

Nominalization in English

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In this thesis, I tried to formulate nominalized constructions (i.e. for-to clause, that clause, to-infinitive, gerund) in the framework of Montague Grammar. The standard approach on this topic is that of Partee(1977), though she analyzed only to-infinitive constructions. Consider the following example:

(1) To please John is easy.

Seemingly, the subject in (1) is IV (i.e. VP), which denotes a property. Then the predicate is easy cannot be an ordinary IV. (consider here Russel's paradox). So she introduced a new kind of IV, namely \overline{IV} , which is of property level. But this approach has some problems, as pointed out in Chierchia(1982). The most important criticism there is that the approach loses simplicity and consistency of the category system.

To avoid this problem, I proposed to add the following function to the model in PTQ.

(2) Individualizing Function (f)

Domain: all $\hat{\phi}$'s, $\hat{\phi} \in ME_{\langle s, t \rangle}$

Range : $f(\hat{\phi}) \in A$

ME: meaningful expression

: proposition

A: domain of individuals

This function maps propositions into the domain of individuals. By virtue of this function, all the nominalized constructions are recast as individuals which I call Situation Individuals. Now that nominalized constructions are individuals, it is not necessary to introduce new level categories. So we can avoid the problem above. Of course, to-infinitives are, seemingly, not of category t (i.e. sentence), which corresponds to proposition, but of category IV. Therefore they are not the proper input of the function f . So I introduce a rule that adds a

variable in the subject position of to-infinitives which do not have an overt subject. Thus it is possible to treat to-infinitives as propositions.

Though I introduced the function f , which maps propositions onto individuals, we can hardly imagine that all of the nominalized constructions denote the same kind of individual. For example, as Bach and others discussed, that clauses and for-to clauses denote quite different objects. See the following examples:

- (3) a. For people to own handguns is illegal in England.
 b. That people own handguns is illegal in England.

(Carlson, 1979)

The that clause in (3b) refers to a specific actual situation. The for-to clause in (3a), on the other hand, refers not to a specific situation, but to a certain situation. I claimed that that this difference was caused by the presence or absence of a tense operator. And I defined the structure of a situation as follows:

- (4) V (Argumentⁿ) index

The Argument in the bracket indicates (most typically) real things that participate in a situation. The V indicates a real state or action of, or a real relation between Arguments. The Vs and Arguments are expressed linguistically as verbs and arguments subcategorized by verbs, respectively. The index locates a situation on the plane with time- and world-axis. I assumed that an index is realized as a tense and a modal operator. Situations in which all of these constituents are filled are specific (or uniquely identifiable). The situation denoted by that clause in (3b) is specific, since all of these constituents are filled. On the other hand, the situation denoted by the for-to clause lacks an index (or has a variable as an index), since it does not have a tense (and a modal) operator. Hence the situation is not a specific one, but is a certain situation. I call a situation with no variable S-token (Situation Token),

and a situation with one or more variables like a for-to clause S-type (Situation Type). I argued that many of the semantic properties of nominalized constructions can be made clear by this distinction.

With this distinction in mind, I stratified the domain of individuals: Type stratum and Token-stratum. And I imposed conditions on the function f so that each nominalized construction could be mapped into the proper stratum in the domain of individuals.