On the Use of the Subordinator *As If* as a Counter-Expectation Marker*

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1. Introduction

When one tries to convey a piece of new information, it may be expressed with a speaker's evaluative stance like unexpectedness. The linguistic category showing some new information as unexpected has been recently focused on in the field of linguistic typology and referred to as *mirativity* since DeLancey (1997). The notion of mirativity is defined as follows:

(1) a. Mirativity covers speaker's 'unprepared mind,' unexpected new information, and concomitant surprise. (Aikhenvald (2004:196))
b. [T]he proposition is one which is new to the speaker, not yet integrated into his overall picture of the world. (DeLancey (1997:36))

As stated in the definition in (1a), mirativity is the linguistic category that conveys, possibly with a concomitant of surprise, some new information that is unexpected to the speaker. The relevant new information is, furthermore, judged as unexpected relative to the speaker's knowledge, and hence is not the one that has already been integrated into what the speaker has in mind. To sum up, mirativity denotes some new information that has not been integrated into the speaker's knowledge and is judged as unexpected by the speaker.

In the literature, most of the research is dedicated to those languages which encode mirativity in their grammatical (morpho-syntactic) systems. For example, it is argued that such agglutinative languages as Kham and Turkish have linguistic markers to encode mirativity.[1] Let us look at the following examples:[2]

(2) kãhbul u-rɨ:h-zya-o oleo [Kham]
blanket 3S-weave-Cont-Nml MIR
'She's weaving a blanket!' (Watters (2002:290))

(3) Kemal gel-miş. [Turkish]
Kemal come-Past
'Kemal came.' (Slobin and Aksu (1982:187))

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[1] Kham is spoken primarily in Mid-Western Nepal, belongs to the Tibeto-Burman language family and has a basic word order of SOV. See Watters (2002) for details.

[2] The following abbreviations are used throughout this paper: Asp = Aspect, Evid = Evidential, Inf = Inference, Mir = Mirative, Nom = Nominative, P-Inf Perceptual Inference, Pres = Present, Top = Topic.

As shown in (2), Kham marks mirativity with recourse to the auxiliary use of the existential verb *ole-* 'to be' in 3rd person singular, coupled with the nominalizer *-o*. This example suggests that the propositional content is expressed as the newly apprehended knowledge of the speaker. Turkish, as well as Kham, expresses mirativity by means of the past tense form *-m*iş. For example, Kemal in (3) is described as an unexpected visitor.

As briefly shown above, many previous studies on mirativity have been conducted to investigate how a language linguistically marks some newly discovered, unexpected information. Although there are few studies on mirative expressions in English, DeLancey (2001, 2012) states that English resorts to intonation contour or some conventionalized constructions (e.g. *it turns out that* …) in order to express mirativity; in other words, English does not directly express mirativity in its grammatical system. Given this, it is expected that English has some linguistic expressions specialized for encoding mirativity without recourse to its grammatical system. Thus, an empirical issue arises of whether English has some expressions used to mark mirativity. Then, a related, though more conceptual, issue is what kinds of mirative meanings can be encoded (cf. Aikhenvald (2012)).

In order to deal with the two issues above, this paper considers monoclausal *as if* as a case study to explore mirative expressions in English and make clear its semantic/pragmatic properties from the perspective of mirativity. In general, the subordinator *as if* introduces a subjunctive adverbial clause denoting comparison. The subordinator, however, may be used in the main clause context in order to argue against or contest against some implied view in the discourse (Brinton (2014)). Let us look at the following example:

(4) 'I'm only telling you and you mustn't mention it to anybody.' 'As if I would!' (*Genius English-Japanese Dictionary*, 5th edition)

The *as if* mono-clause in (4) is used to make a response to the imperative. More precisely, the imperative implies that the utterer of the *as if* monoclause may spill the beans. S/he argues against this implied view by using the *as if* monoclause, suggesting that s/he has no intention to tell the secret to anybody. Adopting the viewpoint of mirativity, more specifically, counter-expectation, this paper argues that the semantic/pragmatic properties of *as if* monoclauses can be well captured. By doing so, it is expected that this study contributes to understanding the empirical and conceptual sides of the mirative system in English.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some details of mirativity and counter-expectation. Section 3 proposes that the subordinator *as if*

in its monoclausal use functions as a mirative or counter-expectation marker. Based on the proposal, section 4 analyzes communication effects of *as if* monoclauses by observing some attested data. Section 5, furthermore, considers the use of the subordinator *as if* as a discourse marker which lacks a content clause. Section 5 draws conclusions.

2. Mirativity

2.1. Background

Mirativity is a relatively new linguistic concept proposed in the development of the research on evidentiality from the perspective of linguistic typology (DeLancey (1997)). Mirativity and evidentiality are closely related but different linguistic categories. In short, evidentialitity is grammatical marking of information source, or the way in which information is obtained:

(5) Evidentiality is a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information. (Aikhenvald (2004:3))

Evidentiality and mirativity are similar in that they "essentially delineate the speaker's relationship, either physically or psychologically, to experienced events and states. (Dickinson 2000:381))". However, while an evidential marker denotes source of information, a mirative marker indicates the relation of the information expressed in the propositional content to the speaker's overall knowledge. For concreteness, let us consider the following Japanese sentences, where different evidential markers appear at the sentence final positions (See Aoki (1986:230, 232)):

(6) a. Ame-ga fut-tei-ru φ. [Direct]
Rain-Nom fall-Asp-Pres Direct
'(I see) It's raining.'

b. Ame-ga fut-tei-ru sooda. [Hearsay]
Rain-Nom fall-Asp-Pres hearsay
'(I hear) It's raining.'

c. Kono-kusuri-wa yoku kiku rashii. [Inference]
This-medicine-Top well work Inf
'(It seems) This medicine works well.'

The examples above suggest that evidentiality is integrated into the Japanese grammatical system; in other words, Japanese encodes different evidential meanings with recourse to different sentence final elements. For example, the declarative

sentence with the zero-evidential marker *φ* in (6a) means that the information of the propositional content is obtained by the speaker's direct perception. The sentence final element *sooda* in (6b) implies that the speaker acquired the information by actually hearing it. Finally, *rashii* in (6c) marks the propositional content as resulting from the speaker's inference. Thus, an evidential marker specifies a unique evidential meaning and does not express more than two evidential meanings in essence.

The primary function of mirativity is, on the other hand, to express speaker's unexpected new information and does not necessarily specify any evidential meaning; to put another way, the evidential meaning that mirativity may convey is a secondary function. To see this, let us consider the following Turkish examples, originally observed by Slobin and Aksu (1982):

(7) a. Kemal gel-di. [Turkish]
Kemal come-Past
'Kemal came.' (Slobin and Aksu (1982: 187))
b. Kemal gel-miş. (= (3))
Kemal come-Past
'Kemal came.'

According to Slobin and Aksu (1982), the past tense form *-di* in (7a) serves as a direct perception evidential. The past tense form *-miş* in (7b), on the other hand, primarily expresses the speaker's surprise but does not indicate a fixed evidential meaning; namely, it allows either a direct or indirect evidential interpretation. Given that an evidential marker indicates a unique evidential meaning, the past tense form *-miş* cannot be regarded as an evidential marker. Slobin and Aksu's (1982) observation leads DeLancey (1997) to claim that the primary function of the past tense form *-miş* is to express some newly acquired information with the tone of the speaker's surprise (or unexpectedness), namely, mirativity.

Citing the following Kham example, Watters (2002) also indicates that the mirative marker *-oleo* does not obligatorily encode a certain evidential meaning:

(8) kãhbul u-rɨ̀:h-zya-o oleo (= (2))
blanket 3G-weave-Cont-Noml MIR
'She's weaving a blanket!'

The sentence final particle *oleo* in (8) marks the propositional content as unexpected for the speaker. More precisely, the speaker had not expected that the person in

question would weave a blanket, but contrary to her/his expectation, she actually is doing it. Watters's (2002) point here is that (8) allows either a direct perception evidential interpretation or an inference evidential interpretation. Since (8) does not specify any evidential meaning, it is concluded that the sentence final particle *oleo* is seen as a mirative marker.

To summarize, mirativity is different from evidentiality because it does not specify any evidential meaning; rather, its core meaning is to express new information which is unexpected to the speaker.

2.2. Mirativity and the Speaker/Hearer Distinction

Let us first recall the definition of mirativity in (1), which is proposed to "cover[s] speaker's 'unprepared mind,' unexpected new information, and concomitant surprise." According to this definition, who evaluates some newly acquired information as unexpectedness is the speaker.

The definition in (1), however, does not necessarily exclude the possibility that a mirative marker encodes new information as unexpected to the hearer. A recent study by Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012) proposes that the definition of mirativity be expanded to accommodate unexpectedness for both the speaker and hearer:

(9) The category [= Mirativity] will often be used in circumstances in which the proposition is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the speaker, but may also be used when it is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising <u>for the addressee</u>. (Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012:488), underline mine)

Their proposal is based on DeLancey's (1997) observation that Kalasha linguistically marks unexpectedness for the hearer by using *hu'la*, which is a participial form of the verb *hik* 'become':[3]

(10) Amerika' bo hu'tala dur kai śi'-an hu'la [Kalasha]
America very high house make PST.PF-3PL become.PST.INFR.3
'In America there are very tall buildings.' (DeLancey (1997:47))

According to DeLancey (1997), (10) can be used when the speaker, who had been to America for the first time, is expecting the people in his homeland (or the hearers) to be surprised at her/his newly acquired information conveyed by the propositional

[3] The Kalasha language is an Indo-European language spoken by a Dardic indigenous people residing in the Chitral District of Pakistan.

content.

To sum up, the definition of mirativity is applied to both the speaker and the hearer. Thus, it would be possible to say that the speaker also evaluates the propositional content as newsworthy and unexpected for the hearer while taking account of the hearer's overall knowledge, and present it to her/him. In this sense, a mirative marker may serve to operate on the hearer's knowledge; namely, the speaker may add the new information indicated by the mirative marker to the hearer's knowledge (cf. Ikarashi (2015)).

2.3. Mirativity and Counter-Expectation

As the definition in (9) states, mirativity marks newly acquired information which is unexpected to the speaker and hearer(s); in other words, the information in question is newly added to the speaker's (and hearer's) overall knowledge which includes what s/he expects to be true (henceforth, the knowledge of expectation (Hyslop (2014))). Thus, there is essentially no notable contrast established between the newly acquired information and the speaker's knowledge of expectation.

Aikhenvald (2012), furthermore, argues that there are more specific semantic values subsumed under the label mirativity. Counter-expectation is one of such semantic values and indicates that newly acquired information is counter to the speaker's (and possibly hearer's) expectation which has already been established in the previous discourse. To understand the notion of counter-expectation more clearly, let us consider the following example from Kurtöp, a Tibeto-Burman language of Northeastern Bhutan:

(11) 'au nak-po=ri ngai ko-shang=sa
where Cop-Exis-QP:Perv=REP 1.ERG hear-Perv.Ego=Cexp
'Where (did I hear) (he) was? I thought I heard (to self).'
(Hyslop (2014:125))

The sentence final clitic *=sa* in (11) is used in such a context in which the speaker heard where the person in question was, but cannot remember. The clitic *=sa* expresses that the fact that s/he was unable to remember in spite of hearing it before is counter to her/his expectation. Thus, the clitic *=sa* encodes that something is counter to the speaker's expectation.

To summarize, counter-expectation is one of the semantic values of mirativity, and marks newly acquired information that is contrary to the speaker's expectation.

3. Proposal: The Function of Monoclausal *As If*

The previous section has reviewed mirativity and one of its semantic values, counter-expectation. On the basis of the two concepts, this section proposes the function of *as if* monoclauses. Before proposing the details of it, let us summarize two basic syntactic and semantic properties of the subordinator *as if* and review Brinton (2014), a previous study providing some details of the syntactic and semantic properties of monoclausal *as if*.

First, the subordinator *as if* is, in general, used to introduce a comparison/manner adverbial or a complement clause (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)):

(12) a. Don't attack a mouth as if you're dipping a mop into a slop-bucket!
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1151))

b. It seems/looks as if he's in difficulties.
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1151))

In the adverbial use (12a), the adverbial clause is used to modify the matrix clause and expresses the comparison of equality between the way of attacking a mouth and that of dipping a mop into a slop-bucket. In the complement use (12b), on the other hand, the subordinator selected by the modal predicate *seem* introduces the complement clause and expresses the speaker's epistemic stance (or certainty) toward the propositional content. Thus, the subordinator *as if* allows at least the two patterns described above, the adverbial use and the complement use.

Second, the difference in mood concerns the interpretation of an *as if* clause. The subordinator *as if* introduces an adverbial/complement clause either with subjunctive mood (e.g. the irrealis *were*, the preterite modal *would*, etc) or indicative mood (e.g. the present tense). Roughly speaking, the difference in mood contributes to making either a neutral or counter-factual statement (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)). Let us consider the following example:

(13) He moves about on camera, angular, emaciated, graceful, as if his body were/is weightless. (Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1152))

When the predicate in the *as if* adverbial takes the irrealis form *were*, the sentence in (13) implies that the opposite content is true; namely, the counter-factual reading that the person in question is not actually weightless. When the same predicate takes the present tense *is*, on the other hand, the neutral reading is possible; the sentence presents his being weightless as an open possibility (but not obligatorily as a

counter-factual statement). Thus, the *as if* subordinate clause with subjunctive mood prefers a counter-factual interpretation, while the one with indicative mood a neutral interpretation.

Having observed the two syntactic and semantic properties of the subordinator *as if*, let us briefly review Brinton (2014), which examines the historical development of *as if* and its syntactic and semantic properties. Brinton's argument concerning the historical development of *as if* is mainly twofold. First, following López-Couso and Méndez-Naya (2012:322), Brinton assumes that the fundamental use of *as if* in introducing adverbial clauses of comparison (from early Middle English) leads to the secondary use as complement clauses (arising in Late Middle English). Along with Declerck (1992), Brinton further argues that the monoclausal use of *as if* synchronically develops from the complement use. As a result of this process of insubordination, monoclausal *as if* has been derived. Brinton also discusses some influences of the historical development of the subordinator *as if* on some semantic/pragmatic properties of monoclausal *as if*. First, the propositional content introduced by *as if* expresses an implied view against which the speaker argues or contests. Second, monoclausal *as if* has become fixed to express a negative epistemic stance toward the propositional content (cf. the counter-factual reading in (13)). To understand these two properties, let us consider the following example:

(14) Mother said, "As if I were the one at fault."
(COCA: FIC 2000) (Brinton (2014:99))

According to Brinton, the monoclausal *as if* in (14) is used in such a context that someone's utterance or behavior in the previous discourse suggests that the person in question is the one at fault, and s/he attempts to deny the implied view with a feeling of angriness. In other words, the propositional content expresses the hearer's idea that the person in question is the one at fault, but what is conveyed to the hearer is the opposite content; that is, the speaker is asserting that she is not the one at fault.


Having in mind the two properties of mono-clausal *as if* described above, we propose the following function of it on the basis of counter-expectation:

(15) Proposal
Monoclausal *as if* marks information that is counter to the speaker's expectation.

To make clear some details of the proposal in (15), let us reconsider example (14),

repeated below as (16):

(16) a. As if I were the one at fault. (= (14))
b. Speaker: A, Hearer: B



As schematized in (16b), the content of the *as if* clause expresses Hearer B's expectation that Speaker A is the one at fault. Hearer B's expectation is contrary to Speaker A's expectation because Speaker A believes that s/he is not the one at fault (as indicated by the two-way arrow). By using the monoclausal *as if* in (16a), the opposite information of the clausal content (denoted below Assertion) is conveyed to the hearer; what Speaker A asserts is that s/he is not the one at fault. The Speaker A's assertion is counter to the Hearer B's expectation, too. Thus, monoclausal *as if* also serves to indicate the presence of the information that is counter to Hearer B's expectation. In this sense, monoclausal *as if* can be regarded as a device to manipulate hearer's knowledge, which is argued to be a property of mirative expressions (see section 2.2.).

The proposal in (15) is supported by three pieces of evidence. First, if there is no implied view against which the speaker argues in the discourse, the use of monoclausal *as if* becomes infelicitous. More specifically, one cannot use monoclausal *as if* in the out-of-the-blue context because there is no implied view previously established in the discourse. For concreteness, let us consider the following context:

(17) [Context] The speaker is trying to initiate discourse.
Speaker: # Hey, as if I would make any noise!

The speaker in (17) intendsd to initiate discourse by using the monoclausal *as if*, but, in this context, the monoclausal *as if* is infelicitous. This result is expected because no one suggests in the previous discourse that the speaker will make a noise, and

hence there is no implied view (or the hearer's expectation) which is contrary to the speaker's expectation.

Second, monoclausal *as if* cannot be used when it does not provide the hearer with information that is counter to her/his expectation. For example, consider the following context:

(18) [Context] Mary is John's wife and has very nice cooking skills. One day, after eating a piece of nice cake which Mary baked, John is trying to praise Mary.
John: # As if you were a chef!
cf. (Just) like a real chef!

John in (18) is trying to praise Mary's nice cooking skills by using the monoclausal *as if* while comparing her to a chef. The use of monoclausal *as if*, however, is unacceptable in this context. This is because the context does not require the speaker to argue against Mary's nice cooking skills by conveying the opposite content of the *as if* clause.

Third, it is expected that monoclausal *as if* cannot be syntactically embedded because the speaker uses it while taking account of the speaker's and hearer's overall knowledge at the speech time. As pointed out by Brinton (2014), monoclausal *as if* does not occur in embedded clauses:

(19) * She said that as if she were the one at fault. (Brinton (2014:101))

In our proposal, *as if* serves as a counter-expectation marker and expresses information that is counter to both the speaker and the hearer. This implies that monoclausal *as if* is used while accessing the state of their overall knowledge at the speech time. The embedded clause in (19), on the other hand, simply expresses what the speaker (= she) heard in the past time and is unable to denote any information which is counter to the speaker's and hearer's expectation at the speech time. Thus, syntactic embedding renders monoclausal *as if* unacceptable.

This section has proposed that the main function of monoclausal *as if* is to express information that is unexpected to the speaker. As a result of the speaker asserting the opposite content, the hearer also receives the information that is counter to her/his expectation. In the literature, it is often argued that monoclausal *as if* may express some exclamatory meaning (Ando (2005), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)). Under the present proposal, however, the exclamatory meaning is seen as a secondary effect resulting from expressing

counter-expectation. On the basis of the present proposal, the next section considers what kinds of communicative effects arise and how they are accounted for.

4. Communicative Effects of Monoclausal *As If*

The previous section has proposed that the core function of monoclausal *as if* is to encode the speaker's counter-expectation. The speaker asserts the opposite content of what the *as if* clause expresses, and as a result the hearer receives the information which is unexpected to her/him. Through this process, it is expected that monoclausal *as if* may trigger a range of secondary communitive effects, depending on the type of context in which it is uttered. To see what kinds of communicative effects arise from the counter-expectation function of *as if*, this section observes some attested data collected from TV programs and movies whose scenarios are written in English. In what follows, three types of communicative effects are presented: scolding, indirect answering, and criticizing.

First, monoclausal *as if* can be indirectly used as a scolding expression. The following example is cited from the science fantasy movie titled *The Others*. In this scene, Grace is observing her children (= Anne and Nicholas) study, but they are refusing to study separately in their own rooms, as they are afraid of ghosts:

(20) Grace: Anne, any more protests and there'll be no playing for you at all today. In fact, I think you can study in separate rooms…
Anne/Nicholas: No, no, no!
Grace: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes…!
Anne: But we get scared if we're separated.
Grace: You get scared…! <u>As if you weren't used to this house by now.</u>
Nicholas: What if we see a ghost? (*The Others*)

As shown in (20), Grace first suggests that Anne and Nicholas can study in separate rooms, but they refuse their mother's suggestion by saying that they will get scared if they are separated. Following Anne's utterance, Grace is using the *as if* mono-clause. Under our proposal, the *as if* mono-clause is interpreted as follows. The content clause expresses Grace and Anne's thought which Grace infers from their behavior and utterance; Grace and Anne have not yet been used to the house. In contrast, what is conveyed to them is the opposite content: they has been actually used to the house. The speaker's (= Grace's) assertion indirectly implies that they can study separately because they should have been used to the house. Thus, monoclausal *as if* may indirectly serve as a scolding expression in the context of discipline.

Second, monoclausal *as if* can be used as an indirect answer as a result of expressing counter-expectation. For concreteness, let us consider the following scene, which is cited from the romance movie named *Down with Love*. In this scene, Gwendolyn walks up to her boyfriend, Catcher, from behind, and subsequently opens conversation while blindfolding Catcher's eyes with hands:

(21) Gwendolyn: [Blindfolding Catcher's eyes with hands] Guess who?
Catcher: As if I'd need to guess.
Gwendolyn: Tell me my name. (*Down with Love*)

Gwendolyn is asking Catcher who is blindfolding his eyes with hands, and Catcher is replying to the question by using the monoclausal *as if*. Here, the content of the *as if* mono-clause expresses what Catcher infers from Gwendolyn's question: Gwendolyn expects Catcher to guess who is blindfolding his eyes. Contrary to Gwendolyn's expectation, Catcher is asserting that he does not need to guess the question because he already knows the answer without guessing. Thus, the *as if* mono-clause functions as an indirect answer to Gwendolyn's question, and conveys to her that he actually does not need to guess because it is obvious that the woman who is blindfolding his eyes is Gwendolyn.

Third, monoclausal *as if* can be used to criticize the hearer. Let us consider the following scene taken from the romance movie *The Great Gatsby*. In this scene, Gatsby is talking with Daisy, who is the former girlfriend of Gatsby and is Tom's wife now, but Tom is trying to interrupt their conversation:

(22) Gatsby: [To Tom] I just need to speak to Daisy alone. You (Tom) see, you, you've got her (Daisy) all excited now, don't you old sport. Daisy, hey.
Daisy: Even alone I can't say I never loved Tom, it wouldn't be true.
Tom: Of course, it wouldn't.
Daisy: As if it mattered to you.
Tom: Of course it matters. I'm going to take better care of you from now on. (*The Great Gatsby* [*2013*])

Here, Tom is breaking into their conversation suddenly by approving of Daisy's statement that it would not be true to say that she never loved him. Responding to Tom's interruption, Daisy is uttering the *as if* monoclause. The clausal content, in this case, expresses Tom's assumption that it matters to him, but what Daisy is asserting is the opposite content; it actually does not matter to Tom. By conveying

the opposite content to Tom, the *as if* mono-clause indirectly functions to criticize Tom's rude interruption.

This section has seen the three communicative effects which we have argued to result from the role of *as if* as a counter-expectation marker: scolding, indirect answering, and criticizing. The next section further discusses the use of *as if* as a discourse marker specialized to encode counter-expectation without expressing any clausal content.

5. The Subordinator *As If* as a Discourse Marker

This section briefly discusses the case where the subordinator *as if* is used as a discourse marker. As proposed in section 3, the core function of monoclausal *as if* is to denote counter-expectation. Interestingly, there are some cases where the subordinator *as if* is used without any clausal content to just indicate that the hearer's assumption is counter to the speaker's expectation.

For example, let us consider the following data from an American medical drama series *House, M.D*. In this scene, the medical team leader, Dr. House, is exchanging opinions with his subordinate, Foreman, about an illegitimate medical treatment after walking out of his lab and leaving the rest of the members in it:

(23) Foreman: You could have said all that in there (Dr. House's lab).
Dr. House: In front of the narc? As if. (*House, M.D*, Season 7-7)

In this scene, Foreman is asking the reason why Dr. House did not talk about the illegal medical treatment in his lab. Responding to Foreman, Dr. House is simply uttering the discourse marker *as if*. Dr. House's reply here roughly means that he was unable to talk about the illegal treatment in front of the members of his medical team because one of them, *the narc*, will tell it to the director of the hospital.

Brinton (2014) refers to the use of *as if* like the one in (23) as exclamatory *as if*, which "is used in a dismissive or derisive way in response to some expressed or implied state of affairs" (Brinton (2014:96)). From the perspective of our proposal, what Brinton calls exclamatory *as if* is seen as a discourse marker encoding counter-expectation without its clausal content which denotes the hearer's expectation. In this case, the hearer's assumption is stated in the previous discourse and remains to be expressed as the clausal content of *as if*. An interesting question is whether there is any difference between mono-clausal *as if* and exclamatory *as if*, but we will leave it for future research.

6. Concluding Remarks

This paper considered the core function of *as if* mono-clauses from the perspective of counter-expectation, which is one of the semantic values subsumed under mirativity. We proposed that the core function of mono-clausal *as if* is to encode information which is counter to the speaker's expectation; the information is expressed as the clausal content of *as if* and reflects the hearer's viewpoint. By asserting the opposite information of the clausal content, it also provides the hearer with the information which is counter to her/his expectation. Thus, mono-clausal *as if* serves as a marker to express information which is counter to both the speaker's and hearer's expectation.

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