

Two Types of Negative Polarity Items in English*

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1. Introduction

Since Klima (1964), a licensing condition for Negative Polarity Items (henceforth, NPIs) has been one of the major topics in the linguistic literature.¹ Many studies on this topic have mentioned the different acceptabilities of the NPIs as a provisory note, which states that in general *until* and *lift a finger* occur less freely than *any* and *ever* in many constructions. In other words, it has been generally agreed that *until* and *lift a finger* are restrictive NPIs while *any* and *ever* are relatively free or liberal ones.

However, just glancing over the diverse acceptabilities without further investigating each NPI, we are destined to fail to propose a truly adequate licensing condition for the NPIs. In fact, every licensing condition proposed so far contains obvious exceptions. One such condition is proposed by Linebarger (1980, 1987, 1991).

Linebarger, consistently covering NPIs as a whole, proposes that the NPIs have to be in the scope of negation. However, as Linebarger herself admits, the following example is an obvious exception to her proposal:

- (1) Do you have any money? (Linebarger 1991: 180)

No negative sense is perceived here. Thus, *any* in this case is never licensed by Linebarger's condition, which crucially relies on negation as a licenser. Such an obvious counterexample is, therefore, unavoidable in her proposal. In order to avoid this obvious problem and propose an adequate licensing condition, it is necessary to examine each NPI carefully in the present paper.

The proposal I make in the present paper is that the NPIs

should be classified into two groups: (i) those NPIs containing minimizers, and (ii) those NPIs without minimizers.² As far as I know, no previous analyses make clear distinction between these two groups. As can be seen from the observation in what follows, the minimizers are necessarily the focus of negation and emphasizes the negative sense. That is, the former group essentially accompanies negation. In the present paper, we focus on the NPIs with the minimizers and give some comments on the other NPIs for comparison.

The present paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we examine several sentences with overt negatives, and see two characteristics of the minimizers: (i) they are necessarily the focus of negation and must be c-commanded by negatives, and (ii) they stress the negative senses of the sentences. Based on this examination, we proceed to consider several types of sentence without overt negatives in section 3. The discussion in this section reconfirms the two features of the minimizers. A comparison is also made between the NPIs with the minimizers and the other types of NPI such as *any(one)*, *ever*, and *until*. We then propose that these two types of NPI should be distinguished. In section 4, based on the two attributes of the minimizers, we detect negative senses in a few examples.

2. Two Characteristics of Minimizers

This section illustrates two characteristics of minimizers by examining sentences with overt negatives: (i) they are necessarily the focus of negation and must be c-commanded by negatives, and (ii) they stress the negative senses of the sentences.

First, take a look at the following pairs, where NPIs *budge an inch*, *hold a candle*, and *read a verse* occur:

- (2) a. John wouldn't budge an inch, even if he is threatened.

- b. * John budged an inch, even if he is threatened.
- (3) a. His paper doesn't hold a candle to mine.
b. * His paper held a candle to mine.
- (4) a. John hasn't read a verse of the Bible.
b. * John has read a verse of the Bible.

The NPIs in (a) sentences obviously occur in the scope of the overt negatives, but those in (b) sentences do not, which seems to suggest that the NPIs must occur in the scope of negation.

Now let us take *budge an inch* as a representative of the NPIs with minimizers and consider further examples:

- (5) a. * John didn't [*budge an inch because he was pushed*],
but because he fell.
b. John didn't [*move because he was pushed*], but
because he fell.

In (5a), *budge an inch* obviously occurs in the scope of negation (the scope is marked with square brackets), but the sentence is unacceptable, contrary to our expectation. As for (5b), which also describes the movement of John, the sentence is acceptable.

We must now explain why (5a) is unacceptable in spite of the fact that *budge an inch* occurs in the scope of negation. Considering the fact that the near synonymous (5b) is acceptable, the unacceptability of (5a) should not be attributed to the sentence meaning. Note that in both sentences, the overt negative *not* and the following conjunction *but* are correlative. In fact, *not* actually negates the former occurrence of *because*-clause, and the following *because*-clause introduced by *but* restates the reason why John moved. The existence of the following restatement clause makes sure that the former *because*-clause is the focus of negation. Then, *budge an inch* in (5a) and *move* in (5b) cannot be the focus of negation, although they are present in the scope of negation. That is, being in the scope of negation is not enough for *budge an inch* and *move*. Rather, they must be the focus of negation. Thus,

it is accurate to say here that *budge an inch* as a whole must be the focus of negation.

This line of argument is further elaborated by considering the following examples:

- (6) a. John didn't [*budge because he was pushed*], but because he fell.
 b. *John didn't [*move an inch because he was pushed*], but because he fell.
 b'. John didn't move an inch.

This pair contrasts with that of (5) in terms of the occurrence of the minimizer *an inch*. Comparing (5a) with (6a), we find that *an inch* is not the focus of negation in the former, while there is no minimizer in the latter. Thus, the difference in acceptability is attributed to the occurrence of *an inch* in the position where the negative focus is not placed. Sentence (5a) indicates that *budge an inch* as a whole must be the focus of negation. Sentence (6a), however, shows that the verb *budge* does not have to be the focus of negation. What must be the focus of negation are the remaining items *an inch*. That is, it is the minimizer *an inch*, not the whole VP *budge an inch* that has to be the focus of negation. This is also shown by the contrast between (5b) and (6b). Although we take just *an inch* as a representative of the minimizers in the discussion, the same argument is also true of such minimizers as *a candle*, *a verse*, and so on, which leads to the conclusion that minimizers have to be the focus of negation.

The argument above deals with the condition which minimizers must satisfy; they must be the focus of negation. The following pairs reveal, however, that this condition is not a sufficient condition, but only a necessary condition:

- (7) a. * A cent wasn't paid.³
 b. Not a cent was paid.
 (8) a. * A single person didn't come.

- b. Not a single person came.

These examples indicate that the minimizers *a cent*, *a single person* must also be c-commanded by the negatives.⁴ Thus, the minimizers must also be c-commanded in the surface structure by overt negatives if any. (5a) and (6b) satisfy the c-command condition for the minimizers, but fail to fulfill the condition that the minimizers must be the focus of negation.

Next, consider the following examples:

- (9) a. John didn't budge.
 b. John didn't budge (even) an inch.

The optional occurrence of the emphatic *even* in (9b) demonstrates that the minimizer emphasizes the negative sense, which shows the second characteristics of the minimizer. Let us now consider how we make such an interpretation. The process of negating the minimum quantity of the minimizer does not mean the exact opposite in a logical sense, but rather it implies that even the smallest quantity does not exist at all.^{5, 6} With regard to this implication, we make some speculation here. Minimizers with appropriate verbs describe such minimum action as *budge an inch*, *lift a finger*, *contribute a red cent*, and so on. Under normal circumstances, communicating that someone has taken the minimum action is not informative, while communicating that someone has not taken even the minimum action is fully informative. From this viewpoint, we speculate that the minimizers are acceptable only in negative contexts. The phenomenon is not limited only to English, but is widely observed among many languages.⁷

In this section, we have seen two characteristics of the minimizers:

- (10) a. Minimizers must be
 (i) the focus of negation, and
 (ii) c-commanded on the surface by overt negatives

if any.

b. Minimizers stress negative senses.

(10a) is a twofold condition which minimizers must satisfy, and (10b) is a function which they carry out in sentences. It should be noticed here that these two characteristics are not independent of each other, but rather they are closely related. When the sentences with minimizers are acceptable, the minimizers are necessarily the focus of negation, and at the same time they emphasize the negative senses.

3. Minimizers Without Overt Negatives

In this section, we consider several examples without overt negatives, paying special attention to the implications of the sentences. In the course of the discussion, two characteristics of minimizers are confirmed: when the sentences with minimizers are acceptable, the minimizers are necessarily the focus of negation, and at the same time they emphasize the negative senses. We then make a comparison between the NPIs with the minimizers and other NPIs such as *any(one)*, *ever*, and *until*. Finally, we propose that these two types of NPI should be distinguished. The sentences to be investigated are: (i) interrogatives, (ii) conditionals, (iii) comparatives, and (iv) the *be surprised if* construction.

3.1 Minimizers in Interrogatives

This subsection examines minimizers in *wh*- and *yes-no* interrogatives. First, consider the following example:

(11) Who would lift a finger for you?

This is the *wh*-interrogative in form with the minimizer *a finger*. The wider pitch range of the sentence is, however, not that of an

ordinary one, which suggests that the speaker of this sentence is not just asking a question.⁸ Instead, the sentence has the following natural implication:

(12) No one would lift a finger for you.

This implication describes the nonexistence of the people who will help the hearer. In other words, sentence (11) should be interpreted as a rhetorical question. That is, the speaker, by uttering the interrogative sentence, intends to express a strong negative belief as shown in (12).

Noting here that the speaker's belief in (12) is the one and only natural implication of (11), we then think about the function of the minimizer. The implication, where the minimizer is the focus of negation and stresses the negative sense, conveys the speaker's strong negative belief. In other words, two characteristics of the minimizer are observed in the negative implication. This leads us to say that the speaker holding the strong negative belief signals it by putting the minimizer in the *wh*-interrogative with the proper intonation.

Next, let us consider the *yes-no* interrogatives:

(13) Does Charlie bat an eye when he is threatened?

This is a *yes-no* interrogative sentence in form with the minimizer *an eye*. However, the intonation pattern of the sentence is different from that of the typical *yes-no* question, which suggests that the speaker of this sentence is not just asking a question about Charlie's disposition.⁹ Rather, the sentence has the following implication:

(14) Charlie doesn't bat an eye even when he is threatened.

This is the one and only natural implication, where the speaker's

strong negative belief is expressed. In other words, sentence (13), like (11), should be interpreted as a rhetorical question. Thus, we can say that the speaker, trying to convey the strong negative belief, signals it with the minimizer in the *yes-no* interrogative sentence.

Finally, let us compare the *yes-no* interrogative containing the minimizer with the one containing one of the NPIs *anyone*:

(15) Did anyone call last night?¹⁰

Comparing (15) with (13), both of which are *yes-no* interrogatives in form, we notice a sense of uncertainty in the former rather than the strong negative sense observed in the latter. In other words, the speaker of sentence (15) is just asking a question without expecting any particular answer. This is also confirmed by the following data, where the additional imperative *tell me* precedes:

(13') *Tell me, does Charlie bat an eye when he is threatened?

(15') Tell me, did anyone call last night?

The imperative forces the sentences to be interpreted as the ordinary *yes-no* interrogatives seeking information. The acceptability of (15') shows that the original sentence in (15) is interpreted as an ordinary *yes-no* interrogative. Thus, sentence (15) does not bear negative senses and *anyone* in (15) never occurs in the scope of negation (let alone the focus of negation). As can be seen from the observation above, these examples show a clear contrast between the NPIs with minimizers and *anyone*.

3.2 Minimizers in Protases

This subsection deals with minimizers in protases, and compares them with those with *ever*. First, consider the following sentences:

- (16)a. If you contribute a red cent to the Moonies, I'll hit you.
- b. *If you contribute a red cent to the Moonies, I'll reward you.

As for this pair, only (16a) has the following implication:

- (17) You shouldn't contribute a red cent to the Moonies.

This implication expresses the speaker's negative, or more precisely, inhibiting intention. That is, the speaker, by uttering (16a), forbids the hearer to contribute any money to the Moonies. Again, the intention is signaled by the very existence of the minimizer in the protasis. In other words, the speaker, trying to convey the inhibiting intention, signals it with the minimizer.

Let us now consider the different acceptabilities in (16), where the apodoses are completely different. Considering the meanings of the apodoses, we realize that the apodosis of (16a) expresses threat, while that of (16b) expresses praise. That is, the former shows that the speaker threatens the hearer with hitting, which is obviously unfavorable for the hearer, while the latter indicates that the speaker encourages the hearer to donate by praise.

Note here that, within a single sentence uttered, the speaker's intention is consistent. Then, when a full sentence expresses the prohibiting intention, so does a part of it. Following this line of argument, we can say that the protases in (16), which are only a part of the full sentence, convey the prohibiting intention. The protasis is, therefore, compatible with the apodosis in (16a), while it is not in (16b).¹¹

Consider now the following example, where one of the NPIs *ever* appears in the protasis:

- (18) If you ever come to Ann Arbor, look me up.

The strong negative sense is not observed here. Instead, a sense of uncertainty is noticed as in the case of the *yes-no* interrogative in (15). That is, the speaker of (18) does not expect a particular time, but just wants the hearer to come whenever he visits *Ann Arbor*.¹² Therefore, sentence (18) does not have negative senses and *ever* in (18) does not occur in the scope of negation (let alone the focus of negation). This is the second argument which shows a clear contrast between the NPIs with minimizers and *ever*.

3.3 Minimizers in Comparatives

Following the argument above, we consider the following sentences, where the minimizer *a finger* occurs in the *than* clause:

- (19) a. Cows fly more often than John lifts a finger to help the poor.
 b.* The sun rises more often than John lifts a finger to help the poor.

(cf. Linebarger 1991: 178-9)

(19a) has the following implication:

- (20) John doesn't lift a finger to help the poor.

The implication conveys the speaker's strong negative belief. Again, the speaker, trying to convey the strong negative belief, signals it with the minimizer. Also, only the *than* clause, which is a part of the full sentence, conveys the strong negative belief.

Leaving aside the exactly same *than* clauses, let us now focus on the main clauses in (19). In (19a), the event of cows' flying, which is obviously not likely to happen, is compared with the event of John's helping the poor, and the former is expressed as happening more often than the latter. That is, the speaker of (19a), referring to the impossible or unimaginable event of cows'

flying, stresses that John never helps the poor.

In (19b), the sunrise, which is an ordinary event, is compared with the event of John's helping the poor, and the former is expressed as occurring more often than the latter, which suggests that the frequency of John's helping the poor is uncertain. This is obviously incompatible with our claim that only the *than* clauses in (19) convey John's never helping the poor, which explains the unacceptability of (19b).

We now consider the case where one of the NPIs *any* is present in the *than* clause:

- (21) More people drink this brand than any other beer.

This sentence states that a group of people who drink one particular brand is larger than the other group who drink other brands. There is just a simple sense of comparison in this case, and *any* does not refer to any particular brand, but it just mentions whatever brand as long as it is beer. Thus, this sentence does not convey a strong negative sense as in the case of the NPIs with minimizers, and *any* in (21) never occurs in the scope of negation (let alone the negative focus). This is the third argument which shows a clear contrast between the NPIs with minimizers and *any*.

3.4 Minimizers in the *Be Surprised If* Construction

As the final argument for distinguishing the NPIs containing minimizers from other NPIs, let us consider the *be surprised if* construction. First, consider the following examples, where the minimizer *a finger* appears in the *if* clauses:

- (22) a. I'll be surprised if John lifts a finger to help the poor.
 b.* I'll be glad if John lifts a finger to help the poor.

Sentence (22a) has the following implication, where the speaker's

negative expectation is expressed:

- (23) John won't lift a finger to help the poor.

The speaker, by uttering sentence (22a), intends to convey this strong negative expectation. Again, only the *if* clause with the minimizer conveys this expectation.

We now consider the different acceptabilities between (22a) and (22b). In (22a), the speaker says that he will be surprised if John lifts a finger to help the poor. The state of being surprised is, in general, a psychologically direct reaction to an unexpected event. In other words, one is surprised when an event which he has expected not to happen actually happens. Thus, the speaker's negative expectation that John won't lift a finger to help the poor, which is contained in the main clause, is compatible with that conveyed in (23), and the sentence is acceptable.

Sentence (22b) expresses, however, that the speaker will be glad if John lifts a finger to help the poor. The state of being glad, contrary to that of being surprised, reflects one's expectation that something favorable will occur. Then the main clause, which conveys the speaker's expectation that John will help the poor, is incompatible with the *if* clause, since the latter expresses the completely opposite expectation as mentioned above. This explains why (22b) is unacceptable.

Next, we consider the following sentence, where one of the so-called restrictive NPIs *until* appears:

- (24) * I'll be surprised if he hires you until you shave off
your beard. (Horn 1989: 348)

The contrast between (22a) and (24) indicates that the minimizer *a finger* can occur in the *be surprised if* construction while *until* cannot. As we have stated above, the person who will be surprised has some expectation at the time of utterance. *A finger* is acceptable in the negative expectation (23), while *until* is not in

the speaker's expectation that he never hires the hearer until the hearer will shave off his beard.

In this connection, consider the following example, where no overt negatives are found:

(25) John stayed home until midnight.

Considering the meaning of the sentence, we observe the sense of continuity rather than any negative senses, which shows that *until* does not necessarily occur in the scope of negation. This is the final argument which shows a clear contrast between the NPIs with minimizers and *until*.¹³

In this section, through considering several types of example, we have confirmed two characteristics of minimizers even in cases without overt negatives. In the course of discussion, we have specifically focused on the implications of the sentences. Every implication of the sentences with the minimizers conveys a strong negative sense, which obviously indicates that the original sentences essentially accompany the strong negative sense. We have also examined the cases where the other types of NPI appear, and shown that the sentences with them do not necessarily accompany the strong negative sense, and that they do not necessarily occur in the scope of negation (let alone the negative focus). These observations, therefore, lead us to propose that the NPIs with minimizers should be distinguished from the other NPIs.

4. Detecting Negative Senses

Since we have confirmed two characteristics of minimizers in the previous section, we now go on to consider a few cases where they occur: sentences with *only*, and sentences with lexical negatives *doubt* and *deny*. The minimizers are, if they are acceptable, necessarily the focus of negation. Thus, we rely on

this characteristics and detect the sense of negation in the following discussion.

4.1 *Only*

As the first example, where minimizers are utilized to detect negative senses, we consider the sentences with *only*:

- (26) a. Only three people bugged an inch when I asked for help. (Linebarger 1991: 175)
 b. * Only about three-fourths of the people bugged an inch when I asked for help.

Considering the characteristics of the minimizers, we can say that *an inch* must be the focus of negation in (26a), which is confirmed by the following negative implication contained in the sentence:

- (27) Most people didn't budge an inch when I asked for help. (Linebarger 1991: 175)

An inch here is obviously the focus of negation and stresses that most of the people did not help the speaker. In (26b), however, we do not have a similar negative implication. This difference may be attributed to the quantity of the people modified by *only*. In a mathematical sense, the quantity is small in the former, but large in the latter.

One might say that the sequence *only about three-fourths of the people* itself is not acceptable in (26b). In other words, one might argue that *only* cannot modify a large quantity. The following sentence, however, reveals that *only* can in fact modify a large quantity in an appropriate context.

- (28) The problem was so easy that I expected everyone could solve it. However, only about three-fourths of the people could do so.

Under the assumption that the given problem was so easy that everyone could solve it, *only* can modify a large quantity *about three-fourths of the people*. Although *about three-fourths of the people* is mathematically a large quantity, it could be noticed as a small one in a psychological sense.

Considering the argument above, we place (26b) in a different context:

- (29) I expected that almost all the people would help me.
However, only about three-fourths of them budged an inch when I asked for help.

On the assumption that almost all the people would help the speaker, the sentence is acceptable. In other words, the second sentence of (29) has a negative implication. We must remember here that the sentence with *only* has a negative implication when it modifies a small quantity. Thus, under the appropriate context in (29), *about three-fourths of the people*, which is normally considered to be a large quantity, is in fact perceived as a small one. It is now more appropriate to say that the sentence with the modifier *only* yields a negative implication when the modifiee is "noticed" as a small quantity.

4.2 Notes on Verbs with Lexicalized Negatives

The second case, where minimizers are employed for negative senses, deals with the contrast between *doubt* and *deny*. Consider the following pair:

- (30)a. I doubt that John will lift a finger to help the poor.
b. * I deny that John will lift a finger to help the poor.

In this pair, the only difference lies in the verbs in the main clauses. Considering the fact that (30a) is acceptable while (30b)

is not, the minimizer *a finger* is the focus of negation in the former but not in the latter. Following Horn (1978b: 147-8), who indicates that *doubt* is paraphrasable as *believe...not* and *deny* as *assert...not*, we assume that the lexicalized negative in *doubt* focuses on the minimizer and thus the sentence is acceptable. This sentence clearly indicates that the lexicalized negative can focus on the minimizer. Considering this possibility, we then ask why *deny* cannot focus on the minimizer as in the case of *doubt*.

In considering this issue, we must consider the nature of each verb. A little reflection reveals that *doubt* expresses one's mental attitude of suspicion or negative opinion, while *deny* represents one's act of denial. Therefore, the crucial difference lies in the fact that *doubt* is a thinking verb, while *deny* is a performative verb. In the act of denying, one has some presupposition at the time of utterance. In (30b), what is considered to be presupposed is the proposition described by the whole embedded clause. We must note here the fact that each internal element within the presupposed or established proposition is never affected from the outside. Thus, in (30b), every internal element of the presupposed *that* clause is never focused on by the lexicalized negative of *deny*. This explains why (30b) is unacceptable. Although both verbs lexicalize negatives within them, the distinct characteristics of *doubt* and *deny* explain the different acceptabilities.

5. Summary and Conclusion

In this paper, we have claimed that the NPIs with minimizers should be distinguished from the other NPIs such as *anyone*, *ever*, *any*, and *until* in that (i) the former must be the focus of negation and c-commanded on the surface by negatives if any, and (ii) they stress negative senses. The latter, however, does not necessarily occur in the scope of negation. Throughout the examination of several types of example, we have observed these features even in

cases without overt negatives. Finally, based on these characteristics, we have detected the negative senses in a few examples with minimizers.

Our claim in the present paper has several advantages. First, the claim facilitates proposing a proper licensing condition for NPIs. As we have seen in the previous sections, the NPIs without minimizers do not necessarily occur in the scope of negation. In other words, the negative context is just one of the environments where the other NPIs occur. By excluding these NPIs from consideration, we can avoid such an obvious counterexample as Linebarger's, and we will be able to propose an adequate licensing condition for the NPIs.

The second advantage is related to the first. As we have mentioned in section 2, counterparts to the English minimizers are observed in a variety of languages. By limiting our attention to the NPIs with minimizers and disregarding other types of NPI, we will be able to make a comparative study of NPIs much easier.

Finally, as we have briefly shown in the last section, we can detect negative senses more accurately if we depend on the very nature of the minimizers. The other types of NPI, however, are not a reliable means to spot the negative senses, since they can occur even outside the scope of negation.

Notes

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¹ Klima (1964), Linebarger (1980, 1987, 1991), Ladusaw (1980), and Yoshimura (1993), among others.

² We use the term *minimizer* in the sense of Bolinger (1972), where he uses the term to refer to a class of expressions indicating

the minimum quantity. *Bit, smidgen, iota, whit, trace, sign* and so on are cited as examples of minimizers.

³ I owe the data and the argument to Shinsuke Homma.

⁴ C-command is defined as follows:

a c-commands *β* iff *a* does not dominate *β* and every *γ* that dominates *a* dominates *β*. (Chomsky 1986: 8)

⁵ Fauconnier (1975) explains this mental process with his "Pragmatic Scale."

⁶ The implication is also observed in the following examples, where one of the NPIs *any* occurs:

- (i) a. I don't have potatoes.
- b. I don't have any potatoes.

(Kadmon and Landman 1993: 359)

Kadmon and Landman observe that a speaker can utter (ia) even if he has rotten or non-cooking potatoes, while (ib) does not allow such exception. In other words, (ib) implies that even the smallest quantity of cooking or non-cooking potatoes does not exist. It seems that minimizers share the second characteristics of stressing negative senses with *any*. However, as will become clear in the discussion in section 3, *any* is not necessarily the focus of negation. Thus, minimizers and *any* are distinguishable in this regard.

⁷ Horn (1978a: 149-151) cites some data from Swahili and Japanese as well as some European languages.

⁸ The intonation contour of (11) is represented below, where *you* is accented:

- (i) Who would lift a finger for you?

Compare the contour with the one of the following ordinary *wh*-question:

- (ii) Who called last night?

The contour represented in (i) is obviously wider than that of (ii).

⁹ The intonation contour of (13) and (15) is shown below:

- (i) Does Charlie bat an eye when he is threatened?
- (ii) Did anyone call last night?

In (i), where rhetorical question interpretation is obtained, *Charlie* is accented, since he is contrasted with someone else. In (ii), on the other hand, *anyone* is accented.

¹⁰ This sentence is read with the natural intonation of an ordinary *yes-no* question (see the note 8 above). However, the sentence can also be read with the unusually wider pitch range as shown below:

- (i) Did anyone call last night?

Under this intonation, both *anyone* and *call* are accented and the latter is pronounced specifically long, and the sentence is interpreted as a rhetorical question.

¹¹ Japanese Positive Polarity Item (PPI) *nanika* shows the same contrast as in (16):

- (i) a. *Nanika iwa-nakatta ra, naguru zo.*
 something say-Neg if hit Particle
 'If you do not say anything, I'll hit you.'
- b. **Nanika iwa-nakatta ra, okane-o ageru zo.*
 something say-Neg if money-Acc give Particle
 'If you do not say anything, I'll give you money.'

Nanika is acceptable in (ia), where the apodosis expresses threat, but not in (ib), where the apodosis conveys praise. Although (i) and (14) shows the same distribution, the negative implication, which licenses the NPI *a red cent* in (14), is not observed in (ia).

In fact, (ia) has the implication that the hearer should say something, which is obviously not a negative implication. We do not fully investigate the PPI here, but the contrast in (i) seems to be an additional example, where polarity items are licensed in the level of implication.

¹² The fact that *ever* does not refer to a particular time is confirmed by the following data:

- (i) When I left home yesterday, I didn't (**ever*) remember to close the windows. (Krifka 1991: 172)

The subordinate clause refers to the particular time *yesterday*, which conflicts with *ever* in the main clause.

¹³ As for (25), the continuous sense of the VP is compatible with that of the *until* phrase. Continuity seems to account for the following contrast as well:

- (i) a. John didn't come home until midnight.
b. *John came home until midnight.

In (ia), the predicate *come home* together with *not* has the continuous meaning of John's not coming home, which is compatible with that of the *until* phrase. Thus, the sentence is acceptable. The predicate of (ib) *came home*, on the other hand, describes an instantaneous event, which is obviously incompatible with the *until* phrase, and the sentence is unacceptable.

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