A New Possible Approach to Information Society: Where Do the "Imaginative" Objects and the "Real" Objects Meet Together?

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I. A metaphorical Introduction

1.1 Kurosawa's movies and the Miyazaki's animation movies

Akira Kurosawa, a famous movie director, passed away about 5 years ago. His movies have influenced the movies fans all over the world as well as in his home country and to be frankly I have been one of his fans since I saw his attractive film "Tubaki Sanjuro" at a movie theater in Ueno, Tokyo. "Tubaki Sanjuro" was the first Kurosawa's movie I saw at the movie theaters and for the 8 years old boy the most parts of the contents of the drama were beyond comprehension. In spite of the difficulty in grasping the concrete contents the film was very impressive and attractive. Even in the 8 years old boy mind the inexplicable attractiveness of his movie has remained since that time. 17 years later, I had a chance to see his new movie "Kagemusha", somewhere downtown, Tokyo. My impression was something quite contrary to my first Kurosawa's movie. The comprehension of the drama was maybe perfect but the impression of that film was almost nothing and honestly disappointing. The attractive atmosphere that once surrounded his films in monochrome colors disappeared from his new colored movie.

In my intuitive impression something similar have happened everywhere in this country's situation relative to movie creation and appreciation. The majority of applauded Japanese movies were monochrome color movies. Ozu's films and Mizoguchi's films were mostly monochrome color movies. What has ever disappeared from Japanese films just on account of trivial change in color?

Hayao Miyazaki, a recently celebrated animation film producer and creator, once told his honest impression towards Kurosawa's films change in terms of quality. "In Kurosawa's movies in color something crucial has disappeared. Kurosawa has never succeeded in making excellent tasted colored movies like the other Japanese film makers". 

Miyazaki's explanation was clear and suggestive. According to his remarks, since the time of appearance of colored film in Japanese movies, we have lost the appropriate way of portraying the nature that is/was behind the film or we have never found a new way of making pictures in the total atmosphere that once surrounded the men and the nature or even society. This explanation was ambiguous academically but at the same time suggestive intuitionally, because this explanation is very close to the feelings that we often have when comparing Miyazaki's anime, "Sen to Chihiro no kamikakushi" for example to Kurosawa's relatively later color movies.

Again, what has ever disappeared from Japanese films just on account of trivial change in color? Or perhaps we can put this in another way more properly: what has disappeared from
our total life since that time, in the 1950's or 1960's. In my own view, it is (intuitively) clear that the disappearance of quality in Japanese movies happened almost in the same period of change of "Leben im Information-zeitalter." By the term "Leben im Information-zeitalter", I want to refer to the beginning of our new way of living in which we have began to live a isolated life from people, nature, or "Mitwelt" at the expense of comforts of material life, temporally gained subjective freedom, abundance of information in the misunderstood Shannon's meaning. (As I try to explain later, it seems that these phenomena are true only in the facial level of living and in the depth level we still live in the not-isolated world. But anyway, it is clear that the "horizons of meaning" has changed in some crucial ways at this time.)

1.2 What and how is "Information-zeitalter"? : the purpose of this paper

What I have tried to do in my pervious papers/books and also in this paper is to explain and understand the relationships of our various aspects of life in "Information-zeitalter." (This German term has such subtle meaning as "abundance of information but scarcity of meaning", so the translation of this term is difficult. When we try to translate this term into "information life" or something, the subtle meaning is not there any more because of the implicit and mechanistic meaning of "information" itself.)

In this article, I intend to put the problems and themes I have analyzed and considered in my previously papers for years into the somewhat different schema which might be explained adequately when using the term "Kankeitai (gestalt situation)", "Imi-no-deai (meeting events)" or "Jyocho-sonzaiรณ (information ontology)." In simple words all these terms are the ones that are relative to the horizon/horizons of meaning. Our attitudes towards the information studies are fundamentally quite contrary to those derived from the mechanistic or reductionism way of thinking that is typical of the scholars such as Daniel Bell. Bell's comrades often intend to say that in this world the objects or matters are mutually isolated (i.e. mechanistic way of world view) or that the matters or incidents in this world are in the relationship based on the mechanistic laws or in the causal relationship. In this paper, we want to present a quite different view on this world: The matters or objects in this world are tied with each other with the "meaning." In this sense our attitudes towards the world are similar as ontological attitudes, if we understand the term "ontology" as something with broader meaning than that originally presented by Martin Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit". In the case of Heidegger's ontological world, the matters or objects are tied with each other with "meaning". But this "meaning" means something with somewhat ego-centered tendency, just as a Japanese writer tried to point out the presence of "desire-related schema of meaning" in the center of Heidegger's ontological speculation. It seems that each person has his/her own "desire-related schemata of meaning", so in our world the relationship of "desire-related schemata of meaning" or encounter of multiple levels of ontological attitudes seems to be more important than his/her even autistic schema. In short, we want to focus our attention on the interrelated schemata of meaning rather than isolated schema of meaning. We can not deny that at this present stage of
struggle with the new development of “information ontology” our terminologies and the ways of thinking are rather confused than might be expected by people or scholars interested in the “Leben im Information-zeitalter.” But this struggle has just begun in the middle of technocentered “Information-zeitalter”. We need more time, more speculation, or even more experience of old and new “Leben im Information-zeitalter.”

II. Differences of aspects and differences of schemata of meaning

2.1 Imi no deal (meeting of meanings, objects)

Getting back to decline of quality of our movies, a critic tries to present a simple and suggestive explanation about this matter. According to his explanation, Fuji film has been the major problem; Fuji film is not a good device or portrayal material that enables the movie producers to represent or present the atmosphere or background of movies which is indispensable when trying to put the low materials such as people, landscape, objects, cities and towns, hills and rivers into the schema of unified space, i.e. related (or designed) arrangement of position.

If we can set this hypothesis into the broader context of problems, it seems that we can get some useful suggestions with which we would be able to come out of a confusion of meaning in the information society. The term “related arrangement of position” is apparently the key term or concept that we need when trying to find the core point of information theories derived from mechanistic way of thinking, because no “arrangement of position” of matters seems to be the most prominent characteristic of these theories. In another way, in the case of those theories, reductionism is a typical attitude towards the world where isolated matters exist regardless of human intention, desires, direction of sight or “arrangement of position of meaning.”

2.2 Meanings outside reductionism

Being figuratively expressed, “arrangement of position” means “meeting of meanings”, and in its turn, this figuratively used expression takes us to somewhere suggested or discussed in the books of Kurt Goldstein, Michel Foucault, Merleau-Ponty or a Japanese scholar Wataru Hiromatsu. In short, these authors have a common interest in, “arrangement of position of meanings or objects” or the place of meetings of meanings, although they used different words of their own terminology in their books or papers.

“The place of meetings (of meanings)” is apparently the key concept in both Foucault’s “Les mots et les choses” and Goldstein’s writings relative to aphasia. “The lost common place relative to place and name” in Foucault’s “Les mots et les choses” is considered as the matter of difficulty of “Kategorialen Verhalten” in Goldstein’s writings and the latter refers to “difficulty in grasping the fundamental aspect from a given process or situation” or “lack of ability of dealing with something merely imaginative or possible” in more concrete words. In another way of expression, it is the “the place of meetings (of meanings)” that the both authors tries to pay their attention on.
"The place of meetings of meanings or objects" is also the key problem in the case of certain scholars of phenomenology, if we translate the particular jargon of phenomenology into our own self-made words that we have presented for the purpose of getting the hidden common way of thinking among the superficially different academic disciplines. A Japanese scholar of phenomenology Junichi Murata uses the term "aspects", "pairing of subjects" or "structuring of subjects" with the intention of explaining the similar situation as "meetings of meaning or objects" of our schema. One of examples that Murata cites in his book is the problem of way of seeing the colors. (The examples Murata cites in his book are often those presented in Merleau-Ponty's books or the authors of phenomenology or Gestalt school of psychology.) Murata's example (also Merleau-Ponty's example) is such that; the color of brown doesn't exist in this world that is viewed from the reductionism way of thinking, because the color of brown doesn't have the given spectrum of light. In terms of the spectrum of light, the color of brown is the same as the color of yellow.

According to Murata (also Merleau-Ponty), the color of brown exists only on terms of "pairing of subjects", i.e. the color of brown is the color of yellow that is surrounded by the brighter light than the brightness of yellow itself. After presenting this example or the similar examples in the related chapter, Murata tries to point out the contradictory assumption that lies under the mechanistic way of thinking or the reductionism view of perception theory. What Murata intends to say in this respect is that the direction of sight is the essential matter that determines "pairing of subjects" or "structuring of subjects" and that the way of seeing the subjects fundamentally depends on these "pairing of subjects" or "structuring of subjects". It seems that Murata has a similar attitude towards the meaning of the world as our one in that he clearly refuses the meaning of the world with no "meeting of meanings or objects".

2.3 Where do the bright light and the dark light meet each other?

According to Murata, "pairing of subjects" or "structuring of subjects" determine the way of seeing the subjects or the appearance of subjects. This hypothesis is without doubt a new step towards dissolving the confused situation related with reductionism, but some crucial problems remain still unsolved, i.e. "do the subjects themselves change following the change of direction of sight?", "do only the way of outward appearance of the subjects change in this situation?" I think that we need certain kind of imaginative experiment or "freie Variation" within our own schema for the purpose of getting the proper answer to this question. Figure 1 is the object for this imaginative experiment.

Figure 1 shows a perspective view of a rectangular cube in the shape of something like dice or Japanese tofu. The characteristic of this figure is the change of outward appearance of the subject. At the first moment of perception of this subject, this subject is a dice but suddenly the appearance of this subjects transforms into another appearance. After and before this transform of appearance a dice is a dice, while the appearance of this same dice completely changes. The bottom of dice suddenly transforms into a side and in accord with this change the total shape of the dice changes. And to our surprise, the subject (the subject who perceives this cube or the
imagined subject who is considered to be watching this cube) $\beta$ changes his/her direction of sight from upside to the left at the same moment of change of the shape of a dice.

What can we get through this imaginative experiment? It is clear that we can not answer to the question, whether the objects themselves change or whether only the outward appearance of the objects changes, because in the case of Figure 1 or in the similar cases perhaps we can not separate the appearance of the object from the object itself. In a sense, the object itself or the "Wesen (essence)" of the object exists nowhere. And in another sense, the object itself exists somewhere in the imaginative field.

The phenomenon that the direction of sight of the subject $\beta$ changes with the change of the appearance of the object is indeed stimulating. And we can add a few interesting findings to this phenomenon. The subject $\alpha$ is watching the phenomenon that the direction of sight of the subject $\beta$ changes. If it were not for the existence of the subject $\alpha$ or this dual situation of the subject this phenomenon doesn't exists. The subject $\alpha$ is watching the phenomenon in the continuation of time. Figure 1 is not a substance but a process because this figure or the experience of seeing this figure exists in the continuation of time. The subject $\alpha$ is not my private subject nor the unique subject only for myself because you and he/she as well as myself can experience the role of the subject $\alpha$, i.e. the subject $\alpha$ is a universal subject. In other words, the subject $\alpha$ is a sort of intersubjective subject.

After this imaginative experiment we can realize that an important question remains untouched in Murata's book. "Where do two different kinds of light, bright and dark, meet each other?" At this stage of our understanding about this phenomenon we can not present anything crucial except for the few findings through our imaginative experiment we did a few moments ago. In the case of Murata's example, such factors or matters are indispensable as the two kinds of light, "pairing of rays of light", the subject $\beta$, the subject $\alpha$ and the continuation of time.

![Figure 1](image-url)
2.4 Can we see a picture only after the "meeting of objects"?

As Figure 1 shows, it is not so easy to distinguish the object itself from the appearance of the object, because any object needs some kinds of outward appearance when it appears in the "real" situation included human "real" sight. And on the other hand, this "real" sight is not necessarily a sufficient condition, if this "real" sight does not have a "imaginative" tie with the "Wesen" of the object. The "fact" known as constancy phenomenon (perceptual constancy) shows us that the object of our "real" perception is a combination of "real" and imaginative aspects of an object. A regular square figured on a paper has many aspects when it is watched from various viewpoints. It is a rectangular, a rhombus, a parallelogram and also a regular square, but which is the "real" object? This phenomenon tells us that we cannot say what is a "real" object nor what is an "imaginative" object regardless of the context or situation in which this object is located. This context or situation includes various factors such as "real" space, "imaginative" space, time, the subject \( \beta \), the subject \( \alpha \), direction of "real" sight, direction of "imaginative" sight and so on, and it is clear that the "meaning" of an object or even the "definition" of an object depends totally on the sets or composition of these factors, i.e. "aspects". So regardless of consideration of aspects, we can not say whether a yellow lemon on the screen of television is a yellow lemon or whether it is just a combination of red and green luminous points on the screen. Aspects determine the meaning or the definition of the object.

Figure 2 shows an optical illusion (visual illusion) called "Mueller-Lyer". It is clear that in the case of this figure the phenomenon of optical illusion is determined by "pairing of subjects", "structuring of subjects" or "meeting of meanings or objects", and that the subject \( \beta \) or \( \alpha \) is an essential factor in this case as a subject playing the central role in setting the chance or situation of "meeting of meanings or objects". If it were not for the role of the subject, the phenomenon of "Mueller-Lyer" never occurs because the two objects with arrows can not be placed in the situation of "pairing of subjects" without assistance of the subject \( \beta \) or \( \alpha \). The two objects consisting the "Mueller-Lyer" never meets without the help of the mediating subject. In addition, just as the case of Figure 1, the phenomenon of this optical illusion needs two kinds of subjects, one as a watcher of the figure with geometrical meaning and another as a watcher of the figure with "ontological" meaning (meaning based on the "Lebenswelt=life-world").
2.5 Meaning as a event

Those phenomena that occur in the cases of Figure 1 and Figure 2 might be better called "events" when taking into consideration the related matters involved in these phenomena. In another way, these phenomena can not be explained from the reductionism way of thinking that is an attitude towards the world consisting the separated and isolated parts or elements. It is doubtless that Figure 1 and Figure 2 mean nothing to a person on the mechanistic or reductionism worldview.

A Japanese philosopher Wataru Hiromatu gives us an appropriate term for explaining these situations. Hiromatu uses the term "Kankeita (aspects of relationship of matters)" in order to comprehend the phenomenon of another optical illusion called "(subjective contour of) Kanizsa" without adapting the reductionism way of thinking nor "perception schema based on the assumption of equation of human eye and camera eye" (kamera moderu no sikau-ron). According to Hiromatu, "Kankeita" means "relationship of places of figures" and "Kanizsa" depends on "Kankeita". Hiromatu insists that "the Wesen(essence)" of this phenomenon is nothing but a given "Kankeita". Hiromatu adds the phenomenon of an eclipse of the moon to a list of events or phenomena derived from "Kankeita". "The relationship of places of the sun, the moon, the earth and so on is the "Wesen" of an eclipse of the moon.

II. Information theories as reductionism and alternative information theory based on Kankeita

3.1 "Frame problems" and Kankeita

According to a Japanese sociologist Masachi Oosawa the so-called "frame problems" are the most serious difficulty with which the scholars of artificial intelligence and automatons are often confronted with. Oosawa shows several inadequate actions of R2D2 robot, a character in the movie "Star Wars", as typical cases of "frame problems". The several lethal blunders R2D2 did are all the results of failures of solving "frame problems", i.e. the possibility or the ability of selecting the relevant factors in a given situation and of neglecting the insignificant and irrelevant factors. R2D2 can understand or calculate one aspects of the results followed his decision or act, but he can not understand nor calculate a set of aspects of the results brought about by his act, so he makes such a mistake as "saving" his battery along with a fatal bomb that are placed on the same wagon on which his battery lies. He knows the fact that a bomb and a battery lie on a same wagon in a room and that someone set a dangerous bomb in the room to blow up his battery, but he doesn't know that when he pushes the wagon, a bomb comes along with his battery. Even after the improvement of his inner program, he can not do a proper act. His new program orders him to calculate all the possible situations to be occurred after a certain action, but it takes a long time to calculate the possible outcomes, so he makes a same mistake; the bomb explodes before the end of his calculation.

This case of failures of R2D2 is an allegorical example of "frame problems" and it seems that the failures of R2D2 robot is also a good example of the situations related with "hermeneutic
circle”. In short “the frame problems” are very close to the problems that have been dealt with in the tradition of hermeneutics. According to Rafael Capurro, a German philosopher and a scholar of hermeneutic information studies under the influence Heidegger and Gadamer, the serious contradictions that the scholars of artificial intelligence often face come directly from the fundamental problems in the tradition of “rationalism” way of thinking. In the other words, Capurro insists that the research field of artificial intelligence based on the rationalism or on the assumption of division of inner world and outer world can not go beyond the world consisting of mere raw matters, isolated elements, fragmented experiences and split body-mind.

As we have suggested above, some important means exist somewhere between “pair of objects”, somewhere in the space of “structuring of subjects”, somewhere in the “related places of objects and subjects”. It seems that the robots or the subjects with artificial intelligence have a serious difficulty in entering the world of the subjective meaning or the world of meaning existing somewhere between the objects and the objects. Capurro insists that we human beings live in a pluralistic world and some parts or aspects are invisible to the eyes of people on the objectivist (or materialist) worldviews. For example, Capurro says, the web of human relationship (the existential dimension in all its variety and complexity) is not real from the viewpoint of objectivism, because the meaning of this web is subjective or in more proper words “in-between”. So, apparently, “frame problems” are not the mere problems in the realm of cognition, but far more important problems relative to “Leben im Informationszaitalter”.

3.2 Shannon and “Imi no deal”

Capurro’s impressive remark on “invisible meanings or relationships” shows us some useful suggestions for going beyond “ontic= not ontological” attitudes towards information theories that are prevailing ones at this moment of information era. It is clear that we need a lot of time and hard efforts before being able to transform the “ontic” attitudes towards information theories into more ontological type, i.e. sympathetic attitudes towards the world including plurality of meanings just mentioned above. In the following part of this paper, we want to try a preliminary effort to gain such sympathetic attitudes towards the world full of ontological meanings. What we want to do here is an attempt to examine Claude Shannon’s theory from ontological views on information.

It is without doubt that Shannon’s theory on information or communication has greatly contributed to the development of information theories. But it is also true that his theory has been the major causes of misunderstandings prevailing in the modern information theories. And we assume that most of these misunderstandings has derived from the “ontic” attitudes that lead to the tendency of placing his theory outward a given theoretical and practical context where his theory was born. This theoretical and practical context is apparently intimately tied with the central purpose behind the construction of his theory, in other words, the purpose of sending information with the best possible efficiency through a given channel of communication. In addition, to attain this purpose, some prerequisites are needed, for example,
"preunderstanding" of "a given set of events" or preexisting "information" about the related phenomenon.

For example, according to the definition of (amount of) information by Shannon (and Weaver), we can calculate amount of information with the formula shown below. But we have to be careful of the prerequisites to do so. This formula requires "preunderstanding" of the probability of a phenomenon. "P" in the following formula means the probability of the relevant phenomenon. In short, we need the preexisting information about the probability of the relevant matter. \( n = \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{P} \right) - \log_2 1 - \log_2 P = - \log_2 P \) [bit] We can calculate amount of information \( n \), but "n" means the amount of information of a phenomenon that is known as a phenomenon occurring with the probability \( P \). So, it is a complete misunderstanding that the more information we have, the better understand the ambiguous situations. We already know the probability of occurrence of a given phenomenon, so the (amount of) information on the relevant phenomenon has nothing to do with the ambiguity of this phenomenon.

It is correct that if the phenomenon with a little \( P \) occurs, we can get a greater amount of information. And vice versa. But the \( P \) of a given phenomenon doesn't have almost any practical meaning, if we deal with that given phenomenon as an isolated one from the other ones involved within a set of phenomena. For example, English letter \( e \) has a greater \( P \) compared with \( z \), and this means that \( e \) has a greater amount of information than that of \( z \). However, this difference of amount of information counts for something only within a practical schema that related to the purpose of sending \( e \), \( z \), and the other English letters trough a particular channel. In short, in that case, \( e \) needs short length of figures, while \( z \) needs a greater length of figures for the purpose of sending English letters through a given channel effectively and efficiently. The famous formula about entropy" \( H = P \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{P} \right) + (1 - P) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{1 - P} \right) \) \( = -P \log_2 P - (1 - P) \log_2 (1 - P) \) [bit] \( (P \) is the probability of event \( E1 \) and \( 1 - P \) is the probability of event \( E2 ) \)" means nothing but that if all of the English letters occur with the same probability in the English sentences, then the total set of phenomena or events have the greatest amount of information. In another case of baseball of the last season, the game of Yokohama and Hiroshima has a greater amount of entropy compared to the game of Hanshin and Yokohama, because we can easily imagine the winner of the game of Hanshin against Yokohama than the winner of the game of Yokohama against Hiroshima.

If we deal with the concept or the meaning of amount of information or entropy outside the context within which the concept or the meaning of amount of information or entropy means something practically, it is unavoidable that we make a great misunderstanding. For example, such a misunderstanding as that "information is something very good for people or for the total society because it enables us to get rid of ambiguity about various kinds of matters" seems to be a serious misunderstanding for the concept of information society itself.

3.3 Information theory separated from Kankeitaï

It is important to know that amount of information can be calculated only on the certain conditions and that in many cases, we can not get information nor entropy. For example, in a
case of giving the best present to someone's girlfriend, choosing one from a set of 4 possible gifts, a diamond ring, red rose, her favorite food and her favorite CD, we can not calculate the amount of information of the possible gifts (amount of information we can get when we know her best choice) if she say, "I want everything" as well as on the such conditions as; 1) when we don't have a preunderstanding about the list of her favorite things 2) when she is very greedy and the list of her favorite things is growing more and more 3) when we don't know the probability of her desire about each of the four gifts (the extent of her desire for each item) 4) when she says, "I don't want anything." In this case of selection of the best gift, amount of information means the number of a choice between two things, so we can calculate the amount of information only on the condition that she selects one item from a set of 4 items.

So it is clear that at least in the case of Shannon's information theory, the way of thinking of "reductionism" that leads to the tendency of dealing with the meaning of "information" without consideration of "aspects of relationship of matters (Kankeita)" causes a various sorts of misunderstandings.

For example, even in the case of Mark Poster's discussions, it is undeniable that his understanding about the meaning of "information" has a certain amount of ambiguity. In a passage from one of his books on Information theories (to be precise, in a passage on Daniel Bell), he says, "Information is the part of communication that is not lost through transmission." 10 It seems that this remark is based upon an ambiguous confusion of the theories of Shannon, Norbert Wiener, and John von Neumann.

Of course, there are some scholars who are aware of the fact that they cannot draw out any reliable theories about meanings or contents of information from Shannon's own theory, and according to Tooru Nishigaki, a Japanese sociologist Tamito Yoshida is one of such scholars. Nishigaki insists that Yoshida's definition of information with 4 different levels of definition of information from the narrowest to the broadest is a trial of grasping information with the "meaning" of information 10, and of course this trial is motivated by the general belief that Shannon's theory lacks discussion of "meaning of information."

But we cannot help from questioning "why the 'meaning' of information remains as a key term in Yoshida's schema, even after he acknowledges that Shannon's theory is devoid of meaning of information?" It is clear that Shannon's theory doesn't need any meanings of information, and then why should we add "meaning" to his communication theory? Nishigaki insists that behind the superficial appearance of information society, there are some kinds of power-orientation that tries to exert influence on the normalizing meanings of matters through the stabilizing quality of signs and symbols in terms of their meaning. To put this in our way, we have to be careful of not neglecting some kinds of intention of translating Shannon's purely practical motivation for the communication theory into another schema of "information" theory. At least in the schema of Shannon's original theory there are no "common places" where such diverse matters as IT, theory of so-called American New-Economy, neo-classic theory of economics, E-democracy, the broadest definition of information as "pattern" by Tamito Yoshida, digital divide get together. Just as in the case of Figure 1,
Figure 2, we have to search for the origins and characteristics of "the common place" where Shannon, Bell, Mark Poster and a lot of advocates of "IT Revolution" get together.

IV. How is a new step towards alternative theories of Information Societies possible?

4.1 Living "Kankeitei" and mechanistic "Kankeitei"

One of the most important things we could get through our thinking in this paper is apparently the fact (or hypothesis) that what we see through the aspects of relationship of matters (through "Kankeitei") is quite different from that seen in a way of reductionism. In a way these findings are quite similar to those found by the scholars of Gestalt psychology, but in our own view, our findings includes the broader aspects compared to the case of Gestalt psychology. For example "the common places" in our schema seem to be the places where imaginative objects and "real" objects meet together and where the subject $\alpha$ and the subject $\beta$ meet together. As the symptoms of some patients of agnosia and schizophrenia show, the lack of ability of seeing objects through "Kankeitei" seem to be closely related with the lack of ability of imagination and the lack of change of different sets of Kankeitei(sets of frame of reference), and also it is clear that the ability of imagination and the ability of change of different sets of Kankeitei are tied up with each other. For example, according to the explanation of Wataru Hiromatu, (the subjective contour of) "Kanizsa" depends on "Kankeitei," and Atusi Yamadari insists that some patients of a certain type of agnosia cannot "see" "Kanizsa" and they cannot "see" a illustration of a boy with a kite (a kite is not present in that picture, but most of people can imagine a presence of a kite because of the total atmosphere of that picture). In our own view, the ability of seeing objects through "Kankeitei" is the ability of "seeing" the relationship of objects or matters through "imagination." In this sense, "imagination" means a certain kind of mental ability of "seeing" the objects in a given relationship or an ability of making a set (or a frame) of relationship in which the related matters or objects are placed.

As Minkowski suggests, in the case of schizophrenics, the spaces or places around them are fixed, static and dead, and they are not the place any more where the present and the past meet together, the self and the other meet together, the alive and vivid experiences arise from it.

One of the serious contradictions that are found in the schemata of the prevalent information studies is that their discussions are often based on some sorts of Kankeitei in spite of their apparent preference for reductionism. And it seems that this kind of Kankeitei is quite different from that Minkowski presupposes.

Of course this comparison of Kankeitei(s) between a living and actual one and a static, mechanistic or "objective" one doesn't necessarily mean that we should refuse the latter as a cause of making the people confronted with severe and restless aspects of Information Society. Just as the phenomena of decline of Japanese movie production implies, it cannot be denied that Kankeitei seems to be conditioned on the mediation of media, technology. But on the other hand, the mechanistic way of thinking closely related to the latter type of Kankeitei appears to
deprive a lot of advocates of Information Society of an insight into the multiple strata of Kankeitai(s), i.e. they cannot understand that we (can) live in a world of living Kankeitai as well as in a world of mechanistic Kankeitai. So it seems to be an urgent problem for us to gain an insight into a possible (or some possible) Kankeitai(s) again so that we can “see” a world with rich meanings again like imaginative relationship of matters, common sense, ontological aspects of our life and like (96).

4.2 Seken and Internet

In addition to a recovery of an insight into the multiple strata of Kankeitai(s), it is also important for us to “see” the actual situations of Kankeitai from which people see and experience the meaning of their life and relationship with IT and Internet. The several researches I and the members of ReGIS (Research Group on Information Society of Tsukuba) conducted during the last few years seem to give us useful suggestions about this problem. Under the present conditions (the main purpose of this paper), we cannot examine the details of our research data here, but it is worth while showing part of our research findings here.

One of the most surprising findings we found through our research (96) is that Internet usage seems to be almost unrelated to the “Mitwelt” (the world where human relationship, orientation for self-identity and ontological relationship of objects have important meanings). And in accord with this fact, Internet usage and computer literacy appear to be little related to differences of income levels of the respondents. If we consider income levels as an index of “digital divide”, it is clear that Internet usage and computer literacy do not brings forth “digital divide” in this country.

Our findings seem to give us a clue to reconsideration of position of Internet and IT in Japan. One of our hypotheses about this problem is such as; we Japanese still live in a Seken (part of Japanese world where traditional human relationship or mutual evaluation of people towards each other motivate people’s attitude or behavior; at least in Seken we Japanese seem to live a life in a not-isolated way) or we live in two different types of society at the same time, one as a modern, westernized type and another as a traditional, “inside-oriented” (“inside-oriented” refer to such tendency that mutual understanding among people is higher evaluated than mere making money, promotion of social status and purified mind is also highly valued) type. And we also have a hypothesis that the meanings of IT or Internet decisively depend on “Seken” or this kind of dichotomy of society, but before we try to prove our hypotheses, we will need more time to consider such problems as Kankeitai, “the common place” where matters and meanings get together, the factors that place Bell’s theories and Shannon’s theories into the same schema or frame of reference. These subjects will be the themes of our next papers.

Notes and References
(1) Akira Kurosawa and Hayao Miyazaki, 1993, Naniwa eiga (what is the movie?), Tokuma-shoten, Tokyo.
(2) Hayao Miyazaki tries to explain the reasons of “failure” of Japnese colored movies by using the term "hikari (light, rays)." He says that decline of Japanese movies is mainly due to the lack of ability of dealing
with "Hikari." This term "Hikari" seem to refer to ways of directing sights as well as mere rays or light. As we show below, direction of our sights appears to be a decisive factor of creating "relationship of places and matters" (imi ga deau ba; the places where meanings and objects get together). Kurosawa's first colored movie was made in 1970. This year is said to be a beginning of new era in Japan. The problem of "lost sights" seem to remain as a fundamental one for us even at this time in the 21st century. See Kurosawa and Miyazaki (1993), op. cit., p.170.


5. Makoto Nakada, 2003, Sekai ha jyoshi to sousouyoku de dekiteiru (our world is based on common sense and imagination), Suna-syobo, Tokyo.


7. A Japanese writer and philosopher Seiji Takeda pointed out in his book on Heidegger that the desired-related schema of meaning (Yokubou-soukan-zusiki 欲望相関固式) exists in the center of Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit." Yokubou-soukan-zusiki includes such ontological meaning as desire, greed, wish, body, motivation, interests, consideration, care and so on. Seiji Takeda, 1995, Heidegger Nynmon (introduction to philosophy of Heidegger), Koudansha, Tokyo, p.43ff.


12. Baschiya, 1988, Tenkei-genmon no ippo nai (an introduction to philosophy), Koudansha, Tokyo. Kankeihi (関係思) is one of the terms that are peculiar to Hiromatu's books.


14. Rafael Capurro, 1985, Epistemology and Information Science, in Stephan Schwarz (ed.) REPORT TRITA-LIB-6023. Rafael Capurro, 1995, Leben im Informationszeitalter, Akademie Verlag, Berlin. The passage shown in our paper is a summary of his thought according to the author (Nakada)'s own comprehension.

15. Rafael Capurro, Epistemology and Information Science, op. cit. (chapter II).


(19) See B.Kimura (1991), op. cit. and Wolfgang Blankenburg, 1971, *Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit*; Ein Beutrag zur psychopathologie symptomarmer Schizophrenien, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart. Both of the authors (Kimura and Blankenburg) try to relate the disappearance of common sense to the mechanistic worldview that is peculiar to schizophrenics.

(20) This research was conducted in Japan in August 2002 by Makoto Nakada and the members of ReGIS. The subjects of our research were 569 men and women of age from 25 to 44. Part of this research findings was shown in a following paper; M. Nakada, T. Tamura, T. Takenouchi, L. Tkach Kawasaki and T. Itaka, 2002, The positive and negative aspects of digital divide theories, a paper presented for II. ICIE-SYMPOSIUM. (http://www.capurro.de/augsburg2-papers.htm)