The So-Called "English School" in International Relations, Its Concept of "International Society" and the Legacy of Colonial Rule

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Note: The table contains information about the researchers involved in the study.
The So-Called ‘English School’ in International Relations, Its Concept of ‘International Society’ and the Legacy of Colonial Rule

Harald KLEIN SCHMIDT

The so-called ‘English School’ of International Relations has been credited with having accomplished the conceptual distinction between the ‘international society’, understood as a ‘group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values..., bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and ... the working of common institutions’, and an ‘international system’, understood as a group of states interacting ‘in such a way that each of them has to take into account the capabilities and possible actions of at least one of the others’ and seen as manifest in the five ‘institutions’ of Great Power politics, the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and war.¹ ‘English School’ is not a term chosen by its alleged members, but it became so called externally in a critical, if not polemical review article by Roy E. Jones,² who censured a number of international relations theorists for applying theory to politics and neglecting the economic dimension of international relations. Among those theorists whom Jones attacked were core members of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, which developed at set of research projects and held regular meetings from 1959 to 1985 under the sponsorship of the Rockefeller Foundation. The Committee stood under the directorship first of Herbert Butterfield (1900–1979), historian at Cambridge until 1968, then of Martin Wight (1913–1972), historian successively at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the University of Sussex, then of Adam Watson, a diplomat venturing occasionally into

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academe, until 1978 and finally of Hedley Bull (1932–1985), political scientist at Oxford.\(^3\) Jones focused his attack on the work of Wight and Bull, although he also included authors such as Michael Donelan,\(^4\) F. S. Northedge\(^5\) and Robert Purnell\(^6\) for works which they had published mainly during the 1970s. The ‘English School’ thus received its name after some twenty-five years of the existence of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, within which the core of the definitions and ideas that Bull argued in *The Anarchical Society* had in fact been worked out. By the time the ‘English School’ came to be called ‘English School’, the centre of its activity had, however, moved from the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics to the London School of Economics and Political Science, where the core definitions and ideas informing the thought of the School found their way into the curriculum of International Relations as a field of study. While teaching at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Martin Wight, in 1961, asked the question: ‘What is international society’, suggesting that the debate existed then already.\(^7\) However, at that time, Wight did not provide an answer to the question. Instead, he restated his then already existing shaky orthodoxy according to which there were various

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distinct ways of formulating attitudes towards the international system. He called them 'traditions' and consociated them with the names of Machiavelli, Grotius and Locke as well as Kant.\textsuperscript{8} Shortly after Wight's remark, Charles Anthony Woodward Manning (1894–1978), incumbent of the first professorship in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (1930–1962), published a book, on which he claimed to have been working since the 1920s and which features 'international society' in its title.\textsuperscript{9} In this book, Manning became explicit in defining his concept of 'international society' as a society 'composed of states' and subject to some order. Manning declared his 'international society' variously as a 'notion' or as a 'metaphor', noted that admission to the 'international society' was conditional upon acceptance by its already existing members. Manning explicitly equated the 'international society' as he conceived it, with the 'family of nations' as a part of the ideology of colonial rule\textsuperscript{10} and, in full agreement with the positivist theory of international law at the turn of the twentieth century, flatly declared that the 'authority of the state derives not from international law'.\textsuperscript{11} It is therefore inappropriate to credit Hedley Bull

\footnotesize{8} Martin Wight, \textit{International Theory. The Three Traditions} [Lectures delivered to the London School of Economics and Political Science, repeatedly during the 1950s], edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Ernest Porter (Leicester, 1991).


\footnotesize{11} Charles Anthony Woodward Manning, 'The Legal Framework in a World of Change', in: Brian Ernest Porter, ed., \textit{The Aberystwyth Papers. International Politics. 1919–1969} (London, 1972), pp. 301–335, at p. 307. Heinrich Triepel, \textit{Völkerrecht und Landesrecht} (Leipzig, 1899) [new edn (Tübingen, 1907); reprint (Aalen, 1958); French version (Paris, 1920)]. Frederick Charles Hicks, \textit{The New World Order. International Organization, International Law, International Cooperation}. (New York, 1920), p. 13, already defined what he termed a (Society of Nations) in contradistinction against the League of Nations as an institution regulated by (a generally accepted body of international law) and operated through (a well-organized official means of intercourse for the ordinary relations of states, viz., the diplomatic service). Even before World War I, the Latin American jurist Alejandro Álvarez (1868–1960), \textit{La codification du droit international, ses tendences , ses bases} (Paris, 1912), p. 50, had similarly argued that what he then variously termed (the international community) (la communauté internationale) or (an international society) (une société internationale) was not just a simple aggregate of otherwise isolated states but was tied together by common interests and that there was reciprocal, economic, social and intellectual interdependence under the rule of law. These terms did then in the main comprise the club of American and European states, while excluding most states in Africa, South and Southeast Asia as well as the South Pacific. For reviews of the evidence see: Kleinschmidt, \textit{Geschichte} (note 10), pp. 387–392. Andreas L. Paulus, \textit{Die internationale}
with having kicked off debate about the ‘international society’, as Bull, who was Manning’s student, simply canonised the concept Manning and Wight had constructed as colleagues at the London School of Economics and Political science. Yet Bull, as his own contribution, did add to the existing body of thought his rigid conceptual distinction between ‘international society’ and ‘system of states’ as two alternative forms of cooperation among states. Contrary to Manning and Wight, Bull insisted that order could only be manifest within an ‘international society’ to the extent that he claimed, treaties by international law could not be manifest in an apparently unruly ‘system of states’ but only be regarded by their signatories as valid if and as long as these signatories were tied together in an ‘international society’. Bull’s ‘international Society’ thus was an exclusive club of states, even though he admitted, as a rival concept, something he called ‘world society’ as an entity ‘linking all parts of humanity’, while allegedly not shaped by common institutions, rules and values. However, Bull did not elaborate on his ‘world society’. Hence, rather than having invented the notion of ‘international society’, Bull shaped the early discourse of the ‘English School’ through his distinction between ‘international society’ and ‘international system’. He later induced the British Committee to dedicate its work to the problem of the “Expansion of International Society” from its alleged European origins to the globe at large. The Committee implemented Bull’s request and produced a volume on this topic in 1984, one year before Bull died and the Committee disbanded. It has remained controversial, however, whether and, if so, to what extent the ‘English School’ has ever been a school. Self-identification, a common interpretative approach and the acceptance of


13 Ibid., p. 279.
international theory as normative theory, the ‘guidelines’ that Tim Dunne has established for the identification of school members, have been vague and have remained controversial, mainly because the theorists subsumed into the ‘School’ never joined the same academic institution, never acted as joint supervisors of doctoral dissertations or as organisers of major research projects, with the consequence, that the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics remained the sole institutional component of the ‘English School’, and at weak one at that. Nevertheless, the name ‘English School’ has gained currency, so that the ‘School’ has featured at least in the jargon of international relations theory.

Bull defined his concept of ‘international society’ as a ‘society of states’ under a ‘common set of rules’ and accepting ‘common institutions’. The definition is tautological to the extent that Bull used the word ‘society’ both as a technical term, in conjunction with the attribute ‘international’, and as a non-technical term referring, if the conjecture is applicable that he thought of legal rules, to a group under the rule of law. Consequently, to Bull, ‘international society’ was governed by the law, simply because it was a society. In this respect, he took a view similar to Manning, who had already argued that ‘international society’ was governed by binding law and that the law governing members of the international society’ was binding because it was law. He then specified three rules appearing to be common to the members of an ‘international society’, the commitment to mutually accept the ‘independence’ of all members of the ‘international society’, to honour legal agreements as binding and to become subject to limitations regarding the use of force. The latter two rules are obviously not subject to any kind of legislation within any type of society. In a posthumously published text, Bull remained faithful to this conclusion in claiming that, within his concept of ‘international society’, the centrality of natural law, the universality of the institution and the respect for individuals as subjects to international law were core institutional assets of the ‘international society’ together with ‘solidarism in the enforcement of rules’ and the ‘absence

16 Dunne, Inventing (note 3), pp. 6–9.
of international institutions.’ However, Bull did not follow this line of argument in *The Anarchical Society*, where he struck thoroughly at the belief that international law could be associated with or even be seen as derived from natural law. In his rejection of the doctrine of natural law as irrelevant, Bull uncritically followed his teacher Manning, who had equally pointedly turned against the natural law doctrine, bluntly demanding that the ‘student should know now to listen very critically to anyone who thinks to persuade him that international law is essentially a form of “natural law”.’ Manning supported his rejection of the natural law doctrine with the claim that ‘in any modern civilized country’ law is ‘the invention of human achievement.’ This was, of course, a fundamental misunderstanding of any version of natural law doctrine. While Manning believed that adherents to the natural law doctrine should have assumed that nature created law, the doctrine centered on the assumption that law was by nature part of the world and thus could be used as a means to resist rulers’ acts of injustice and to demand transformations of statutory law. By contrast, Manning shared the erroneous view, widely spread during the 1930s, that the use of the natural law doctrine implied either the mutually exclusive, allegedly sinister intentions of either seeking to justify breaches of valid treaties or attempting to prevent seemingly required legal reforms.

The discrepancy between Bull’s commitment to the theory that international law was enforcible within ‘international society’ and his unfounded rejection of the natural law doctrine had serious consequences for his argument. First, he, like Manning, had to take for granted the binding force of law and, second, Bull prevented himself from the ability of arguing that his assumed order within the ‘international society’ was compatible with a universal moral order (that could have been based on natural law). Hence, Bull allowed for

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23 This discrepancy has been noted in A. Claire Cutler, ‘The “Grotian Tradition” in International Relations’, in: *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991), pp. 41–65, at pp. 53–58. René Jeffery,
the possibility of clashes between the rules he saw as enforcible upon member states of the ‘international society’ and a universal moral order. Put differently, the rules of ‘international society’ could stand against universal morality.\footnote{On this point see Paul Keal, \textit{European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Moral Backwardness of International Society} (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 92. (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 26–27.} This is an important point of criticism, because Dunne has insisted that the value of ‘English School’ thought as represented in Bull’s work\footnote{Bull, \textit{Society} (note 1), pp. 21–22.} should have been underpinned by ‘moral universalism’, namely the demand that moral priority should be given to goals for humankind as a whole over goals beneficial for states.\footnote{Dunne, \textit{Inventing} (note 3), pp. 145–146. Hidemi Suganami, ‘The Argument of the English School’, in: Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, \textit{The English School of International Relations. A Contemporary Reassessment} (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 102) (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 43–80, at p. 65.} As this claim is unfounded, a central distinctive feature of ‘English School’ thought is simply absent.

Moreover, Bull misread Wight’s didactical reductions, wherein the names of Machiavelli, Grotius and Kant were no more than catchwords to attract students’ attention, as manifestations of some actual thought patterns of the past. Bull assumed that these apparent thought patterns would lend themselves to objective analysis. However, Wight, who, somewhat misleadingly, referred to these thought patterns as the ‘three traditions’ of international theory, treated them as labels without wishing to imply that there were necessary continuities that linked all or at least some major aspects of the work of authors like Machiavelli, Grotius or Kant to the present time. Yet Bull postulated precisely this, specifically for Grotius, namely that this author had articulated some long-standing truths that Bull, in his own time, felt justified to use for his own theorising.\footnote{Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in: Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., \textit{Diplomatic Investigations} (London, 1966), pp. 51–73 [reprinted in: Bull, \textit{Hedley Bull on International Society}, edited by Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; and New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 95–124]. Bull, ‘Hobbes and International Anarchy’, in: \textit{Social Research} 48 (1981) [reprinted in: Bull, \textit{Hedley Bull on International Society}, edited by Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke and New York, 2000)]. Bull, Importance (note 20), pp.} While admitting that
none of Wight’s alleged three traditions would by itself suffice to provide a model for world politics in general,\(^{28}\) Bull was specifically attracted by what Wight had termed ‘Rationalism’ and credited Grotius, its alleged main representative, with having cherished the idea of some ‘international society’ as the institutional source for order maintained through international law. In doing so, Bull implanted words into the text of Grotius’s *De iure belli ac pacis libri tres*, which this work does not contain. Bull fathered upon Grotius the phrase of some ‘society of states’ where Grotius used the words ‘magna illius universitatis’ when articulating the demand that legal rules should be respected when they are not just for the use of single states but of general use.\(^{29}\) The phrase ‘great society of states’ occurs only in the English version of the work first issued in 1913. Bull further claimed that some ‘central Grotian assumption is that of the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states comprising international society’. Needless to say that Bull neither did nor could adduce any passage in Grotius’s work in support for this claim. In taking his stance, Bull sharply rejected the then existing meaning of the term ‘Grotian tradition’, arguing that this meaning was too broad.\(^{30}\) As Lauterpacht had forcefully argued,\(^{31}\) Grotius had positioned the law of nature as one


source for the law of nations above the entirety of states and had argued that the law of nature would even be the supreme source of law if a divine creator agent would not exist. Bull thus misread Grotius. Against these odds, Bull had instant success with his claim to such an extent that the allegedly ‘Grotian’ concept of ‘international society could have become credited with a ‘unique character’ as a ‘particular conception’ of the ‘English School’. For evidence on his concept of the ‘international society’, Bull, however, drew, not on Grotius, but heavily on his reading of Wight’s work. He invoked an institution or set of institutions that appeared to be responsible for imposing and maintaining some degree of order in the otherwise seemingly anarchical ‘international society’, and specified the maintenance of the allegedly self-equilibrating ‘balance of power’, the enforcement of international law, the generation of rules for the conduct of diplomacy, the enforcement of rules for the conduct of war and the management of inter-state relations through what appeared to Bull as the labours of the ‘Great Powers’. Bull thus, like Manning and Wight, posited the ‘international society’ as constructed, while equipping it with objectively existing social units manifest in some institutions ‘out there’, rather than exclusively as categories of perception. Bull, like Wight, was aware of earlier theoretical propositions of a concept of ‘international society’, such as Paulus Vladimiri in the fifteenth and Christian Wolff in the eighteenth century. But Wight as well as Bull, nevertheless, discarded these propositions as purely ‘conceptual’ or simply ‘fiction’, as these propositions did not appear to have led to the establishment of international institutions. In short, Bull’s concept of ‘international society’

32 Grotius, De iure (note 29), Prolegomena, nr 8–11, 17–18.
rested on the paradoxical claim that international society’ was a construct that could be manifest in real-world institutions ‘out there’, even though these ‘institutions’ were not necessarily to be identified with international organisations such as the League of Nations or the UN family. The claim that the concept of ‘international society’ had already been present in the work of Grotius, militated against Bull’s acknowledgement that Grotius was essentially a natural law thinker, who would not be able to admit that the foundations of what he termed the law of war and peace could be established within human society. As a natural law thinker, Grotius, for one, took for granted the universal validity of natural law as a given in the world, while Wight and Bull struggled with their conception of ‘international society’ as the construct of a law-creating social units limited in space, of which one, the so-called ‘Western’ ‘international society’ could have been expanded across the globe. The problem that this process of expansion could violate universal moral rules and thereby create a disturbing legacy of immoral and illegal action, did not bother them. As Bull did not take into consideration Grotius’ legal theories, but used Wight’s didactical reductions about international theories, he mistook Wight’s construct of the ‘three traditions’ of international theory for an empirical element of the past. In doing so, he fathered upon Grotius his own concept of ‘international society’ and then used his own misreading of Wight’s reading of Grotius to derive this concept from Grotius. Subsequent ‘English School’ theorists have followed Bull’s lead.

Bull sought to revise the terminology of International Relations by claiming that an ‘international system’ could principally exist anywhere in the world and at any time, provided only that states existed. In doing so, he opposed Wight, who had committed himself to the view that what he termed ‘systems of states’ were each equipped with a distinct cultural homogeneity, maintained by some inherent balance of power and had occurred at various times and places in the history of humankind, specifically in Ancient China, the Hellenic world and the so-called ‘Western’ world, whereby Wight ignored the

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38 For this point see Keal, Conquest (note 24), pp. 24–25, 30.
ancient Sumerian state system. Moreover, Wight constructed his concept of ‘international society’ as a system of states on the basis of Hobbesian myths of the ‘state of nature’, even claiming that the question what a system of states was, should be considered as equivalent of asking what the ‘state of nature’ was. By contrast, Bull postulated that the ‘international society’ of the nineteenth and the twentieth century was unique and culturally specific, had originated in Europe and ‘expanded’ beyond the confines of Europe exclusively through the efforts of European governments since the latter part of the nineteenth century. The mechanisms of the alleged ‘expansion’ of the ‘international society’, which Bull presented as a success story, were, according to Bull, ‘entry’ or ‘admission’ through agreement by the ‘society’s’ members, acts that occurred rarely during the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth century.

Bull gleaned evidence for this historical account of the alleged ‘expansion’ of the ‘international society’ largely from the few published articles of Martin Wight, manuscripts of Wight’s unpublished papers read to the British Committee and the manuscript notes for Wight’s lectures delivered to the London School of Economics and Political Sciences during the 1950s, but did little scrutiny of historical sources by himself. Because of the narrowness of his source base, Bull overlooked the fact that his construct of the ‘international society’ was virtually identical (except for the word) with the construct of the

42 Bull, Emergence (note 37), p. 120.
'legal community’, concocted by public lawyers on the basis of Hegelian creeds late in the nineteenth century as a ‘community of intercourse’, into which admission was to be granted by members and which provided for the generation of international legal rules. In the jargon of international law of the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth century, this ‘legal community’ often appeared under the slogan of the ‘family of nations’.

There were three venues linking these international theories with theorists of the ‘English School’. One was through the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), in which Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889–1975) produced not only his massive A Study of History (1934–1961) with a comparative survey of 23 so-called ‘civilizations’, but also an equally substantial Survey of International Affairs, most of which he wrote himself in the years between 1923 and the later 1930s. Wight was Toynbee’s collaborator for some volumes of the Survey. In the volume dealing with the Briand-Kellogg-Pact to outlaw war of 1928, Toynbee ascribed exclusively to what he then variously termed ‘Western Society’ or ‘Western civilization’ an aptitude for social organization which allegedly did not exist elsewhere in the world. Wight seconded with the observation that in what he then called ‘the international system’, there was not merely an ‘uneven distribution of power’, but also some principle of communal ‘democratic politics’, according to which power varied inversely with acceptance of responsibility for maintaining the international system. It was, thus, according to Toynbee and Wight, only the allegedly ‘Western civilization’ that could provide sufficient ‘social organization’ to ‘maintain’ the ‘international system’ over the world at large. Toynbee’s idea that what he called ‘civilizations’ were culturally homogeneous social units,

formed the base for Wight’s concept of the system of states, which he, although using Samuel von Pufendorf’s term for inter-state alliances, redefined as a club of states joined together through common diplomatic service, the occurrence of congresses and conferences, a common diplomatic jargon and the intensity of trade relations. Bull referred to this club of states as ‘international society’ and added the set of five ‘institutions’ as its assets.

The second venue was through the London School of Economics and Political Science, where Wight’s colleague Manning, having received some basic training in ‘jurisprudence’, made it clear that this ‘international system’ was a ‘society of states’ or an ‘international society’, to which, he felt, reference could be made ‘as the “family of nations”’, whose members would decide about its rules and which he also credited with having originated in Europe. To Manning, ‘international society’ was a ‘metaphorical’ phrase, albeit one that, to him, was equivalent of a productive ‘myth’, helpful, he thought, for the maintenance of international order. It was mythical, he argued, because ‘international society’ was ‘neither international not strictly a society’. It was not truly international because, according to Manning, it was not global; and it was not quite the same as a society of persons because the states it comprised were persons ‘not in fact but only in point of theory’. Yet it was a ‘phenomenon presupposed by the very possibility of a functioning system of international law’, not just a felt obligation to engage into commitments for the world at large. Following nineteenth-century legal theory, Manning equipped his ‘international society’ with the capability of making international law, categorising the ‘international society’ at this juncture as a ‘quasi-community of states’ because, he insisted, states were ‘notions’ and could, by consequence, not be joined together into a real community. Manning, like

51 Wight, Systematibus (note 40), pp. 16–17.
53 Manning, Nature (note 9), pp. 43–44.
54 Ibid., pp. X, 27, 168.
55 Ibid., p. X.
56 Ibid., pp. 42–43.
nineteenth-century legal theorists, also maintained that states as members of the ‘international society’ as a ‘quasi-community’ would have to agree on accepting as binding the legal system governing the ‘society’, while the binding force of this very agreement was to be part of the legal system accepted as binding.\(^\text{58}\) Manning expected that some situationally generated inevitability, rather than being dictated by ‘that mythical “natural law”’, would drive states into his ‘international society’ and subject themselves to the ‘society’s’ rules,\(^\text{59}\) even when they did not have a common culture, and thus envisaged his Europe-centered ‘international society’ as a possible platform for the creation of a future ‘society of all mankind’.\(^\text{60}\) He did so in agreement with practicing British lawyers, such as Clarence Wilfred Jenks (1909–1973), who then held a leading position at the International Labor Office in Geneva. Jenks believed that ‘the great majority of the newer countries will accept the established rules of international law as a common heritage’, insisting that these ‘common rules’ were European in origin and would form the platform for the competing ‘Latin American, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, Chinese, Japanese, African and Soviet legal systems’. In taking this stance, Jenks professed to the creeds of interwar functionalism as a theory of integration that would ultimately establish binding rules for global relations among states and, beyond these rules, allow the formation of some form of world government. Some interwar period theorists of international law shared these creeds seeking to fuse with the general international law of European provenance the manifestly existing regional frameworks of international law, made up of rules with their validity being restricted to continents, parts of continents or so-called ‘schools’ of thought. These theorists, who referred to their approach under the label of ‘regionalism’, used the phrase ‘international society’ (société international) as a term for the club of states accepting the general international law of European provenance, which they chose to credit with ‘universal’ validity. Manning’s and Jenks’s diction thus echoed interwar debates about the possibilities to fuse universalism and particularism into a general theory of international law that was to be compatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations as the institutional manifestation of the ‘international society’.\(^\text{61}\) Bull later radicalised this diction by claiming that ‘the formerly European

\(^{\text{58}}\) Ibid., p. 104.


\(^{\text{60}}\) Ibid., pp. 177–178.

international society has become a global one’, even though its members would no longer be committed to making joint efforts at maintaining the institutions that Bull set for his ‘international society’ by definition. The conceptual relationship between this purportedly global ‘international society’ and the ‘world society’ he had also sketched, has remained unspecified.\(^\text{62}\)

The third venue was through the reception by US historian Adda Bruemmer Bozeman (1908–?) of Baltic descent, who claimed that only the ‘West’ featured a culture where states could be regarded as subject to the rule of law and that this allegedly ‘Western’ ‘configuration’ should be accepted as a required condition for the enforcibility of the law.\(^\text{63}\) Bozeman’s ‘configuration’ is just a rephrasing in historical diction of the ‘community of the law’ invented by international lawyers at the turn of the twentieth century. Bull referred to Bozeman as having built the ground for the conceptualisation of his ‘international society’.\(^\text{64}\)

Thus, already before Bull took up his pen to write about ‘international society’, the phrase and the concept were in use in the British intellectual community and there it was filled with ideas that at first, nineteenth-century jurists had generated about the need to have law made exclusively within ‘legal communities’. By consequence, at the level above the sovereign states, international law could only arise from some ‘international society’, whose members were sovereign states. These theorists argued a ‘dualistic’ theory about international law, suggesting that international law was a distinct category of law, which originated from the agreement of the state members of the ‘international society’ to have that law and to enforce it through their domestic institutions of legislation and government.

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64 Bull, Third World (note 62), p. 28.
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal theorists, both of state public and of international law, referred to this ‘society’ as the ‘family of nations’. They also insisted that the ‘family of nations’ was under the rule of law and adduced as evidence what they took to be the empirical finding that order among the states did exist. The ‘family of nations’ as the ‘international society’ thus appeared as a ‘society sui generis’, ordered and yet not subject to common institutions of government. Like social scientists of the 1920s, Manning used the ‘dualistic’ theory of international law to conceptualise his ‘international society’ in contradistinction against state societies, and has therefore wrongly been credited with having initialised the structural study of anarchy. At the London School of Economics and Political Science, Bull was a student not only of Wight, but also of Manning, whose employment of the ‘dualistic’ theory of international law he followed. And while Bull seems to have been emotionally attached to Wight, he did keep a friendly relationship also with Manning, sufficient to allow him to contribute a article on ‘international order’ to a festchrift for Manning and later included this article into his Anarchical Society.

Like late nineteenth-century public and international lawyers, Toynbee, Wight, Manning and Bull assumed that the law-generating and order-maintaining capacity of the ‘international society’ should not and could not be derived from natural law, which they chastised as purely speculative, allegedly without ‘foundation in the will or consent of political communities throughout the world’. Instead, Bull insisted that law and order in the ‘international society’ had to be based on positive and affirmative government action in states that were already, in Bull’s view, members of the ‘international society’. Without knowledge of the historical background of his concept of ‘international society’, however, Bull failed to recognise that this concept like that of the ‘family of nations’ was deeply rooted in the ideologies of European colonial rule and, thereby, part of a dubious legacy.

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67 Suganami, Argument (note 26), p. 49.
70 Bull, Emergence (note 37), p. 120.
71 Ibid., pp. 123–124.
Manning himself was part of this legacy. Born in Cape Town, he committed himself to justifying apartheid in the Union of South Africa and to calling into question UN sanctions against South Africa, in his capacity as President of the London-based South Africa Society, albeit in published statements only after his retirement from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Without any scruples, he used the ideology-laden concept of ‘civilized states’, for which international lawyers at the turn of the twentieth century reserved membership in the ‘family of nations’, as late as in 1975 and thus bequeathed to the ‘English School’ a colonialist terminology for the concept of the ‘international society’ essentially being an adaptation of the colonialist concept of the ‘family of nations’. In recent years, however, Manning’s impact has declined. A volume celebrating 75 years of international relations teaching at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Manning no longer was the object of hero worship and the volume did not dedicate an article to him, while Bull received one. While refraining from using the phraseology of ‘civilized states’ and the ‘family of nations’, Bull did refer to Lassa Francis Oppenheim (1858–1919), who was the grand priest of the concept of the ‘family of nations’ among international lawyers at the turn of the twentieth century and familiar with the contemporary German discussions of ‘dualistic’ conception of international law. Bull used Oppenheim’s work as the source for his view that the rules governing his ‘international society’ would have to be created within that society and not derived from natural law. Bull erroneously attributed to Grotius Oppenheim’s ‘dualistic’ theory of international law. He restated this erroneous creed explicitly as valid for what he gave out as ‘Contemporary International Law’ in his *The Anarchical Society*, adducing Oppenheim as an author whose work appeared to...
provide testimony for the alleged structure of ‘international society’ of the late twentieth century. Moreover, through his idiosyncratic distinction between a conservative ‘pluralist’ and a progressive ‘solidarist’ perception of ‘international society’, the latter unjustly fathered upon Grotius, Bull recast into his own terms the obsolete rivalry between positivist and natural law explications of the sources of international law, looming large at the turn of the twentieth century. Thus, although he admitted that there were minor differences in the various conceptualisations of ‘international society’, specifically with regard to the extent of the binding force of its rules, between Grotius and Oppenheim, Bull did nothing more than translate into a seemingly politically correct language the conceptual legacy of the colonialist ideology of the ‘family of nations’ and concocted from it his concept of ‘international society’.

These colonialist ideologies sought to restrict the recognition of the legal personality of states (implying the recognition of subjectivity by international law) to those few states that had somehow already become members of the ‘family of nations’, while purporting to justify the exclusion of large numbers of population groups in Africa, Asia and the South Pacific. Like these ideologies, constituting the ‘family of nations’ as an essentially European club of states, the concept of ‘international society’ appeared as of exclusively European origin in Bull’s making. Like the public and international lawyers at the turn of the twentieth century, Bull filled the concept of ‘international society’ up with European values, which he, like them, thought, were to be imposed on the world at large. In this myopic perspective, Bull not only overlooked the significant contributions to the generation of internationalism elsewhere in the world, but also contradicted his own later admission that ‘[n]ormative principles that lie at the basis of the international society of modern Europe (the immunity of envoys; pacta sunt servanda; respect for boundaries) were deeply respected ‘among African as among other pre-literate peoples’. Most importantly, he failed to recognise the fact that the imposition of European perceptions of the world and its political order

79 Bull, Society (note 1), p. 139.
80 Akira Irie [= Iriye], Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore and London, 1997).
destroyed other, then existing competing perceptions, most notably in East Asia.  

Bull denied the concept of ‘state’ to the states of pre-colonial Africa and, as a person born in Australia, in all seriousness argued that the European colonial conquest and suppression was justified because Europeans had there merely occupied ‘sparsely inhabited lands’, an argument that was directly identical with Oppenheim’s justification of European colonial rule. There was neither a purposeful, rationally conducted process of the ‘expansion’ of European ‘international society’ across the globe, nor was this ‘expansion’ a success story of the seemingly voluntary acceptance of the purportedly European ‘institutions’ that Bull positioned into his concept of ‘international society’. Instead, the making of the concepts of the ‘family of nations’ and its sequel, the concept of the ‘international society’ resulted directly from the imposition of colonial suppression.  

Therefore, neither Bull nor other authors associated with the ‘English School’ could have ‘invented’ the concept of the ‘international society’ but did simply bring back into the International Relations discourse a deeply questionable intellectual tool that had been used in vain attempts to legitimise colonial rule. Recent revisionist contributions to theories enshrined in the ‘English School’ paradigm have, it is true, have sought to supplement Bull’s theorising by insisting that his concept of the ‘international society’ is too narrow and needs to be supplemented by the broader and less ideology-laden concept of ‘world society’ as the agent solely capable of legitimising states as sovereigns in the ‘international system’. They have also demanded that ‘English School’ authors should specify the conceptual relationship between ‘international society’ and ‘world society’, address the problem of the tension between Bull’s rival concepts of conservative and progressive perceptions of ‘international society’, devote more attention to the regional level of international relations, present a more straightforward classification of types of ‘international society’ and focus on the conceptualisation of ‘world society’ as an overarching framework conveying, among other

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83 Bull, European States (note 81), p. 111.  
84 For criticisms of this approach see Keal, *European Conquest* (note 24), pp. 29, 31, who, however, does not discuss the colonialist legacy of the concept of ‘international society’ but limits himself to investigating the institutional legacy.
things, sovereignty to states. Moreover, claims have emerged that the concept of the 'international system', much chastised by Bull, should be given more weight in analyses of international relations. Also, Edward Keene has linked the concept of ‘civilisation’ with ideologies of colonial expansion, which he described as the process of the imposition of European domination over the colonial dependencies. Likewise, Paul Keal has pointed towards five major 'English School' theory deficits which he perceives as causes of discontent with the concept of 'international society', namely the lack of an answer to the question, 'who decides the common good' of 'international society'; the prioritising of order between states to questions of justice within states; the lack of awareness that individuals, as Keal thinks, need international legal personality against the states of whose nationality or citizenship they have; full awareness of the fact that 'international society' has expanded from Europe and has excluded non-Europeans; and the need to ascertain the moral basis of 'international society' as well as of states as its members. Keal has also powerfully argued that the expansion of 'international society' concurred with processes of the 'dispossession' of the victims of colonial rule, thereby creating a 'political and moral legacy of conquest', takes a genuinely constructivist position by looking at the specific cultural patterns


information regional international systems that existed in various parts of the world before the superimposition of European colonial rule and the globalisation of European International Society, and argues that the validity of norms wanes under the conditions of system expansion. Last but not least, Martha Finnemore as well as Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami have noted various methodological shortcomings of ‘English School’ theorising, claiming that ‘English School’ authors lack theory orientation and should position the ‘School’ unequivocally in either a ‘nomothetic’ or an ‘ideographic’ approach to scientific research, while arguing that ‘English School authors appear to avoid making this choice. Much of the criticism has, however, been apologetic rather than touching upon the core issue of the origin of the concepts informing ‘English School’ thought. When Jones correctly notes that Wight’s celebrated ‘three traditions’ are not well attested in primary sources, Suganami doubts that ‘the argument of the Jones article has ever been taken seriously and even ridicules Jones as a ‘Welshman writing from Cardiff’. Suganami, moreover, follows an earlier apologetic position in treating Bull as an infallible saint and minimises even gross misunderstandings and contradictions. When, for example, Bull argues at one point of *The Anarchical Society* that in his ‘international society’ order can exist without rules, and at another point claims that rule-enforcing institutions of ‘international society’ are required for the maintenance of order, Suganami tries to rescue Bull with the unifying remark that, according to Bull, both the rules and institutions go together in contributing ‘causally to the achievement of “the elementary or primary goals of the society of states”’. Or when Martha Finnemore complains that ‘English School’ authors lack explicitly stated theory, Suganami tries to rescue the entire ‘School’ with the argument that ‘School’ authors have professed to the ‘self-identification’ with the so-called ‘Grotian’ or ‘Rationalist tradition’ in contradistinction against the so-called ‘Realist’ and ‘Revolutionary’ traditions, while ignoring the fact that these traditions flew from Wight’s mind rather than

95 Wilson, English School (note 17), p. 53.
Likewise, Keal, although outspoken in his critique of colonialist strategies and their implementation through European government action, apologetically claims that through ‘the power relations inherent in [the distortions of mutual understanding and knowledge of the colonial suppressors and the victims of colonialism], the identity of the [victims’] other is either submerged or lost’. But European colonial governments actively and purposefully destroyed the collective identity of the victims of their rule, rather than looking at how these identities were ‘lost’. By contrast, critics have not shown awareness of the problematic history of the concept of ‘international society’ itself, namely that this concept is, except for the words, identical with the colonial concept of the ‘family of nations’, while the well-known despotic elements of colonialism have been left unnoticed alike by ‘English School’ authors and their critics. Their claims and criticisms, nevertheless, are equivalent of the demand that essentials of Bull’s theories about the ‘international society’ should be revoked. There is, thus, not only little English about ‘the English School’ but the ‘School’ has, for too long a time, carried on a worrisome legacy of colonialist thought through Bull’s theories.

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97 Suganami, English School (note 39), pp. 82, 101.