

Reports on the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the
Tsukuba English Linguistic Society

Semantics of Periphrastic Causatives


Mika Okuyama

In this talk, I discussed the semantic nature of the following two types of periphrastic causatives, namely, *make* and *have* causatives:

- (1) a. John *made* Mary go.
- b. John *had* Mary go.

I supposed that *make* and *have* causatives have their conceptual structures which make clear their own semantic nature. Furthermore, I argued that the main verbs used in (1) play crucial roles to define their conceptual structures.

As for *make* causatives, I proposed the following conceptual structures:




The conceptual structure of *make* causatives shown in (2) tells us as follows: a certain situation [what John did] referred to as SITUATION₁ causes a situation [Mary go] referred to as SITUATION₂ as an effect; moreover, SITUATION₁ and SITUATION₂ are related in terms of the notion of PRODUCE. This notion is supposed to be abstracted from all uses of the verb *make*. The important point to be noted is that SITUATION₁ is the immediate cause of the SITUATION₂. However, one might argue that SITUATION₁ is not the immediate cause, because, as example (1a) shows, human beings can be described as the causer of SITUATION₂. In this talk, I suggested that SITUATION₁ can be me-

tonimically described as human beings. Given (2), *make* causatives are such causatives that (i) the most salient participant of SITUATION₂ is AFFECTED by SITUATION₁, and (ii) this affected entity functions as an Actor of the subsequent situation and thus SITUATION₂ is produced.

As for *have* causatives, I presented the following conceptual structure:

(3) John had Mary go.



The conceptual structure shown in (3) represents the semantic nature of *have* causatives as follows: (i) the aim of the causer is to achieve his/her will, and the will is conveyed to the causee; (ii) the causee ACCEPTs the causer's will in the sense that he or she voluntarily does what the causer wants; (iii) the caused event and the causer can be related in terms of the notion of ATTRIBUTION. This notion is supposed to be abstracted from all uses of the verb *have*. It is worthwhile here to make a few remarks on the question of why the notion of ATTRIBUTION is concerned with *have* causatives. I discussed that in *have* causatives it is due to the causer's will that the caused event occurs. That is, without the causer's will, the caused event would never occur. This indicates that the occurrence of the caused event originates from the causer's will. In this respect, I suggested that the notion of ATTRIBUTION is involved in *have* causatives. Given (3), it follows that in *have* causatives the causer and the causee must be an intentional entity (typically, a person); i.e., the causer wants the causee to bring about the caused event, while the causee voluntarily does what the causer wants in the sense that the causee ACCEPTs the causer's will.