

The importance of the
Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā manuscript for
research on the Buddhist *vāda* tradition*

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0. Introduction

For several years, a project being directed by Prof. Shōryū Katsura and motivated by Prof. Ernst Steinkellner has been underway to edit chapters 3, 4 and 6 of a unique Sanskrit manuscript of the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (PST), Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* (PS/PSV). My team (consisting of Dr. Yasutaka Muroya, Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe and myself) has been working for the last seven years on chapter 6 of the PST (Ms 243a1–260a3), based on a transliteration by the staff of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna. The critical edition of this chapter is now nearly finished. In this paper, I would like to present and discuss some of the results of our research.

Studies on other chapters of the PST manuscript have already uncovered important information helping to better understand not only of the history of Buddhist logic and epistemology, but also

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of the history of Indian philosophy in general. Editions of the first and second chapters of the PST dealing, respectively, with perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*), were already published by Steinkellner, Dr. Krasser and Dr. Lasic (cf. PST I, PST II). The immense value of the PST manuscript for reconstructing Dignāga's PS and PSV, lost in the original Sanskrit, has been demonstrated through Steinkellner's reconstruction of the PSV's first chapter (cf. PSV I), as well as Katsura's reconstruction of all *kārikās* of chapters 3 and 4 dealing, respectively, with inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) and examples as well as pseudo-examples (*drṣṭānta/drṣṭāntābhāsa*).¹ With regard to PS chapter 5 dealing with the *apoha* theory, Dr. Pind published his dissertation (cf. Pind 2015),² which also contains materials from PST, chapter 5, in the footnotes. A full critical edition of PST 5 is currently being produced by Lasic and Dr. McAllister in Vienna. Concurrent with work on PST I and II, Steinkellner collected and evaluated fragments, first from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (Steinkellner 1999), and, more recently, with a more comprehensive scope covering the entire range of sources Jinendrabuddhi used (Steinkellner 2017).

When compared to the other chapters, the specific importance of the Sanskrit manuscript of the PST's chapter 6 dealing with false rejoinders (*jāti/過類*) lies in the following feature. Dignāga devoted an entire chapter of the PS and the PSV to false rejoinders.³ From Dharmakīrti onward, this topic, which belongs for the most part to the field of dialectics (*vāda*), was discussed only rarely by Indian Buddhist logicians. In contrast, it was actively discussed by Naiyāyika and Jaina logicians until later periods. And before

¹ PS 3,1–31 is found in Katsura 2009, PS 3,32–43ab in Katsura 2011 and PS 3,43cd–51 and 4,1–21 in Katsura 2016. See also Katsura's contribution to the present volume.

² Many further studies are referred to in Katsura 2011.

³ The *svamata* section of this chapter has already been partially translated into Chinese by Prof. Lu Cheng (cf. Lu 1928), and has been fully translated into Japanese and elucidated by Prof. Kitagawa (cf. Kitagawa 1965: 282–351).

Dignāga it was also a focus of Buddhist thinkers: *jāti* is one of the main topics of the Buddhist *vāda* tradition as represented in texts such as the **Upāyahṛdaya* (UH, 方便心論 *Fangbian xin lun*; ca. 2nd cent.),⁴ the dialectical section of the Spitzer manuscript (Spitzer Ms, ca. 3rd cent.),⁵ the **Tarkaśāstra*⁶ (TŚ, 如実論反質難品 *Rushi lun fan-zhinan pin*; ca. 5th cent.), the *Vādaavidhi* (VVi, 論軌 *Lungui*; ca. 5th cent.) and the *Nyāyamukha* (NMu, 因明正理門論 *Yinming zhengli men lun*; ca. 6th cent.). The information gained through examining the Sanskrit manuscript of the PST's chapter 6 thus enables us not only to interpret Dignāga's *jāti* theory more exactly than hitherto, but also to elucidate the history of the Indian Buddhist *vāda* tradi-

⁴ A considerable number of the twenty rejoinders (相應 **samaprasaṅga*?) found in the last chapter of the UH correspond to *jāti*s of later periods. However, it should not be overlooked that in the UH, these rejoinders are regarded as correct rejoinders, unlike in the case of *jāti*s. According to Prof. Kajiyama, these "correct" rejoinders in the UH were later criticized in the *Nyāyasūtra* as false rejoinders (*jāti*) (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 15–16; Ishitobi 2006: 148).

⁵ The contents of the sections on dialectics in this ancient Sanskrit manuscript have been examined by Prof. Franco (cf. Franco 2004: 462–505). Despite the fragmentary condition of the material, he has succeeded in clarifying that the last chapter of this portion of the manuscript explains several *jāti*s (cf. Franco 2004: 498–505). Connected to this, he states that the **Tarkaśāstra* (TŚ) "displays the strongest similarity to the Spitzer fragments" (cf. Franco 2004: 498). This view is, of course, true for the first chapter of the dialectic portion of the manuscript. Indeed, the similarity between this chapter and the first chapter of the TŚ is remarkable, as Franco successfully shows (cf. Franco 2004: 465–466). For the last chapter on *jāti*s, however, I believe the UH is quite relevant. Although Franco mentions that there are parallels between the Spitzer Ms and the UH (cf. Franco 2004: 500, n. 209), this observation might be expanded upon. In my opinion, it is possible that the *jāti* theory in the Spitzer Ms was influenced by the theory of correct rejoinders in the UH. Cf. Ono forthcoming a.

⁶ I use this title here for the sake of convenience. I wonder, however, whether this hypothetical Sanskrit title, which is widely accepted by modern scholars, is appropriate. Frauwallner's justification of this title is quite debatable. Cf. Ono 2017a: 910–912.

tion before Dignāga's time. Until now, most of the information we had about this was transmitted only through Chinese translations.

In the following, I would like to present some examples concerning the PST's chapter 6 with regard to its contribution: 1) to a more precise understanding of the PSV's *jāti* theory, 2) to a better understanding of the NMu's *jāti* section, 3) to elucidating theories concerning *jāti* before Dignāga's time, especially the *jāti* theory in the VVi and its relationship to the TS.

1. Sanskrit reconstruction of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, chapter 6

In the process of critically editing the sixth chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, it was of course also necessary to reconstruct the twenty-five *kārikās* of the PS, including the three final *kārikās* that conclude the entire work. Very few Sanskrit fragments of the *kārikās* from this chapter have been identified so far.⁷ However, on the basis of *pratīkas* and allusions in the PST, and with the help of the two Tibetan translations, we are now able to propose the following reconstruction:⁸

⁷ The *kārikās* 7 and 12ab' defining two kinds of *jāti*s, i.e., *kāryasama* and *vikalpasama*, are found in the PVA (cf. PVA 44,29–45,4; see Katsura 1987: 51, 55; Watanabe 2010: n. 12). The *jāti* "*kāryasama*" is the only one mentioned by Dharmakīrti (cf. Katsura 1987: 55; Watanabe 2010). In addition, several of these *kārikās* have equivalents in the verses of the Chinese translation of the NMu (正理門論), either in whole or in part, as is shown in the following footnotes and in the second section of this paper (cf. Take-mura 1968: 281–284).

⁸ Following Katsura's latest method (cf. Katsura 2016: 1237), **bold** typeface is used for words from *pratīkas* in the PST, roman typeface for those alluded to in the PST and in other Sanskrit fragments. *Italics* are used for words retranslated from the Tibetan translations. The meaning of « » and < > will be explained below. On this occasion, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for having kindly checked this reconstruction during his stay at Tsukuba University in March 2016.

pramāṇābhāsavaktṛṇām yuktāvayavavādivat /
 pakṣasiddhiḥ *samā* mā bhūd iti nyūnādy udīritam //1//
tatpradarśanam evāto yuktam uttaram ucyate /
 tadābhāsābhidhānaṃ *ca jātiṣūttararūpakam* //2//⁹
prāptyaprāptāv anīṣoktir hetoḥ kālatraye 'pi vā /
te «**prāptyaprāptyahetvākhye**» ⟨hetunyūnatvarūpīke⟩ //3//¹⁰
arthe hetāv ⟨asiddhābhe⟩ «**nityākhyā**» **nityatānvayāt** /
nityatvāsaktir atrāpi ⟨*pakṣadoṣatvarūpikā*⟩ //4//¹¹
prāg ukter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāvaprasañjanam /
 «**anuktasamam**»¹² **āropya vaktur vacanasādhanam** /
 ⟨asiddhābhāsam⟩ ⟨**ūnābham**⟩ **prāg ukteḥ sādhanam prati** //5//
prāg utpatter ahetutvād asiddhaviparītabhāk /
 «*anutpattisamam*»¹³ ⟨**dvedhā**⟩ **dvayādhyāropato matam** //6//
kāryatvānyatvaleśena yat sādhyāsiddhidarśanam /
 tat «**kāryasamam**» etat tu ⟨tridhā⟩ vaktrabhisandhitāḥ //7//¹⁴
nidarśitavipakṣābhyām sādharmaṇyānyasādhanam /
 «**sādharmyasamam**» «**anyat**» *tu vaidharmyena samatvataḥ* //8//¹⁵
dvedhā ⟨*sādhāraṇābhāsam*⟩ *paratrāsiddhidarśanāt* /
sāmyena siddhāv iṣṭāyām ⟨**viruddhāvyabhicārivat**⟩ //9//
drṣṭāntābhāsadoṣoktir apy atra syād ananvayāt /
 viparītānvayatvāc *ca sādhyadrṣṭāntasañkarāt* //10//
hetos tādātmyabhedena vyabhicārinibham dvayam /
na tu prayoge pūrvatra hetur aikāntikaḥ kṛtaḥ //11//
sādharmye 'pi viśeṣoktir «**vikalpasamam**»¹⁶ *atra tu* /
vyabhicārivīśeṣeṇa nityāsaktes ⟨**tadābhatā**⟩ //12//
asāmānyena vaikatvaprasaṅgād «**aviśeṣakṛt**»¹⁷ /

⁹ Cf. NMu k. 19ab: 能破闕等言 似破謂諸類。

¹⁰ Cf. NMu k. 24: 若因至不至 三時非愛言 至非至無因 是名似因闕。

¹¹ Cf. NMu k. 28: 無常性恒隨 名常住相似 此成常性過 名如宗過說。

¹² Cf. NMu k. 25abc: 說前無因故 應無有所立 名無說相似。

¹³ Cf. NMu k. 25d: 生無生亦然。

¹⁴ Cf. PVA 44,29–30; NMu k. 26abc: 所作異少分 顯所立不成 名所作相似。

¹⁵ Cf. NMu k. 20abcd': 示現異品故 由同法異立 同法相似餘 由異法。

¹⁶ Cf. PVA 45,2; NMu k. 20'd–21a: 分別 差別名分別。

¹⁷ Cf. NMu k. 21b: 應一成無異。

sādhyahetvaviśeṣād v(āsiddhābhāsam) tu tan matam //13//
sādhyabādhakadharme 'pi tulyatvenāviśeṣakṛt /
hetor doṣe (viruddhābhā) doṣābhāve tu dūṣaṇam //14//
uttarāṇi syur ekānte yadi dṛṣṭam na bādhate /
abādhane viruddhatvaṃ sādhyabādhakasādhanāt //15//
«upalabdhisamam» sādhyadarśanam anyahetunā¹⁸ /
sādhyānekāntam āropya hetau (tatpratirūpatā) //16//
avyāpitvena hetoś ca sādhye 'bhāvavikalpanāt /
(asiddhābhām) dhvanisthena na hi sarvaṃ prasādhyate //17//
«saṃśayākhyā»rthabhedena hetoḥ saṃśayacodanā¹⁹ /
sādhyārope tv (anekāntanibham) hetor (asiddhavat) //18//
vipakṣe 'rthād anīṣtoktir «arthāpattisamā»tra tu²⁰ /
vyabhicāro 'nyasādhyatve tatsādhyatve (tadābhatā) //19//
«prasaṅgasamam» iṣṭe 'pi dvayos tu hetumārgaṇam /
(dṛṣṭāntābhāsavat) tv etad²¹ diṅmātram sarvajātiṣu //20//
viparītānṛtatve ca vādavidhau tu jātiṣu /
doṣatrayaṃ viruddhatvaṃ naiva bhedo 'tra lakṣyate //21//
nyāyasūkṣme 'pi jātīnām lakṣaṇottaraduṣṭatā /
jñeyā nyāyaparīkṣātas taddiśā cānyajātiṣu //22//
tarkamātrabalās tīrthyāḥ so 'py anirdiṣṭalakṣaṇaḥ /
svaprayogaviruddhaś ca na ceṣṭārthaprasādhakaḥ //23//
sudūranaṣṭās tu munīndraśāsanān nayanti ye tarkapathena
dharmatām /
tathāpi tāthāgatadharmalakṣaṇaṃ parīkṣyatām yady upayāti
vikriyām //24//
pramāṇarāśer guṇadoṣavistaraparakāśanād yac chubham atra
sañcitam /
tad astu lokasya vimokṣajanmanor guṇāguṇajñasya kṛtānta-
śāntaye //25//

About 80% of the Sanskrit text of the *kārikās* have been recovered from the Sanskrit manuscript of the PST.

¹⁸ Cf. NMu k. 21cd: 顯所立餘因 名可得相似.

¹⁹ Cf. NMu k. 22ab: 難義別疑因 故說名猶豫.

²⁰ Cf. NMu k. 22cd: 說異品義故 非愛名義准.

²¹ Cf. NMu k. 27: 俱許而求因 名生過相似 此於喻設難 名如似喻說.

1.1. On the *svamata* section (kk. 1–20)

The *svamata* section of this chapter consists of *kārikās* 1–20 (and the PSV thereon). Here, Dignāga describes his own interpretation of fourteen kinds of *jātis* (words within “《 》”).²² The same fourteen kinds of *jātis* are also discussed in his earlier work, the NMu. And they are also found in Vasubandhu’s VVi.²³ However, the order of the *jāti* descriptions has been drastically changed by Dignāga in his two works.²⁴ *Jātis* are false rejoinders that an opponent offers against a proponent who is constructing a correct syllogism. Until Vasubandhu’s VVi, the reason why *jātis* are false had not been explained from a “purely logical” viewpoint.²⁵ In the NMu, Dignāga establishes a strategy of explaining *jātis* from a logical viewpoint by dissolving (or incorporating) the dialectical character of *jātis* into his system of logic.²⁶

In chapter 6 of the PS, Dignāga follows the same strategy. In the beginning, Dignāga defines a correct rejoinder (*yuktam uttaram*) as properly indicating logical fallacies in a proponent’s syllogism, such as, for example, its lack of necessary required members (*nyūna*)²⁷ or its having fallacies in individual members (*avayavadoṣa*) (kk. 1–2ab). After this definition, he identifies *jātis* as being pseudo-

²² Indeed, twelve of the fourteen are mentioned by name. Only two, *vaidharmyasama* and *aviśeṣasama*, are not. These two are nonetheless referred to, the first by the word “*anyat*” and the second by the word “*aviśeṣakṛt*.” I therefore enclose them in double angle brackets, as I have also done with the names of the other *jātis*.

²³ In the TŚ, 16 kinds of *jātis* have been enumerated. In the VVi, Vasubandhu reduced this number to 14 (cf. Frauwallner 1957: 129).

²⁴ Dignāga has changed the order of description of *jātis* twice, i.e., first when composing the NMu and again when composing the PSV (cf. Take-mura 1968: 326–327; Ono forthcoming b). Dr. Kang has analyzed the intentions behind the second change (cf. Kang 2012).

²⁵ See the third section of this paper.

²⁶ Cf. Tucci 1930; Kitagawa 1965: 282–351; Katsura 1984; Katsura 1987; Ono 2017b: 49–50; Ono forthcoming b.

²⁷ Cf. Watanabe 2017.

rejoinders (*uttararūpaka*), i.e., non-genuine or false rejoinders (k. 2cd).²⁸ With this definition in place, it is possible to explain all *jāti*s as rejoinders that falsely indicate (that is, only pretend to indicate) certain logical fallacies in the opponent's syllogism.

Following this principle, in *kārikās* 3–20 (and the PSV thereon) Dignāga shows that each of the fourteen rejoinders is false by clarifying which logical fallacy the respective *jāti* is pretending to indicate. For example, the first two *jāti*s, called *prāptyaprāptisama* and *ahetusama*, are characterized by Dignāga as falsely indicating the lack of a reason in proponent's syllogism (*hetunyūnatvarūpika*, literally "similar to the [indication of] the lack of a reason") and as falsely indicating that the reason is unestablished (*asiddhābha*, literally "similar to the [indication of] an unestablished reason") (kk. 3–4a). Likewise, the third *jāti*, *nityasama*, is characterized as falsely indicating that the proponent's thesis is false (*pakṣadoṣatvarūpika*) (k. 4b–d), and so on.

In this manner, the method of explaining *jāti*s from the viewpoint of logical fallacies that Dignāga established in the NMu is skillfully summarized in only twenty *kārikās* of PS chapter 6. In the Sanskrit reconstruction of the *kārikās* presented above, the logical fallacies that are being falsely indicated by the respective *jāti*s are marked with “⟨ ⟩.”

The Sanskrit *kārikās* thus clearly show Dignāga's strategy, summarized in the following table:

| PS 6 | Name of <i>jāti</i> | Types of falsely indicated logical fallacies (x- <i>ābhāsa</i> , etc.) |
|----------|--------------------------|--|
| vv. 3–4a | <i>prāptyaprāptisama</i> | hetunyūnatvarūpika, asiddhābha |
| | <i>ahetusama</i> | |
| v. 4 | <i>nityasama</i> | <i>pakṣadoṣatvarūpika</i> |
| v. 5 | <i>anuktasama</i> | asiddhābhāsa, (<i>hetuny</i>)ūnābha, [udāharaṇanyūnatābhāsa] |

²⁸ Cf. NMu k. 19ab: 能破闕等言 似破謂諸類.



| | | | |
|-------------|----------------|--|---|
| v. 6 | anutpattisama | dvedhā [<i>asiddhābhāsa</i> , <i>anaikāntikābhāsa</i>] | |
| v. 7 | kāryasama | tridhā [<i>asiddhābhāsa</i> , <i>viruddhābhāsa</i> , <i>asādhāraṇatayānaikāntikābhāsa</i>], [<i>dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣābhāsa</i>] | |
| vv. 8–11 | sādharmyasama | <i>sādhāraṇābhāsa</i> , <i>viruddhāvyabhicārivat</i> | |
| | vaidharmyasama | | |
| vv. 12–13a' | vikalpasama | tadābhatā [= <i>sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇānaikāntikābhāsa</i>], [<i>viruddhānaikāntikābhāsa</i> (= <i>viruddhāvyabhicāryābhāsa</i>)], [<i>anaikāntikābhāsa</i>] | |
| vv. 13'a–14 | aviśeṣasama | I | [<i>anaikāntikābhāsa</i>] |
| | | II | <i>asiddhābhāsa</i> |
| | | III | <i>viruddhābha</i> |
| vv. 16–17 | upalabdhisama | I | tatpratirūpatā [= <i>anaikāntikābhāsa</i>] |
| | | II | <i>asiddhābha</i> |
| vv. 18 | saṃśayasama | anekāntanibha, <i>asiddhavat</i> [= <i>asiddhābhāsa</i>] | |
| vv. 19 | arthāpattisama | <i>tadābhatā</i> [= <i>anaikāntikābhāsa</i>] | |
| vv. 20 | prasaṅgasama | <i>dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsavat</i> | |

* Falsely indicated logical fallacies in square brackets appear in the PSV, but not in the PS.

1.2. On the *paramata* section (kk. 21–22)

The *paramata* section of chapter 6 is much shorter than the *svamata* section and consists of only two *kārikās* (together with the PSV). Here, Dignāga criticizes the *jāti* theories of the VVi and of the Naiyāyika. Dignāga's criticism of the Naiyāyika's *jāti* theory (*kārikā* 22 with PSV) is short and does not seem particularly important.²⁹

²⁹ In *kārikā* 22, he refers his reader to his other treatise, the *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, for detailed criticism of the Naiyāyika's theory of false rejoinders (cf. Muroya 2017: 99–100). This text is, however, not preserved (cf. Hattori 1968: 9). It is noteworthy that Sa skya Paṇḍita mentions the *Nyāyaparīkṣā*'s

However, his criticism of the VVi's *jāti* theory (*kārikā* 21 with PSV) together with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary are historically important, as we shall discuss in the third section of this paper.

1.3. On the final *kārikās* (kk. 23–25)

The last three *kārikās* of PS chapter 6 are the final *kārikās* that conclude the entire work. As was pointed out by the late Helmut Krasser, we here find central statements by Dignāga regarding the relationship between the Buddha's teaching and logic and epistemology. Krasser translated the 24th *kārikā* into English on the basis of the PSṬ manuscript and the two Tibetan translations of the PS and the PSV:

[Those] who lead (*khrid*) to *dharmatā* by way of *tarka* have gone far away from (*sudūranaṣṭa*) the teaching of *muni*. Nevertheless, the characterization (*lakṣaṇa*) of the *dharma* [as propounded] by the Tathāgata has to be examined as long as (*yadi*) it undergoes a change.³⁰

Although Krasser did not provide a Sanskrit reconstruction of the *kārikā*, the Sanskrit text he presumed as the basis for his rendering was probably nearly the same as the one I have adopted:³¹

**sudūranaṣṭās tu munīndraśāsanān nayanti ye tarkapathena
dharmatām /
tathāpi tāthāgatadharmalakṣaṇaṃ parīkṣyatām yady upayāti
vikriyām //24//**

criticism of the Naiyāyika's *jāti* theory in his treatises, i.e., the *Mkhas 'jug* and the *Rigs gter* (cf. Jackson 1987: 254–255; 326–328; 375–376).

³⁰ Krasser 2004: 134. Cf. PSV(V) [D]85b3f., [P]93a5f.: *gang zhig rtog ge'i lam las chos nyid la khrid na // thub pa'i bstan las cher bsrings nyams par byas pa yin // de lta'ang de bzhin gshegs pa'i chos rnam kyī mtshan nyid // gal te gzhan du 'gro na dpyad par bya ba'i 'os //*; PSV(K)177a2–4: *thub pa'i dbang po'i bstan pa las ni yun ring nyams gyur pa // gang yin rtog ge'i lam gyis chos nyid bgrod par byed ma yin // de lta na yang de bzhin gshegs pa'i rtog ge'i mtshan nyid ni // gal te rnam par 'gyur bar 'gro bar byed dam brtag par gyis //*

³¹ Cf. Krasser 2004: 134, n. 16.

In this reconstruction I make two small specific suggestions: “*na-yanti*” and “*tāthāgata*” (instead of “*tathāgata*”). The lengthening of the first *a* in *tathāgata* to *ā* is suggested for metrical reasons, since the *Vamśastha* meter must have a long vowel in the fourth *akṣara* of the *pāda*. As for “*nayanti*,” Krasser’s choice to follow Vasudhararakṣita’s translation “*khrid na*” over Kanakavarman’s translation *bgrod par byed ma yin* is probably correct. For the pre-supposed Sanskrit, I propose “*nayanti*,”³² since this can reasonably be considered to be the basis of both translations; Kanakavarman’s “*bgrod par byed ma yin*” can be regarded as a translation of *na yanti*. It also satisfies metrical constraints (short/long/short).

2. The importance of the Sanskrit manuscript of *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* 6 for interpreting the *Nyāyamukha*

As has been pointed out on several occasions, there are many parallels between chapter 6 of the PS/PSV and the *jāti* section of the NMu.³³ It is possible to re-examine these parallel passages quite precisely by using the Sanskrit reconstruction of PS/PSV chapter 6 based on the Sanskrit manuscript of PST chapter 6.³⁴ By doing this, new light can be shed on our understanding of the NMu, for which a Sanskrit manuscript, though reported to be in the TAR, is unfortunately still not accessible to the general scholarly community.³⁵

³² Jinendrabuddhi apparently paraphrases this word as “*niścinvanti*” (cf. PST(Ms) 259b3).

³³ Cf. Tucci 1930; Kitagawa 1965; Katsura 1984; Katsura 1987.

³⁴ My team has been also working on a reconstruction of the entire chapter 6 of the PSV. In comparison to the work of reconstructing the *kārikās*, however, quite a few matters still remain to be considered. We would like to finish this reconstruction, too, in the near future.

³⁵ Cf. Steinkellner 2011: xx–xxi; Katsura 2016: 1237; Do rgya dbang drag rdo rje 2016: 72. The NMu, together with the *Nyāyapraveśaka* (因明入正理論), is one of the *mūla*-texts for Buddhist logic in Eastern Asia. Its study is important for elucidating the *yinming/inmyō* tradition. According to old catalogues of Buddhist literature in China and Japan, it seems that quite a

A closer examination of certain prose passages has already been undertaken by Muroya.³⁶ Previous scholars have already pointed out correspondences between *kārikās* in the PS's chapter 6 and the eight *kārikās* (kk. 20–22, kk. 24–28) in the NMu's *jāti* section.³⁷ There is at least one case of a NMu *kārikā* being reused in its entirety in chapter 6 of the PS (NMu k. 24 reused as PS 6.3). In other cases, the NMu *kārikās* have been modified somewhat by Dignāga when reusing them.

Here, I would like to present two examples to illustrate how information gained from the Sanskrit manuscript of the PST's chapter 6 has contributed to our understanding of difficult *kārikās* in the NMu.³⁸

2.1. *Nyāyamukha* k. 23ab: 由此同法等 多疑故似彼/破

Regarding NMu k. 23ab, two variants of the text in *pāda* b are hitherto known: 多疑故似破 and 多疑故似彼.³⁹ In their interpretations,

few commentaries were written on the NMu in China, Korea and Japan. However, with few exceptions, they are now missing. Recently, Prof. Moro of Hanazono University in Japan began to study a manuscript of a NMu commentary written by a 9th-century Japanese monk, a manuscript that no one had as yet examined (cf. Moro 2015). My team has begun a collaboration with Prof. Moro within the framework of our research project.

³⁶ Cf. Muroya 2017.

³⁷ Cf. Tucci 1930: 54–70; Kitagawa 1965: 284–347; Takemura 1968: 281–284; Katsura 1984; Katsura 1987.

³⁸ See also Ono forthcoming b, in which I attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit text of all *kārikās* (kk. 19ab–28) in the NMu's *jāti* section. Regarding the reconstruction of the *sādhana* section (kk. 2–4, 6–10), example section (kk. 11–14), *pramāṇa* section and final *kārikā* (k. 29), see Katsura 2009, Katsura 2016, Katsura 1982 and Muroya 2016, respectively.

³⁹ The former is supported by the Ming (明) edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, whereas the latter is attested in the Song (宋) and Yuan (元) editions and the Korean Tripiṭaka (高麗大藏經) (cf. Taishō Vol. 32, p. 4, n. 4; Korean Tripiṭaka's NMu 435a11). These two variants are also found in old manuscripts of the NMu preserved in Japan.

Tucci, Ui and Katsura unanimously adopt the former variant “似破.”⁴⁰ Tucci’s translation of k. 23ab is as follows:

Since there are many doubts [which derive from these arguments based upon] this homogeneity etc. [these *jātis*] are fallacies of refutation (似破; MO).

To be sure, the expression “似彼” in itself seems somewhat curious, whereas the expression “似破” seems more natural since this expression commonly appears in *yinminglinmyō* literature to render the word “*dūṣaṇābhāsa/uttarābhāsa*.” In this case, however, the expression “似彼” is more appropriate. The reason is the following:

The passage preceding k. 23ab is Dignāga’s initial reply to the question why, unlike in explanations by other teachers (like Vasubandhu), the first seven *jātis* are explained in the NMu together.⁴¹ There Dignāga answers briefly that the seven *jātis* must be explained together, “since [these *jātis* are] the same kind of false rejoinders.”⁴² Since the relevant half-*kārikā* is located immediately after this answer, it would therefore be reasonable that it also explains how these *jātis* are the same. If we take the above-mentioned principle of Dignāga’s criticism of *jātis* into consideration,⁴³ the *jātis*’ sameness should consist in the fact that the same logical fallacies are falsely indicated by them. By adopting the variant “似彼” this is possible in the following way:

⁴⁰ Cf. Tucci 1930: 59f.; Ui 1929: 670–672; Katsura 1984: 63. Tucci’s interpretation is obviously not correct; Ui and Katsura have reached an interpretation of this half-*kārikā* that is more fitting, although their selection of the variant may, I suspect, be incorrect.

⁴¹ Cf. NMu 4c2f.: 復由何義此同法等相似過類異因明師所說次第. Of the first seven *jātis* in the NMu, i.e., from *sādharmyasama* to *arthāpattisama*, the first four, i.e., from *sādharmyasama* to *aviśeṣasama*, are explained together as a group at the beginning also in the VVi and TŚ. In contrast, *upalabdhisama*, *saṃśayasama* and *arthāpattisama* are explained in the VVi and TŚ in the seventh, eighth and twelfth position, respectively.

⁴² Cf. NMu 4c3: 似破同故.

⁴³ See the first section of this paper.

[For,] since these [seven *jāti*s] such as *sādharmyasama*, etc. [indicate the] inconclusiveness [of the reason] in most cases (多; **prāyas*), [all of them are the same in that] they are similar to [the indication of] that (i.e., inconclusiveness) (似彼).

Unfortunately, it is difficult to reconstruct the Sanskrit of this half-*kārikā*. Nevertheless, it is most likely that the Sanskrit equivalent of 似彼 was “*tadābhatā*” (meaning *anaikāntikābhatā* in this context), which is attested in PS 6.12d on the basis of the Sanskrit manuscript of the PST.⁴⁴

2.2. *Nyāyamukha* k. 25: 說前無因故 應無有所立 名無說相似 生無生亦然

With regard to NMu k. 25, the Chinese translation of *pāda*-abc corresponds well to PS 6.5abc’: “*prāg ukter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāvaprasañjanam / anuktasamam.*”⁴⁵ However, *pāda*-d “生無生亦然” does not correspond to PS 6.5’cd, and is, moreover, difficult to understand in itself. Tucci interpreted this *kārikā* as follows:


“Balancing the non-expressed” (*anuktisama*) is called [that *jāti* which consists] in arguing that since the reason before [being expressed], is non-existent, the probandum also must necessarily be non-existent. The same [must be understood] as regards [the other *jāti* called “balancing the] produced and the non-produced” (*utpatti-anutpattisama*).⁴⁶

Tucci apparently understood the expression “生無生” as a copulative compound (*dvandva*), probably in analogy to *jāti* pairs such as *varṇyāvarṇya*, *prāptyaprāpti*, *upalabdhyānupalabdhi* or *nityānitya* in the *Nyāyasūtra*. The *jāti* pair “*utpattyanutpatti*” is, however, not

⁴⁴ Cf. PST(Ms) 249a2. The expression “*tadābhatā*” was probably used in PS 6.19d as well. As Sanskrit equivalents for 似彼, adjectives such as *tadābhāsa*, *tadābha*, etc. are also possible.

⁴⁵ The character “應” is also found in NMu k. 21b (應一成無異), which probably corresponds to “*ekatvaprasaṅgād aviśeṣakṛt*” (PS 6.13’ab). “應” can be, therefore, regarded as rendering *prāsaṅj*.

⁴⁶ Cf. Tucci 1930: 65–66.



found in other texts.⁴⁷ One way to solve this problem is to take PS 6.5–6 into consideration as a whole:

prāg ukter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāvaprasañjanam /
 anuktasamam āropya vaktur vacanasādhanam /
 asiddhābhāsam ūnābham prāg ukteḥ sādhanam prati //5//
prāg utpatter ahetutvād asiddhaviparītabhāk /
 anutpattisamam dvedhā dvayādhyāropato matam //6//

As has been shown above, these two *kārikās*, describing *anuktasama* and *anutpattisama*, respectively, can be easily reconstructed from the Sanskrit manuscript of the PŚ. The structure of the first *pādas* of both is almost the same. The difference between the expressions *hetvabhāvena* and *ahetutvād* is probably based only on metrical needs. What this most likely means, I believe, is that Dignāga divided the related k. 25 of the NMu into these two *kārikās* in the PS.

To begin, we can safely assume that the *pādas* abc' of NMu k. 25 (說前無因故 應無有所立 名無說相似) and PS 6.5abc' were identical:

prāg ukter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāvaprasañjanam /
 anuktasamam (... .. = 生無生亦然) //

What Sanskrit words should then be placed inside the brackets to correspond to “生無生亦然”? The word “*anutpatti(sama)*” to correspond with “無生” should be supplied for showing the name of what is to be defined (*lakṣya*). A word like “*tathā*” corresponding to “亦然” should also probably be included. Lastly, I propose adding the ablative noun “*utpatteḥ*” as a correspondence of “生,” which in this context may be an abbreviation for “*prāg utpatter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāvaprasañjanam*.” This assumption is in harmony with the NMu’s running commentary.⁴⁸ Thus, a Sanskrit equivalent of “生無

⁴⁷ Cf. Katsura 1987: 51, 53.

⁴⁸ Cf. NMu 5b7–8: 生無生亦然者。生前無因故無所立，亦即說名無生相似。 [Translation: “生無生亦然” means: If somebody argues that since the reason before being produced is non-existent, it follows that what is to be proven (also must) be non-existent; this (kind of arguing) is also called “*anutpattisama*”; Katsura 1987: 53] Kitagawa also suggests that “生無生亦然” corresponds to PS 6.6abc' (Kitagawa 1965: 296, n. 702).

生亦然” might be “*utpatter anutpattisamaṃ tathā*” and the entire *kārikā* can be reconstructed as follows:

*prāg ukter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāvaprasañjanam /
anuktasamaṃ utpatter anutpattisamaṃ tathā //*

If this is accepted, NMu k. 25 can be translated as follows:

anuktisama is [called that *jāti* which consists in arguing that] since the reason before being expressed (*ukteḥ*) is non-existent, it follows that what is to be proven [also] must be non-existent. Likewise, *anutpattisama* is [called that *jāti* which consists in arguing that since the reason before] being produced (*upatteḥ*) [is non-existent, it follows that what is to be proven also must be non-existent].

3. Sanskrit fragments of the *Vādaividhi*

3.1. Fragments of the *Vādaividhi* collected by Frauwallner

In his article “Vasubandhu’s *Vādaividhiḥ*,” published in 1957, Frauwallner tried to elucidate the structure and contents of the VVi (論軌 *Lungui*),⁴⁹ one of the logical works of Vasubandhu, by reconstruct-

⁴⁹ In the Chinese translation of the NMu, two references to “*Lunshi* etc. (論式等)” are found. Regarding the first, Shentai (神泰; 7th cent.) commented that “etc.” means the *Lungui* (論軌) and the *Lunxin* (論心), and ascribed all three works to Vasubandhu (cf. NMuJ 77a28f.: 言論式等. 則等取論軌及論心. 此三論並世親所造). None of them were, however, translated into Chinese, and only the name and some fragments of the *Lungui* and the *Lunshi* have been transmitted to Buddhists in Eastern Asia. Frauwallner, following Tucci’s view (Tucci 1929b: 482), identified the VVi as the *Lunshi* (cf. Frauwallner 1957: 104, n. 3; Ono 2012: 1011f.; Kuijp and McKeown 2013: 55). Ui was, in contrast to Tucci and Frauwallner, of the opinion that the *Vādaividhāna* and the VVi were translated as the *Lunshi* and the *Lungui*, respectively (cf. Ui 1929: 477–478). Ui’s opinion is justified for the following reason: According to Wengui (文軌; 7th cent.), one of the disciples of Xuanzang (玄奘, 602–664), Dignāga stated in his PS that “*Lungui* regards a property-possessor (有法 *dharmin*) like a pot to be a positive

ing the entire structure of the text from fragments in the Tibetan translations of the PSV and the PST as well as in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*. His main sources were the Tibetan translations, especially that of PST chapter 6. In fact, about 70% of the VVi as reconstructed by Frauwallner consists of fragments from the Tibetan translation of this chapter. The manuscript of PST chapter 6, therefore, enables us to obtain the greater part of the VVi in Sanskrit.

3.2. Sanskrit fragments of the *sādhana* section of the *Vādavidhi*

With regard to the *sādhana* section of the VVi, critical editions of chapters 1 and 2 of the PST have already clarified the Sanskrit equivalents of the Tibetan fragments that Frauwallner reported in the appendix of his article.⁵⁰ These fragments are as follows:

- **Ffrg. 1** (definition of *pakṣa*):⁵¹ PST II 62,1: vicāraṇāyām iṣṭo 'rthaḥ pakṣa iti.

Cf. PST(Ms) 115a4: vicāraṇāyām iṣṭo 'rthaḥ pakṣa iti ...

example (同喻 *sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*),” and that “*Lungui* is not the work of Vasubandhu or a work in which Vasubandhu was not skilled,” and further that “When he became skilled, he composed the *Lunshi*, which regards the statement ‘whatever is being produced is impermanent’ as the essence of a positive example. [That] is not different from our position.” (cf. NPSH 333,22–334,1: 又集量論中陳那云。論軌論中以瓶有法爲同喻者，其論非是世親所造，或是世親未學時造。學成以後造論式論，即以所作無常爲同喻體，不異我義; Hattori 1968: 114–115, n. 2.4; Katsura 2014: 102, n. 2). Since in his PSV Dignāga criticized the VVi in the same way that Wengui reports Dignāga's criticism of the *Lungui* (cf. PSV I 5,17–20; PST I 86,4–87,2; PSV ad PS 4.14cd = Ffrg. 5), we now know that the *Lungui* must be identical with the VVi. However, the PSV contains no passage stating any view similar to the one reported by Wengui regarding the *Lunshi*. Nonetheless, a view similar to the one reported by Wengui is found in Uddyotakara. Uj conjectures that the reported statement is from the *Vādavidhāna* (cf. NV 136,21–24; Uj 1929: 483f.; Frauwallner 1933: 301, Fragment A I 8).

⁵⁰ Regarding these fragments, Steinkellner 2017 includes a comprehensive set of notes as well as an English translation.

⁵¹ Cf. Steinkellner 2017: 136–137.

- **Ffrg. 2** (definition of *pratijñā*):⁵² PST II 62,1–2: sādhyābhidhānam pratijñeti.
Cf. PST(Ms) 115a3–4: vādaavidhau sādhyābhidhānam pratijñālakṣaṇam.
- **Ffrg. 3** (definition of *pratijñā*):⁵³ PST II 62,8–9: agnibījānitya-tvānām anumeyatvenodāharaṇāt. dharmamātram anumeyatvenābhimatam iti gamyate.
Cf. PST(Ms) 146a6: na hi sādhyadharmavyatirekeṇa vādavidhāv anyat sādhyam uktam, sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ sādhyatvenābhidhānāt.
- **Ffrg. 9** (definition of *pratyakṣa*):⁵⁴ PST I 87,3–12: tato 'rthād vijñānam pratyakṣam iti. yasya viśayasya vijñānam vyapadiśyate, yadi tata eva tad utpadyate, nānyataḥ, nāpi tato 'nyataś ca, taj jñānam pratyakṣam. tad yathā rūpādijñānam sukhādijñānam iti. etena bhrāntijñānam nirastam, yathā śuktikāyām rajatajñānam. tad dhi rajatena vyapadiśyate rajatajñānam iti. na ca tad rajatād utpadyate, śuktikayaiva tu tad upajanyate. samvṛtijñānam apy anenāpāstam. tathā hi tad ghaṭādibhir vyapadiśyate, ghaṭajñānam ghaṭajñānam ity evam. na tu tat tebhya bhavati, teṣāṃ samvṛtisattvenākāraṇatvāt. rūpādibhya eva hi tathāsanniviṣṭebhyas tad bhavati. anumānajñānam apy anenaiva nirastam. dhūmajñāna andhasmṛtibhyām api hi tad bhavati, nāgnita eva. tato bhavaty eva, na tu na bhavatīty ayam apy atrārtho 'bhimataḥ.
- **Ffrg. 10** (definition of *anumāna*):⁵⁵ PST II 60,1–6: nāntarīyākārthadarśanam tadvido 'numānam iti. yo 'rtho yam antareṇa na bhavati, sa tasya nāntarīyakaḥ, yathāgner dhūmaḥ. tasya darśanam anumānam, anumīyate 'neneti kṛtvā. anumeyārthajñānam tu phalam. anena vyabhicāridarśanam nirastam.

⁵² Cf. Steinkellner 2017: 137–138.

⁵³ Cf. Steinkellner 2017: 138.

⁵⁴ Cf. Steinkellner 2017: 23–24.

⁵⁵ Cf. Steinkellner 2017: 135–136.

sambandhasmrtyapekṣatām liṅgadarśanasya darśayitum – tadvida ity uktam. yas taṃ vetti – nāntarīyako 'yam iti, tasyā-numānam, nānyasya.

With regard to fragments representing the VVi's theories of reason/pseudo-reason (*hetu/hetvābhāsa*) and example/pseudo-example (*drṣṭānta/drṣṭāntābhāsa*), Katsura and his team have collected Sanskrit fragments from chapters 3 and 4 of the PST. In those cases where the PST does not contain fragments, they have reconstructed Sanskrit texts corresponding to the Tibetan fragments from the same chapters of the PSV. These are as follows:⁵⁶

- **Ffrg. 4** (definition of *hetu*), Katsura 2011: 1240, 6–10: tādr̥gvinābhāvidharmopadarśanam hetur iti. yo 'rthaḥ śabdānityatvādih sādhyah tādr̥sā tadjātīyena vinā yo 'rtho na kvacid bhavati, yathā prayatnāntarīyakatvam anityatvenāgninā dhūma iti, sa tādr̥gvinābhāvī dharmas tasyopadarśanam, upadarśyate 'neneti vacanam, yathā prayatnāntarīyakatvād ityevamādih, sa hetuḥ. yena tu nopadarśyate, sa na hetuḥ. yathā cākṣuṣatvād anityaḥ śabda ityevamādih.
- **Ffrg. 5** (definition of *drṣṭānta*), Katsura 2016: 1244, n. 11; cf. Ono 2012: 1009: PSV ad PS 4.14cd: *vādaividhāv uktam – tayoḥ sambandhanidarśanam drṣṭāntaḥ, yad idam abhidhānam – yathā ghaṭa iti, yena ca (: vā) sambandho nidarśyate – yat prayatnāntarīyakam tad anityam iti.*⁵⁷

⁵⁶ As for texts from the PST, I show here, with only one exception, the critical texts of Katsura's team without any editorial remarks. These will be included in the publication of the critical edition of PST chapters 3–4. In the Sanskrit reconstruction of the PSV, **bold** typeface is used for words from pratikas in the PST, roman typeface for words alluded to in the PST and in other sources. *Italics* are used for words retranslated from the Tibetan translations. In the Sanskrit text of the PST, in contrast, **bold** typeface is used for words from the PSV.

⁵⁷ As is suggested by Wengui (cf. note 49) and confirmed in the PSV (cf. PSV ad PS 4.14cd: **evam ca yathā ghaṭa ity etad ayuktam, nidarśyasyādrṣṭāntatvāt, iyatā cāvinābhāvitvasyānidarśanāt**), Dignāga seems to be criticizing the VVi's theory of the example when arguing that the *Vādaividhi*'s statement of the example, as comprising just the mention of

Cf. PST(Ms) 183a1–2: **tayoḥ sambandhanidarśanam dṛ-
ṣṭānta iti. tayos tādr̥ktadavinābhāvinoḥ sādhyasādhanayoḥ
sambandho 'vinābhāvitvaṃ nidarśyate yena, sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.
tasya svarūpaṃ darśayann āha – yad idam abhidhānam
yathā ghaṭa iti. yena ca vākyena (em., cf. ngag gang gis T:
yenāvācākyena Ms) sambandho nidarśyate, sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.
tat punaḥ kīdr̥śam ity āha – yat prayatnānantarīyakam tad
anityam iti; PST(Ms) 255b3: **tayoḥ sambandhadarśanam
dṛṣṭāntaḥ, tadvipakṣayor veti vacanāt.****

- **Ffrg. 6: PSV ad PS 3.7b': [vādavidhau tv ayam viruddhahetāv/
viruddhahetvābhāsa antarbhūtaḥ.]⁵⁸**

the property possessor such as “like a pot,” fails to show the invariable connection. The last sentence of this Sanskrit reconstruction of Ffrg. 5, then, should not begin with “yena vā,” contrary to what Katsura and I once proposed in earlier papers (cf. Katsura 2016: 1244, n. 11; Ono 2012: 1009; this reading is suggested by Kanakavarman’s Tibetan translation: PSV[K] 152b6; cf. also Katsura 1986: 54; 110, n. 55), but should begin with “yena ca,” as I have shown above. In this way, according to the VVi’s definition of the example, the mention of just the property possessor, here “yathā ghaṭa,” is sufficient to show the invariable connection, here “yat prayatnānantarīyakam tad anityam.” Adopting the reading “yena ca” appears to be in harmony with the PST’s explanation and Frauwallner’s interpretation as well (cf. Frauwallner 1957: 119: “Das Beispiel ist die Mitteilung der Verbindung dieser beiden. Wodurch die Verbindung (, d. h. die untrennbare Verbindung (*avinābhāvaḥ*), dieser beiden, d.h. des solchen und des untrennbar damit Verbundenen, also des zu Beweisenden und des Beweisenden,) mitgeteilt wird, das ist das Beispiel, wie wenn man sagt: ‘wie ein Topf’; ferner wodurch (*yena ca; MO) man die Verbindung aufzeigt: ‘Was durch eine Bemühung entstanden ist, das ist nicht ewig’.”). I would like to correct my previous reconstruction as well as my interpretation thereof (cf. Ono 2012: 1009).

⁵⁸ This is a tentative reconstruction by Katsura’s team. In spite of the mention of the *Vādavidhi* in Ffrg. 6, Katsura does not take this to be a fragment of that text. It is, however, clearly a statement by Dignāga. Dignāga asserts here that the logical fallacy of *pratijñāvirodha* in *Nyāyasūtra* 5.2.4 (*pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ pratijñāvirodhaḥ*) should have been included in the category of pseudo-reasons as set out in the VVi (cf. Kitagawa 1965: 144). Although this statement is certainly related to the VVi’s second

- **Ffrg. 7** (definition of *hetvābhāsa*), Katsura 2016: 1244, n. 2: PSV ad PS 3.49a: *vādaividhau tāvad asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhārthā eva hetudoṣā/hetvābhāsā iti. ...*⁵⁹
Cf. PST(Ms) 163a3–4: vaiśeṣikasya indriyakāni sāmānyāni santi. ata **aindriyakatvād anitya** iti sādhyatas tad viruddha ity ucyate.
Cf. PST(Ms) 163a5: **sāṅkhyasya sat kāraṇe kāryam sambhavād** iti sambhavya sattvena virodha iti pratijñārthanirākaraṇād **dvitīyaḥ** kila **viruddhaḥ**.
- **Ffrg. 8** (definition of *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*), Katsura 2016: 1244, n. 11: PSV ad PS 4.18ab: **asiddhārthatā dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣaḥ**, *yathā buddhivad ghaṭavac cety uktam*.
Cf. PST(Ms) 184a2–3: asparśatvān nityaḥ śabdo **buddhivad** iti sādhyadharmāsiddhatā, **ghaṭavad** iti sādhyasādhanadharmāsiddhatā.

When viewed in light of these results, Frauwallner's judgement to ascribe these fragments to the VVi can be accepted for the most part, with the exception of **Ffrg. 6**. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that Frauwallner's hypothesis concerning the entire structure of the VVi's *sādhana* section is without problems. In my opinion, his hypothesis that the VVi, unlike Yogācāra's works teaching the eight *sādhana*s (八能立), adopted the so-called three-member syllogism and excluded verbal testimony (*āgama*) from valid cognition must be reconsidered.⁶⁰

viruddhahetu mentioned in **Ffrg. 7**, it still cannot be regarded as a VVi fragment.

⁵⁹ Katsura does not provide a Sanskrit reconstruction of remaining part, probably because there remain many unclear points. My tentative reconstruction is as follows: *tatrāsiddhādīnām udāharaṇam evāsti, na tu lakṣaṇam, yathā cākṣuṣatvād adhrauvyam ity asiddhaḥ*, amūrtatvān nitya ity *anaikāntikaḥ*, *vaiśeṣikānām aindriyakatvād anitya ity eko viruddhaḥ*, *sāṅkhyasya sat kāraṇe kāryam sambhavād iti dvitīyaś ca viruddhaḥ*.

⁶⁰ See Ono 2012 and Kuijp and McKeown 2013.


3.3. Sanskrit fragments of the *jāti* section of the *Vādaividhi*

In terms of the remaining Ffrg. 11–24, my team has recovered Sanskrit fragments from the PST manuscript and produced reconstructions of the PSV from the Tibetan translation in those cases where the PST manuscript did not contain fragments.⁶¹ In addition, I provide corresponding passages in the TS.⁶²

- **Ffrg. 11** (classification of *jāti*): PSV ad PS 6.21: *vādaividhau tu – viparītatvābhūtatvaviruddhatvāny uttaradoṣā ity uktam*. Cf. PST(Ms) 254b2: tatra **viparītaṃ** pūrvapākṣikaprayukta-hetuvilakṣaṇam. asatyam **anṛtaṃ** yasyā artho na tathā yathā pratijñāyate. **viruddho** yasyāḥ sahānavasthāyī. Cf. TS 30b25–26: 難有三種過失。一顛倒難，二不實義難，三相違難。若難有此三種過失，則墮負處。
- **Ffrg. 12** (*jāti*s characterized as being inverted): PSV ad PS 6.21: **tatra tāvad viparītaṃ sādharma yavaidharma yavikalpāviśeṣaprāptyaprāptyahetūpalabdhisamśayānuktikāryasamādi**. Cf. TS 30b26–c1: 一顛倒難者。立難不與正義相應，是名顛倒難。顛倒難有十種。一同相難，二異相難，三長相難，四無異難，五至不至難，六無因難，七顯別因難，八疑難，九未說難，十事異難。

⁶¹ As for fragments from the PST, I show here in principle (with the exception of a few crucial points) the critical text edited by my team without any editorial remarks. These will be included in the publication of the critical edition of PST chapter 6.

⁶² With few exceptions (cf. Frauwallner 1957: nn. 61, 63), Frauwallner did not refer to specific correspondences in his article, although he definitely recognized the close correspondences between the two texts as a whole (cf. Frauwallner 1957: 129: “Schließlich, was das Wichtigste ist, die Erklärungen der einzelnen falschen Einwände stimmen im Tarkaśāstram, bei Vasubandhu und Dignāga durchwegs überein.”; “Schon der Vergleich, wie beide die falschen Einwände behandeln, ist belehrend. Vasubandhu hat die Zahl der falschen Einwände um zwei verringert. Er bespricht nur zwei unrichtige und zwei widersprechende falsche Einwände, während das Tarkaśāstram je drei kennt. Seine Darstellung ist knapper und straffer. Aber inhaltlich hat er kaum etwas geändert.”).



- **Ffrg. 13:** PSV ad PS 6.21: [*tatra caturṇām viparītavm. anaikāntikena tu sādharṃyādinaikāntikahetvanumānaṃ codayati. aikāntikasya tv anaikāntiko yathā viparītas tathā viruddho 'pi, sahānavasthānāt. arthādhigame caikāntikaḥ satya ity anaikāntiko nāmāsatyatvena śakyate vaktum.*]
- **Ffrg. 14a** (*vikalpasama*):
Cf. PST(Ms) 248b4–6: *tad yathānityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnā-nantarīyakatvād ghaṭavad iti. jātivādy āha – saty etasmin sādharṃye ghaṭa eva pākyaś cākṣuṣaś ca. tena ghaṭa eva cākṣuṣatvāt pākyatvāc cānityo bhaviṣyati, na śabdaḥ. śabda evācākṣuṣo 'pākyaḥ śrāvaṇaś ca, na ghaṭaḥ. tena śabda evācākṣuṣatvādityān nityo bhaviṣyati, na ghaṭa iti.*
Cf. TŚ 31a16–20: 外曰。汝立聲與瓦器同相，因功力生故，別有所以。一可燒熟不可燒熟，二爲眼所見不爲眼所見等。如是別聲與瓦器各有所以。聲因功力生常住，瓦器因功力生無常。是故聲常住。
- **Ffrg. 14b:** PST(Ms) 254b5–6: *vādaividhau hi pākyatvasyā-naikāntikatvadarśanāyoktam – na vinānityatvena prayatnā-nantarīyakatvaṃ dṛṣṭam, agnineva dhūma ity anumānāya tad uktam. na tu pākyatvādinā vinā na dṛṣṭam vyajanānilādiṣv anityatvam. ato viparītam etad iti.*
Cf. TŚ 31a20–25: 是難顛倒。何以故。我立因與無常不相離，與常相離。顯此因爲無常比智，譬如爲火比智顯煙。煙者與火不相離。是故我立因成就不可動。汝顯別聲不可燒熟，是故常者，欲瞋苦樂風等不可燒熟，而是無常。是故不可燒熟不可立爲常因。
- **Ffrg. 14c:** PST(Ms) 255a2–4: *vādaividhāv uktam – śrāvaṇatvaṃ ca śabdasya prayatnānanarīyakasyāpi sato dṛṣṭam. ataḥ pra-saktam apy asmād aśrāvaṇatvānumānaṃ dṛṣṭasāmarthyān nivartate. na tu prayatnānantarīyakasyāpi sato 'sya nityatvaṃ dṛṣṭam, yat sāmarthyād anityatvānumānaṃ nivarteta. ato viparītam evaitad iti.*
- **Ffrg. 14d:** PST(Ms) 255a5–7: [*(satyam etad iti) vādaividhikāraḥ. iha dvidhānaikāntikatvaṃ codyate, sādharṃyena vā vipakṣe 'pi*

hetor astitvapradaśanāt, vaidharmyeṇa vā sādhyavyāvṛttau hetor vyāvṛttyabhāvapradaśanāt. tatra **yady** asmābhiḥ pākyaṭvasya **sādharmyeṇā**naikāntikatvam **ucyeta**, tadā **satyam etat** – na tu pākyaṭvādinā vinā na dr̥ṣṭam ityādikam uttaram pūrvapakṣeṇa na sambadhyeta. na tu sādharmaṇocyate, kiṃ tarhi **vaidharmyeṇa**. pareṇa hy apākyaṭvādinā śabdasya nityatvam uktam. tatra **sādhyābhāve hetor abhāva upadaśyaḥ**. na **cāpākyaṭvaṃ sādhyasya** nityatvasyābhāve **nāsti**. ato 'naikāntikam iti.]⁶³

- **Ffrg. 14e**: PST(Ms) 255b3–4: na tu **kasyacic chrāvaṇasya nityatvaṃ dr̥ṣṭam aśrāvaṇasya caikāntenā**nityatvam, yat **sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ nityatvam anumīyeta**. ta-smād viparītam etad iti.
- **Ffrg. 15a** (*prāptyaprāptisama*): PST(Ms) 256a3–4: **yady ayaṃ hetuḥ prāpya sādhyati, aviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyena prāpnotī**tyādinā ya uktaḥ

Cf. PSV ad PS 6.3: *tad yathā prayatnānantarīyakatvād anityaḥ śabda iti sodāhāraṇe hetāv ukte yady ayaṃ hetuḥ prāpya sādhyam sādhyati, aviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyena prāpnoti, prāptasaritsāgarajalāviśeṣavat. na cāsiddhena prāptiḥ. sādhyam cet siddham kasyāyam hetuḥ. athāprāpya, aprāptair aviśiṣṭatvād ahetubhir asādhanam.*

Cf. TŚ 31c7–13: 外曰。若因至所立義，共所立義雜，則不成立義，譬如江水入海水無復江水。因亦如是故不成因。若所立義未成就，因不能至。若至所立義，已成就用因何爲。是故因不成就。若因不至所立義者，則同餘物不能成因。是故因不成就。若因不至，則無所能，譬如火不至不能燒，刀不至不能斫。

- **Ffrg. 15b**:

Cf. PST(Ms) 256a2: pūrvapakṣavādinā jñāpako hetur uktaḥ, paras tu kārakam adhyāropya dūṣayati. ato viparītam ucyate, jñāpakahetuviparyayeṇa codanāt.

⁶³ With regard to **Ffrg. 14d**, Frauwallner himself hesitated to admit it as a real fragment and did not include a translation of it in his German reconstruction of the VVi (Frauwallner 1957: 140, n. 5). I think his judgment is correct.

Cf. TŚ 31c13–15: 論曰. 是難顛倒. 因有二種. 一生因, 二顯不相離因. 汝難若依生因, 則成難. 若依顯因, 則是顛倒.

• **Ffrg. 16a** (*upalabdhisama*):

Cf. PSV ad PS 6.16ab: **anyenāpi hetunā sādhyasyopalabdhir upadarśyate yena, tad upalabdhisamam. tad yathā pūrvavad anityatve kr̥te nāyam hetur anityatve, vidyudādāv anyataḥ pratyakṣatvāder anityatvasiddheḥ. na hi tat tasya hetuḥ, yad yena vināpi bhavati. aparas tv etad evānyathā prayunkte – nāyam anityatve hetur avyāpakatvāt, tad yathā caitanye svapanam.**

Cf. TŚ 32a9–23: 依別因無常法顯故, 此則非因. 是名顯別因難. 外曰. 若依功力聲無常者, 若無功力處, 即應是常. 如電光風等不依功力生, 亦為無常所攝. 是故立無常不須依功力, 功力非因故. 若是因者, 離功力餘處應無無常. 譬如離火立煙, 煙是火正因, 煙與火不相離故. 功力則不如此. 是故不成因. 復次, 功力不能立無常義. 何以故. 不遍故. 依功力生若遍者, 得立無常, 若不遍者, 則不得立無常. 譬如有人立義一切樹有神識. 何以故. 樹能眠故, 譬如尸利沙樹. 有人難言. 樹神識不成就. 何以故. 因不遍故. 一尸利沙樹眠, 餘樹不眠. 是眠不遍一切樹. 是故眠不能立一切樹有神識. 依功力生亦如是. 不遍一切無常故, 是故不能立無常.

• **Ffrg. 16b**: PST(Ms) 256a4–6: **vādaividhāv uktam – na hy evam avocāma – prayatnānantarīyakatvenaivānityatvaṃ sidhyati, nānyatheti. yady anyad api jñāpakam asti, prītāḥ sma ity etat kila viparītam, prayatnānantarīyakatvād anitya eveti vivakṣite prayatnānantarīyakatvād evānityatvādhyāropād iti.**

Cf. TŚ 32a24–26: 論曰. 是難顛倒. 我說不如此, 不說依功力生是因能顯一切無常餘因不能. 若有別因能顯無常, 我則歡喜, 我事成故.

• **(Ffrg. 16c = NV 543,17–18: yad eva prayatnānantarīyakam tad eva tasmād anityam iti.)**

Cf. TŚ 32a30–b4: 若我說一切無常依功力生者, 汝可難言. 依功力生是因不遍故不成就, 此難則勝. 我說聲等有依功力生者悉是無常. 不說一切無常皆依功力生. 是故汝難顛倒.

• **Ffrg. 17a** (*anuktisama*):

Cf. PST(Ms) 256b5–6: jātivādinā hi prāg ukter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāvaḥ prasañjitaḥ. yadi prayatnānantarīyakatvād ity etasmād dhetor anityaḥ śabdaḥ, prāg ukter hetvabhāvān nānitya iti prāptam. ataḥ prāñ nityaḥ san katham anityaḥ kariṣyata iti.

Cf. TŚ 32c7–10: 外曰. 若說依功力言語爲因聲無常者, 則何所至. 未說依功力言語, 前聲是常, 是義得至. 前世聲已常, 云何今無常.

• **Ffrg. 17b**: PST(Ms) 256b7: atra vāda vidhikāreṇoktam – viparītam etat. yasmāj jñāpaka iti kṛtvā hetur ukto na dhvaṃsaka iti. jātivādī tu dhvaṃsakaṃ kṛtvā dūṣayatīti.

Cf. TŚ 32c10–13: 論曰. 是難顛倒. 何以故. 我立因爲顯義, 不爲生不爲滅. 若我立因壞滅, 汝難則勝. 若汝難我未說前未了聲無常, 是難相似. 若以壞滅因難我, 是難顛倒.

• **Ffrg. 18a** (*kāryasama*):

Cf. PSV ad PS 6.7abc': tad yathānityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti yadi ghaṭo 'nyena kāryatvenānityaḥ, kim atra śabdasya.

• **Ffrg. 18b**: PST(Ms) 257a3: yena tena prakāreṇa sāmānyena yat kṛtaṃ tad anityam iti sādhye ghaṭakāryatvādinā viśeṣeṇa pratyavasthānād viparītam etad iti vāda vidhikāro manyate.

Cf. TŚ 32c17–20: 論曰. 是難顛倒. 何以故. 我不說與器同事故聲無常, 我說一切物同依因得生故無常, 不關同事. 譬如瓦器故聲無常. 烟是異物而能顯火. 瓦器亦如是能顯聲無常.

• **Ffrg. 19** (*jātis* characterized as being untrue) = PSV ad PS 6.21: **abhūtaṃ prasaṅgārthāpattisamādi.**

Cf. TŚ 33a5–8: 二不實義難者. 妄語故不實, 妄語者不如義無有義. 是名不實義難. 不實義難有三種. 一顯不許義難, 二顯義至難, 三顯對譬義難.

• **Ffrg. 20a** (*prasaṅgasama*): PST(Ms) 257a5: anityaḥ śabdo naimittikatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte jātivādinoktam – ghaṭa eva tāvad anitya ity atra ko hetur iti.

Cf. TŚ 33a9–13: 論曰。聲無常。何以故。依因緣生故。譬如瓦器。是義已立。外曰。我見瓦器依因緣生。何因令其無常。若無因立瓦器無常者。聲亦應不依常因得常。

- **Ffrg. 20b:** PST(Ms) 257a5f.: *atra vāda vidhikṛtoktam – abhūtam etad iti. kasmāt. na hi dṛṣṭam apy arthaṃ hetusādhyam kathayāmaḥ, dṛṣṭam caitat – naimittiko ghaṭo nātyantabhāvīti.*
Cf. TŚ 33a13–15: 論曰。是難不實。何以故。已了知不須更以因成就。現見瓦器有因非恒。有何須更覓無常因。是故此難不實。
- **Ffrg. 21a (arthāpattisama):** PST(Ms) 257a7–b1: *nāsty ātmānupalabdher vandhyāputravat iti kṛte jātivādinoktam – arthād āpannam upalabhyamānānām sattvam, upalabhyamānam api kiñcin nāsty evālātacakrādīti.*

Cf. TŚ 33a16–21: 論曰。無我。何以故。不可顯故。譬如石女兒。此義已立。外曰。是義義至。若可顯定有不可顯定無者。可顯或有或無。不可顯亦應如是。譬如火輪陽焰乾闥婆城。是可顯而不能立有。若可顯不能定立有。則不可顯不能定立無。

- **Ffrg. 21b:** PST(Ms) 257b1: *abhūtam etad iti vāda vidhau. upalabdheḥ sattvāpattir ity adhyāropād iti.*
Cf. TŚ 33a21–28: 論曰。是難不實。有何道理是義義至。不可顯物畢竟不有。是義不至。可顯物者有二種。有義至有非義至有。義至者。若有雨必有雲。若有雲則不定或有雨或無雨。由烟知火。於此中不必有義至。若見烟知有火。無烟知無火。是義不至。何以故。於赤鐵赤炭見有火無烟。是故顯物義至難不實。
- **Ffrg. 22 (jātis characterized as being contradictory):** PSV ad PS 6.21: *viruddham anutpattinīyasamādi.*

Cf. TŚ 33c16–19: 三相違難者。義不並立。名為相違。譬如明闇坐起等不並立。是名相違。相違難有三種。一未生難。二常難。三自義相違難。

- **Ffrg. 23a (anutpattisama):**

Cf. PST 257b1: *viruddham etad asan nityaś cetīti (em., cf. zhes pa ... zhes pa T: ceti Ms), [asattvanityatvayor ekatrānavasthānāt.]⁶⁴*

⁶⁴ Here, the Tibetan translation of the PST (*med pa rtag go zhes pa 'di*

Cf. TŚ 33c22–25: 論曰。是難相違。何以故。未生時聲未有。未有云何常。若有人說。石女男兒黑女兒白。此義亦應成就。若不有不得常。若常不得不有。不有而常則自相違。

- (Ffrg. 23b = NV 539,6–11: *apare tu prāg utpatteḥ kāraṇābhāvād ity ukte 'rthāpattisamaiveyam iti, prāg utpatteḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvasyābhāvād arthād aprayatnānantarīyako 'prayatnānantarīyakatvāc ca nitya iti kṛta uttaram brūyāt. nāyam niyamo 'prayatnānantarīyakam nityam iti. trayī hi tasya gatiḥ, kiṃcin nityam ākāśādi, kiṃcid anityam vidyudādi, kiṃcid asad evākāśakusumādi.*)⁶⁵

Cf. TŚ 33c25–34a2: 此難與義至難不實難相似。何以故。非是實難故。依功力聲無常。是義已立。是義義至得。若不依功力。則應是常。此義不實。何以故。不依功力者有三種。常無常不有。常者如虛空。無常者如雷電等。不有者如空華等。此三種悉不依功力。而汝偏用一種爲常。是故不實。

- Ffrg. 24a (*nityasama*):

Cf. PSV ad PS 6.4bcd: *tad yathānityaḥ śabda iti tasya nityam anityatayā yogaḥ prāptaḥ, ajaḍasvabhāvadvād dharmāṇām, (ataś ca nitya eveti ...).*

Cf. TŚ 34a3–5: 外曰。於無常處常有無常。一切法不捨性故。無常中有常。依無常故得常。

- Ffrg. 24b:

ni 'gal pa ste zhes pa med pa nyid dang rtag pa nyid dag gcig tu mi gnas pa'i phyir ro) requires an emendation of the Ms's reading "*viruddham etad asan nityaś ceti, asattvanityatvayor ekatrānavasthānāt*" to "*viruddham etad asan nityaś cetīti, asattvanityatvayor ekatrānavasthānāt*." If this is accepted, then the quotation must be presumed to end at "*cetīti*." Moreover, the preceding part of the PSV, i.e., "*yasmāt prāg utpatteḥ śabda eva nāsti, tasmād*," can be, in my opinion, included in the VVi's explanation of *anutpattisama*, since the corresponding section of the TŚ includes this sentence. The ascription of the portion in square brackets will be discussed on a later occasion.

⁶⁵ Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 128, n. 63.

Cf. PST(Ms) 257b3: **nityasamam api viruddham** uktam. katham nāmānitya eva sa nityaḥ setsyatīty (atrāha – **nityasamam apītyādi**).

Cf. TS 34a6: 是義相違. 何以故. 若已無常云何得常.

Detailed interpretations of these fragments can be found in Ono 2017b.

3.4. Some problems regarding the fragments of the *Vādaividhi* collected by Frauwallner

In light of the new evidence provided by the PST manuscript, almost all the fragments identified by Frauwallner can now be accepted as fragments of the *Vādaividhi*. Ffrg. 13 and Ffrg. 23a, however, along with the above mentioned Ffrg. 6, need to be reconsidered. Frauwallner interpreted Ffrg. 13 in the following manner:

[Davon sind die vier (ersten) verkehrt. Denn während mit Hilfe eines sicheren Grundes eine Schlußfolgerung vorgebracht wird, erwidert (der Gegner) mit Hilfe einer unsicheren Gleichartigkeit usw. So wie das Unsichere dem Sicherem gegenüber verkehrt ist, so ist es aber auch widersprechend, weil (beides) nicht nebeneinander bestehen kann. Denn da beim Erkennen eines Gegenstandes das Sichere wahr ist, kann man zeigen, daß das Unsichere nicht wahr ist.]⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 122; PSV(V)[D]83b6–7, [P]91a1–3: *de la bzhi po rnam kyis phyin ci log nyid ni 'di ltar phyogs gcig tu nges pa'i gtan tshigs kyis rjes su dpog par brjod la / ma nges pa ni (D: pa'i P) chos mthun pa la sogs pas 'gal zla 'jog par byed do // phyogs gcig tu nges pa ni ji ltar ma nges pa dang phyin ci log bzhin du 'gal yang lhan cig mi gnas pa yin pa'i phyir ro // bden na yang don phyogs gcig tu nges par sbyor ba'i lta na ma nges pa yin pas brdzun yin yang rnam par rtog pa mtshungs par brjod nus so //*; PSV(K)[P]175a2–4: *de la bzhi ni phyin ci log yin te / gang gi phyir nges pa'i gtan tshigs kyis dpog pa la ma nges pa chos mthun pa la sogs pas rtsod par byed pa yin no // nges pa la ni ji ltar ma nges pa phyin ci log yin pa de bzhin du 'gal ba yang yin te lhan cig mi gnas pa'i phyir ro // don rtogs pa la ni nges pa bden pa yin pas ma nges pa zhes bya ba ni mi bden pa nyid du bstan par nus pa yin no //*

While hesitating to regard this passage as a literal quotation, Frauwallner recognized it as at least representing an idea of Vasubandhu and added it to his German translation of the VVi.⁶⁷ I believe, however, that this idea did not derive from Vasubandhu.

In order to clarify this problem, the context of this passage must be reconsidered. At the beginning of the *paramata* section of PS chapter 6, Dignāga uses the following *kārikā* to summarize his criticism of the VVi's *jāti* theory:

**vīparītanṛtatve ca vādaividhau tu jātiṣu /
doṣatrayaṃ viruddhatvaṃ naiva bhedo 'tra lakṣyate //PS 6.21//**

In the *Vādaividhi*, on the other hand [i.e., unlike in my explanation of *jāti*s in previous *kārikās*], the triad of fallacies (*doṣatraya*), i.e., invertedness (*vīparītatva*), untruthness (*anṛtatva* = *abhūtatva*) and contradiction (*viruddhatva*), are [indicated] regarding false rejoinders. [However,] no difference is found in this [triad].

Continuing the train of thought of this *kārikā*, Dignāga paraphrases *pādas* abc in his running commentary with the quotation from the VVi:

*vādaividhau tu –vīparītatvābhūtatvaviruddhatvāni uttardoṣā
ity uktam. tatra tāvad vīparītaṃ sādharmaavyavahārikavi-
kalpāviśeṣaprāptyaprāptyahetūpalabdhisamśayānuktikārya-
samādi. (Ffrg. 11–12)*

In the *Vādaividhi*, on the other hand (i.e., unlike in my explanation of *jāti*s in previous *kārikās*) [it is said that] “fallacies of rejoinders are invertedness, untruthness and contradiction. Among these, at first, *sādharmaavyavahārikasama*, *vaidharmaavyavahārikasama*, *vikalpasama*, *aviśeṣasama*, *prāptyaprāptisama*, *ahetusama*, *upalabdhisama*, *samśayasama*, *anuktisama*, *kāryasama* etc., are [characterized as being] inverted.”

⁶⁷ Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 122, n. 38: “Dieser Absatz ist wohl kein wörtliches Zitat, dürfte aber Gedanken Vasubandhu's wiedergeben.”

The passage in question (Ffrg. 13) comes immediately after this paraphrase. Our Sanskrit reconstruction and translation of it are as follows:

**tatra caturṇām viparītatvam. anaikāntikena tu sādharmyādi-
naikāntikahetvanumānaṃ codayanti. aikāntikasya tv anaikāntiko
yathā viparītas tathā viruddho 'pi, sahānavasthānāt.
arthādhigame caikāntikaḥ satya ity anaikāntiko nāmāsatya-
tvena śakyate vaktum.**

Among these [ten *jātis*], the [first] four are [characterized as being] inverted. Certainly (*tu*), [the opponents in these four *jātis*] raise an objection against the inference endowed with a conclusive reason by using an inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) [reason] through similarity, etc. However (*tu*), just as an inconclusive [reason] is inverted against a conclusive [reason], [the former] is also contradictory [to the latter], since [the two] cannot co-exist. And an inconclusive [reason] can also be called untrue (*asatya*),⁶⁸ since [the reason that is] conclusive for the understanding of an object is true.

The structure of the sentences “*tu...tu...*” which is not necessarily clear from the two Tibetan translations used by Frauwallner, can be ascertained on the basis of the Sanskrit manuscript. The author of this paragraph first recognizes that the first four *jātis*, i.e., *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *vikalpasama* and *aviśeṣasama*, are characterized as being inverted (just like they are classified in the VVi), since the opponents in those *jātis* raise an objection against the inference endowed with a conclusive reason by bringing up an inconclusive reason, such as “formlessness” (*amūrtatva*) in the case of *sādharmya/vaidharmyasama*, or “uncookableness” (*apākyatva*) or “invisibleness” (*acākṣuṣatva*) in the case of *vikalpasama*.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ This “*asatya*” can be understood as a synonym of “*anṛta/abhūta*” (cf. PST(Ms) 254b2: *asatyam anṛtam* yasyā artho na tathā yathā pratijñāyate; PST(Ms) 257b2f.: *yataś cāsan nityatvam asatyam*, ato 'bhūtam; also note 73 of this paper).

⁶⁹ Cf. PST(Ms) 254b3f.: **tatra caturṇām itī sādharmyasamādīnām. anaikāntikena tu sādharmyādineti sādharmyavaidharmyasamayor amūrta-**

Although Vasubandhu, unlike Dignāga,⁷⁰ does not seem to use the concept of the “inconclusive” (*anaikāntika*) reason in his criticisms of first four *jātis*,⁷¹ the first two sentences of this paragraph could possibly be ascribed to Vasubandhu. However, the following sentences (*aikāntikasya tu ...*) cannot be ascribed to him; on the contrary, they should rather be ascribed to someone who disagrees with Vasubandhu, since they assert that there is no difference between the three classifications in the VVi. This is done by showing that a *jāti* like *sādharmyasama*, which is classified as *viparītatva*, can also be classified as both *viruddhatva* and *anṛtatva/abhūtatva*.

This “someone” is none other than Dignāga himself, as is also confirmed by Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary.⁷² Dignāga expressed the same viewpoint also in his criticism of the VVi’s explanations of the last four *jātis*. There he criticizes that *prasaṅgasama* and *arthāpattisama*, classified as *abhūtatva* in the VVi, can also be classified as both *viparītatva* and *viruddhatva*, and that *anutpattisama* and *nityasama*, classified as *viruddhatva* in the VVi, can also be classified as both *viparītatva* and *abhūtatva*.⁷³ And finally, Dignāga

tvena, vikalpāviśeṣasamayor apākyācākṣuṣatvādinā.

By the way, it is not fully clear to me whether Jinendrabuddhi’s intention here is to relate *aviśeṣasama* to “*apākyācākṣuṣatva*.” In this context, *aviśeṣasama* should rather be related to “*prameyatva*.”

⁷⁰ Cf. PSV ad PS 6.8–14.

⁷¹ Cf. Ffrg. 14abc, 14e. It is, however, worthy of note that Vasubandhu exemplifies the inconclusive reason in his *Vādaśūchi* as follows: “Sound is permanent, because it is formless.” (cf. PSV[K]145a5; PSV[V](D)57a7–8, (P)61a3; Kitagawa 1965: 397).

⁷² “He (= Dignāga) shows that there is no difference (*abheda*) [among the three classifications] by [saying] ‘*aikāntikasya tu*’ and so on. ...” (cf. PST(Ms) 254b4f.: *aikāntikasya tv ityādinābhedaṃ darśayati. saḥānavasthānād iti. na hy aikāntikānaikāntikayoḥ saḥāvasthānam asti. tathā hy aikāntike saty anaikāntiko nivartate.*)

⁷³ Cf. PSV(V)[D]84b6–85a3, [P]92a5–b3; PSV(K)[P]176a4–b2; Our Sanskrit reconstruction of this portion is as follows: **abhūtaṃ prasaṅgārthāpattisamādi. tatra tāvat prasaṅgasamam abhūtam. na hi dṛṣṭam apy arthaṃ hetusādhyam kathayāmaḥ. atra ca viparītaṃ śakyate vaktum,**

concludes his criticism of the VVi's *jāti* theory by stating that the VVi's three classifications of fallacies regarding *jāti*s cannot be mentioned as being exclusive (*asaṅkareṇa*).⁷⁴ Thus, Ffrg. 13 must be regarded as a statement of Dignāga and can be excluded from the list of fragments.

Frauwallner's misunderstanding of this issue seems to have also influenced his identification of Ffrg. 23a and interpretation of Ffrg. 23b.⁷⁵ First, Frauwallner's judgement to admit "*asattvanityatvayor ekatrānavasthānāt*" as a part of Ffrg. 23a seems to have been influenced by his ascription of Ffrg. 13 to Vasubandhu, in which "contradiction" is explained as "being unable to co-exist" (cf. *viruddho 'pi saḥānavasthānāt*). As has been described above, however, this

viruddham api. adrṣṭam hi dṛṣṭād viparītam api, viruddham ca. arthāpattisamam apy evam. yathaiiva hy anupalabdher asattve sādhye 'rthād upalabdhes sattvāpattir ity adhyāropād abhūtam, tathā viparītam api, viruddham ca. viruddham anutpattinītyasamādi. tatra yasmāt prāg utpatteḥ śabda eva nāsti, tasmād viruddham etad asan nityaś ceti. viparītam api caitad abhūtam ca, sato 'rthasya nityatvād asato nityatvam viparītam asatyam ceti kṛtvā. nītyasamam api yathā viruddham tathā viparītam api śakyate vaktum, abhūtam ca. yathā hy anityena nityam viruddham, evam viparītam apy etad anītyasya nityatvam iti, abhūtam ca. See also note 75.

⁷⁴ Cf. PSV ad PS 6.21: *tasmān na jātiṣv asaṅkareṇa viparītābhūta-virūddhatvāni doṣāḥ śakyā vaktum*; PST(Ms) 257b3–4: *tasmād iti. yasmād evam sarvāsu sarve doṣā yujyante, tasmān na jātiṣv asaṅkareṇa viṣaya-vibhāgena viparītatvādayo doṣāḥ śakyā vaktum*; Kuij and McKeown 2013: 156,2–13.

⁷⁵ Ffrg. 23a appears in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignāga's following description of *anutpattisama*: PSV ad PS 6.21: *viruddham anutpattinītyasamādi. tatra yasmāt prāg utpatteḥ śabda eva nāsti, tasmād viruddham etad asan nityaś ceti. viparītam api caitad abhūtam ca, sato 'rthasya nityatvād asato nityatvam viparītam asatyam ceti kṛtvā.* [= *anutpattisama*, *nītyasama*, etc., are contradictory. Among these, this (*anutpattisama*) is contradictory because (it indicates that sound) is permanent and (at the same time) non-existent, since sound itself is non-existent before being produced (*upatteḥ*). This is, however, also both inverted and untrue because (the assumption that) a non-existent (thing) is permanent is both inverted and untrue, since (only) an existent thing (can be) permanent.]

explanation really belongs to Dignāga, and therefore the expression “*asattvanityatvayor ekatrānavasthānāt*” can be regarded as an explanation of Jinendrabuddhi that follows Dignāga.⁷⁶ Second, Frauwallner recovered **Ffgr. 23b** from the *Nyāyavārttika*. This fragment, mentioning the second interpretation of *anutpattisama*, has a correspondence in the TŚ,⁷⁷ and is obviously derived from the VVi. The only problem is that Frauwallner interprets the first sentence of this fragment, “*arthāpattisamaiveyam*,” as follows:

[... Daher ist diese Erwiderung (*anutpattisama*; MO) widersprechend.] Dieselbe Erwiderung ist aber auch unrichtig, und zwar als entsprechende (Erwiderung) auf Grund einer selbstverständlichen Folgerung (*arthāpattisamaḥ*).⁷⁸

Frauwallner seems to have understood that the VVi regards this *jāti*, i.e., *anutpattisama*, not only as contradictory, but also as untrue, since it is similar to *arthāpattisama*, which is characterized as untrue. This interpretation, however, is impossible because the VVi, as has been shown above, does not recognize overlapping classifications of *jāti*s. Rather, “*arthāpattisamaiveyam*” should be simply rendered as “this (*jāti*) is none other than (*eva*) *arthāpattisama*.” The VVi’s second interpretation of *anutpattisama*, in short, identifies the *jāti* called *anutpattisama* with *arthāpattisama*, so that this *jāti* is no longer contradictory, but only untrue.

To conclude, I would like to add the following two statements within “《》,” statements that Frauwallner did not ascribe to the VVi, as being possible fragments after all.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Cf. note 64.

⁷⁷ Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 128, n. 63.

⁷⁸ Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 127. Frauwallner’s interpretation may derive from his understanding of the corresponding section of the TŚ (cf. TŚ 33c25: 此難與義至難不實難相似; Tucci 1929a: 29,3–4: etad asatkhaṇḍaneṣv arthāpattisamam). However, this passage should be interpreted as “this *jāti* is similar (or equal) to *arthāpattisama*, (which is) characterized as an untrue *jāti*” (cf. Katsura 1987: 53).

⁷⁹ Cf. Ono 2017b: 59–60; 62–63.

- **Fragment 1** (*aviśeṣasama*): PST(Ms) 255b6–7: **hetvabhāva eva pareṇa codita iti. prāgutpattyabhāvasya sādhyatādhyāropād dhetusādhyayor aviśiṣṭatvam uktam pareṇa – «anatyantabhāvitvam ubhayor» iti.**

Cf. TŚ 31b19–23: 外曰。因與立義二無無異。... 因與立義同無有故。

- **Fragment 2** (*ahetusama*): PSV ad PS 6.3: «*yadi prāk sādhyād dhetuḥ, asati sādhye kasyāyaṃ hetuḥ. atha paścāt, siddhe sādhye na hetur bhavati. atha sakṛt, hetuhetumadbhāvo na sidhyati savyetaragoviṣānavad*» *ity eṣāhetusamā.*

Cf. TŚ 31c22–25: 若因在前世立義在後世者, 立義未有, 因何所因。若在後世立義在前世者, 立義已成就復何用因爲。若同世俱生, 則非是因。譬如牛角種芽等一時而有不得言左右相生。

The first can be considered a fragment of the VVi describing the second interpretation of *aviśeṣasama*, in which the Jātivādin objects that the reason and what is to be established in the proponent's syllogism would amount to the same. The reason I presume the second to be a fragment of the VVi lies in its stylistic similarity to Ffrg. 15a. If the latter can be regarded a fragment, then it comes as no surprise that this portion can as well.

3.5. The *Vādaśāstra* and the *Tarkaśāstra*

As shown above, the correspondence between the VVi's *jāti* section and TŚ chapter 2 is remarkably close. Sentences in the two texts often seem to have nearly the same structure, so much so that it is possible to assume that much of the Sanskrit text of the TŚ's chapter 2 was identical to the VVi's *jāti* section.⁸⁰ For example, the VVi's second interpretation of *upalabdhisama* is as follows:

⁸⁰ There are, of course, passages that are found only in TŚ chapter 2, and conversely, only in the VVi's *jāti* section. The latter passages (cf. Ffrg. 14c,e) are significant for seeing the development of Vasubandhu's thought from the ideas found in the TŚ. Ffrg. 14e seems to discuss *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*. This issue remains for a future study.

na hy evam avocāma – prayatnānantarīyakatvenaivānityatvaṃ
sidhyati, nānyatheti. yady anyad api jñāpakam asti, prītāḥ sma
ity etat kila viparītam,

We have not said that impermanence is proved only by *pra-*
yatnānantarīyakatva and not by other means. If there were
also other (means) for letting impermanence be known, we
would rejoice. Therefore, this [*jāti*] is said to be (*kila*) inverted.
Cf. TS 32a24–26: 是難顛倒. 我說不如此. 不說依功力生是因
能顯一切無常餘因不能. 若有別因能顯無常. 我則歡喜. 我事
成故.

Here, even the rhetorical expression “*prītāḥ smaḥ*” in the VVi has
a correspondence in the TS, namely “我則歡喜.” In this respect, the
word “*kila*” in the above citation is noteworthy. It is possible that by
adding “*kila*,” Vasubandhu is making it clear that his explanation of
upalabdhisama has been quoted from other texts, such as the TS.⁸¹
And it is possible that this kind of borrowing relationship extends to
all of the *jāti* descriptions in the VVi. In any case, future research
should reconsider the relationship between the VVi and the TS care-
fully.

4. Concluding remarks

In this paper, I have tried to show how the study of Sanskrit manu-
scripts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region can contribute to a
better understanding of the Buddhist *vāda* tradition. Since this tradi-
tion has deeply influenced the East Asian *yinming/inmyō* tradition,
these manuscripts are also significant for the study of Buddhist logic
in Eastern Asia. If this paper has helped to highlight this point, it
will have achieved its intention.

⁸¹ Nevertheless, the possibility that Jinendrabuddhi added “*kila*” cannot
be excluded.



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- CTRC China Tibetology Research Center.
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- Ffrg. Fragments of Vasubandhu's Vāda vidhi according to Frauwallner 1957: *Anhang I*.
- NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): see DhPr.
- NMu Yinming zhengli men lun [因明正理門論, Nyāyamukha] (Dignāga). Taishō Tripitaka Vol. 32, No. 1628.
- NMuJ Li men lun shuji [理門論述記] (神泰 Shentai). Taishō Tripitaka Vol. 44, No. 1839.
- NPSh Yinming ru zhengli lun shu [因明入正理論疏] (文軌 Wengui). In: J. Y. Shen (沈劍英), 敦煌因明文獻研究 [A Study on Hetuvidyā Manuscripts in Dunhuang]. Shanghai 2007.
- NV Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara): *Nyāyavārttikam. A Critical Gloss on Nyaya Darshana Vatsyayana's Bhashya*, ed. V. P. Dwivedi and L. S. Dravida. Varanasi 1916.
- PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga). See PSV[K], PSV[V].
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- PVA Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra (Prajñākaragupta): *Pramāṇavārttikabhāshyam or Vārttikālānkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam)*, ed. R. Sāṃkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.
- TAR Tibetan Autonomous Region.
- TŚ Rushi lun fanzhinanpin [如実論反質難品, *Tarkaśāstra]. Taishō Tripiṭaka Vol. 32, No. 1633.
- UH Fangbian xin lun [方便心論, *Upāyahṛdaya]. Taishō Tripiṭaka Vol. 32, No. 1632.
- VVi Vādavidhi (Vasubandhu): see Ffrg.

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