Have Causatives and Related Issues*
Mika Okuyama

0. Introduction

In Okuyama (1992a), I attempted to explore semantic differences between the two periphrastic causatives, namely, *make* and *have* causatives, claiming that they have their own semantic nature which defines their "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations.[1] The main idea in that paper was that each main verb appearing in a periphrastic causative (i.e. *make* and *have*) has an abstract semantic function which contributes to the semantic nature of each causative. In Okuyama (1992a), on the basis of the semantic function of each verb, I further proposed conceptual structures for these causatives in which "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations can be made clear.[2]

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the conceptual structure of *have* causatives, developing the idea presented in Okuyama (1992a). There are two important problems which we will deal with in this paper: (i) how the verb *have* contributes to the semantic nature of *have* causatives, and (ii) what their conceptual structure should be like. Moreover, I will attempt to make clear the conceptual relation between *have* causatives and *have* constructions that have passive meanings, or more specifically, adversative ones.[3]

The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 1, I illustrate several phenomena concerning *have* causatives, in order to obtain the general backgrounds of some characteristics of *have* causatives. Moreover, I point out five problems which should be explained by our analysis. In section 2, I discuss an abstract semantic function of the verb *have* which contributes to the meaning of *have* causatives. In section 3, I provide the conceptual structure for this type of causative. Furthermore, I explain the problems raised in section 1. In section 4, on the basis of the semantic function of the verb *have* argued for in section 2, I consider how the conceptual structure of *have* adversatives can be represented. Then I observe the relation between *have* causatives and *have* adversatives. Concluding remarks

are provided in section 5.

1. **Phenomena and Problems**

1.1. **Some Characteristics of *Have* Causatives**

First, consider the following contrast:

(1) a. John had Mary *read* the book.

    b. *John had Mary *like* French cooking.

          (cf. Baron (1972,1974), Ritter and Rosen (1990))

Baron (1972,1974) argues that the difference in acceptability between
(1a) and (1b) is due to whether the embedded verb is [-stative] or
[+stative]. She claims that the embedded verb in *have* causatives must
be [-stative]. Thus, (1a) is acceptable because the embedded verb
(*read*) is [-stative], while (1b) is unacceptable because *like* is a
[+stative] verb.[4]

Second, consider what kind of a category can be the subject (or,
the causer) of *have* causatives:

(2) a. *Tom* had me change my mind.

    b. **The confusion* had me change my mind.

    c. **What Tom did* had me change my mind.

          (Baron (1974), Givón (1975))

Baron (1974) claims that what is responsible for the contrast shown in
(2) is whether the causer is [+agentive]: if the causer of *have*
causatives is [+agentive] (*Tom* in (2a)), the sentence is acceptable
as shown in (2a); on the other hand, if the causer is [-agentive]
(*the confusion* in (2b) and *what Tom did* in (2c)), the sentence is un-
acceptable.

Following Baron's observation, Oohashi (1985) points out that there
is also a certain restriction on the embedded subject of *have* causa-
tives; the embedded subject must be an animate with intention, that is,

typically a person. Look at the following contrast:

(3) a.   John had *Mary* roll down the hill.
    b. *John had *the rock* roll down the hill.

The example in (3a) satisfies the above restriction, whereas the example in (3b) does not, because *the rock* is neither an animate entity nor an intentional one. Notice that the verb *roll* is ambiguous between an intentional reading and a non-intentional one. Thus, the sentence *Mary rolled down the hill* has two interpretations: i.e., Mary intentionally rolled down the hill and Mary did not rolled down the hill under her own volition. According to Oohashi (1985), however, the fact that the embedded subject must be an animate with intention implies that the verb *roll* in (3a) must be interpreted only in the [+intentional] reading.

Furthermore, as is well known, *have* causatives cannot be passivized, which is illustrated in the following examples:[5. 6]

(4) a.   John had Mary read the book.
    b. *Mary was had to read the book by John.

As for the meaning of *have* causatives, Shibatani (1973) points out that *have* causatives are incompatible with a coercive meaning. Observe the following contrast:

(5) a.   I had the doctor come *by asking him to do so.*
    b. *I had the doctor come *by twisting his arms.*
                                  (cf. Shibatani (1973))

In (5b), the *by* phrase induces a coercive meaning. That is, it describes a situation where the matrix subject *I* threatens *the doctor*. On the other hand, since the *by* phrase in (5a) does not induce any coercive meaning, it describes a non-coercive situation. Therefore, from the contrast in (5), Shibatani concludes that *have* causatives are non-coercive causatives.

Thus far, we have seen five characteristics of *have* causatives.

To recapitulate: (i) [+stative] verbs cannot appear in the embedded clause of *have* causatives; (ii) the matrix subject (or the causer) must be [+agentive]; (iii) the embedded subject (or the causee) must be an animate with intention; (iv) *have* causatives cannot be passivized; and finally, (v) *have* causatives have a non-coercive meaning.

1.2. Problems

The five characteristics we have seen above are useful in understanding the general properties of *have* causatives. In order to investigate the semantic nature of *have* causatives, we must take into consideration the following problems, which have not been explained thus far:

    (i) Why must the embedded verb be [-stative]?
    (ii) Why must the causer be [+agentive]?
   (iii) Why must the causee be an animate with intention?
    (iv) Why can *have* causatives not be passivized?
    (v) Why can *have* causatives have a non-coercive meaning?

Subsequent sections (especially section 3) are devoted to providing satisfactory accounts of these problems. But before going directly into explaining them, in the next section we will clarify an abstract semantic function of the verb *have* which contributes to the semantic function of *have* causatives.

2. The Verb *Have*

We assume here that the verb *have* has an abstract semantic function, although it can be used in a variety of constructions. Given this assumption, it follows that the constructions headed by *have* should be unified under the abstract semantic function of this verb. However, the question arises here as to how these can be related, or more specifically, the identity of the semantic function which is abstracted from the different uses of the verb *have*. Although it

would be necessary to examine all uses of *have* in order to clarify
such a function, here I will mainly observe the type of relation which
exists between the basic use of this verb (i.e. possession) and its
causative use.[7] Since this study is not intended as a detailed and
complete description of the verb *have*, it is sufficient to show the
relation between the basic use of *have* and its causative use, which,
as I will argue below, contributes to the semantic nature of *have*
causatives.

Consider the following sentences, in which (6a) illustrates the
basic use (i.e. possession) of *have* and (6b) its causative use:

(6) a.   John has a pen.

     b.   John had Mary go.

Let us consider the relation between *John* and *a pen* in (6a). Intui-
tively speaking, it is obvious that these two entities are conceptually
related in terms of "BELONG TO".[8] That is, the sentence in (6a) in-
dicates a conceptual relation such as *a pen BELONG TO John*. More
specifically, in (6a), a concrete object (*a pen*) "BELONGs TO" John's
sphere of possession, or in other words, *a pen* is in John's sphere of
possession--John possesses a pen. I propose here that *have* in (6b)
also indicates the conceptual relation specified by "BELONG TO"; the
situation of Mary's going and *John* can be related in terms of "BELONG
TO". Given this proposal, in (6b), the abstract situation of Mary's
going "BELONG TO" John's sphere of influence, or in other words, the
situation occurs under John's influence.

One might cast some doubt on the claim that such a conceptual
relation indicated by "BELONG TO" exists between the matrix subject
(*John*) and the situation of Mary's going. A close examination of the
meaning of *have* causatives, however, reveals that our observation is
on the right track. Though a detailed discussion of the meaning of
have causatives will be made in the next section, the important point
to be addressed here is that in *have* causatives, it is the will of the
causer that immediately causes the event or the result described in the
embedded clause. In other words, *have* causatives describe a situation

in which the causer (or the matrix subject) has the will to bring about
the situation or the event described in the embedded clause. Thus in
(6b) the situation of Mary's going is brought about by the will of the
causer. In this respect, it can be said that the causer is responsible
for the occurrence of that situation. This means that the situation
occurs under John's influence. Therefore, it follows that, in (6b),
the "BELONG TO" relation also exists conceptually between the matrix
subject (John) and the situation described in the embedded clause in
(6b).

We must therefore look more carefully into the problem of how the
intuitive relation "BELONG TO" is defined in terms of the abstract
semantic function of have. In many studies of this verb, it has been
argued that there is a certain function by which the verb have relates
its subject to its NP or sentential complement. Culicover (1987) con-
siders such a relation, observing a variety of uses of have, as il-
lustrated in the following examples:

(7) a. John has two ears.
    b. John has two cars.
    c. John has two carrots (in his hand).
    d. John has two brothers.

Sentences (7a-d) include inalienable and alienable possession, spatial
location, kinship, respectively. Moreover, Culicover points out that
the verb have has many uses other than the varieties of possession
shown in (7). He presents the following examples, which concern neither
space nor possession:

(8) a. John had a terrible day.
    b. John had a bad night.

In (8a,b), have describes the event of the time period experienced by the
subject NP John. (8a) describes a certain kind of day time activity
and (8b) John's experience of restless. Although the such varieties of
have as shown in (7) and (8) are seemingly different, Culicover provides

the following hypothesis, which serves to lump all uses of the verb *have* together:

> (9) If X has Y there is some (unspecified) link between X and Y.'
>
> (Culicover (1987:79))

Beside Culicover, Wierzbicka (1988) considers the semantic function of *have*. In order to make clear the semantics of *have a V* constructions (e.g. *have a drink*), which is the main issue of Wierzbicka (1988), she sheds some lights on the semantic function of *have*: she analyzes it on the basis of its basic use (i.e. possession), assuming that there is a certain abstract function common to all uses of this verb. She states the function of *have* as follows:

> (10) *Have* makes a predication about the object into an (implicit) predication about the subject.
>
> (Wierzbicka (1988:345))

For example, consider the following sentence:

> (11) John has [the book in his office].

The bracketed part of the sentence in (11) shows a predication relation concerning the object (i.e. *the book* is *in his office*). Due to the semantic function of *have* demonstrated in (10), the predication relation indicated by the bracketed part is regarded as a predication concerning the subject *John*, as shown by the arrow in (11).

Let us now return to our main discussion, keeping in mind the analyses reviewed above. In our observations, the linkage proposed by Culicover is intuitively captured by the "BELONG TO" relation, which conceptually exists between the subject and the sentential/NP complement. I propose here that the notion of ATTRIBUTION be abstracted from the "BELONG TO" relation. Given this notion, we can restate Wierzbicka's observation in a much more straightforward way. Notice

that she does not clearly account for the problems of why and how
the predication relation with the object can be predicated of the
subject. If we adopt the notion of ATTRIBUTION, we can give an
account for this problem. That is, in (11), the bracketed part of
the sentence is ATTRIBUTED to the subject (*John*) in the sense that
the situation of the book being in his office "BELONGs TO" the subject.
Therefore, to the extent that this notion of ATTRIBUTION is concerned,
it can be claimed that a predication relation with the object is
carried over into a predication of the subject. The notion of ATTRIB-
UTION is supposed to guarantee Wierzbicka's view shown in (10). It is
in this sense that ATTRIBUTION is a workable notion, indicating the
abstract semantic function of the verb *have*.[1]

To summarize, in this section I have shown that the verb *have* is
specified in terms of the notion of ATTRIBUTION, which is supposed to
be the abstract function common to all uses of *have*.

3. The Semantic Nature of *Have* Causatives

3.1. The Conceptual Structure of *Have* Causatives

In the previous section, we have claimed that the notion of ATTRI-
BUTION is supposed as the abstract semantic function of the verb *have*.
In this section, following this claim, I present a conceptual struc-
ture for *have* causatives which specifies their semantic nature. The
term *conceptual* is used here to show how the speaker perceives the
CAUSE-EFFECT relation described by *have* causatives. By representing
the conceptual structure, we can successfully make clear how the
CAUSE-EFFECT relation of *have* causatives is perceived by the speaker.

In order to present the conceptual structure, we will begin by
considering the meaning conveyed by the expression of *have* causatives.
The following contrast, observed in Okuyama (1992a), shows that the
causee (or the embedded subject) of *have* causatives is willing to and
prepared to bring about the event described in the embedded clause:

(12) a. *John had Mary do the work without considering her
     wishes.[11]

   b. John had Mary do the work after considering her
     wishes.

As (12a) shows, *have* causatives are incompatible with the adverbial
phrase *without considering her wishes*, which indicates a situation
in which the causer *John* forces the causee *Mary* to do the work against
her will.   In (12b), on the other hand, the adverbial phrase *after
considering her wishes* implies that the event of Mary's doing the work
occurred in agreement with Mary's wishes.   From this contrast we
can say that the causee in *have* causatives voluntarily participates in
bringing about the event described in the embedded clause.

Next, consider the following sentences:

(13) a. *I *accidentally* had him go.
   b. I *deliberately* had him go.

The difference of the acceptability in (13) is due to the adverbs in
each sentence: *accidentally* in (13a) and *deliberately* in (13b).   The
fact that *have* causatives are compatible not with *accidentally* but
with *deliberately* shows that the causer does want the causee to bring
about the event described in the embedded clause.   In other words,
the causer in *have* causatives has his/her own will to bring about the
event described in the embedded clause.

From the observation above, we can conclude the following: the
causer has a will to bring about the event described in the embedded
clause; and the causee voluntarily brings about the event, granting
the will of the causer.   Next the question arises as to the manner in
which the will of the causer is conveyed to the causee.   Consider the
following examples:

(14) a.??John had Mary run by ordering her to do so.
   b. John had Mary run by asking her to do so.

The fact that (14b) is preferable to (14a) indicates that the action of asking, rather than the action of ordering, is a more desirable way for the causer to convey his/her will. Thus, the will of the causer is conveyed to the causee by the action of asking.

To present a conceptual structure for *have* causatives, we must now return to the point proposed in the previous section. Let us consider how the notion of ATTRIBUTION is embodied in *have* causatives. The observation shown in (12)-(14) suggests a solution to this problem. The examples indicate that in *have* causatives (i) the causer has a will to bring about the event described in the embedded clause, and (ii) s/he conveys his/her will to the causee, and finally (iii) accepting the causer's offer, the causee voluntarily does something which brings about the event. The important point to be noted here is that the occurrence of the caused event depends upon the will of the causer. That is, as the contrast in (13) indicates, if the causer does not have his/her own will to bring about the caused event, the sentence turns unacceptable. This leads us to conclude that, in the situation described by *have* causatives, the caused event would never occur without the causer's will, regardless of whether or not the causee has his/her wish to bring it about. In other words, the caused event is attributable to the causer's will. In this way, we can say that the notion of ATTRIBU- TION is embodied in *have* causatives.

On the basis of the observations mentioned above, I present the conceptual structure for *have* causatives as follows:

(15) a. John had Mary go there by asking her to do so.

b.
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      PERSON₁ 〰〰〰 WILL 〰〰→ PERSON₂
     (CAUSER)                 (CAUSEE)
         ⇑                    ACCEPT
         ⇑                      │
  ATTRIBUTE═══════════════      │
                                ▼
                              EVENT
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Examining sentence (15a), which is a typical example of *have* causa-

tives, again we make clear their semantic nature which is demonstrated by the conceptual structure in (15b). In sentence (15a), the first point to be noted is that the CAUSER (*John*), represented as PERSON$_1$ in (15b), has a WILL to bring about the EVENT of Mary's going, and that he communicates his will to the CAUSEE (*Mary*), represented as PERSON$_2$, by the action of asking her. The will of the causer is ACCEPTED by the causee in the sense that she voluntarily participates in bringing about the EVENT [Mary go]. In this way, the EVENT [Mary go] occurs as an effect of the will of the CAUSER (or PERSON$_1$'s).

We can say that these points observed in sentence (15a) are successfully represented in the conceptual structure in (15b). The waved line serves to indicate that the CAUSER's (or PERSON$_1$) WILL is conveyed by the action of asking; this line and the solid line show the process of the occurrence of the caused event; before its occurrence, there is a level of acceptance, which is represented as ACCEPT. The square indicates that the will of the CAUSER (or PERSON$_1$) is successfully granted by the CAUSEE (or PERSON$_2$) and as its effect, the EVENT occurs. Moreover, the double line means that the CAUSER and the caused EVENT are related in terms of the notion of ATTRIBUTION, which is the semantic function of the verb *have*. Hence, we can conclude that the semantic nature of *have* causatives, which is observed in the typical example in (15a), can be represented as in (15b).

In the next subsection I will show that the representation in (15b) is workable as an explanation of a variety of examples of *have* causatives, and provide accounts for the five problems raised in section 1.2.

3.2. Some Consequences of the Conceptual Structure

In this subsection, I will consider solutions to the five prob-
lems raised above, on the basis of the conceptual structure of *have* causatives proposed in (15b).

Consider the first problem, i.e, why the embedded verb must be [-stative]. For convenience, we repeat the examples in (1a,b) as (16a,b):

(16) a. John had Mary read the book.

   b. *John had Mary like French cooking.

                    (cf. Baron (1972,1974), Ritter and Rosen (1990))

Recall that, Baron (1972,1974) claims, on the basis of the contrast in
(16), that the embedded verb must be [-stative]. If so, her analysis
predicts that the following example would be unacceptable because the
embedded verb is not [-stative]:

   (17) I had him be careful.

As (17) shows, however, there are sentences with [+stative] verbs which
are acceptable, contrary to Baron's prediction. We cannot explain
the acceptability of (17) only by saying that the embedded verb
of *have* causatives must be [-stative]. One might argue here that if
in addition to the semantic feature [-stative] we stipulate that a
feature such as [+intentional] should play a role in *have* causatives,
the problem raised by (17) would be explained. Even if we can explain
the acceptability of (17) by using the feature like [+intentional], the
problem still remains as to why such a semantic feature as [+in-
tentional] needs postulating. However, if we consider how the speaker
perceives the situation described by *have* causatives, we can do without
postulating such a redundant stipulation. That is, the conceptual struc-
ture shown in (15b) can explain straightforwardly what factors should
be relevant to the difference in the acceptability between (16b) and
(17). Recall here that the conceptual structure of *have* causatives
tells us that the embedded subject or the causee voluntarily parti-
cipates in doing what the causer wants. In this respect, it can be
said that the causee intends to bring about the event described by
the embedded clause. Thus, some intention will be invariably read
off on the part of the causee in *have* causatives. It follows that
the embedded subject (the causee) must semantically cooccur with a
verb having the meaning of intention. Some stative verbs such as
like cannot imply some intention of the subject, while others such as
be careful can. This fact is illustrated in the following examples:

(18) a. *Like French cooking.

    b. Be careful.

The fact that the verb *like* cannot appear in an imperative form means that the implicit subject of (18a) cannot intentionally like French cooking. In other words, the verb *like* does not require that its subject should have intention. On the other hand, the fact that (18b) is perfectly acceptable means that *be careful* requires that its subject have intention. Recall here that, as the conceptual structure in (15b) shows, the causee of *have* causatives voluntarily brings about what the causer wants. This indicates that the causee has a certain kind of intention. Therefore, verbs which do not imply intentions of their subjects (e.g. *like*) cannot occur in the embedded clause of *have* causatives. In this way, (16b) but not (17) is excluded. Now we have an answer to the first question.

    We can next explain the problem in (ii), which was raised in the previous section. Consider the sentences in (2), which are repeated in (19):

(19) a. *Tom* had me change my mind.

    b. *The confusion* had me change my mind.

    c. *What Tom did* had me change my mind.

                     (Baron (1974), Givón (1975))

This problem can also be explained straightforwardly by considering the mechanism of the conceptual structure of *have* causatives. Recall here that it is due to the will of the causer that the caused event occurs in *have* causatives. In other words, the occurrence of the caused event depends on the will of the causer. This means that the subject of *have* causatives is limited to a volitional entity. The subjects of (19b) and (19c) denote certain situations, which cannot be volitional entities. Thus, sentences (19b,c) cannot satisfy the condition that the subject of *have* causatives is restricted to a volitional entity, and hence the unacceptability of (19b,c).

    By the same token, consider the third problem concerning Oohashi's

analysis. Recall sentences (3a,b), repeated as (20a,b):

(20) a. John had *Mary* roll down the hill.

b. *John had *the rock* roll down the hill.

As we have seen in the previous section, Oohashi merely ascribes the contrast in (20) to the fact that the embedded subject of *have* causatives (the causee) must be an intentional animate, typically a person. We have pointed out a problem as to why the causee must be an animate with intention. Our conceptual structure of *have* causatives provides a solution to this problem, including two conditions as corollaries. The first is that, as we have shown in the explanation of (16)-(18), the causee is taken to have his/her own volition to bring about the caused event. And the second is that the causee is an entity that has the ability to accept the causer's will. Now we can solve the problem. That is, the reason why the causee must be an intentional animate (typically, a person) is that only a person can satisfy these two conditions.

Moreover, on the basis of the conceptual structure of *have* causatives, we can say that the causee serves as an Agent in the sense that s/he voluntarily participates in bringing about the caused event of his or her own voliton.[12] This leads us to an explanation of the fourth problem as to why *have*causatives cannot be passivized. The following contrast illustrates the unacceptability of the passivization of *have* causatives:

(21) a. John had Mary do the work.

b. *Mary was had to do the work.

Before directly going into an explanation of the problem at hand, consider the following well-known fact about passivizability. Look at the following contrast:

(22) a. The page was turned by Tom.

b. *The corner was turned by Tom.

Since Bolinger (1975), it has been argued that the subject of a passive must be a Patient that is affected by the action denoted by the verb. In (22a), *the page* can be conceived of as a Patient because its state is changed by Tom's turning of it (i.e. the page is moved from the right side of the book to the left side). *The corner* in (22b), on the other hand, cannot be taken to be a Patient that is affected by the action of Tom's turning, because Tom's action does not give rise to any significant change in it. Thus, (22a) is acceptable while (22b) is not.

Let us now return to the problem of the unpassivizability of *have* causatives. What must be noted here is that the causee (*Mary* in (21)) functions as an Agent rather than as a Patient. In spite of the fact that the subject of passives must be a Patient in the sense of Bolinger, the causee *Mary* in (21), which could be expected to be the subject of the passive, is taken to be an Agent in the embedded clause since she does the work voluntarily. For this reason, *have* causatives cannot be passivized.

We can now provide an answer to the last problem of why *have* causatives have a non-coercive meaning. From the mechanism of the conceptual structure in (15b), it can be said that the causee voluntarily accepts the causer's will. Consequently, we can suppose that the causee hardly, if ever, puts up any resistance to the causer's will. It is in this sense that *have* causatives can have a non-coercive meaning.

In this subsection, we have demonstrated that the conceptual structure is sufficiently workable to give satisfactory accounts for the problems raised in the previous section. The next section will show the relation between *have* causatives and *have* adversatives.

4. *Have* Adversatives: A Relation with *Have* Causatives

In this section, I will consider how *have* causatives and *have* adversatives can be related, observing how *have* adversatives can be represented conceptually in terms of the notion of ATTRIBUTION.

4.1. Some Properties of *Have* Adversatives

Before showing some of the properties of *have* adversatives, we
must first make a few remarks on *have* causatives in two respects. First
examine the following examples of *have* causatives:

(23) a. John had Mary shine his shoes by asking her to do so.

b. John had his shoes shined by Mary by asking her to
do so.

Notice that sentence (23b) is as much an example of a *have* causative
as (23a). The structural difference between (23a) and (23b) is
whether the embedded clause is active or passive. The following
question arises: Under what conditions are passives used in the
embedded clause of a *have* causative? To answer this question, con-
sider the following observation of passives made in Okuyama (1990,1991):

(24) a. Passives are expressions such that CHANGE OF STATE of the
subject NP is conceived of as the FOREGROUND and the other
participant(s) as the BACKGROUND.

b. ...what is important in passives is a change of the state
on the part of the subject NP, not on the part of the
by-NP.

(Okuyama (1990,1991))

The important point is that, in passives, we cognitively focus not on
someone who does some action but on the change in state of the subject.
This change of state is taken to be the FOREGROUND. Thus it follows
that since the embedded clause of (23b) is a passive form, the change
of state of *his shoes* is focused on and functions as the FOREGROUND,
while *Mary* who shined the shoes functions as the BACKGROUND. In other
words, in cases where the change of the state of the shoes is an
important event for the causer, passives are used in the embedded
clause of *have* causatives, as shown in (23b).

Keeping this observation in mind, let us consider the conceptual

structure of *have* causatives in which the embedded clause is a passive
form. The process of the occurrence of the caused event of (23b) is
the same one as that of (23a): that is, as in (23a), the causer in
(23b) (*John*) has a mind to bring about the caused event and he conveys
his will by asking the causee to do it; the causee ACCEPTS the causer's
will and performs some action to bring about the event. Thus, roughly
speaking, (15b) can be the representation of both (23a) and (23b). For
convenience, the representation in (15b) is repeated as (25):

(25)　　PERSON₁ ～～～ᵂᴵᴸᴸ～～～> PERSON₂

(CAUSER)　　　　　　　(CAUSEE)

　　　　　　　　　　　ACCEPT

ATTRIBUTE ════════════

　　　　　　　　　　　EVENT

If we take into consideration the semantic difference between (23a) and
(23b) (i.e. actives and passives), a slight modification of (25) will
be needed in order to show the property of passives in (24). (26) be-
low is supposed to be the representation of *have*-causatives where the
embedded clause is passivized:

(26)　　PERSON₁ ～～～ᵂᴵᴸᴸ～～～> PERSON₂

(CAUSER)　　　　　　　(CAUSEE)

ATTRIBUTE　　　　　　ACCEPT

　　　　　　　　　　　EVENT

As we have seen above, the fact that passives are used in the embedded
clause of *have* causatives, as in (23b), indicates that the change of
state of *the shoes* is FOREGROUNDED and *Mary* who shines them is BACK-
GROUNDED. Thus, in (26), by using the dotted circle, we demonstrate
that the causee (*Mary*), who does what the causer wants, is BACK-
GROUNDED.

The second point to be mentioned here is that *have* causatives imply that the occurrence of the caused event is of benefit to the causer. Recall what is indicated by the conceptual structure of *have* causatives represented in (25). In the sentence *I had Mary do the work by asking her to do so*, the caused event *Mary do the work* occurs as follows: the causer hopes that the event of Mary's doing the work will occur, and s/he communicates this to Mary through the action of asking; the causer's will is accepted by the causee *Mary* and she does the work as an instrument of the causer's will. Notice that the occurrence of the caused event originates in the causer's will. From this fact, it follows that the caused event is of benefit to the causer. That is, we can say that in *have* causatives, the caused event is beneficially ATTRIBUTED to the causer.

With this observation in mind, let us show a certain property of *have* adversatives, with respect to which they can be distinguished from *have* causatives. Consider the following examples, in which the (a) sentences are examples of *have* causatives and the (b) sentences those of *have* adversatives:[13]

(27) a. John had his shoes shined by asking her to do so.
     b. *John had his car stolen by asking her to do so.

As we have seen above, sentence (27a) is acceptable since it is compatible with the adverbial phrase *by asking her to do so*. On the other hand, (27b) is incompatible with the adverbial phrase *by asking her to do so*. What does this fact indicate? The following examples provide a solution to this problem. Consider the following contrast:

(28) a. *John had his shoes shined without asking her to do so.
     b. John had his car stolen without asking her to do so.

Since the causer in *have* causatives conveys his/her will to the causee, as is clearly shown in the conceptual structure in (25), the adverbial phrase *without asking her to do so* is incompatible with *have* causatives. Hence the unacceptability of (28a). What must be noted

here is the acceptability of the *have* adversative in (28b). The fact that *have* adversatives are compatible with an adverbial phrase like *without asking her to do so* indicates that there is no communication between the subject (*John*) and the person who stole his car. We can claim that in *have* adversatives the event described occurs, regardless of the will of the subject. This claim is confirmed by the unacceptability of the following example:

(29) *I want to have my car stolen.

The sentence in (29) is unacceptable if it is interpreted as a *have* adversative. The expression *I want* means that the subject hopes that the event described in the embedded clause will occur. As we have seen above, however, the event occurs regardless of the will of the subject. Thus, since the expression *I want* is incompatible with *have* adversatives, the sentence in (29) is unacceptable. Now we can explain the unacceptability of the sentence in (27b): the adverbial phrase *by asking her to do so* is incompatible with *have* adversatives because the action of asking to someone is contradictory to the situation described by *have* adversatives. It is in this respect that *have* adversatives can be distinguished from *have* causatives.

4.2. The Relation between *Have* Causatives and *Have* Adversatives

We have shown the conceptual structure of *have*-causatives in which the embedded clause is a passive form. In this subsection, I will first consider the conceptual structure of *have*-adversatives. In order to present this, we must recall the claim that the event described in the embedded clause occurs regardless of the will of the subject. This claim does not mean that the event itself has nothing to do with the subject. Consider the following examples:

(30) a. I had my car stolen.
   b. *I had Bill's car stolen.

The contrast in (30) shows that there is a relation between the subject and the event: more specifically, if the subject's own car is stolen as in (30a), the event is of adversity to the subject I; on the other hand, even if the other person's car (*Bill's car*) is stolen, as (30b) shows, the event cannot be taken to be an adversative to the subject.[14] We can thus propose that the event is such that it is adversatively attributed to the subject. In other words, the notion of ATTRIBUTION is concerned with *have* adversatives as well as *have* causatives.

On the basis of the properties of *have* adversatives discussed above, we propose that their conceptual structure is as follows:

(31)   John had his car stolen.

PERSON ⟵══ATTRIBUTE══╢EVENT ╟

Compare the representation in (31) with those for *have* causatives. For the sake of convenience, two types of representations are repeated below:

(25)   PERSON₁ ∿∿∿ᵂᴵᴸᴸ∿∿∿→PERSON₂
       (CAUSER)   (CAUSEE)
                            ACCEPT
       ATTRIBUTE ══════════════
                              ↓
                            EVENT

(26)   PERSON₁ ∿∿∿ᵂᴵᴸᴸ∿∿∿→PERSON₂
       (CAUSER)   (CAUSEE)
                            ACCEPT
       ATTRIBUTE
                              ↓
                            EVENT

Recall that (25) is the representation of *have* causatives when the

embedded clause is an active form, and that (26) represents *have*
causatives when this is a passive form. Though there is a difference
between actives and passives in the embedded clause, the will of the
subject (or the causer), which is accepted by the causee, is a relevant
matter in both (25) and (26). Therefore, the causer's will and a level
of acceptance need to be represented in two types of *have* causatives.
On the other hand, in *have* adversatives, the event occurs regardless of
the will of the subject. That is, the subject is an entity that the
event happens to. Thus, as (31) shows, *have* adversatives can be defined
only in terms of the relation between the event and the subject which
it happens to.[15]

Both *have* causatives and *have* adversatives are supposed to des-
cribe the subject's experience of the event described in the embedded
clause. As we have seen above, in *have* causatives, the occurrence of
the event is of benefit to the subject (the causer) in the sense that
the causee brings about the event as a performer of the causer's will.
It follows that the subject of *have* causatives beneficially experiences
the event described in the complement. On the other hand, in *have*
adversatives, the event happened to the subject and it is an adversative
event for him or her. In other words, the subject adversatively expe-
riences the event. Thus far, we claim that *have* causatives and *have*
adversatives can be related in terms of the notion of ATTRIBUTION because
both types of *have* constructions describe situations in which the events
described in the embedded clauses are beneficially or adversatively expe-
rienced by the subjects.[16]

5. Summary

In this paper, we have proposed a conceptual structure for *have*
causatives, pointing out that the notion of ATTRIBUTION plays a
crucial role as an abstract semantic function of the verb *have*.
According to our conceptual structure, we can provide satisfactory
accounts for five problems, which are supposed to be deeply concerned
with the semantic nature of *have* causatives. In addition, in the latter
part of this paper, we have observed how the notion of ATTRIBUTION is

also involved in *have* adversatives. Furthermore, we have shown how *have* causatives and *have* adversatives can be related conceptually.

Notes

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[1] Wierzbicka (1988) also notes that the study of causative constructions is related to the problem of "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations. She defines "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations as follows: how the speaker of the language draw distinctions between different kinds of causal relations and how they perceive and interpret causal links between events and human actions (1988:237). I agree with her view that speakers' perceptions of an event are deeply concerned with causative constructions.

[2] See Okuyama (1992a), where semantic differences between *make* and *have* causatives are mainly discussed. On the basis of the rough idea suggested therein, we will take up in the present study a question of how we perceive the events described by *have* causatives, and provide an answer in terms of their conceptual structure.

[3] Henceforth, *have* constructions with adversative meanings will be referred to as *have* adversatives.

[4] Ritter and Rosen (1990) claim that *have* causatives cannot have individual-level predicates in their complements. According to them, the contrast in (1) is ascribed to the stage-level or individual-level distinction of the embedded predicates. See Ritter and Rosen (1990).

[5] One might claim that the unpassivizability of *have* causatives would be related to the fact that the verb *have* itself cannot be passivized, as shown by the sentence *The pen was had by Tom*. In this paper, however, we will pursue the possibility that this un-

passivizability can be accounted for in terms of the agency of the embedded subject (i.e. the causee). We will return to this matter in section 3.2.

⁶ Let us consider *make* causatives, which are similar to *have* causatives in that both have bare infinitives in the complement. When *make* causatives are passivized, *to* must appear:

(i) a. John was made *to* do the work.

b. *John was made do the work.

If *have* causatives could be passivized, *to* might appear as well as *make* causatives. For this reason, we add *to* to sentence (4b). Though the reason why *to* must appear is debatable, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁷ In Okuyama (1992a), I roughly suggest that there is a certain polysemous relation between the basic use of *have* and its causative use. Adopting this suggestion, I will elaborate on the problem of what the abstract function of the verb *have* is.

⁸ The term *conceptual* is used here to indicate how people cognitively capture the world which surrounds them.

⁹ Culicover (1987) calls this linkage *association*.

¹⁰ Brugman (1988) presents a variety of examples of constructions which are characterized as being headed by the verb *have*. They can be exemplified as follows:

(i) a. I had my baby kissed by the president.

b. I had my bicycle stolen.

c. I had him climbing the walls.

d. The movie had him dying in the end.

e. Albany has an express bus running to it.

f. She has children coming to her house this Sunday.

g. I had him bring chips to the party.

h. She has children come to her house every Sunday.

i. The play has him lonely and old when he dies.

j. I have a tooth missing.

k. I had him in the palm of my hand.

l. She has me up a creek without a paddle.

m. I have five dollars in my pocket.

n. The shelf has several books on it.

o. Imelda's count has Ferdinand as the victor.

p. No one will have this person as chairman.

q. I have my husband to keep honest.

r. I have my husband to keep me honest.

s. Rumor has it that he will not pass his orals easily.

t. We have eaten already.

u. We have to grade exams this weekend.

v. I have two sons.

w. I have no more patience.

x. I have five dollars.

In this paper, I assume that the notion of ATTRIBUTION serves as the abstract function under which all uses of *have* constructions can be unified. In other words, the relation between the subject NP and their complements in *have* constructions can be specified in terms of ATTRI- BUTION. I also assume that the differences in their concrete meanings shown in (ia-x) are reduced to the problem of how the notion of ATTRIBU- TION is embodied in each sentence. This paper, however, is intended to make clear problems in cases of *have* causatives and *have* adversatives. As for the discussion of the other *have*-constructions, we will leave the issue for further research. For a detailed description of *have* con- structions, see Brugman (1988).

[11] My informant points out that (12a) becomes acceptable if the inter- pretation is such that, although John does not take Mary's wishes into consideration, it happens that what he tells her to do is in conformity with her wishes.

[12] Okuyama (1992a) shows evidence that the causee functions as an Agent in terms of "agentivization" in the sense of Schlesinger (1989). See Okuyama (1992a) for a detailed discussion.

[13] Whether the interpretation of a *have* construction is as an adversative or a causative is determined by pragmatic factors. For

example, consider the sentence *John had his shoes shined.* Since we generally think that it is a beneficial event for someone if someone shines that person's shoes, the sentence has a benefactive reading as a default. However, in a situation in which John does not want his shoes shined, the above sentence can have an adversative interpretation due to such a pragmatic factor. Moreover, consider a sentence such as *John had his car stolen.* This sentence has an adversative reading as a default one because the event (the car being stolen) is generally taken to be an adversative one. However, in a situation in which John wants someone to steal his car, the above sentence can have an benefactive reading due to such a pragmatic factor. In this paper, such pragmatic factors are ignored and sentences are interpreted in their default readings, because our interest is not in the problem of what pragmatic factors are involved in the differences in interpretation between *have* causatives and *have* adversatives, but only in the problem of how the two types of *have* constructions can be related conceptually.

[14] (30b) becomes acceptable (but not perfectly) in a situation in which I borrow the car from Bill and it is stolen. In this case, the subject can be related with the event because s/he suffers adversity.

[15] In this paper, we treat only the example of *have*-adversatives where the embedded clause is a passive form. However, sentences in which the embedded clause is active can be interpreted as examples of *have* adversatives, if the event described in the embedded clause is taken to happen regardless of the subject's will and to be an adversative event. Consider the following example:

(i) John had Bill steal his car on him.

In (i), the expression *on him* serves to bring an adversative effect into the sentence. If *on him* is taken away, the adversative interpretation is not preferable. (As for the problem of whether the expression *on him* brings an adversative effect to the sentence, consider the example such as *It rained on me*, where it is meant that the event (*it rains*) is an adversative event for the person described by *I*.)

[16] One might argue that, since the causer of *have* causatives

functions as an Agent, it thus cannot be taken to be like an Experiencer of the event described in the embedded clause. I will not discuss such problems as to which is a plausible semantic role for the causer or as to whether the causer can have both semantic roles at the same time, because this is beyond the scope of this paper. But, as is discussed in the text, we can say with fair certainty that the matrix subject (the causer) experiences the event described in the complement. A similar point is made in Culicover (1987). He states as follows: "in X has Y if Y is an event, then X experiences Y in that X plays a role in Y." See Culicover (1987).

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Doctoral Program in Literature and Linguistics
University of Tsukuba