal with opponent objections. They had to decide, first of all, whether to accept the system of inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) created by Dignāga.

<sup>5</sup> VV 29–30 cited in Pr LVP 16, 7–10 (D 6a3f., P 6b5f.): *yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva\* me bhaved doṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ // yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā / pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupālabhaḥ //*. \*Johnston and Kunst 1978: 61 and Yonezawa 2008: 268 read *eṣa*. For further investigation of these verses, cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 115 *infra*.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Pr LVP 23, 3: *nāsmākaṃ svapratijñāyā abhāvāt /*.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., *Suttanipāta* (*Aṭṭhakavagga*, tr. Norman 1995) 787: *upayo hi dhammesu upeti vādaṃ, anūpayaṃ kena kathaṃ vadeyya, attamaṃ nirattaṃ na hi tassa atthi: adhosi so diṭṭhi-m-idh' eva sabbā*. "A person who clings [to a view] indeed clings to a dispute with regard to doctrines. By what [means] and how could one dispute with one who does not cling [to a view]? For he has taken up or laid down nothing. He has shaken off all views in this very world." 832: *ye diṭṭhim uggayha vivādiyanti idam eva saccaṃ ti ca vādiyanti, te tvaṃ vadassu, na hi te 'dha atthi vādamhi jāte paṭisenikattā*. "If people take up a view and dispute, and say, only this is true, tell them, there is no opponent for you here when a dispute has arisen." As for the Buddhist concept of *dr̥ṣṭi*, cf. Halbfass 1988: 266f.

In PS 3.1 Dignāga states:

An inference-for-others, however, elucidates the matter (*artha*) [i.e., reason (*hetu*)] which [the proponent] has understood himself (*svadṛṣta*). There, the presentation of the inferendum (*anumeya*) is held to have the goal of the reason (*hetu*) as its object.<sup>8</sup>

PS 3.2 sets forth the definition of the thesis (*pratijñā*):

[A valid thesis] is one which is intended by [the proponent] himself (*svayam iṣṭa*) as something to be stated in its proper form alone [i.e., as a *sādhyā*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject, it is not opposed by perceptible objects, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly recognized.<sup>9</sup>

According to the commentator Dharmakīrti (seventh c.), with the word *artha* of PS 3.1, Dignāga means that the logical reason (*hetu*) of an inference must be an *artha* which does not have a conceptually superimposed nature but is rather a real matter ascertained by the proponent himself.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, the thesis (*pratijñā*) must

<sup>8</sup> PS 3.1 (Tillemans 2000: 9; Katsura 2009:159; cf. PVin 3.1ab): *parārtham anumānaṃ\* tu svadṛṣṭārthaparakāśanam / tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviśayo mataḥ //* \**parārthānumānaṃ* in Tillemans 2000. The English translation follows Tillemans 2000.

<sup>9</sup> PS 3.2 (Tillemans 2000: 9; Katsura 2009: 159; cf. PVin 3.6ab): *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi //* The English translation follows Tillemans 2000. For further analysis of these two verses, cf. Tillemans *loc. cit.* Cf. also NM 1: *svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ /*; NB 3.38: *svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti //*. In PS 3.3 and 3.5 respectively Dignāga refutes the *Nyāyasūtra*'s definition of the thesis as a presentation of the probandum (*sādhyānirdeśa*) and that of Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra* as a statement of the probandum (*sādhyābhidhāna*). See Tillemans 2000: 39 n. 145.

<sup>10</sup> PV 4.13 (Tillemans 2000: 24f.): *tad arthagrahaṇaṃ śabdakalpanāropitātmanām / alīngatvaprāsiddhyartham arthād arthaprasiddhitaḥ //* (tr. Tillemans) “This word ‘state of affairs’ [in Dignāga’s definition of an inference-for-others, i.e., *svadṛṣṭārthaparakāśana*] is designed to establish that things whose natures are verbally and conceptually superimposed are not [valid] reasons, for [one] state of affairs [viz., the *sādhyā*] is established from [another] state of affairs [viz., the reason].” ; cf. PVin 3: 1, 5f. ad 3.1cd: *atra svadṛṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ āgamāt paraḍṛṣṭaṃ na sādhanam nāpy anarthataḥ //*

be one which the proponent himself accepts (*vādyabhyupagata / vādyabhyupagama*), intends in a real sense (*arthokta*) and wishes to prove.<sup>11</sup> If Dharmakīrti correctly interprets Dignāga's words, these two verses amply demonstrate that it is impossible for the Mādhyamika to accept these definitions because the Mādhyamika holds that any subject of or reason for a thesis is unreal and merely conceptual superimposition. Even if the Mādhyamika would set forth the negation of the subject as a thesis and would attempt to prove it by means of a logical reason (*hetu*), this logical reason would not meet the first of the three conditions (*trirūpa*) of a valid reason as asserted by Dignāga, viz., the requirement that the reason should reside in the locus (i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*), because the locus, that is, subject, is not established for the Mādhyamika himself. On account of this lack of establishment, the Mādhyamika would also violate another important requirement for a proper inference-for-others, namely, that the subject and the reason be established for both parties in a debate (*ubhayasiddhatva*).<sup>12</sup> It is impossible for the Mādhyamika to comply with this requirement, for he does not accept the ontological existence of the entities posited by non-Mādhyamika debators.

In brief, the Madhyamaka thinkers after the time of Dignāga had to confront and find solutions to these problems if they wanted to participate in dialectical discourse with disputants from philosophical backgrounds completely different from their own. Bhāviveka dealt with the problem by making allowance for the employment of Dignāgean logic within the sphere of transactional usage (*vy-avahāra*), that is, on the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) level.<sup>13</sup> Bhāviveka

<sup>11</sup> PV 4.29ab (Tillemans 2000: 48; cf. PVin 3.6cd): *asiddhāsāadhanārthok-tavādyabhyupagata\*grahaḥ* // (tr. Tillemans) "..., one understands that [the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a *sādhana*, is stated according to the [real] sense and is what is accepted by the proponent (*vādin*)."<sup>\*</sup>*abhyupagama* PVin 3.6cd. Cf. further PV 4.28 and Tillemans 2000: 48ff.

<sup>12</sup> See section 3 of the present paper and n. 55 below.

<sup>13</sup> In the twenty-seventh chapter of his *Prajñāpradīpa* (hereafter Prajñ, D257b3–258b5, P323a5–325a3, tr. Ejima 1980: 42–55), Bhāviveka systematically denies the ultimate establishment of a means of valid cognition (*tshad*

accepts, in accordance with Dignāga's epistemological views, direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) as means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and also acquiesces to the aforementioned demand for common establishment.<sup>14</sup> In Bhāviveka's system, the subject of the thesis, e.g., "things" (*bhāvāḥ*), is conventionally established for both the Mādhyamika and his opponent, and the Mādhyamika proves, as his own thesis (*pratijñā*) or probandum (*sādhya*), the non-origination of things.<sup>15</sup> In this way, Bhāviveka makes it possible for the Mādhyamika to set forth an inference-for-others within the realm of transactional usage (*vyavahāra*). He sets aside the Mādhyamika's ultimate ontological position that things are not real or self-existent in order to allow the Mādhyamika to debate with others, in spite of the illusion-like nature of his negative theses.

Candrakīrti, on the contrary, makes no such compromise. In his mind, Bhāviveka, or anyone else who claims to be a Mādhyamika, should not employ a formal probative inference of his own in a debate with substantialist opponents because it is impossible for the Mādhyamika to accept the ontological status attributed to the subject by the opponents even on the conventional level. If he nev-

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*ma, pramāṇa*), including direct perception (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) and inference (*rjes dpag, anumāna*), the members of an inference, i.e., inferendum (*sgrub bya, sādhya*), thesis (*dam bca', pratijñā*), reason (*gtan tshigs, hetu*), and example (*dpe, dṛṣṭānta*), the statement equipped with these members, and refutation (*sun 'byin, dūṣaṇa*). He makes this denial at the end of his Prajñā after having used these logical tools for interpreting the MMK.

<sup>14</sup> Prajñā (chap. 18) D 182b2f., P 227a6f. (cf. Ejima 1980:190 and Yoshimizu 2003: 280 n.24): *gzhan gyi phyogs 'ba' zhig la grags pa'i phyogs kyi chos kyis ni bsgrub par bya ba'i don bsgrub mi nus par nges par gzung ste / gang yang rung ba la ma grub pa'i phyir gzhan gyi phyogs la ma grub pa bzhin pas ... /*

<sup>15</sup> Bhāviveka concurs with Dignāga's definition of the thesis that it is the presentation of the probandum (*sādhya*) which is intended by the proponent himself and is not opposed by incompatible objects. See Prajñā (chap. 27) D 257b6f., P 323b8f. (tr. Ejima 1980: 46): *de bzhin du dam bcas pa la sogs pa sgrub pa'i yan lag rnam la yang / (P omits /) de dag gi sgrub par bya ba bstan pa (P omits bstan pa) ni bsgrub par bya ba nges par gzung ste / sgrub par 'dod pas bsgrub par bya ba nyid du 'dod pa'i phyogs don 'gal ba la sogs pas ma brtsams pa gang yin pa ni dam bcas pa'i mtshan nyid yin no //*

ertheless enters into debate with them under the same rules, he will either have to abandon the doctrine of non-substantiality and hence relinquish being a Mādhyamika, or remain an adherent of the Madhyamaka view but accept that his inference will be invalid because the subject is not established for him. As will be seen below, Candrakīrti indeed censures Bhāviveka for committing the latter fault.

Candrakīrti terms Bhāviveka's inferential proof "independent inference" (*svatantrānumāna*), presumably understanding this sort of inference to be one in which the subject of the thesis, the logical reason, and the example are established for the proponent himself, independent of another's thesis.<sup>16</sup> This naturally links up with Candrakīrti's rejection of the idea that the Mādhyamika has a thesis (i.e., the rejection of *svapratijñā*). If the subject or thesis is not established for the Mādhyamika himself, he does not have one. Candrakīrti thus disallows the use of a thesis as defined by Dignāga, i.e., a thesis which is intended by the proponent himself (i.e., *svayam iṣṭa*; cf. PS 3.2). Rejecting, therefore, "independent inference," Candrakīrti instead relies either on *prasaṅga* reasoning, which serves solely to negate an opponent's thesis, or on other-acknowledged inference (*paraprasiddhānumāna*), the subject of which, as well as the reason, are established for the opponent but not for the Mādhyamika. By using these two kinds of reasoning, Candrakīrti was able to engage with the magic show without contradicting Madhyamaka ontology. Indeed, foregoing the option to remain silent like a saint, Candrakīrti armed himself with reasonings for debates and polemical discussion.

As a strong critic of both Bhāviveka and Dignāga, Candrakīrti, the reputed founder of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka, has generally been considered to be a major challenger of the Indian Buddhist logical-epistemological tradition. It is sometimes even thought that he was opposed to all aspects of Dignāga's logic. This is, however, in my view not true. On the contrary, Candrakīrti accepted Dignāga's method of inference-for-others to a certain degree and applied it in regard to Nāgārjuna's statements, the most promi-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Yoshimizu 2003: 269 and the studies referred to at 276, n. 2.

ment case occurring with his defense of Buddhapālita's consequences, where he demonstrates their connection with inference-for-others. I am of the opinion that Candrakīrti in fact attempted to create a type of *reasoning-for-others* for the Mādhyamaka context, intending for it to replace the Dignāgean inference-for-others. In the present paper, I shall attempt to clarify Candrakīrti's logical project – aspects of which he owes to Dignāga as well as to Bhāviveka – which he designs with the aim of creating an environment favourable for Mādhyamika debaters.

### 1. Reasoning-for-others or pseudo-inference-for-others in Candrakīrti's interpretation of MMK 1.1

#### 1.1 The introductory elucidation of MMK 1.1

Although he rejects the idea that the thesis of an inference, as defined by Dignāga, is intended by the Mādhyamika proponent himself, Candrakīrti nevertheless refers, as Bhāviveka also does in his own commentary, to some statements in Nāgārjuna's MMK as "theses" (*pratijñā*),<sup>17</sup> notably to the negative statement of the MMK's initial verse.

MMK 1.1: Never do any things exist anywhere originated either from themselves, from another, from both, or from no cause.<sup>18</sup>

Candrakīrti does not view this verse as aiming to establish either the non-origination of all things or the negation of the four kinds of origination. Rather, it must be seen as solely negating the types of origination imagined by the opponent.<sup>19</sup> Still, he calls these nega-

<sup>17</sup> Seyfort Ruegg (2000: 129ff.) enumerates Candrakīrti's use of the term in both the Pr and the MAV.

<sup>18</sup> MMK 1.1: *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana //*.

<sup>19</sup> Candrakīrti's position is that mere negation is not the probandum to be established by the Mādhyamika. Early Tibetan Mādhyamikas such as Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055?–1145?) and Zhang Thang sag pa 'Byung gnas ye shes (alias Ye shes 'byung gnas, twelfth c.) elaborate on this idea. Pa tshab says that the Mādhyamika does not even approve negation as the probandum

tions “theses” (*pratijñā*). Candrakīrti's ambiguous use of the term *pratijñā* has puzzled modern scholars. It is highly unlikely that Candrakīrti blindly relied upon his predecessor Bhāviveka's understanding of it.<sup>20</sup> Nor is Candrakīrti's position accurately represented if one distinguishes between “acceptable theses” and “unacceptable theses” from the viewpoint that the Mādhyamika may state a thesis only if it does not presuppose a self-existent property (*svabhāva* or *svalakṣaṇa*),<sup>21</sup> because nowhere does Candrakīrti suggest such a distinction. My conjecture is that he uses the term *pratijñā* to refer to a statement that is presented for the sake of teaching others and that is to be substantiated by a reasoning in the form of

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(*dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ti ka* 11a9, p. 49 cited in Dreyfus and Tsering 2010: 402, n.25: *nged la dgag pa tsam gyi bsgrub bya'ang 'dod pa med de / dgag bya'i rang bzhin ma grub pas na bkag pa yang mi 'thad ste*); Zhang Thang sag pa describes the same idea with the words, “it is nothing” (*ci yang ma yin, dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 15a3). By emphasizing the negation of negation, they argue against the Indian Madhyamaka masters from the East, i.e., the so-called Svātantrika masters, Jñānagarbha (eighth c.), Śāntarakṣita (eighth c.) and Kamalaśīla (? –797?) (for detail, cf. Yoshimizu 2010a: 455 *infra*). Kamalaśīla takes the position that the Mādhyamika should establish as his own probandum the negation of a superimposed entity, saying that the Mādhyamika's non-implicative negation (*prasajyapratishedha*) establishes the negation of an intrinsic nature superimposed by his opponent. Cf., e.g., MĀ D172a6f.: *gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi 'on kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcad pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par 'dod pa de la ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te /*.

<sup>20</sup> Matsumoto (1997: 327f., 383) infers that Candrakīrti merely followed Bhāviveka in referring to MMK 1.1 as theses.

<sup>21</sup> The distinction from an ontological viewpoint has been proposed by Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 129f. and Yotsuya 2006: 117. Rejecting this distinction, Tanji (1992: 239) has expressed the opinion that Candrakīrti uses the term “theses” in reference to the negations of MMK 1.1, in the sense that these theses are established solely for the opponent, in contrast to Bhāviveka, who uses the same term to refer to logical theses established for the Mādhyamika himself. This interpretation makes sense if one takes Nāgārjuna's negations as the theses of other-acknowledged inferences (*paraprasiddhānumāna*). Oetke (2003a) has also criticized Seyfort Ruegg's distinction and his understanding that the Madhyamaka tenet does not presuppose the existence of anything.

either a *prasaṅga* or an other-acknowledged inference (*paraprasi-ddhānumāna*).<sup>22</sup> If this is the case, this thesis would constitute a part of a *reasoning-for-others* in the same manner that Dignāga’s thesis constitutes a part of an inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*).

To confirm this conjecture, I would first like to examine Candrakīrti’s introductory elucidation of MMK 1.1 in his Pr (LVP 12, 8–14, 1), in which the term “thesis” (*pratijñā*) is employed, which he presents as follows. I will summarize the points with special attention to the underlined words:

1. Candrakīrti first explains that it is with a desire to expound (*pratipādayiṣayā*) dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) that Nāgārjuna, to start, takes up the negation of origination.<sup>23</sup>
2. Candrakīrti then explains that Nāgārjuna declares MMK 1.1 having ascertained (*niścītya*) that origination is inappropriate in all ways.<sup>24</sup>
3. Candrakīrti explains how *pāda* cd of the verse should be read. The concluding sentence runs as follows: “The [other] three theses [negating origination from another, from both and

<sup>22</sup> In this regard, Zhang Thang sag pa, a Tibetan commentator on the Pr, may be right in describing the thesis accepted by Candrakīrti as a “mere thesis” (*dam bca’ tsam*) and opposing it to a “genuine thesis” (*dam bca’ rnal ma*), which bears the thesis-characteristics as defined by Dignāga in PS 3.2 (*dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 10b1, cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2010a: 448). Zhang also applies the term “pseudo-thesis” (*ltar snang dam bca’*) to the thesis of a *prasaṅga* reasoning (*ibid.*, 12a1f., cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2010a: 453 n. 28).

<sup>23</sup> Pr LVP 12, 8: *idānīm anirodhādiviṣiṣṭapratītyasamutpādapratipādayiṣayā utpādapratīṣedhena nirodhādīpratiṣedhasaukāryaṃ manyamāna ācāryaḥ prathamam evotpādapratīṣedham ārabhate*. “Now, with the desire to expound dependent origination qualified [in the introductory verses of the MMK] as being without cessation, etc., the master [Nāgārjuna], thinking that the negation of cessation, etc., is easy [to accomplish] through negating origination, takes up right at the beginning the negation of origination. Indeed, origination as postulated by other [thinkers] is postulated [as being] from self, or it is postulated [as being] from other, from both, or from no cause.”

<sup>24</sup> Pr LVP 12, 12: *sarvathā ca nopapadyata iti niścītyāha*.

from no cause] are to be construed in the same manner [as the negation of origination from self]" (*evaṃ pratijñātrayam api yoḥyam* Pr LVP 13, 3).

4. Candrakīrti notes that these negations are non-implicative (*prasajyapraṭiśedha*).<sup>25</sup>
5. Candrakīrti subsequently quotes MAV 6.8<sup>26</sup> and Buddhapālita's commentarial statement on MMK 1.1, which he considers to provide a reasoning (*upapatti*) for Nāgārjuna's negations or "theses." Candrakīrti says: "Moreover, the reasoning (*upapatti*) based on which [one concludes that] origination from self cannot occur is to be determined (*avaseya*) by relying on [my] *Madhyamakāvatāra* [viz., MAV 6.8] and so on. For his part (*tu*),<sup>27</sup> the master Buddhapālita states [the following reasoning]."<sup>28</sup>

This introductory elucidation of MMK 1.1 informs us how Nāgārjuna came to present the teaching of non-origination and that Buddhapālita as well as Candrakīrti proved it. This may also be construed as occurring in a logical process, as follows:

- [1] Nāgārjuna's desire to expound dependent origination (*iṣā*)
- [2] Nāgārjuna's ascertainment (*niścaya*) of non-origination
- [3] Nāgārjuna's declaration of the four theses (*pratijñā*) for the negation of origination

<sup>25</sup> Pr LVP 13, 5f.: *prasajyapraṭiśedhasya vivakṣitatvāt parato'py utpādasya praṭiśetsyamānatvāt*.

<sup>26</sup> MAV 6.8 (cited in Pr LVP 13, 7–8): *tasmād dhi tasya bhavane na guṇo 'sti kaścij jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva yuktaṃ //*

<sup>27</sup> For the interpretation of this expression *tu*, see MacDonald 2003: 147f.

<sup>28</sup> Pr LVP 13, 6–14, 1: *yayā copapattiyā svata utpādo na saṃbhavati, sā* (MAV 6.8) *tasmād dhi tasya bhavane na guṇo 'sti kaścij jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva yuktaṃ / ityādinā madhyamakāvatārādidvāreṇāvaseyā\* // ācāryabuddhapālitas tv āha /*. \*MacDonald (2008: 27f.) reports that neither the palm-leaf manuscript of the Pr from the late twelfth or the thirteenth century (Ms. P) nor the manuscript relied on by the author of the \*LT refer to the *Madhyamakāvatāra* as the source of the quotation. She suspects that the name of the text is an interpolation.

[4] Proposition of a reasoning (*upapatti*) by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti.

It thus consists of the four steps: [1] desire (*iṣā* or *icchā*), [2] ascertainment (*niścaya*), [3] thesis (*pratijñā*), and [4] reasoning (*upapatti*). The order of [1] and [2] are to be reversed, as will be seen below.

It should be noted that these same four steps are first mentioned by Bhāviveka in his *Prajñāpradīpa*. Candrakīrti likely adopted the idea of this logical process as well as the style of elucidation from Bhāviveka's work, for the *Pr* and the *Prajp* show strong similarities in this regard.<sup>29</sup> According to Bhāviveka, Nāgārjuna had a desire to teach (*bstan par bzhed nas*, *\*pratipādayiṣayā*) the non-origination of all things;<sup>30</sup> by virtue of his own ascertainment (*rang la nges pa'i dbang gis*, *\*svaniścayavaśāt*) of the non-origination of all things through argument and scripture (*rigs pa dang lung gis*, *\*yuktyāgamena*), Nāgārjuna set forth the group of the four theses (*dam bca' pa'i spyi*, *\*pratijñāsamūha?*) in the form of non-implicative negations (*med par dgag pa*, *\*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*). Bhāviveka further asserts that because a mere thesis (*dam bcas pa tsaṃ*, *\*pratijñāmātra*) is unable to establish the intended (*bsams pa*) meaning of the statement (*tshig gi don*, *\*vākyārtha*), one should understand that a logical reason, i.e., the property of being existent which qualifies the subject (*phyogs chos*, *\*pakṣadharmā*), and an example (*dpe*, *\*dṛṣṭānta*) are implied.<sup>31</sup> What is distinctive in Bhāviveka's

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Prajp D48b1–8, P57b3–58a5 cited in n. 31 below. In Buddhapālita's commentary (BMv D161a7–162a1) one does not see the idea of such a logical process for teaching non-origination.

<sup>30</sup> One should note that according to Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna desired to expound dependent origination.

<sup>31</sup> See Prajp D48b1–8, P57b3–58a5 (underlining by the present author): *slob dpon gyis* (P *gyi*) *rtēn cing 'brel bar 'byung ba skye ba med pa la sogs pa thun mong ma yin pa'i khyad par dang ldan pa de kho na ston par mdzad pa nyid kyi bcom ldan 'das la mngon par stod nas / skye ba med pa bstan nas 'gag pa med pa la sogs pa khyad par bstan sla bar dgongs pa na skye ba med pa dang por bstan par bzhed nas / gzhan gyis yongs su brtags* (P *brtag*) *pa'i skye ba rnam par rtog pa mngon sum du mdzad de / 'di ltar skye bar smra ba dag las kha cig ni dngos po rnams bdag las skye'o zhes zer /* (P omits */*) *gzhan dag ni gzhan las so zhes zer / kha cig ni gnyis las so zhes zer / gzhan dag ni rgyu med pa las so zhes zer ba dag rigs pa dang lung gis brtags pa na skye*

explanation is his determination that each of Nāgārjuna's theses has to be endowed with a logical reason which fulfils the three conditions (*trirūpalīṅga*)<sup>32</sup> because, as Bhāviveka maintains, Nāgārjuna himself ascertained the non-origination of all things by way of, in addition to scripture (*āgama*), argument (*yukti*).<sup>33</sup>

In contrast, Candrakīrti does not delineate the argumentation that led Nāgārjuna to the ascertainment of non-origination. Instead, he introduces the reasoning (*upapatti*)<sup>34</sup> formulated by Buddhapālita: "Things do not arise from themselves, because their arising [from themselves] would be purposeless and there would be the fault of absurdity [in the re-arising of things already

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*ba rnam par thams cad du 'thad pa mi bzod par rang la nges pa'i dbang gis*  
(P gi) / *bdag las ma yin gzhan las min (P ma yin) // gnyis las ma yin rgyu med*  
*min // dngos po gang dag gang na yang // skeyes pa nam yang yod ma yin //*  
(P l) *zhes bya ba gsungs te / 'di ni dam bcas pa'i spyi dkod pa yin no // de la*  
*re zhig bdag las ma yin zhes bya ba ci zhig ce na / skeyes pa nam yang yod ma*  
*yin // zhes bya ba la sogs pa ste / re re dang sbyar bar bya'o // bdag las zhes*  
*bya ba ni bdag las zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // dam bcas pa tsam gyis bsams*  
*pa'i tshig gi don mi 'grub pas / 'dir phyogs kyi chos ni yod pa nyid yin par*  
*gzung ste / 'di ltar bdag las zhes bya ba ni bdag nyid yod pa la snyad gdags*  
*pa'i phyir ro // dpe ni bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa'i chos kyi dbang gis te*  
*bsgrub par bya ba dang (P inserts l) sgrub pa'i chos grags pa dang ldan pa'i*  
*chos can gyi dpe yin pa'i phyir ro // bdag las ma yin zhes bya ba'i dgag pa 'di*  
*ni med par dgag pa'i don du lta bar bya ste / dgag pa gtso che ba'i phyir dang /*  
*'di ltar rtogs pa ma lus pa'i drang (P dra ba) dgag pas rnam par mi rtog pa'i*  
*ye shes zhes bya ba'i yul ma lus pa dang ldan pa 'grub par dgongs pa'i phyir*  
*ro //*

<sup>32</sup> See further Prajñ D148b5f., P184a7ff. (cited and translated in Ejima 1980: 148): *'di ni bstan bcos byed pa'i tshig dag ni phal cher chos mthun pa'i*  
*mtshan nyid dang / (P omits l) chos mi mthun pa'i mtshan nyid dang / gtan*  
*tshigs kyi mtshan nyid gsum gyis tha snyad byed de (P inserts l) phyogs kyi*  
*chos nyid dang mthun pa'i phyogs la rjes su 'gro ba dang / mi mthun pa'i*  
*phyogs la (P omits la) med pas te / de'i phyir phyogs tsam zhig bstan to //*

<sup>33</sup> Both scripture and argument are, of course, means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).

<sup>34</sup> In addition to the reasoning, Candrakīrti cites several scriptures in order to confirm that Nāgārjuna's teaching of non-origination does not contradict the Buddha's words (cf. Pr LVP 38, 8 *infra*).

existing].”<sup>35</sup> It is to be noted that when Candrakīrti speaks of Nāgārjuna’s ascertainment, he, unlike Bhāviveka, does not assert that it is Nāgārjuna’s *own* ascertainment (*svaniścaya*, *rang la nges pa*). It appears that he refrains from doing so in order to underscore his position that the Mādhyamika has no ascertainment of his own, just as he has no thesis. Although there are thus several crucial differences in Candrakīrti’s and Bhāviveka’s presentations, it is still interesting to see that they adopt the same basic logical procedure consisting of four steps, [1] desire (*iṣā*, *icchā*), [2] ascertainment (*niścaya*), [3] thesis (*pratijñā*), and [4] reasoning (*upapatti*). More remarkable is that this is exactly the procedure pertaining to the inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) in Dignāga’s system, as Candrakīrti himself has indirectly disclosed.

<sup>35</sup> Pr LVP 14, 1–3 (tr. e.g., Tanji 1988: 11, Tillemans 1992: 315, Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 25, MacDonald 2003: 147f., Yotsuya 1999: 75 and 2006: 229f.): *ācāryabuddhapālitas tv āha / na svata utpadyante bhāvās tadutpāda-vaiyarthīyād* (LVP -vaiyarthīyāt,) *atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca, na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punarutpāde prayojanam asti / atha sann api jāyeta, na kadācin na jāyeteṭi //*; Pr D5b1f., P6a2f. (cf. BMv D161b3ff., Prajp D49a5, P58b7f.): *de la re zhig dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de / de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du ’gyur ba’i phyir dang // skye ba shin tu thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro* (BMv, Prajp: *thug pa med par ’gyur ba’i phyir ro*) // *’di ltar dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa rnams la yang skye ba dgos pa med do // gal te yod kyang yang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi ’gyur bas de yang mi ’dod de / de’i phyir re zhig dngos po rnams bdag las skye ba med do //*. Candrakīrti renders it as a *prasaṅga* as well as other-acknowledged inferences (*paraprasiddhānumāna*). See Pr LVP 20, 1–6 (cf. MacDonald 2003: 172): *na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ tadutpā-davaiyarthīyād iti vacanāt / atra hi tadaty anena svātmanā vidyamānasya parāmarśaḥ / [kasmād iti cet] tathā hi tasya [sam]grahē[okta]vākyasyaitad vivaraṇavākyaṃ na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām punarutpāde prayojanam iti / anena ca vākyena sādhyasādhanadharmānugatasya paraprasiddhasya sādharṃyadr̥ṣṭāntasyopādānam / tatra svātmanā vidyamānasyety anena hetuparāmarśaḥ / utpādavayarthīyād ity anena sādhyadharmaparāmarśaḥ //*; 21, 2ff. (cited and translated in MacDonald 2003: 172): *iha svātmanā vidyamānaṃ puro ’vasthitaṃ ghaṭādikaṃ punar utpādān apekṣaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ tathā ca mṛtpiṇḍādyavasthāyām api yadi svātmanā vidyamānaṃ ghaṭādikaṃ iti manyase tadāpi tasya svātmanā vidyamānasya nāsty utpāda iti /*; 22, 3ff. (cf. MacDonald 2003: 173): *atha vāyam anyāḥ prayogamārgaḥ puruṣavyatirikṭāḥ padārthāḥ svata utpattivādinaḥ tata eva na svata utpadyante svātmanā vidyamānatvāt puruṣavat itīdam udāharaṇam udāhāryam //*.

### 1.2 The regular rule (*nyāya*) of the inference-for-others

In the course of his debate with Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti criticizes him for having claimed that Buddhapālita should have presented a formal inference against the Sāṃkhya opponent. Candrakīrti is of the opinion that introducing an inference is unnecessary because the Sāṃkhya is unable to convince the Mādhyamika of the correctness of the Sāṃkhya's own thesis that things arise from themselves.<sup>36</sup> In support of his view that the Mādhyamika does not need to present an inference, Candrakīrti refers to a rule (*nyāya*) of debate, citing Dignāga's PS 4.6ab = NM 13ab (the underlined is Dignāga's verse):

Because if a [disputant] proposes (*pratijānīte*) a [certain] matter (*artha*), he should, with the desire (*icchā*) to generate ascertainment (*niścaya*) in others just like [his] own ascertainment (*svaniścayavat*), teach others exactly the reasoning (*upapatti*) by means of which [he] has come to understand the matter. Therefore, this is, to start, the rule (*nyāya*), [namely,] that only the opponent [i.e., the Sāṃkhya, not Buddhapālita] (*pareṇaiva*) has to employ a proof of the matter proposed [on the basis of what he him]self has accepted (*svābhyupa-*

<sup>36</sup> According to the Tibetan commentator Zhang Thang sag pa, Bhāviveka's objection as set forth in Pr LVP 18, 5–9 indicates that Buddhapālita is still wrong in not stating a logical reason and an example for an other-acknowledged inference even if it is granted that the Mādhyamika should not use an independent-inference (cf. Yoshimizu 2006: 95–98, 114). This reading supports MacDonald's interpretation of the same segment (2000, 2003: 170 *infra.*), which has instigated discussion among modern scholars. For more details, see MacDonald 2000, 2003, Oetke 2003b, 2006, and Yonezawa 2004. In response to Bhāviveka's objection, as MacDonald summarizes (2003: 173), Candrakīrti argues in the subsequent segment that the Mādhyamika does not need to formulate an other-acknowledged inference since the Sāṃkhya opponent first has to prove his thesis, but is unable to do so (Pr LVP 19, 1–7, cf. MacDonald 2003: 179 *infra.*, where she closely discusses the text and content of this segment; cf. also Zhang Thang sag pa's interpretation cited in Yoshimizu 2006: 96f.). However, at the next stage, Candrakīrti himself demonstrates how other-acknowledged inferences can be drawn out of Buddhapālita's argument (cf. n. 35 above) and sanctions the Mādhyamika's use of formal inferences.

*gamapratijñārthasādhanam*<sup>37</sup>).<sup>38</sup>

For Candrakīrti, this rule of debate applies only to the Sāṃkhya and others who, unlike the Mādhyamikas, employ probative inferences. Nevertheless, if we ignore the qualifier *sva-* in *svanīścaya(-vat)*, one can readily recognize in this passage the four items which both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti mention in regard to MMK 1.1: ascertainment (*nīścaya*), desire (*icchā*), thesis-proposition (*pratijñā*, here verbalized as *pratijānīte*), and reasoning (*upapatti*).

Nāgārjuna, according to Candrakīrti, is said to have first desired to expound dependent origination. This desire theoretically presupposes his ascertainment of dependent origination. This ascertainment is inextricably connected with the ascertainment of non-origination, and is followed by the desire to expound non-origination.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, as mentioned earlier, it is correct to assume that “ascertainment” should precede “desire” in any logical listing of the steps. Nāgārjuna thus taught [3] the theses of MMK 1.1, [1] having ascertained the non-origination of things, with [2] the desire to generate the same ascertainment in others. Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti supplied *prasaṅga* reasonings and other-acknowledged inferences (*paraprasiddhānumāna*) for the accomplishment of this goal. The teaching of non-origination, in its various steps,

<sup>37</sup> LVP reads: *svābhyupagata-*. According to MacDonald 2003: 179 n. 89, all the manuscripts attest *svābhyupagama-*.

<sup>38</sup> Pr LVP 19, 1ff. (cited and translated in MacDonald 2003: 179f.): *yasmād yo hi yam arthaṃ pratijānīte tena svanīścayavad anyeṣāṃ nīścayotpādanecchayā yayopapattiyāsāv artho 'dhigataḥ saivopapattiḥ parasamāy upadeṣṭavyā. tasmād eṣa tāvan nyāyo yat pareṇaiva svābhyupagama-pratijñārthasādhanam upādeyam.* Cf. PS 4.6 = NM 13 cited in PVBh 487, 31 (cf. Katsura 1981: 73f. and Tillemans 2000: 31): *svanīścayavad anyeṣāṃ nīścayotpādanecchayā / pakṣadharmatvasaṃbandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam //*. “With the desire to generate ascertainment in others just like [his] own ascertainment, the [reason’s] being the property of the subject, the necessary connection and what is to be proven are stated; anything other than [them] is excluded.” For problematic interpretations of this verse, see Tillemans 2000: 31f.

<sup>39</sup> Bhāviveka mentions Nāgārjuna’s desire to expound non-origination, but does not mention his desire to expound dependent origination, as has been seen above.

has been undertaken by the Mādhyamikas for the sake of others. This indeed accords with the above Dignāgean rule for debate. In the larger context of the Pr citation, however, where the rule is cited with a view to deflecting Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita, it is used to show that in this specific case only the Sāṃkhya opponent is required to employ a proof of the matter that he accepts (*svābhyupagama*). Candrakīrti later explains that the Mādhyamika should not use such an independent inference but may present a proof of the matter based on that which is accepted by the opponent alone (i.e., an other-acknowledged inference).

I am fairly convinced that in their introductory elucidation of MMK 1.1 both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti aimed to show that the Mādhyamikas, viz., Nāgārjuna and themselves, presented the teaching of non-origination following the proper logical procedure required for the doctrinal debates of their time. To this extent, they assent to Dignāga's regulation as contained in PS 4.6ab (NM 13ab). Interestingly, Candrakīrti does not quote the last half of this verse, in which the *pakṣadharmatva* is mentioned. Instead, he says that the proponent should teach others "reasoning" (*upapatti*). *upapatti* is exactly the word he uses to refer to the reasonings Buddhapālita and later he himself provide for Nāgārjuna's negations of origination. Although Candrakīrti gives his implicit consent to Dignāga's rule when he cites the first half of PS 4.6 (NM 13), by replacing the last half of the verse with his own words, he makes this rule applicable to the Mādhyamika's reasoning-for-others too, expecting that intelligent readers would recall that it is precisely the process Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti himself have followed for teaching non-origination.

### 1.3 Nāgārjuna's teaching for others

Of course, Candrakīrti is also fully aware of the Madhyamaka stance that no kind of thesis (*pratijñā*), ascertainment (*niścaya*) or reasoning (*upapatti*) is established for the Mādhyamika himself. Before commencing his critique of Dignāga's theory of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), Candrakīrti confirms this.

In the logicians' system, one attains ascertainment (*niścaya*) by means of valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*), and if one wishes to generate the same ascertainment in others, one should make a thesis-statement in the form of an inferential proof (*anumāna*). Here a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) plays the role of Candrakīrti's reasoning (*upapatti*). The question may well arise as to whether Nāgārjuna's ascertainment of non-origination is based on a means of valid cognition or not.<sup>40</sup> Candrakīrti's answer is clear: We have neither ascertainment (*niścaya*) nor non-ascertainment (*aniścaya*). Therefore, we do not need to conceive a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).<sup>41</sup>

He further states that the saints have neither reasoning (*upapatti*) nor non-reasoning (*anupapatti*) because for them there is solely ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) and silence (*tūṣṇībhāva*).<sup>42</sup> The underlying idea is that ultimate reality is ineffable, beyond discursive proliferation (*prapañca*) and free of dichotomizing conceptual construction (*vikalpa*). The saints experience ultimate reality in silence. When they talk about it, it is only for the benefit of others. At that time they may use reasonings in order to teach others, as Nāgārjuna and his successors have done.

Even though the ineffable ultimate is the final goal of Madhyamaka philosophy, Candrakīrti still tries to justify Nāgārjuna's teaching as reconcilable with inference-for-others. He explains Nāgārjuna's intent and method as regards MMK 1.1 as follows:

<sup>40</sup> Pr LVP 55, 11f.: *atra kecit paricodayanti / anutpannā bhāvā iti kim ayaṃ pramāṇajo niścaya utāpramāṇajaḥ /*. The unnamed opponents here (i.e., *kecit*) have generally been assumed to be Dignāga and his followers. The commentator Zhang Thang sag pa identifies them as Dignāga and his disciples (*dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 27b5f.: phyogs kyi {glang : Ms. slang} po'i slob ma*). MacDonald (2011), however, has proposed that the Naiyāyikas are the opponents being criticized.

<sup>41</sup> Pr LVP 56, 7f.: *yadā caivaṃ niścayasyābhāvaḥ tadā kasya prasi-ddhārthaṃ pramāṇāni parikalpayiṣyāmaḥ /*. This and the following segments are discussed in Arnold 2005: 146f.

<sup>42</sup> Pr LVP 57, 7f.: *kiṃ khalv āryāṇām upapattir nāsti / kenaitad uktam asti vā nāsti veti / paramārtho hy āry[āṇām] tūṣṇībhāvaḥ tataḥ kutas tatra prapañcasambhavo yad upapattir anupapattir vā syāt /*.

This statement (*vākyaṃ*) is ascertained (*niścitaṃ*) on the part of [people in the] world (*lokasya*) through reasoning (*upapattiyā*) that is acknowledged solely by [them]selves, but [it is] not [ascertained] on the part of the saints (*āryāṇām*).<sup>43</sup>

Indeed, the saints do not utter any reasoning (*upapatti*) according to worldly transactional usage (*lokasaṃvyavahāreṇa*). Rather, having accepted (*abhyupetya*) reasoning (*upapatti*) that is acknowledged from [the viewpoint of] the world alone (*lokata eva*), for the purpose of awaking others (*parāvabodhārtham*) [the saints] awaken (*bodhayanti*) people (*loka*) exactly through this [reasoning].<sup>44</sup>

Although these two passages sound as if Candrakīrti is emphasizing the Mādhyamika's rejection of logical tools, the point here is, on my reading, that he is implicitly demonstrating that Nāgārjuna's procedure in setting forth MMK 1.1's statement – a procedure borrowed from the world – is impeccable, since it is said that his statement has been ascertained through specific reasoning and taught to people using this very reasoning for the sake of their awakening. Candrakīrti here employs the word *vākya* for statement, which may sound less technical than *pratijñā*, but I do not see any essential difference between the two; both refer to the statement that is to be presented for the sake of teaching others and substantiated by way of specific reasoning (*upapatti*).

As regards the question of what Candrakīrti means with the expression “reasoning acknowledged from the viewpoint of the world alone” (*lokata eva prasiddhopapatti*), I would limit myself to suggesting that it might be considered a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), though a *pramāṇa* like those of the Naiyāyika school, which counts four, viz., direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), scripture (*āgama*) and analogy (*upamāna*), because at the end of his imagined debate with Dignāga, Candrakīrti adduces these four kinds of *pramāṇa* and states that the general understand-

<sup>43</sup> Pr LVP 57, 5f.: *ucyate niścitaṃ idaṃ vākyaṃ lokasya svaprasiddhayaivo-papattiyā nāryāṇām |*.

<sup>44</sup> Pr LVP 57, 10f.: *na khalv āryā lokasaṃvyavahāreṇopapattiṃ varṇayanti, kiṃ tu lokata eva yā prasiddhopapattis tāṃ parāvabodhārtham abhyupetya tayaiva lokaṃ bodhayanti |*.

ing of object-matters is established in the world through these four kinds of means of valid cognition.<sup>45</sup>

To conclude, one can justly assume that Candrakīrti has interpreted Nāgārjuna's statement as represented by MMK 1.1, as well as Buddhapālita's presentation of it, as consisting in a logical reasoning for others, the framework of which conforms to Dignāga's inference-for-others. Candrakīrti thereby demonstrates the equivalence of the Mādhyamika's reasoning-for-others and the logicians' inference-for-others. In this limited sense, the former can be characterized as a pseudo inference-for-others, even though neither *prasaṅga* nor other-acknowledged inference (*paraprasi-ddhānumāna*) is a genuine inference from Dignāga's point of view.

## 2. *Prasaṅga reasoning common to Candrakīrti and Dignāga and other-acknowledged inference*

Both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti interpret Buddhapālita's commentarial exposition of MMK 1.1 as presenting a *prasaṅga* reasoning:

(thesis, *pratijñā*;) Things do not arise from themselves.

(consequences, *prasaṅga*;) If one accepts the Sāṃkhya's thesis that things arise from themselves, then their arising would be purposeless and there would be the fault of absurdity [due to infinite regress].<sup>46</sup>

The basic principle of *prasaṅga* reasoning is that based on the temporary acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of the opponent's thesis, one indicates unwanted consequences for the opponent and thereby indirectly proves the opposite of the opponent's thesis. It is not a formal proof that establishes the proponent's own thesis. What is used as

<sup>45</sup> Pr LVP 75, 8: *tad evaṃ pramāṇacatuṣṭayāl lokasyārthādhigamo vyavasthāpyate*. In the later dGe lugs tradition, these four *pramāṇas* are accepted as those to be adopted in the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system. See Yoshimizu 1996: 25–32. NSū 1.1.3 enumerates the four kinds of *pramāṇas*, stating *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni*. According to Kajiyama (1984: 20), the earliest account of these four *pramāṇas* appeared in the \**Upādāyahṛdaya* / \**Prayogasāra* (*Fang Bian Xin Lun*, 方便心論 24a01f.: 爲四。一者現見。二者比知。三以喩知。四隨經書).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Pr LVP 14, 1–3 cited in n. 35. Regarding the constructions of this *prasaṅga* and its reversal (*viparyaya*), see Yoshimizu 2008: 82–86.

the thesis of the *prasaṅga* here is the mere negation of the opponent's thesis. This kind of *prasaṅga* reasoning is often regarded to be peculiar to the Mādhyamika. By nature it is, however, almost the same as that described by Dignāga in his PS in the chapter on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*); for him, *prasaṅga* reasoning is not formal proof (*sādhana*) but refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) of another's thesis. Since neither a logical reason (*hetu*) nor an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is required for a *prasaṅga* reasoning, the reason does not need to meet the three conditions of a valid logical reason. In Dignāga's own words, it is defined as follows:

(PS 3.14) In a certain case (*yatra*), an unwanted [consequence for the opponent] follows from [the viewpoint of the opponent's] thesis (*dam bca'*, *\*pratijñā*) and logical reason (*gtan tshigs*, *\*hetu*). This [case] is recognized as confutation (*lan*, *parihāra*), since the consequence arises (*thal ba'i phyir*, *\*prasaṅgāt*)<sup>47</sup> from [the viewpoint of] the [opponent's thesis and logical reason].<sup>48</sup>

(PS 3.17) Since the consequence (*prasaṅga*) does not have [a logical reason] as the property qualifying the subject (*apakṣadharmatvāt*), it states the faults in [the opponent's] thesis or logical reason after the acceptance (*upagama*) [of them]. Therefore it is understood as refutation (*dūṣaṇa*).<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> I tentatively prefer Kanakavarman's translation (*thal ba'i phyir*, *\*prasaṅgāt*) to Vasudhararakṣita's translation (*sbyor ba'i phyir*, *prayogāt*), for the verse does not deal with a formal proof (*prayoga*). Katsura (2009: 158 cited below) adopts Vasudhararakṣita's translation.

<sup>48</sup> PS 3.14 (Katsura 2009: 160; Kitagawa 1973: 485): *hetupratijñādvāreṇa yatrāniṣṭiḥ prasajyate / taddvāreṇa prayogāt sa parihāra itīṣyate* // The Sanskrit has been reconstructed by Katsura; (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) *dam bca' rtags kyi ngag gis gang // mi 'dod pa la thal ba rtsom // de ni len zhes shes bya ste // de yi sgo nas sbyor phyir ro //*; (Kanakavarman tr.) *dam bca' gtan tshigs sgo nas ni // gang zhig mi 'dod thal 'gyur // de sgo nyid nas thal ba'i phyir // de ni lan zhes shes par bya //*.

<sup>49</sup> PS 3.17 (Katsura 2009: 160; Kitagawa 1973: 487): *prasaṅgo 'pakṣadharmatvāt pūrvatropagame sati / hetupratijñāyos tesām doṣoktyā dūṣaṇam gatam* // The underlined Sanskrit has been reconstructed by Katsura; (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) *thal 'gyur phyogs chos can min phyir // khas blangs sngon du song ba las // de bzhin rtags dang dam bca' yi // skyon brjod sun 'byin du shes bya //*; (Kanakavarman tr.) *thal 'gyur phyogs chos can min phyir // sngon du khas blangs yod na ni // rtags dang dam bca' gghan dag la //*

In his commentary on PS 3.14, Dignāga illustrates *prasaṅga* reasoning by adducing the Vaiśeṣika's refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka's proof of permanent sound. The Mīmāṃsaka formulates the inference: “(thesis:) Sound is permanent, (reason:) because it has no form.”<sup>50</sup> If one accepts this thesis and reason, the proof entails two unwanted consequences for the Mīmāṃsaka: 1) If one accepts the reason, it follows that action and so on, which have no form, would be permanent; 2) If one accepts the thesis, it follows that one would hear sound at all times. The first consequence contradicts the fact that action is impermanent, which the Mīmāṃsaka himself accepts; the second consequence contradicts the fact that sound is not constantly audible, which is generally accepted in the world. In this way, based on the temporary acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of the opponent's thesis and reason, one indicates consequences that are unwanted by the opponent. It is refutation rather than proof since the proponent does not present a logical reason and an example from his side. This is exactly the same *prasaṅga* method Candrakīrti makes use of.

Moreover, Dignāga says: “Here the Vaiśeṣika [refutes his opponent Mīmāṃsaka] by [stating] the thesis alone (*dam bca' ba tsam gyis*, \**pratijñāmātreṇa*) [that sound is impermanent].”<sup>51</sup> It is now not curious at all that Candrakīrti refers to Nāgārjuna's negations in MMK 1.1 as “theses” (*pratijñā*), for they are the theses of *prasaṅga* reasonings.

The most crucial point in Candrakīrti's argument against Bhāviveka's use of an independent probative inference is that the inference incurs the fault of the proposition or thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*)

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*skyon brjod sun 'byin shes par bya //*. I do not translate *teṣām*.

<sup>50</sup> PSV (Kitagawa 1973: 485): (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) *dper na sgra rtag pa ma yin te / las rtag par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ram / rtag tu dmigs par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //*; (Kanakavarman tr.) *dper na sgra ni rtag pa ma yin te / las la sogs pa rtag par thal ba'i phyir ram / rtag tu dmigs par thal ba'i phyir zhes bya ba 'di ni lan yin te / gtan tshigs dang dam bca' ba'i sgo nas khas blangs pa yod na thal ba bsgrub pa'i phyir ro // sngar ni lus can ma yin pa'i phyir rtag pa nyid khas blangs nas lan brjod pa yin la / 'dir ni dam bca' ba tsam gyis yin no //*. Cf. also NM (Katsura 1978: 117f.).

<sup>51</sup> PSV cited above in Kanakavarman's Tibetan version.

that its locus is not established (*asiddhādhāra*) and the fault of the logical reason (*hetudoṣa*) that it is not established in its substratum (*āśrayāsiddha*).<sup>52</sup> As stated at the beginning of this paper, Bhāviveka's proof does not meet the requirement that a valid logical reason be a property which qualifies the subject (*pakṣadhar-matva*), since the subject is not established for Bhāviveka himself. As a result, Bhāviveka also cannot avoid violating the rule of common establishment. Candrakīrti thus indicates that Bhāviveka contravenes Dignāga's stipulations for inference-for-others.

Because of its hypothetical nature, however, by Candrakīrti's time the *prasaṅga* was held to have been a mere supplementary tool to formal inferential proof.<sup>53</sup> Only after Dharmakīrti, and only because his successors link it with probative inference in its reversed form (i.e., *prasaṅgaviparyaya*), does it come to be accepted as a valid and effective debate tool.<sup>54</sup> Hence, for Candrakīrti, an adequate form of proof that, unlike *prasaṅga*, would meet the logical requirements set forth by Dignāga, was a matter of necessity. The other-acknowledged inference (*paraprasiddhānumāna*), which is formally endowed with a logical reason and an example which fulfill the three conditions but whose subject, reason and example are established solely for the opponent, not for the Mādhyamika, was given this role. This proof can safely be said to perform the function of an inference-for-others because except for the fact that its subject and reason are not established as real for the proponent, it is not different from a genuine inference-for-others. With it, Candrakīrti aimed to make it possible for Mādhyamikas to argue with their opponents on equal footing in a debate setting, although it is doubtful, given that this inference contravenes the rule of common establishment (*ubhayasiddhatva*), that other logicians accepted it.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Pr LVP 27, 7ff. (discussed in, e.g., Yoshimizu 2003: 279, n.21).

<sup>53</sup> According to Kajiyama (1987: 73), *prasaṅga* was known as a form of argument from the time of the *Nyāyasūtra* (3rd c.) under the name *tarka*. Bhāviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's reasoning in the form of *prasaṅga* describing it as a "statement open to objection [from the opponent]" (*sāvakaśavacana, glags yod pa'i tshig* Prajñ D49a7). For the term *prasaṅga*, cf. further Oberhammer 2006: 78 *infra*.

<sup>54</sup> Cf., e.g., Iwata 1993: 30–35.

### 3. *The rule of common establishment*

The last obstacle to the Mādhyamika's participation in debates with those who follow Dignāga's logic is indeed the rule of common establishment. Dignāga describes it in his PS 3.11:

Because one makes [a thesis-statement in a debate] with a property [of the subject] (*dharmēṇa*) that is established for the two [parties in the debate], when [this property as a logical reason] is [assumed to be] the opposite for both or [even] one [of the parties], when [it is in] doubt [for both or for one] and when the property-possessor [i.e., the subject] is not established [for both or for one], [it is] not accepted [as a property of the subject].<sup>55</sup>

Since this rule theoretically disqualifies the Madhyamaka inference-for-others, Candrakīrti rejects it. His point is that employment of an inferential proof whose reason is acknowledged by one party alone, i.e., by the opponent, is sufficient for refuting the opponent's thesis. In support of his view, he notes that only the statement of the defendant involved in a legal dispute is able to decide the outcome of cases in courts of law.<sup>56</sup> After citing the NM's assertion that a

<sup>55</sup> PS 3.11 (Katsura 2009: 157, Kitagawa 1973: 481): *dvayoḥ siddhena dharmēṇa vyavahārād viparyaye / dvayor ekasya sandehe dharmyasiddhau ca neṣyate //*; (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) *gnyis ka la grub chos de las // tha snyad yin phyir gnyis ka la'am // gang yang rung ba la bzlog pa'am // the tshom chos grub 'dod ma yin //*; (Kanakavarman tr.) *gnyi ga la grub chos kyis ni // tha snyad bya phyir gnyi ga dang // gcig la dogs dang the tshom dang // gzhi ma grub la mi 'dod do //*. This verse is cited in Prajñākaragupta's PVBh 647, 9. For references concerning this rule, see Seyfort Ruegg 1991: 286 n. 20 and 2000: 245 n. 20.

<sup>56</sup> See Pr LVP 35, 1ff.: *lokata eva dṛṣṭatvāt / kadācid dhi loke 'rthapratyarthibhyāṃ pramāṇīkṛtasya sāksīṇo vacanena jayo bhavati parājayo vā kadācit svavacanena* (R inserts *eva*; Tib. *rang gi tshig kho nas*) *paravacanena tu na jayo nāpi parājayaḥ /*. Here it is pointed out that victory or defeat in legal disputes is determined by the words of either a witness or the defendant, independent of what the plaintiff says. Victory or defeat does not occur on account of statements made by the plaintiff. Similarly, it is the acknowledgement of the inference by the Sāṃkhya opponent which brings about his defeat, and not any acknowledgement from the side of the Mādhyamika. Cf. the corresponding note on this passage in MacDonald forthcoming.

reason serves as a proof (*sādhana*)<sup>57</sup> or a refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) only if it is established for both parties,<sup>58</sup> Candrakīrti claims that Dignāga should follow worldly convention and accept his rule (*nyāya*).<sup>59</sup> I assume that with the term *nyāya* he intends to propose a new regular rule to replace the rule of common establishment, by way of which the Mādhyamika could eliminate the last obstacle to his active involvement in debates.

In the Indian Madhyamaka tradition, however, Candrakīrti was presumably the only scholar who disobeyed the rule of common establishment. Later Mādhyamikas of the Svātantrika lineage complied with it through maintaining that the Mādhyamika accepts the subject which commonly appears to both the Mādhyamika and his substantialist opponent. Jñānagarbha states that the common appearance of a property-possessor and its properties suffices for the adducing of an inference, which shows his consent to the rule of

<sup>57</sup> I read *sādhana*. In Pr LVP, the word *pramāṇa* appears for *sādhana*. The Tibetan versions and Pr R read *sādhana*. See below n. 58.

<sup>58</sup> NM (Katsura 1977: 124 and cited in Pr LVP 35, 5f.): *ya eva ubhaya-  
niścītavādī sa pramāṇam (R sādhanam) dūṣaṇam vā nānyataraprasiddha-  
saṃdigdhavācī. Cf. also the citation in PVSV 153, 19f.: ya eva tūbhaya-  
niścītavācī sa sādhanam dūṣaṇam vā nānyataraprasiddhasaṃdigdhavācī  
punaḥ sādhanāpekṣatvād. According to the twelfth verse of the PS, more-  
over, a refutation (*duṣaṇa*) is also valid only if it is accepted by both par-  
ties; if the opponent does not accept it, the proponent has to present another  
proof. See PS 3.12 (Katsura 2009: 158; Kitagawa 1973: 482): nāniṣṭer  
dūṣaṇam sarvaṃ prasiddhas tu dvayor api / sādhanam dūṣaṇam vāsti sād-  
dhanāpekṣanāt punaḥ // The underlined Sanskrit has been reconstructed  
by Katsura. “Not all that is concerned with something undesirable [for both  
parties] is refutation. Rather, when the [logical reason as a property of the  
subject] (*pakṣadharmā*) is acknowledged by both parties, a proof or a refuta-  
tion takes place. [When it is not the case, the logical reason as a property of  
the subject must be ascertained] again in dependence on [another] proof.”  
The Tibetan versions run as follows: (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) *mi 'dod thams cad  
sun 'byin du'ang // gnyis kar rab tu grub na ni // sun 'byin pa 'am grub pa yin //  
gzhan gyis slar yang bsgrubs na 'dod //*; (Kanakavarman tr.) *mi 'dod phyir kun  
sun 'byin min // gnyi ga la yang rab grub pa // sgrub par byed pa 'am sun 'byin  
yin // gzhan yang bsgrub bya la ltos byed //**

<sup>59</sup> See Pr LVP 35, 6f.: ... *iti tenāpi laukikāṃ vyavasthām anuruddya-  
mānen[ānumāne] yathokta eva nyāyo 'bhyupeyaḥ /*

common establishment on the conventional level of appearance.<sup>60</sup> Kamalaśīla accepts this idea as well.<sup>61</sup> They are of the opinion that the Mādhyamika is thereby able to avoid the fallacy of non-establishment of the subject for the proponent (i.e., *āśrayāsiddha*). Taking this historical development into account, one must conclude that Candrakīrti's attempt to abolish the rule of common establishment failed, at least within the Indian Buddhist tradition.<sup>62</sup>

### Concluding remarks

Candrakīrti was more careful than Bhāviveka in regard to defending the Madhyamaka ontology of non-substantiality and avoiding violation of Dignāga's logical rules. Following Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti reconstructed the context of Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.1 negations and revealed a logical method for teaching others, which consists of the four steps (desire, ascertainment, thesis, and reasoning) that he borrowed from Dignāga and Bhāviveka. Candrakīrti thus showed that the Mādhyamikas presented their teachings for

<sup>60</sup> See SDv 18–19 (cited and translated in Eckel 1987: 87f. and Keira 2004: 147 n. 239): *rgol ba gnyi ga'i shes pa la // ji tsam snang ba'i cha yod pa // de tsam de la brten nas ni // chos can chos la sogs par rtog // de tshes rjes su dpag pa 'byung // gang gi tshes na gzhan na min // de bas rigs pa smra ba rnams // de skad smra la su zhig 'gog //*

<sup>61</sup> See, e.g., MĀ D217b2ff.: *... ji skad bshad pa'i tshul gyis rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba gnyi ga la yang chos thams cad gcig dang du ma dang bral ba tsam du grub pa'i phyir ro // rnam par bcad pa tsam zhig yin pa la ni bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dang rjes su mthun pa'i chos can dngos por gyur pa ma yin pa rigs pa nyid do zhes sngar bstan zin to // des na rang dang gzhan gyi gzhung lugs la gnas pa rnams kyis nye bar brtags pa'i chos can la yang bsgrub pa'i chos rnam par bcad pa tsam gyis ji skad bshad pa gnyi ga la grub pa nyid do //*

<sup>62</sup> The Tibetan resurrection of Candrakīrti's thought reopened the discussion of this issue. Employing the concept of common appearance by Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla, dGe lugs scholars deal with this rule by calling it "the establishment of common appearance" (*mthun snang du grub pa*). Cf. Tillemans 1982: 121 n. 18 and Yoshimizu 2003: 270–273, 280 n. 24. For Tibetans, acceptance of the rule of common establishment is one of the criteria for the division of the two Madhyamaka branches, i.e., the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

the sake of others following the model of the inference-for-others which consists of a thesis (*pratijñā*) and a reasoning (*upapatti*). That is to say, the Mādhyamikas were able to make the best use of *reasonings-for-others* in the form of either *prasaṅgas* or other-acknowledged inferences without contradicting their ontological position of the non-establishment of all things in ultimate reality. Candrakīrti's final aim is considered to have been the creation of an environment of debate where the Mādhyamika could legitimately argue and compete with others. For this purpose, he even revised the rule of common establishment, although the Indian logicians seem not to have listened to him. It is certain that Candrakīrti, like his predecessor Bhāviveka, had to adapt to the demands of the day for the survival of the Madhyamaka tradition.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> In this regard, the following comments by MacDonald (2003: 174) offer valuable suggestions: "Candrakīrti, born into a period in which Dignāga's logic had become authoritative, himself erudite in the intricacies of logical procedure and well-versed in Dignāga's writings on the subject, was aware of the demands of the day and the threat, and his response to the challenge of Bhāviveka (...) must have served the secondary purpose of providing him with a platform from which to address and possibly preempt potential criticism from the logical-epistemological faction itself as regards the Madhyamaka logical procedure. Candrakīrti's partial acquiescence to Bhāviveka's demand for formal inferences was, like Bhāviveka's methodological renovations, a response to his intellectual environment; he was spurred by it to clarify the Madhyamaka argumentative methods – and in this way to bring them up to date -, to distinguish their employment from the prevailing mode of inferential debate, and to justify their deviations from Dignāga's rules."

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