Recent contributions to the Tibetan development of Buddhist philosophical systems have attracted considerable attention, not only because of their significant results but also because of their methodological consciousness that any intellectual tradition must be examined in light of its historical and cultural circumstances. Continuity and discontinuity of thought as well as the characteristics of Tibetan interpretations first become clear through a thorough investigation of both Indian and Tibetan traditions, and yet the significance of individual thought is finally to be considered in its contemporary context. In this respect, the latest studies of the Tibetan development of Dharmakirti's (7c.) epistemology were most successful in indicating the consistency and inconsistency of Tibetan interpretations with Dharmakirti's original ideas. Special attention has been paid to the originality of dGe lugs pa thinkers. They indeed made several theoretical modifications to, reinterpretations and reevaluations of Indian original thought, especially with regard to logicoepistemological
issues in both major fields of Buddhist philosophy, viz., the Madhyamaka system and that of Dharmakirti. In order to gain a clear picture of the dGe lugs pa position on these Buddhist philosophical systems, we have attempted to reveal what might actually underlie their problematic commitments to traditional teachings, i.e., to reveal its historical background, probable textual sources, possible misinterpretations and wrong transmissions of text, as well as particular aims and motivations they may have had in mind.

The present paper too is an attempt to clarify the way dGe lugs pa scholars redefined the concept svalaksana (rang mishan) and to specify the reasons for this redefinition on the basis of the writings by the three main figures from the earlier period of the school, i.e., Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357-1419), rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po (1385-1438). I also wish to consider the question of how Dharmakirti and these Tibetan thinkers understood the meaning of the individuality and reality of existents under the concept of svalaksana, since defining svalaksana is none other than defining what an individual and real entity is. Through the following discussion, one will see that both Dharmakirti and the dGe lugs pa thinkers define svalaksana not in isolation from, but in complete accordance with, their respective considerations of relating philosophical issues. As for the dGe lugs pa, however, it can be said that they aimed to comprehend such fundamental concepts as svalaksana from a wider perspective, namely they tried to formulate a version of individuality and reality which holds true not only for the Sautrāntika tradition of Dharmakirti but for Buddhist philosophical systems in general, including Madhyamaka. I would like to focus on this point in the last part of the paper.

1. Dharmakirti on svalaksana

Little needs to be said about the considerable significance of the term svalaksana which literally means ‘own characteristic’, and comes down to term for ‘particular’ or ‘individual’. Svalaksana is characterized by Dignāga (6c.) as the object of direct perception (pratyakṣa), i.e., the object of a cognition which is free of conceptual construction (kalpanāpodha). Dharmakirti added to this epistemological notion a clear ontological ground by identifying it with that which has causal efficacy (arthakriyāsāmartya, arthakriyāsakti, don byed nus pa), that is, an ability to produce an effect. He explicitly defines this alone (eva) as ultimately existent (paramārthasat) or as a real entity (vastu), in contrast to the ‘universal’ or ‘common characteristic’ (sāmānyā or sāmānyalakṣana). The latter, in contrast to svalaksana, refers to the object of conception or of words that lacks causal efficacy and hence is considered to be merely conventional and unreal. We may be able to give the broad outlines of the development of the idea from Dignāga to Dharmakirti, or from the epistemological to the ontological characterization of svalaksana, as follows: The fact that a thing is actually perceived by someone, sometime and somewhere indicates that this thing exists at that moment at that place, unless this perception is proven to be false by someone else. Since this thing causes a direct perception of its own image, it is admitted to be causally efficacious. Furthermore, this thing must be allowed to be real, for unreal things such as a horn of a rabbit or an abstract concept like ‘eternity’ cannot cause any direct perception. In other words, the arising of a direct perception should properly presuppose the presence of something real as its object. Hence the object of direct perception proves to be existent in reality. In this way, a svalaksana to be cognized by a direct perception can be identified as a real entity.

The term svalaksana, as opposed to sāmānyalakṣana or common characteristic, entails from the beginning that the phenomenon is individual, unique and distinct. Dignāga’s description of svalaksana as the object of direct perception may well reflect the idea that svalaksana is a substantially individual thing, since it is the function of perception to make substantial distinctions among its objects. To this extent, one could also say that svalaksana is a spatiotemporally individual and unique occurrence, which necessarily occupies a certain location in space and time, in contrast to a merely imagined object. The more strict spatiotemporal qualification of svalaksana can be derived from Dharmakirti’s definition of a real existent as having causal efficacy, if this qualification is linked to the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), viz., that whatever is existent in reality is exclusively momentary. It is theoretically consistent to interpret svalaksana as a unique and single phenomenon that occurs and disappears every single
moment, since svalaksana is a real existent to be defined as that which has causal efficacy, although such a momentary thing is far beyond the range of perceptual object.

Besides svalaksana being distinguished the one from the other in virtue of their distinct substances, we can also understand from the literal sense of the word that svalaksanas are known to be unique because of their characteristics (lakṣaṇa). Although it is beyond the function of perception to specify the features of an entity as, for instance, being a pot, being gold, being round, and so on, these kinds of unique features of one svalaksana can be perceived through its image as a whole and help to differentiate this svalaksana from other svalaksanas. Theoretically speaking, such a distinction of svalaksana by its nature too is grounded in its causal efficacy, because, according to Dharmakīrti, the difference of nature consists in the difference of causal efficacy7 in the following manner: a svalaksana is known as individual and unique by its essential nature (svabhāva), since the essential nature of a real entity is determined by a particular ability of its cause to produce this entity, and this entity in turn arises being endowed with a particular ability that is its essential nature.8 Thus considered, it may be proper to say that Dharmakīrti's identification of svalaksana as that which has causal efficacy provides a clear theoretical ground for both the reality and the individuality of the entity that is defined by Dignāga as the object of direct perception.

2. The dGe lugs pa on rang mthshan
The dGe lugs pa thinkers formulated the definition of rang mthshan according to their own interpretation of individuals and real entities. Let us look at the following definition, which mkhas grub proposes for rang mthshan, still claiming it to reflect a Sastraprakāśika position:

"In their own system [of the Sastraprakāśika], the definition of rang mthshan is the thing (dngos po) which consists (gnas), not being conceptually imposed, but from its own side [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature (rang behin) uncommon [with other things]."9

Neither the object of perception nor causal efficacy is men-

tioned here as the definitens or the defining characteristic. Nor is it possible to interpret the phrase 'consisting in its essential nature' as implying 'consisting in its own causal efficacy' and the phrase 'not being conceptually imposed' as implying 'being directly perceived', once one takes account of the views peculiar to the dGe lugs pa with regard to rang mthshan and spyi.

One should first recall the dGe lugs pa position that rang mthshan is identical with a real existent which has causal efficacy (don byed nus pa), but not only rang mthshan is counted as real, nor is it determined for the object of direct perception alone, for they maintain that there exist real universals (sāmānya, spyi),10 and that a rang mthshan appears in a conceptual cognition. Even it is not contradictory that one and the same thing is rang mthshan as well as universal (spyi) in its different aspects. They are not opposing notions but are relative. A pot, for instance, is a particular (rang mthshan) in relation to its property of being impermanent (antiya, mi rig pa), but at the same time it is a universal as well in relation to its individuations, since the property of being a pot is common to all kinds of pots such as golden pots, silver pots, copper pots, and the like.11 Under this condition, the dichotomy between rang mthshan and spyi according to whether it is real or unreal, or whether it is cognized by direct perception or conceptual cognition is on no account conducive to clarifying the dGe lugs pa idea of individuality and reality.

Nor can causal efficacy define the reality of rang mthshan. Although the dGe lugs pas accept the concepts 'that which has causal efficacy', 'that which is ultimately existent' and 'rang mthshan' as synonyms in accordance with the statement of Pramāṇavārttika III 3, they explicitly note that neither causal efficacy nor rang mthshan is taught by Dharmakīrti as a definitens or a defining characteristic of ultimate reality, but just as an instance of those which are to be defined as such (mthshan gtsal).12 That is to say, whatever is 'that which has causal efficacy' or 'rang mthshan' is a real entity, but it is not just this alone that is ultimately real, since there are universals that exist in reality. Yet the dGe lugs pas maintain that the individuality of rang mthshan in the sense of 'consisting in its essential nature' is grounded in reality, as suggested in the aforesaid mkhas grub's definition of rang mthshan, for the notion of 'not being
conceptually imposed but from its own side' is adopted as the defining characteristic of ultimate reality (don dam bden pa, parمارथसात्य) by Tsong kha pa:

"The definition of ultimate reality is that which is not merely conceptually imposed (riog pas btags pa), but established from the side of the object itself (yul rang gi ngos nas)."13

A rang mtshan is a real existent insofar as it meets this condition. In the same way, the rang mtshan is established as an individual insofar as it is intrinsically abiding in its essential nature. The essential nature is, however, not necessarily confined to causal efficacy, since mkhas grub propounds the aforesaid definition of rang mtshan, after having denied causal efficacy together with the spatiotemporal uniqueness as being the defining characteristics of rang mtshan, by saying:

"Such definitions of rang mtshan on which others insist as that which exists, without sharing (ma 'dres pa) place, time and essential nature (yul dus rang bzhin) [with other things] and that which is causally efficacious are unacceptable."14

Neither substantial individuality nor causal efficacy is the definens of rang mtshan either.15 The uncommonness of essential nature is rejected here just because, in my conjecture, it lacks the qualification of being intrinsic (i.e., rang ngos nas mtshan mong ma yin pa'i rang bzhin du gnas pa) in contrast to mkhas grub's own definition, for, as will be discussed below, the non-intrinsic or conventional uncommonness of essential nature is also accepted by those who refuse the real existence of rang mtshan. Accordingly, for the dGe legs pas, rang mtshan is an entity that is individual and unique in reality solely because of the intrinsic abiding in its essential nature.

What then is the essential nature that determines a thing as an individual or rang mtshan? Let us consider this question with the example of 'golden pot' (gser bum), which the dGe legs pas use for rang mtshan when explaining the theory that a rang mtshan appears to a conceptual cognition.16 Since we have closely analyzed this problematic presentation in our previous studies,17 I would just like to reconsider what it means to say that 'golden pot' is an example of rang mtshan.

First, one should note that such an example of svalakṣaṇa would not be acceptable to Dharmakīrti. Even not appealing to the theory of momentariness, the word 'golden pot' (gser bum) cannot directly refer to any substantially individual entity, which is the object of direct perception, but according to the abhava theory it solely refers to the universal. For the dGe legs pa thinkers, however, 'golden pot' is an example of a particular (rang mtshan), and 'pot' is a universal (spyi). In Tibetan, this example is always simply given as 'gser bum', i.e., 'golden pot', which is not accompanied by a demonstrative pronoun, nor by an indefinite article, nor by a suffix designating the plural. That is, neither 'this or that golden pot' (gser bum di/ de), nor 'some golden pot' (gser bum zhiig), nor 'golden pots' (gser bum bzhin) is specifically intended. Since the Tibetan language has no definite articles and only rarely use the indefinite zhiig, the expression 'gser bum' signifies either a golden pot or the golden pot in the sense of a generic singular (viz., a golden pot or the golden pot in general), which is to be cognized as such by its properties of being a pot and being gold. These properties are, on one hand, essential characteristics of a golden pot, whereby a golden pot is distinguished from other things such as silver pots, copper pots, glasses, tables, and so on. On the other hand, they are also common properties to all golden pots, viz., 18-carat golden pots, gold-plated golden pots, small golden pots, big golden pots, and so on. That is to say, any individuation or differentiation among individual golden pots is not, and cannot be, indicated by the expression 'gser bum'. The fact that this example is nevertheless repeatedly applied to rang mtshan means that it completely meets the conditions of rang mtshan for the dGe legs pa. That is to say, a golden pot consists in the essential nature of being a pot and being gold from its own side independent of any conceptual construction. To sum up, the essential nature in perspective of the dGe legs pa does not actually differ from common properties, which are identical with real universals to be signified by generic concepts.

Despite the fact that their understanding of rang mtshan obviously deviates from that of Dharmakīrti, the dGe legs pa scholars seem to have formulated such an idea of essential nature on the basis of Dharmakīrti's own words in Pramāṇavārttika I 40. It is even not far from the truth to speculate that mkhas grub's
definition cited previously is a modification of Pramāṇavārttika I 40. Let us compare them with each other:

Pramāṇavārttika I 40) "Since all things (sarvabhāva) by nature consist in their respective essential nature (svabhāva), they are distinguished from their homogeneous and heterogeneous [things]."18

(mKhas grub's definition) "The definition of rang mtshan is the thing (dngos po) which consists (gnas), not being conceptually imposed, but from its own side [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature (rang lshin) uncommon [with other things]."

The similarity in expression is evident. Taking the subject of Pramāṇavārttika I 40, 'all things' (sarvabhāva), to be identical with svalakṣaṇas in the sense of real existents,20 the dGe lugs pa interpreters understand this verse to be intended to teach the mode of existence of real entities (dngos po'i gnas lugs).21 In this regard, it seems reasonable to assume that they took this verse to describe the essential characteristic of svalakṣaṇa and adapted it to their own definition of rang mtshan. To conclude this section, I would like to propose the following tentative illustration of Pramāṇavārttika I 40 with the example of 'golden pot' in accordance with the dGe lugs pa interpretation: "The svalakṣaṇa such as a golden pot consists in its essential nature of being a pot, being gold, being permanent, and so on. Therefore it is different from such homogeneous things as a silver pot as well as from such heterogeneous things as a table, space, etc."22 So would the verse be elucidated by the dGe lugs pas.

3. Reasons for redefining svalakṣaṇa

From the theoretical point of view, the dGe lugs pa interpretation of svalakṣaṇa apparently goes beyond the range of sound interpretation. It is not exaggerated to regard it as a systematic revision of the Sautrāntika doctrine. This revision is, however, certainly an outcome of various external and internal factors. Such a realistic position as the dGe lugs pa thinkers have is actually considered to have originated with some Indian scholars and have been carried over by Tibetan gSang phu tradition.23 The lack of semantic interest may also be described as a general tendency of this Tibetan scholastic tradition. Of course one should also clarify, in addition to this historical background, the theoretical grounds for the dGe lugs pa's redefinition of svalakṣaṇa. We will devote the last section of the present paper to this inquiry.

mKhas grub explains the reason for his rejection of causal efficacy as a defining characteristic of real entity as follows:

"The dBo ma that 'gyur ba (i.e., the Prāśāntika-Mādhvyamika) maintains that rang mtshan is the main [subject] to be negated (dga' ba) through the logical reason (niags) to investigate the ultimate [reality]. Accordingly, he maintains that the ultimate reality consists in the negation of that very concept (don niags) of rang mtshan asserted by substantialists (dngos smra ba). Hence, whatever is asserted by the substantialists as the very concept of rang mtshan is [none other than] that which the dBo ma that 'gyur ba asserts to be unestablished as a [real] basis (dshi ma grub) even according to verbal conventions (tha snyad du yang), for such [things] as that which [exists] not sharing (ma dres pa) place, time and essential nature [with other things], and that which is causally efficacious are, on the contrary, accepted by the dBo ma that 'gyur ba too [according to verbal conventions]. Therefore, these [things] are the instances of that which is to be defined [as rang mtshan] (mtshan dshi) but are not the definis of rang mtshan here in the case (skabs 'dir) [in which the Sautrāntika tenet is treated]."24

Insofar as rang mtshan is a real entity, the 'concept of rang mtshan' or the defining characteristic thereof must, on one hand, correspond to the condition of real existent, the establishment of which the Prāśāntika-Mādhvyamika refutes even conventionally. In other words, the concept of rang mtshan is, for the dGe lugs pas, from the beginning determined as the object of refutation (dga' ba) from the Madhyamaka point of view, since the core of the Madhyamaka ontology consists in negating such a substantial or real existent. On the other hand, the 'concept of rang mtshan' or the defining characteristic thereof may not correspond to that which the Prāśāntika-Mādhvyamika accepts on the conventional level, for, supposing that such a thing be the defining characteristic of rang mtshan, it would follow that the
rang mshan itself must be conventionally accepted by the Madhyamika too, which, however, contradicts his position in which the real existence of rang mshan is not acknowledged, neither ultimately nor conventionally. Moreover, it is also an important thesis for the dGe lugs pa that, in the Prasangika-Madhyamaka system, all causal relations as well as causal efficacy are conventionally established. Hence the dGe lugs pa exclude causal efficacy from the defining characteristics of rang mshan and ultimate reality.\(^{21}\)

In relation to these Madhyamaka positions, the dGe lugs pa evaluate the ontological views of other schools, viz., Sarvastivada, Sautrantika and Yogacara, as being substantialist, for the reason that the latter assert such substantial or real entities as being vastu (dgos po) or svalakṣana (rang mshan), because they are 'not merely conceptually imposed but established from the side of the objects themselves' (rtogs pa'i byams pa yin par yul rang gi 'ngos nas grub pa).\(^{25}\) In this manner, in order not only to include universals in the domain of real existents, but also to hold the consistency with the Madhyamaka ontology, the dGe lugs pa redefine even the most important concept of Dharmakirti’s tradition.

What the dGe lugs pa scholars thereby finally aimed at is, in my opinion, a systematization of the Buddhist philosophical teachings of the four main traditions, i.e., the Sarvastivada, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamaka. For the dGe lugs pa, the question of what is a real entity or what is the reality should be answered not within the narrow scope of one tradition, but in a range of knowledge that extends over the entire historical development of Buddhist philosophy. In other words, the dGe lugs pa intended to connect the different systems, which had developed separately in different periods in India, by reinterpreting them systematically from one common perspective. What they actually did, however, is to reevaluate the teachings of other schools in light of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka of Candrakirti (7c.), which they estimated as the highest among Buddhist philosophical systems.

This kind of attempt to systematize various philosophical thoughts in light of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka doctrine, indeed, can be seen in several discussions in the dGe lugs pa exegeses.\(^{26}\) In its historical aspect, it is to be considered as a result of the fact that Candrakirti’s system had won a certain popularity among Tibetan Buddhists by the period of Tsong kha pa. At the same time, however, this attempt in turn resulted in accelerating the reevaluation of Buddhist philosophical traditions in the eyes of Tibetan thinkers. Firmly bound to tradition, but also creative, Tibetans intensively engaged themselves in the development of Buddhist philosophy. It is a remarkable phenomenon in Tibetan intellectual history that they rediscovered and reinterpreted many Buddhist philosophical concepts. Redefining svalakṣana is one of Tibetan challenges to the traditional system of Indian Buddhist philosophy. In this regard, it remains a fascinating task for us to discover and analyze their philosophical commitments and their underlying motives. In this fashion, we can better establish the significance of the Tibetan developments in the history of the transmission of Buddhist thought.

NOTES

DEFINING AND REDEFINING SVALAKSANA

System (2) The Theory of Real Universals), Bukkyo bunka kenkyu ronshu (Studies of Buddhist Culture) 4, 2000, pp. 3-32.


3. This paper was presented at the University of Lausanne on the 26th of March, 2002, and originally written on the basis of my two Japanese articles, i.e., “Gelukhu ni yoru Kyoryoubu Dakaketsu Rikai (1)” and “(2) as well as a German paper, “Das Individuelle und das Wirkliche bei den dGe lungs pa: Grundbegriffe buddhistischer Philosophie in tibetischer Modifizierung”, read at the University of Munich on the 22nd of November 2001. For this revised version, I would like to thank Prof. Tom Tillemans for his valuable suggestions regarding both contents and English expressions.


6. Cf. e.g. Pramanaavarttikam I 289ab: satvatsamsayadharṣyadaḥ nāsāyaṃpratāt dharmatvād, Hehuindu (in Dharbakti Hehuindu, Teil I: Tibetan Text and reconstruierter Sanskrit Text ed. by E. Steinkellner, Wien 1967) 4*, 6f.: yat sat tāt kṣayikam eva, aksarikaive’ śrthakriyāvārodhāt tolalakṣaṇam


7. One may take Pramanaavarttika I 40 (cited in n.18 below) to state the uniqueness of svalaksana in this sense, as the dGe lungs pa pos do, if one supposes that the subject of this verse (svāvṛtthāvā) refers solely to svalaksana.


9. Yid byi mun sel (in mKhas grub rje’s gSung ’bum Tha, IHa sa Zhul version) 21b2f. (tr. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality, p.117): rang langs la / rang mtshan gi yid rang po btags pa min par rang ngos nas thun mngon ma yin pa’i rang chen du gnas pa’i dugs po ’o // A similar description occurs in rGyal tshab’s Thar lam gsal byed (in rGyal tshab rje’s gSung ’bum, Cha, IHa sa Zhul version) 45b5f. with regard to the subject (i.e., svāvṛtthāvā) of Pramanaavarttika I 40 (see n.18 below), where rGyal tshab identifies as rang mtshan as the ‘thing which consists, not being conceptually imposed but from its own side, in its essential nature uncommon [with other things]’ (rīdog pa btags pa tsam min par rang chen gi gsal dang ma’i drs par rang gi ngos bo la gnas pa, cf. Yoshimizu, “Gelukha ni yoru Kyoryoubu Dakaketsu Rikai (2)”, p. 23).


12. Regarding the synonyms of rang mtshan, see the explanations by dGe lungs pas cited in Yoshimizu “Gelukha ni yoru Kyoryoubu Dakaketsu Rikai (1)”, pp.58 and 63 n.9. As for their commitments to Pramanaavarttika
13. Tsad ma'i brikey byang (in The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa pa 22 of bkra shis lhan po version ed. by Ngawang Gelek Demo, New Delhi 1978) 54alff.: don dam bden pa'i mtha'nyid rig pa bsags pa tson ma yin par yul rang gi ngsos nas grub pa / Cf. also mNgon sum le'u tik 17a6ff.: don dam bden pa'i mtha'nyid rig pa bsags pa la ma llos par rang gi ngsos boss dpal byed du grub pa / Parallel definitions by other dGe lugs pa are cited in bKra shis lhan, op.cit., pp.53 and 64 n.11. The dGe lugs pa presumably define the two kinds of reality on the basis of Dharmakirti's own words in Pramânavârttika I 68-91, especially 68-70, as I have previously discussed in Yoshimizu, op.cit., pp.52-57 and "Driyaa and vikalpya", p.460 n.5.

14. Yid kyi mun sel 21a5f.: zha ma' dang yul dus rang bzhin ma' 'dres par gnas pa dang / don byed nas pa sogs rang mtshan gyi mtha'nyid du 'dod pa mi 'thad do / One should note the fact that the similar definitions of rang mtshan appear in the dBe bshun 'jug sgo Yid kyi mun sel (in The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa pa 27 of bkra shis lhan po version ed. by Ngawang Gelek De mo, New Delhi 1977) 36b, which is a glossary of terms, concepts and their definitions ascribed to Tsong kha pa, but probably descended from Phya pa's tradition of gSang plu monastery. Yet it seems more plausible to assume that mKhas grub denies the traditionally acknowledged definitions, which Tsong kha pa and he himself have learned from their teachers, rather than to jump to the conclusion that mKhas grub thereby rejects Tsong kha pa's view, because, as will be seen below, mKhas grub gives his own definition with a clear consciousness of the theoretical consistency with Tsong kha pa's fundamental ontology as well as his understanding of causal efficacy. Thus considered, the fact that the old type of definition of rang mtshan is found in the dBe bshun 'jug sgo might support the originality of mKhas grub's definition, as I have suggested in Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyoryobu gakusetsu rikai (2)", p.24f.

15. The substantial distinction according to place and time mentioned here by mKhas grub is, however, on no account concerned with momentary existents, since he himself describes the difference of place and time as a rough incomparability of location such as east and west and morning and afternoon. See Yid kyi mun sel 33a1ff.: snga dron'i ka bo phyi dvo med pa dus ma' 'dres pa don yin gyi / ... shar la reg pa'i rdzas des nub ma la ma reg pa ila bu / yul ma' 'dres pa don yin gyi / ... khra bo la yod pa'ri rang behin de ser skyi la med pa sog / rang behin ma' 'dres pa don yin gyi / Cf. also a parallel explanation in rGyal tshab's Thar lam gshul byed 451a-4 and the discussion in Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality, p.117ff. Moreover, it must be noted that the momentariness itself is differently understood by the dGe lugs pa as having a certain duration. Cf. e.g. Yid kyi mun sel 34a2, 54b5ff. (cited in Tillemans, 17 op.cit., p.884, Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.17 n.23) and the discussion in Dreyfus, op.cit., pp.109-114.

16. This explanation occurs for the first time in Tsad ma'i brikey byang 19a3ff.: rtag pa la yul ji tshang ching 'jug pa' thul ni / ge ri bum bum par 'dzin pa'ri rtag pa la ge ri bum yang bum par snang ching rang gi dangs kyi guang bya de'ang bum par snang la shang ba'iri tshag na de gnis guig tu 'dres nas snang ching snang nor so sbyor med pa snang bsags geig tu bzer pa xes bya ste snang ba rang mtshan dang bsags pa sgra don no // Cf. also Yid kyi mun sel 53a5ff., tfang skyi's Grub mtsha (in Mo sde pa Chapter of Peking version, Buddhist Philosophical Systems ed. by Lokesh Chandra, Satta-Pitaka Series 233, New Delhi 1977) 74b1ff., and Thar lam gshul byed 59b5-60a3. This passage indeed has raised discussions among scholars because of its remarkable assertion that a rang mtshan appears to a conceptual cognition. For the details, see the references cited below in n.17.


19. See Yid kyi mun sel 41b6ff. and Thar lam gshul byed 45b5ff. (cited in Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.22f.). It is Sankarandana who interpreted 'all things' to refer to both individuals and universals (Pramânavârttika D152b6). However, this does not necessarily suggest that
See e.g., Tharthālam gsal byed 46b1. Pramāṇavārttikā I 40 introduces together with 41abc (tasmād yato yato 'rthāṇāṃ vṛddhiṁ tannāvelānāḥ/ jātiḥ bhedāḥ prakāṣīyantāḥ) the idea that such concepts of properties as 'being impermanent' (anītyāvata) and 'being produced' (ākṛtatva) are formulated on the basis of the essential nature (svabhāva) of things, although the real existence of universals, which are identical with or different from particulars, is unacceptable. Dhammakīrti is thereby demonstrating that an inference based on the essential property as a logical reason (svabhāvavṛti) is valid for establishing the reality of entities such as their being impermanent. In fact, he opens with this verse the long discussion of the āpoha theory. rGyal tshab, however, interprets this āpoha section of Pramāṇavārttikā I as contributing to the establishment of the two kinds of reality (see Yoshimizu, op.cit., pp. 460-463, 470 Appendix 2). As regards Pramāṇavārttikā I 40 in commentarial tradition, cf. also Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality, p.118, Yoshimizu, "Pramāṇavārttikā I 40 no kaishaku ni tsuite" and "Drīya and vikalpa," p. 465 n. 19. For the dGe lugs pas, the question of how one can establish reality by means of inferences, if the meaning of words is mere elimination of others (avyāpoha), overlaps with the question of how the Mādhyamika can prove the non-substantiality and emptiness by means of empty words (cf. Yoshimizu, op.cit., p. 462 and "Geluku-na ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2), p. 28.

21. It is interesting to note that both rGyal tshab and mKhas grub offer a similar elucidation in their respective commentaries on Pramāṇavārttikā I 40, as I have pointed out in Yoshimizu, "Pramāṇavārttikā I 40 no kaishaku ni tsuite", p.(101) n.10 and "Geluku-na ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2)", p. 22f.


23. Yul kyi mun sel 21a8-21b2 (cited and translated in Yoshimizu, "Geluku-na ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2)"," p. 19): dbu ma that 'gyur ba / rang mshen don dam dpal pa'i riags kyi digang bya'i gtsos bser 'dod pa / drug pa smra ba 'dod pa'i rang mshen gyi don dbog de bka'ig pa don dam bden par 'dod pa yin la / de'i phyar dbang smra bas rang mshen gyi don dbog tu gung 'dod pa de / dbu ma that 'gyur ba tha snyad du yang gshi ma grub par 'dod pa yin la / yul dus rang bshin ma 'dres pa dang don byed mshen pa sogs dbu ma that 'gyur ba yang khas len pa'i phyir ro// des na de dag skabs 'dir rang mshen gyi mshen gshi yin gyi mshen nyid min no //</p>