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Preface

Slovene-Japanese Relations and Beyond

With this second Slovene-Japanese Cooperation Forum, we believe it is now time to go further, both in breadth and in depth. It is now no longer just a question of relations between two countries – Slovenia and Japan, but of relations between two continents – Europe and Asia. Nor is it just a matter of scientific and cultural exchange between specialists of two universities any more, but a vital matter of forming young students and researchers across the continents capable of managing dialogue and of living with diversity within the larger context. For this we need a sustainable and flexible framework.

In the beginning, we were a few private individuals sharing our friendships, our trust and our collaboration; then we established student exchange, workshops and special seminars, in short, inter-university co-operation which then developed into joint theses production, joint conferences and joint scientific projects. Finally, the first *Slovenia-Japan University Cooperation Network Graduate Student Forum* was held in October 2008. Students from Ljubljana, Tsukuba, Waseda and Bonn Universities participated in this first Forum to discuss the problems of *language and society, tradition and modernization, civil society and governance*. The underlying intent was to provide a venue for graduate students where they could take the initiative and organize a forum for dialogue for themselves, by themselves and amongst themselves.

This was to become a precious opportunity for young researchers to cross the boundaries of the specialized themes of their theses and discover, sometimes quite unexpectedly, that they could share and discuss problems and issues with others from different fields of expertise. To be a specialist in depth but a generalist in breadth; we believe these are the indispensable prerequisites for a vibrant intersection of ideas, opinions and emotions.

The second Forum of 2009 was organized with the same perspectives in mind. Students from Ljubljana, Tsukuba, Gunma and Tokyo (Foreign Studies) Universities participated. Undergraduate students from Ljubljana and Italy were invited to observe and give their evaluation and the Forum was largely coordinated by the young researchers themselves.

From the experience of these past two years, we now hope to enlarge the international network to other universities in the EU, China, Korea, Japan, etc. and to establish a sustainable academic venue for researchers across the human and social sciences.

On behalf of all the participants, we would like to thank their Excellencies, Mr. Shigeharu Maruyama, the Ambassador of Japan to Slovenia and Mr. Miran Skender, the Ambassador of Slovenia to Japan for their continued encouragement of the Forums and support of Slovene-Japanese relations

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January 26th, 2009

DISCUSSION 1.

THE CONCEPT OF NATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL

in dialogue with

. GOVERNANCE AND FLEXIBILITY

. LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY

Report on the Presentations of Session 1

Jia Chai gave a presentation about differences in tea ceremony between Japan and China. In both countries tea is a symbol of harmony, but she claims that in the latter it is more connected with pleasure than in Japan. She also mentioned the Japanese scholar Okakura Kakuzō (1862-1913) and his work *The Book of Tea*, first published in 1906. In Chai's opinion, with this book Okakura wanted to introduce the Asian cultural spirit (or maybe we can also say customs) to a Western audience. Jia also mentioned *Cha Do*, which she considers to be one of the most important traditions Japan has learned from China. She was asked about the role of Korea in the process of transmission of the tea ceremony from China to Japan. Another question was about the differences between English and Japanese habits of drinking tea.

Moe Noda presented a paper about the Italian author Iginio Ugo Tarchetti (1839-1869) and his use of the Doppelgänger motif, common in Western literature from the late 18th century. She analyzed the process of change in the Doppelgänger in dramas and novels. Moe mentioned that this change is connected to the meaning of "uncanny". The concept derives from Sigmund Freud's psycho-analytical essays. She presented two types of Doppelgänger related to Tarchetti's work and concluded that the author's "crisis of identity" was the main reason why he decided for a fantasy world. The Doppelgänger was his way of escaping from reality.

Hideaki Matsumoto's paper was focused on the process of building an individual's identity. As we heard in his presentation this process is actually never completely realized. Every process of formation of one's own identity is affected by one's relationships to others within a group, since development of identity requires interaction with others. By expressing oneself to others and being known and seen by others, one develops one's own identity positively and negatively. Hideaki also mentioned Isaiah Berlin's concepts of affiliation. He distinguished Populism and Nationalism in terms of being aggressive or non-aggressive. He was asked how this theory can explain intolerance against "weak" groups which has been increasing in the past few years, especially for EU newcomers.

Klemen Senica discussed the ways Macedonian national identity could have been created as outlined in Krste Petkov Misirkov's book *Za Makedonckite Raboti* (On The Macedonian Matters). He pointed out the importance of religion and language as the most significant bases on which Macedonian national identity should, according to the author, be created. Klemen was asked about the reasons for the stance of the Communist government after World War II, when politicians in Belgrade wanted to make one national language called Serbo-Croatian but on the other hand tried to distinguish the Macedonian Language from Bulgarian, even though the latter were actually closer than the former.

Monju Cho discussed the consumption of Japanese movies in South Korea and the connection between them and Japanese soft power in South Korea. She focused on the reasons why Japanese culture has not been generally accepted in that country. Monju explained that South Koreans do not have a special interest in Japanese popular culture despite the fact that the South Korean government claims the opposite.

Nataša Visočnik presented a paper concerning diversity. There are different types of diversity and it seems diversity is all around us, but it is obvious that we still do not know how to deal with it. Somehow, we are forced to be equal with other members of the group we belong to, but on the other hand diversity is a popular, maybe even fashionable, concept.

Luka Culiberg discussed language ideologies and the concept of "national language". He started the presentation by asking himself what language is and what it really means to learn other languages. He also mentioned the definition of "dialect" and argued that every so-called national language is a collection of different vernaculars that sometimes belong to a language more for political and historical reasons than for linguistic ones. Thus he claimed that from a sociological point of view, language is a problematic concept that was historically invented in a similar way to the concepts of culture or nation.

Report on the Final Discussion around the Theme: ***The Concept of Nation and the Individual***

Discussion members: Jia Chai, Munju Cho, Luka Culiberg, Hideaki Matsumoto, Moe Noda, Klemen Senica, Nataša Visočnik

The seven contributions of the session entitled *The Concept of Nation and the Individual* addressed a number of topics on the relation between nation state, society and the individual in Japan, China, South Korea, Italy, Slovenia, and Macedonia. The presenters approached these topics from various disciplines such as sociology, linguistics, literary studies, political science and anthropology and used different methodologies to comprehend the main problem within their research.

The majority of papers looked at the concept of identity, nation and society, which was also the thread for a common discussion among the presenters. Jia Chai and Munju Cho discussed the ways of cultural exchange in the past and the present day and how they are taking new forms in this age of modernity. While Jia Chai examined tea as a mode of cultural exchange between countries, more specifically Japan and China, as well as between East and West, she also thought that we should promote our own culture through different elements of our culture but at the same time we should respect the differences between cultures. From another viewpoint, Munju Cho presented the consumption of Japanese popular culture in South Korea since 1998 and specially focused on Japanese movies through a discussion of soft power. She also dealt with the opposition to Japanese culture by the older generation of Koreans for whom the war was still very present and more and more wide acceptance of the younger generation who had no such experience.

This prompted Jia Chai to think that one of the most instrumental doctrines in history is that all humans are divided into a variety of nations. This was the starting point for the ideology of nationalism that we discussed in this session. A nation is a group of human beings who share a common racial, ethnic, sociological, cultural, historical, and political identity, and also share a common language, religion, culture, and history. National identity is relevant to the features of the ethnic group, as well as to the individual's sense of belonging to it. Members of a nation are assumed to share certain traits, values, and standards of behaviour. Although nationalism is one of the most successful political ideologies in human history, its achievement in getting the entire land surface of the world divided between nation-states has led to considerable problems in integrating ethnic and cultural minorities within these states. Nationalist theories are still controversial, while the process and frequent failures of national integration are issues of central importance in the contemporary world.

In the discussion we talked about and analysed the theory of nationalism, the process and problems of national culture, ethnicity, and history in the EU and Asia. The European Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of cultures and traditions of the people of Europe as well as national identities of the member states and the organization of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels. The EU also seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, services, goods, and capital, and the freedom of establishment. And the Asian Union which is being proposed will face similar situations and conditions.

Munju Cho added here that the nation state is a concept that was born in the modern age. From the 19th century to the 20th century many countries rushed into war including the two World Wars. After the end of these wars many countries were approved as a country with new territories. Moreover, many countries were reorganized into new territories, and the standard of reorganization was mainly by race or nation, and political agreement. Many reorganized countries requested integration in order to maintain the country. The concept of the community of the imagination by Benedict Anderson is closely connected to such realities.

However, at the present period, Cho has doubts that the nation and the nation state have a common point. The composition of present countries looks simple; however, dispute and repression continue constantly, including problems of nation and religion. Moreover, the movement between countries is already active in today's world. In brief, it is difficult to define which concepts of the nation and the nation state are the same in such a current climate. For example, South Korea is a country established as one nation, South Korea. However, all people who have the same origin are not South Korean. People who were compulsorily moved to Central Asia and Japan in the period of Japanese colonialism are not now admitted as being South Korean. In addition, even if such people remember the culture and the language of South Korea right up to the present time, they still do not have the same rights as South Koreans. The situation is not simple in China or in Japan either. For instance, China is a community of many minorities, and Japan includes indigenous groups of people such as the people of Okinawa and the Ainu group. Moreover, the situation of Europe where many nations exist is more complex than that of Asia. In other words, nation and nation state cannot be discussed within the same framework. Neither nation nor nation state actually correspond. On the other hand, the existence of individuals forms the identity of their own way in the group which is named the nation. Therefore, the concept of nation and nation state and identity cannot be explained with one standard. Moreover, these concepts need a new definition because globalization is progressing more and more.

Hideaki Matsumoto's paper dealt with similar concepts, especially he focused on the process of forming an individual's identity. As we have heard this is actually never realised. Forming of the individual identity is always connected with the outside opinion, since members of a group to which someone belongs have to recognize their position. He also posed the problem under discussion, the concepts of nation, identity and ideology. This led us to ask ourselves 'what is national consciousness?' Generally people believe that a nation is constituted of a group of people who feel that each member within the group shares common elements (language, culture, tradition, history, etc.) which other national peoples cannot fully understand and that in this sense the group is distinguished from other groups. Because of this belief people can have a national consciousness which occurs naturally to people's minds. So people unquestionably assume that they belong to a nation or an ethnic group and that the nation or the ethnic group should have one state. This assumption leads to the idea of 'nation-state'. However 'nation' does not originate purely from nature. Something we believe to be nation was created by states through the creation of national language, national history, tradition and culture and also through a standardized educational system. This makes people in one state homogeneous, so that an individual can recognize another individual who understands his language or culture, even if they have never met, as a member of the same nation. In addition, people who are nurtured within that system do not regard nation as something artificially created but as something originating from nature and unchanging.

Thus we no longer consider nation and nation-state as self-evident entities. However we also could not consider nation and nation-state as mere illusions, because we could not easily deny the fact that we identify ourselves with the nation to which we belong. Moreover it is only natural that people feel attachment to the environment or the society within which they grew up. So we thought that a cause of xenophobic phenomena in a nation has something to do with a mixture of people's natural attachment to their environment and an artificially created homogeneity of people into one state. Generally nationalists argue for cultural diversity in terms of relation to other nations. In this sense nationalists do not appear xenophobic. However nationalists sometimes stress homogeneity of the nation domestically and try to exclude heterogeneity within a state. So in this sense nationalism could appear ambivalent. Thus it is important to understand historically how our language, traditions and culture have been created in the modern age in order to create homogeneity within one nation-state.

To conclude, Hideaki Matsumoto said that firstly, national consciousness is an ideology and is artificially invented by the modern state. Secondly, it is important to realize how our national consciousness has been structured. Thirdly, through this understanding we might want to salvage the

natural feeling of affiliation in order to cultivate a sense of diversity within and without. Hideaki also mentioned Isaiah Berlin's concepts of affiliation. He distinguished populism (Culture, Patriotism...) and nationalism. But how did these kinds of -isms spread among the common people? The answer was not only hiding in the paper of Hideaki Matsumoto, but also in those of Moe Noda and Klemen Senica who dealt with the impact of literature on the masses.

Thus Klemen Senica's discussion focused on the real example of the making of Macedonian national identity or at least of trying to stimulate awareness of it. At the beginning of the 20th century the Macedonian region was still under the Ottoman rule, but all the neighbouring states had already gained independency (Serbia and Greece) or a high level of autonomy (Bulgaria). As the Ottoman political and military power had started to decline, the neighbouring countries started religious and political propaganda in Macedonia to convince the inhabitants that they were of Serbian, Bulgarian or Greek origin. When Macedonian intellectuals realized that such a destructive policy would lead to a balkanization of the region, they tried to find a solution to protect their 'country' from separation. One of the members of these intellectual circles was Krste Petkov Misirkov (1874-1926). Since he was educated both in Serbia and Bulgaria, he soon realized the plans of the governments. The same year, but six months after the Ilinden uprising (1903) he published a book entitled *Za Makedonckite Raboti* (On the Macedonian Matters). The work expressed the ideas that Macedonian Slavs should create their own national identity and Misirkov tried to find different arguments for its existence. Unfortunately, his views on Macedonian nation as a national of Macedonian Slavs were quite ethnocentric, since Macedonia was at that time (and still is) known for its ethnic and religious mixture.

However, Moe Noda had a different opinion about personal identity. She discussed the crisis of personal identity focusing on a study of the Italian writer Ugo Tarchetti (1839-1869), who was representative of a literary movement animated by a spirit of rebellion against traditional religion and culture. The concept of identity is as old as man. However, Moe thinks that the advent of modernity has helped redefine the concept of identity considerably. Indeed, the advent of the nation-state, socialistic ideologies, the industrial revolution, and the nationalistic waves in 19th century Europe all contributed to give a rigid definition of identity, where *social* identity became predominant and national affiliation the most important attribute of one's identity. Nevertheless, Moe Noda believes there was also a strong reaction to a fixed, determined, vision of identity in 19th century Europe, in particular Italy, through an 'inward-looking' quest for *personal* identity. An

ultimate symbol of this quest for the self is Tarchetti and the attention he gave to the concept of Doppelgänger.

In the 19th Century there were several fantasy novels where Doppelgängers play a pivotal role, we just need to think of authors such as Oscar Wilde and Edgar Allan Poe, and Stevenson's 'Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde.' Nevertheless, Italy did not seem to be affected by the new literary wave, instead most Italian authors preferred the Realist school denouncing social problems and the need to fight for the nation. Thanks to writers such as Igino Ugo Tarchetti, fantasy works started to take root in Italy as well. He himself criticized Italy's most representative writer of the time, Alessandro Manzoni, whose very famous realistic and nationalistic novel 'The Betrothed' was considered to be 'soulless' by Tarchetti. As a matter of fact, Tarchetti was deeply influenced by foreign literary waves, especially Gothic and Romantic works coming from Germany, England and France. It is no exaggeration to say that his works were not only among the first to introduce the Doppelgänger in Italy, but his doubles were also highly original and varied.

Of course, Tarchetti wrote social novels in his early years, nevertheless in the end he thought about social identity and national identity. During the fighting for his fatherland in the time of the Risorgimento wars for the sake of national liberation and unification, he questioned the validity of risking one's own life and killing others for the glory of Italy. Finally, he woke up at the miserable conditions of social life in post-Risorgimento Milan, and subsequently decided to dedicate himself to the search of personal identity, questioning it through existentialist fantasy novels, where the individual is understood as the centre-stage, as the whole. Moe Noda thinks that the validity of Tarchetti's work is also important for the discussion, giving a different perspective to the concept of identity.

Although some might oppose Moe Noda's idea of personal identity and say that identity is a reflection of society and to some extent that literature is a reflection of society, Moe Noda was insistent that personal identity is not influenced by the social environment but there is a great deal in the person's character and the way of thinking. This point raised an interesting question, 'whether you can choose your identity'. Discussion of this question did not bring an answer as different people have different ideas about personal identity.

On the other hand Luka Culiberg tried to show why language should be considered as an ideological concept, which is also 'imagined', since we cannot define the difference between language and dialect through purely linguistic criteria. He pointed out that our discussion was revolving around key concepts of nation and identity. It was a vivid discussion among the members of the group, but

the nature of the topic was perhaps too broad and therefore too vague to make important progress within the scope of a short discussion. The problem of nation and the one of individual identity within a national community is such a fundamental problem of modern human society that it can hardly be successfully tackled in the context of a single discussion. The major implications and mechanisms of the ideological construction of national identity were of course known to all the participants, while the theoretical details are far too complex to allow for an actual theoretical progress of ideas in such a context. Thus discussion more or less revolved around general points of the ideological nature of national communities and around the question of the meaning that national identity has for its members. The topics where we could not reach a complete agreement were for example questions of whether one can get rid of or change one's own national identity (as opposed to nationality) and to what degree one's world view is determined from the outside (for example based on one's identity) as opposed to relying only on individual psychology. Since it is exactly the point where agreement cannot be reached that is the most fruitful point of possible progress in our understanding, such points should exactly be where we should continue our discussion in the future.

Finally we also discussed the question of cultural diversity in the modern state as raised by Nataša Visočnik. She tried to answer this question by presenting two cases: Japan and Slovenia, with their similarities and differences. She discussed the variety of diversity that can be seen all around, but it is obvious that we still do not know how to deal with them. Somehow, we are forced to be equal with the other members of our group, but on the other hand diversity is a word that lately is being used in many ways. Her study of diversity advances through the assertion of its existence and value in any country, through the analysis of the problems of its non-acknowledgment, and through giving it voice. The notion of diversity needs to be freed both in theory, and political and social practice, from the idea of dominant-minority relations. We found out that the question of diversity is not a phenomenon of the modern nation-state but a problem of it. There are a great many arguments about cultural diversity used by many politicians but they usually employ this expression just as an excuse for their actions when they are dealing with minority groups within a nation state.

The problem of a nation-state and the idea of diversity is that they have opposite goals and ideas about the definition of state organization. While the nation-state has always depended on the nationalistic programmes in which nation-building was seen to require a control of cultural and linguistic plurality, diversity points out the differences and varieties and urges that this control should be abolished as it makes discrimination possible. Especially there should be a reconsideration of homogenized totalitarianism that was the founding doctrine of nationhood. Although it sounds utopian, cultural diversity is assumed to be one which espouses a view of a common humanity, one in which peoples of diverse social and historical experiences have rights to autonomy and resources;

a social environment in which a diversity of physical, material, intellectual and other abilities are regarded as a source of wealth and strength. It is not intended to assume an elimination of conflict, which has always been a part of the politics of difference, although it may have implications for the expression and management of conflicts.

In the end we learned that nationalism and internationalism do not necessary oppose each other but that they can go hand in hand as we become a more and more global society. We think that we have to learn that to be respected we must respect others with cultural sensitivity. Even if we don't understand other cultures we can respect each other. Respect is a good start for inter-cultural communication and for resolving common problems such as environmental questions, pollution discrepancies in the different parts of the world and so on. It is not only education that can bring us information about these problems and their resolutions, but also reform of the legal system and infiltration of these ideas into real everyday life, into the consciousness of real people.

The Culture of Tea in China and Japan as a Medium of Cultural Exchange

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Aim

The purpose of this study is to promote cultural exchange between countries through an understanding of the history and spirit of tea culture, and to show how and why tea, as a symbol of Asian life, can be an effective tool in bridging the cultures of the East and the West as well as those of China and Japan. Tea represents not only the natural world as understood in Eastern tradition but also the daily life of common people. Tea unites a diversity of peoples across the Asian continent and is a strong reminder of the close bonds that have endured between those peoples over the centuries.

A way of promoting cultural exchange

There has been a long history of cultural exchange between Japan and China but there have also been many misunderstandings and problems of pride between the two countries. In order to promote cultural exchange, first of all it is necessary to recognize the history and the differences between each country accurately and objectively. Secondly, it is necessary to promote a kind of communion between countries and foster mutual respect across a wide variety of values, history, culture and traditions. I believe that taking the way of tea, especially the idea of tea spirit, could help to promote cultural exchange.

Okakura's quest for cultural exchange through tea ceremony

Okakura Kakuzō originally wrote *The Book of Tea* to introduce Asian thought and civilization to the West. He stood within the tradition of Asian culture but expressed himself in Western modes of thought in order to explain the central values of Japanese life.

Okakura wrote *The Book of Tea* in 1906 when Japan was facing an influx of western ideas and institutions and was in danger of losing its cultural identity. The postwar period found Japan again in a similar situation, with the fall of the old system and a call for a new, democratic form of government. The Japanese people did not adopt the democratic ideal of the West, but looked for a democratic ideal formed in their own heritage. *The Book of Tea* also set forth democratic ideals in the tradition of tea ceremony. Okakura added:

...our home and habits, costume and cuisine, porcelain, lacquer, painting—our very literature—all have been subject to its influence. No student of Japanese culture could ever ignore its presence.¹

Background of Chinese and Japanese tea culture

Chinese tea has a long history of over 5,000 years. Tea from China, along with silk and porcelain, began to be known throughout the world over more than a thousand years ago. In the past people not only formed a special way of tea-drinking, but also developed an art-form called tea-making. The art of making tea is called "*Cha Do*", and was accepted as one of the most important cultures that Japan learned from China.

The custom of drinking tea was first introduced into Japan from China in the 9th century. In the 16th century, tea drinking had spread to all levels of society from merchants to wealthy farmers. From the ranks of the mercantile families came the seminal tea master, Sen no Rikyu (千利休), whose many contributions are still revered today. Under his influence new forms of architecture, landscaping and applied arts came into being. Rikyu set forth the guiding principles of harmony, respect, purity, and tranquility. Under his influence Chado fully blossomed as a comprehensive art with the preparation and serving of tea.

Comparative research on tea culture

Japanese tea ceremony is the highest artistic achievement in tea ceremonies in the world. Japanese tea ceremonies are perfected with training in etiquette and a profound spirit. But the Chinese take tea ceremony more as a pleasure, a special need in daily life. The difference between Chinese and Japanese tea ceremonies is that the Chinese focus on the enjoyment, while the Japanese focus on the ceremony. The Chinese tea culture is more of a sensual

¹ Cf. <www.sacred-texts.com/bud/tea.htm> (retrieved September 2009).

experience, focusing on enjoying the tea through taste and smell. For the Japanese tea ceremony, it is more on ritual, with focus on the precise procedures involved in preparing and serving the tea.

Tea as a product of cultural exchange, having absorbed various elements, has become a unique synthetic culture both in China and Japan. In China, tea includes articles, poems and pictures about tea, the art of making and drinking tea, and some customs about tea. It is an art form cutting through a whole spectrum of culture in Japan. Japanese Tea ceremony involves more than the simple process of making tea, it includes many art forms, literature, architecture, gardening, calligraphy, even the entire Japanese culture system.

Harmony

The phrase “harmony, respect, purity, tranquility” occurs in the Sen no Rikyu literature of China, and is not an original Japanese formulation. It consciously seeks to be one of the great paths of spiritual cultivation, and we can appreciate these ideals as valuable to all human beings today.

For example, no matter whether in China or Japan, the emphasis on harmony in the tea ceremony is the practice of social equality and social peace. Harmony strongly suggests an atmosphere of accord. The reason is tea ceremony insists upon careful manners in all aspects of interaction and communication.

The essence of the tea ceremony lies in man himself, not in the making of tea. The tea ceremony involves manners, etiquette, knowledge, and a sincere heart to prepare tea. The guests have to be full of gratitude and appreciation when drinking tea. So tea drinking becomes a collective meditation for a group of people. In short, tea is thought of as group meditation. When making tea, conversation is kept throughout. Guests relax and enjoy the atmosphere created. Tea is a way of keeping the mind in balance, using the simple harmonious ceremony to promote friendship.

Conclusion

Tea culture has elegance, in our contemporary society full of strong desires, tea culture plays a role of enriching cultural and leisure life. It is a way to find peace and to meditate. It can clear busy thoughts and create a mood of calmness.

The advances of science and technology have fostered great conveniences in our modern lives, but they have also brought deep anxiety with them. The threat of warfare, the use of weapons of huge destructive power, and the steady erosion of the environment poisoning the air we breathe and the water we drink are realities. It is surely time to look at tea anew, taking the broad perspective of human culture to transcend the boundaries of nations.

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Crisis of identity: A study of Tarchetti's works and the Doppelgänger motif

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1. Introduction

Iginio Ugo Tarchetti (1839-1869) is known as the first fantastic Italian novelist to employ the Doppelgänger motif in his works. Before he died, at the age of twenty nine, he wrote several fantasy short stories and novels. In this presentation, I will treat *History of a Leg* and *A Spirit in a Raspberry* from *Fantastic Tales*. Before I begin my discussion of the novels of Tarchetti, I would like to define the meaning of fantastic literature, although I will only consider western literature from the late 18th century onwards in my analysis. Fantasy novels became very popular in Germany in the late 18th century through the major fantasy novelists such as Oscar Wilde, Edgar Allan Poe or E.T.A. Hoffmann. Also I should mention that the 19th century was an age of fantasy novels where the Doppelgänger motif plays a pivotal role. One just needs to think of stories such as *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* by R. Stevenson or *William Wilson* by E.A.Poe.

However, in the case of Italy, the situation was different from other countries, and we have to wait until the late 19th century for fantasy novels to be written by a literary group in Milan, named “Scapigliatura” (meaning “disheveled”). Tarchetti was one of the artists of this group. Scapigliatura was an artistic movement which developed in Italy after the period known as *Risorgimento*. Scapigliatura is the equivalent of the French *Bohème*. Many artists including poets, writers, musicians, painters gathered in Milan and these artists had a spirit of rebellion against traditional culture and religion.

First, the question of why Italy was behind in producing fantasy novels as compared to other European countries has to be considered. In the beginning of the 19th century Italy's literary school was dominated by realistic romances like the famous Italian novel *The Betrothed* by Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1873) or *The Last Letters of Jacopo Ortis* by Ugo Foscolo (1778-1827). This type of novel supported the war as a means of national unification in the context

of the Risorgimento; the war for the unification of Italy and the creation of the modern Italian state. In 1859, Tarchetti was drafted to the army in Southern Italy but his military career was cut short by ill health and in 1865 he settled in Milan.

As I mentioned earlier, during the period of the war, the preferred literary phenomenon was nationalistic and ideological romance such as the novels of Manzoni or Ugo Foscolo. Such themes were contrary to irrational ideas such as belief in spirits or something like imaginary things. That is why Italy had no reason to have fantasy novels in this period. During this phase, Tarchetti wrote some anti-military novels and gradually he started to lean toward irrational spiritual or para-psychological phenomena. Tarchetti is a typical representative of the Scapigliatura school and I will present him as the first novelist to use the Doppelgänger motif in Italy. Let me represent the reasons that can be found in his novels in order to explain why Tarchetti dealt with the topic of “identity crisis” using the Doppelgänger motif by comparing it with other typical models of Doppelgänger in the novels of the 19th century.

Before starting to analyze this theme, I should define the meaning of Doppelgänger that is used here. The term Doppelgänger was first used by an Austrian psychoanalyst, Otto Rank (1884-1939), a disciple of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and was described as a double man who appears before a living person as a wraith or apparition. Rank explains that the meaning of Doppelgänger has changed with the times from antiquity until now. In the early ages, a Doppelgänger was considered to be a protector of human beings, but after humans noticed its existence the Doppelgänger became something menacing. The Doppelgänger was also mentioned by S. Freud in his essay entitled *The Uncanny* in which he investigates the concept’s linguistic, artistic and psychological connotations. Freud pays close attention to the unique connotations of the German word *unheimlich*, whereby he draws attention to the ambiguity of its twofold etymology. On the one hand, *unheimlich* is that which is not *heimlich* (secret). On the other hand, however, *unheimlich* is that which is not *heimelig* (homely, in other words familiar, accustomed or protected). Delving more deeply into the German word’s etymology, Freud (1919) writes that in Grimm’s dictionary *unheimlich* stands for “not familiar, alien, alienated, unfriendly etc.” It is only since the end of the 18th century that the word has been used in the context of emotional life, whereby it has come to mean “horrible, gruesome, terrifying and fearful.” Freud (1919) explains that Doppelgänger is one of the examples of the “the uncanny” that has changed its meaning during its existence over the course of the 19th century.

This change in meaning is reflected in western literature. In classical plays it can be found in the stories of doubles or twins such as *Amphitruo* or *Menaechmi* by Plautus or *The Twin Venetians* by Carlo Goldoni, where the Doppelgänger is not something threatening and menacing but something that assumes the role of the trouble maker. However, over the course of the centuries, the Doppelgänger has become a cause of destruction and death, examples of which can easily be found in the fantasy novels of the 19th century. In Tarchetti's fantasy tales too, the Doppelgänger is a cause of destruction and death. Yet, in the case of Tarchetti's Doppelgänger, the doubles are highly original and multi-faceted and it is hard to find these types of Doppelgänger in other fantastic novels of the 19th century. In the next paragraph, I will present the two types of Doppelgänger related to Tarchetti's work which I define as: "Doppelgänger separated from the body" and "Doppelgänger that overlaps another's body".

2. The two types of Doppelgänger related to Tarchetti's work

History of a Leg is one of the novels Tarchetti wrote in 1869. The story is about a mutilated leg which turns into the subject's Doppelgänger when one part of the body is separated from the whole. The incompleteness that represents the "crisis of identity" is manifested in the mutilated leg which turns into a menacing being.

The leg's owner, Eugenio, was wounded in the Crimean War and was forced to have his leg amputated. After the amputation he is haunted by hallucinations. These hallucinations originate from the box where the leg is kept, where the "soul of the leg calls him by lamenting its impossibility to move anymore, and its willingness to be part of the body again."¹ As a response to the leg's laments the main character feels a compulsion to assimilate his missing part. However, the leg has already rotted away and only skeleton fragments are left. In other words, his leg is dead and assimilating it would certainly mean death. Eugenio is thus driven to make an extreme choice between life and death.

¹ « And now, there was my leg....you can see it for that considerable part of my skeleton is preserved under that glass box. (...) Subsequently, that part of me which died, which I had voluntarily cut from its great center of vitality, is now claiming to be connected to the other parts [of the body], it longs for them, and expects them to be part of the vague totality. And I am not able to separate, go away from this part of myself: if I am away from it just one day, I nevertheless feel some force longing for me; I feel everything that's mine is with me (...) it's time to free myself from this torture - or live completely, or die completely- this is the terrible dilemma I see reflected on this fragment of my skeleton. » (Tarchetti 1995: 26)

In addition to stories dealing with men tormented by Doppelgängers from their own bodies, there are also more clearly original types of Doppelgänger in Tarchetti's works. Among his *Fantastic Tales*, we ought to mention *A Spirit in a Raspberry* where the Doppelgänger overlaps with the main character. A wealthy Baron, master of a castle, is unable to catch any game whilst out hunting. As he becomes thirsty, he devours a lot of raspberries growing on a bush nearby. At that point, the Baron is assailed by hallucinations and feels that something is trying to occupy his brain and he seems to be turning into a double man.² What is the being that takes possession of the main character? It is the ghost of a castle maidservant, all traces of whom were lost several days earlier. She had been killed in the woods, and buried under the raspberry bush where the Baron stopped to rest. This tale about the spirit of a woman turning into raspberries is truly fantastic. What I would like to stress is that the transfer of the woman's ghost into the main character and the spirit of the woman can also be defined as a Doppelgänger. Contrary to other Doppelgängers, the spirit has a different gender, and the main character eventually evolves completely into a woman.³ In this way, the male part and the female part coexist in the same body and this unification of sex shows Tarchetti's extreme desire for a totality and completeness of being.

² « This heaviness I feel over my head, this sensation, is indeed very strange... and what are these strange desires that I feel, this illusion I never had, this sort of confusion and duplicity I feel throughout my senses? Am I crazy? Calm down, I need to understand what is going on, I need to recollect my thoughts, my ideas... My ideas! Yes, I feel that these ideas, these are all my ideas. However...it's too easy to tell myself to recollect them. It's impossible, I feel in my brain something that is messing up my ideas. That is....even better...maybe it is actually rearranging them in a different fashion... there's some useless material, but some things are exhilarating; there is something that would like to occupy my brain, which is harmless, but at the same time it pushes and clashes against my skull....It seems to me to have now turned into a double man. A double man! » (Tarchetti 2003: 120)

³ « He seemed to be under an epileptic attack; all his vitality seemed to be concentrated on the painting; it seemed that there was something inside him, something which wanted to burst out of his body, to fly away and become part of the drawing. He stared at the oil painting and would jump hysterically in front of it, as if he was attracted to it through an irresistible force. The most wonderful prodigy consisted in his very physical traits seemingly transforming, the more he stared at the drawing the more he would change his facial expression. Each person recognized the Baron, but at times would spot a strange similarity with the image reproduced in the painting. (...) The Baron continued to approach the picture; his enthusiasm grew, his shape mutated more and more, his face looked more and more as the image depicting the young lady... » (ibid.: 133-4)

3. Conclusion

Various types of Doppelgänger in Tarchetti's works have been discussed as "double as part of the whole" or "overlapping double". It seems of vital importance to scholarly research of Tarchetti's works to pose the question of why the Doppelgänger motif constitutes a significant component of his literary work.

Either through partial amputation of a body part or through an overlapping of two souls, I believe Tarchetti is pointing out the dangerous and precarious nature of human identity. Moreover, I think melancholy constitutes the "fil rouge" all through Tarchetti's work. In this presentation, I treated only two works but also in Tarchetti's other novels there are a lot of melancholic characters.⁴

In other words, the concept of "melancholy" is an apt concept to explain Tarchetti's works. As the author himself, Tarchetti's characters' conflicting inner selves are characterized by "melancholy," and a quest for a "completeness and totality" which ultimately means to be driven to death. This is in striking similarity to the author's biography. In Tarchetti's own words:

"There's always been, at the bottom of the heart, a hidden melancholy which makes us weep. If there is any joy at the bottom of the heart, or there seems to be, that's only dependant on social contact, which is ephemeral, as human beings themselves, which are ultimately lonely. We ought not to study man inside society, whereas society and our own pride force us to dissimulate our feelings, whereas thanks to other people's unwariness we end up being unwary of ourselves. Instead, we ought to study man when he is alone, when he thinks, works, talks, meditates, walks and we'll notice that man is restless, suffers and seems to atone for some misdeed. I think I've never seen anything sadder than a human smile, or man's joyfulness at times moved me into tears. Hurt and agony always seemed to me more natural and, I would add, more serene." Tarchetti, *Pensieri (Thoughts)*, 1869

⁴ « I have been affected by hypochondria since I was young, and maybe my inclination towards loneliness, being deprived of beloved ones, and being kind of stone-hearted, led me to this condition, to a dark and mortal melancholy. I would like to explain the steps that led me to this meager situation, and I only feel that I will be able to recover by dying. » (Tarchetti 1995: 10-11)

Tarchetti portrays spirits, evanescent beings, wandering between life and death. This inclination is expressed in Tarchetti's biography and may stem from the fact that he died of tuberculosis when he was 29 years old. It is clear that his works were influenced by anguished experiences between life and death. His extreme frailty led him to create a powerful Doppelgänger which drives his characters to death. Tarchetti opted for a fantasy world, where Doppelgängers are free to exist and interact with human beings.

Insecurity and anxiousness originate in a vague and indefinite area between life and death which I think led to the author's driving force: "the crisis of identity". This is a state of mind similar to melancholy or Baudelaire's "spleen", that is an indefinable loss which an artist desires to recover. In Tarchetti's work this loss, or incompleteness, is filled thanks to the Doppelgänger which is at the same time, the ultimate instrument of death.

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Identity: The Individual and the Group

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Introduction

I will discuss the interrelation of the individual and the group he belongs to, and then, how identity and collective identity are formed through this interrelation. In addition, I will approach how a sense of affiliation develops from such interrelation. I will discuss these themes through Isaiah Berlin's study of Herder. Herder was a German thinker of the late-eighteenth century, and Berlin, who was born in Russia and grew up in England, was a political philosopher of the twentieth century. I believe Berlin's study of Herder demonstrates a particular aspect of affiliation.

In topicalizing the sense of affiliation, I do not intend to idealize the concept of fraternity. Instead, I intend to discuss the group as an environment which shapes the individuals within it unconsciously and which is in turn shaped by these individuals. This process is a kind of circular process which is out of each individual's control. I believe that understanding this circular process could help towards an understanding of the nature of identity, social identity and national identity.

Furthermore, I believe that through a discussion of the nature of affiliation we can better comprehend why this sense of affiliation, which I assume results from the interrelation of the individual and his group, can sometimes turn into an aggressive affiliation, such as can be seen in the reactionary behavior and violence fueled by a feeling of nationalism of the independent movements following the 1989 fall of communism or again after 9.11 in the U.S.

Affiliation

First I will address the nature of affiliation. In his study of Herder, Berlin distinguishes between two aspects of affiliation which he calls respectively Populism and Nationalism. Berlin's Populism is a type of affiliation which results from those bonds which originate naturally between people. Berlin continues that according to Herder only such bonds can truly

make men happy. This type of affiliation consists in “the belief in the value of belonging to a group or a culture” (Berlin 2000:367). So Berlin also describes Populism as a form of Patriotism. Such Patriotism is cultivated in every expression of members within the group through language, poetry, music, dance, art and so on. So Populism as defined by Berlin is a type of cultural affiliation. This cultural affiliation provides a social environment which enables each individual to express himself freely and spontaneously. Without such an environment, each individual would feel that he was an outsider. An obvious example is the attachment to the mother tongue.

On the other hand, nationalism is a type of affiliation which results from an artificial relation determined by invented institutions of a modern type of state such as emerged after the 1789 French Revolution. So Nationalism can be defined as political, a type of affiliation where the institution is more important for a group than natural bonds. Herder believed such artificial affiliation sometimes forcibly emphasizes the ideal of the collective will, suppressing each individual personality and the free expression of an individual’s true feelings. So Berlin defines Nationalism as aggressive and populism as non-aggressive.

To summarize, I would like to call Populism an authentic manifestation of human nature to belong to a group and Nationalism a distortion of nature to belong to a group. In order to show why I make these distinctions, I will address more closely Berlin’s idea of Populism.

Populism¹

I believe belonging to a group incorporates three key social functions, that is: self-evaluation, mutual-recognition and affiliation. Self-evaluation means that the individual can feel he is someone within a group. It follows that for an individual to have this feeling there should be others who recognize him. So the feeling of being someone within a group requires mutual recognition. Then self-evaluation and mutual-recognition can cultivate the type of affiliation defined as Populism. This is the natural bond of each individual, not of the single collective will.

¹ The two sections ‘Populism’ and ‘Importance of expression’ are discussed from my point of view; however, I would like to acknowledge the great influence of the works of Charles Taylor in my discussion. See Taylor (1985a: chaps. 1, 2, 3) and Taylor (1985b: chap.1).

So these three functions are intimately interrelated with each other. They all help the individual within a group to achieve self-realization or acquisition of identity. So I can say belonging to a group is a crucial condition for the individual and is a fundamental need of human nature. This is why I believe Populism can be called an authentic manifestation of human nature to belong to a group.

Importance of expression

As I mentioned above expression is an important manifestation of populism. The expression of each individual creates a culture and a culture shapes a group and so promotes affiliation which in turn leads to fraternity. Indeed Herder emphasized the significance of free and true self-expression². I believe that in order for the acquisition of identity to be genuine, it must not be forced on the individual by some artificial institution or by intervention of the state. Instead, it must be encouraged and sustained by free and true self-expression because free and true self-expression creates a unique culture and so a peculiar group. Furthermore, how can one recognize who he is and what he is if, as an individual, he does not or cannot express himself sincerely? So self-realization means acquisition of a unique personality and does not mean acquisition of a single collective will.

I would like to add that this discussion about social relations between the individual and the other, or his or her environment, can be extended to apply also to relations between groups.

Conclusion

To conclude, we can now understand one of the crucial processes which forms both the individual and the group and that this process cultivates patriotism. I believe the process of shaping identity is fluid, both of the individual and of the collective, because the process of shaping identity allows and requires freedom of expression and uniqueness of each individual. So identity is never completed nor fully realized. I believe that identity does not take its position in the fixed center of self as we usually assume, but that identity is always developing fluidly. This kind of freedom would be the basis for non-aggressive affiliation.

² See Berlin (2000: chaps.4,5,7).

However when an individual or a group identifies a specific enemy, this fluid process can congeal like cement and strengthen individual identity and the bond between each individual in an aggressive way. This is the likely reason why a sense of affiliation originally cultivated as patriotism can easily turn aggressive so that the distinction between Populism and Nationalism becomes meaningless.

Furthermore, when a group is in such a state of crisis and is so aggressive, diversity can hardly exist. This is an all too common experience and such situations are hard to avoid, as where there is no diversity there is no scope for effective criticism of any kind.

I believe these phenomena are attributed to the fact that self-evaluation, mutual-recognition, affiliation, and expression are fundamental needs of human nature. As I mentioned above, what is argued for individuals about these functions is equally true of groups, thus it can be said that these functions work also among groups. Therefore some development of aggressive behavior in a group can be attributed to the frustration of these functions between groups, which I call distortions of human nature.

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Krste Petkov Misirkov and Macedonian National Identity

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During the time of the Social Republic of Yugoslavia, when Macedonia was one of the constitutional parts of that multiethnic country, Macedonian intellectuals considered Krste Petkov Misirkov (1874-1926) as one of the fathers of Macedonian national identity (Koneski 1974: 72, 77). After gaining full national independence, Macedonian political leaders together with most intellectuals, started to glorify the period of Alexander the Great (356-323) and tried to find a connection between his empire and the modern Macedonian national state. Only some left-wing professors in Macedonia continued to focus on Misirkov's work for national unity.

Misirkov was born in 1874 in a small village called Postol which is now part of Egean Macedonia, Greece. When he was only 15, Misirkov left for Salonica (Thessaloniki) and later to Belgrade to continue his studies. In 1890 he left Serbia for Sofia, Bulgaria, with a group of students from Macedonia. Some of these students later became revolutionaries, such as Petar Pop-Arsov (1868-1941) or Dame Gruev (1871-1906). The same year, after a short stay in Sofia he returned to Belgrade and continued his education in Serbia. Five years later he decided to go to Russia and in 1897 he was able to enrol at the Faculty of History and Philology in St. Petersburg. Misirkov graduated in 1902 and he returned to Bitola, Macedonia. As a high school teacher he began to fight for the liberation of Macedonia and "for social, political, and cultural independence" (Koneski 1974: 69). After spending eight months in Bitola he returned to Russia and started to write articles about the Uprising of Ilinden.¹ Soon Misirkov left for Bulgaria again to publish his book entitled *Za Makedonckite Raboti (On the Macedonian Matters)*. The work was immediately criticized by Bulgarian political elites for its pro-Macedonian ideas. After this failure he returned to Russia and stayed there for the following 13 years. Misirkov spent the last years of his life in Bulgaria again working as the director of a museum and as a teacher. He died on July 26, 1926.

However, if we want to understand the importance of Misirkov's work, we first have to introduce the historical situation of that time in the South Balkans. At the beginning of the 20th century, the

¹ The revolt against the Ottoman empire started on August 2, 1903 in the village of Kruševo, but was brutally suppressed.

name Macedonia was used to describe a wider geographical area than the territory that today comprises the state territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Also Aegean Macedonia and Pirin Macedonia were part of Macedonia, which was at that time under Ottoman rule. Since Greece (1832) and Serbia (1878) had gained their independence earlier than their neighbouring “country” and Bulgaria had acquired a great level of autonomy, all three had started to forcefully compete for the ethnic identity of Macedonian Slavs. After the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) Macedonia was split among the above mentioned neighbouring states. Now, nearly 100 years later, there is still some political disagreement about this part of history.²

Misirkov’s view of the concept of nation is different from the one that modern anthropological and sociological theories have developed, but it was completely acceptable at the time when he wrote his programme of unification of all Macedonian Slavs. He stated that “the people of a nation are nothing other than a great association founded on blood kinship, on a common origin and on common interests” (Misirkov 1974: 2). At the end of his book Misirkov (1974: 56) added an even more poetic description.

Ever since our childhood we have felt that whatever is dear to others is dear to us as well; whatever gives pleasure to other people gives pleasure to us as well; they weep, and so do we, they laugh, and so do we. It is this universal happiness and sorrow, together with the customs and habits we share, that makes us one nation, one whole.

Today it is commonly believed that members of one nation do not share the same blood kinship and it is rare that they share the same interests.³ Misirkov immediately pointed out that the real enemies of Macedonia were not Russia or Austria-Hungary, the fierce competitors for influence as he described it, over “small Balkan states”, but Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia (Misirkov 1974: 4, 16). Moreover, there is a further point which should not be neglected. Misirkov (1974: 4, 20, 24) did not seek full independence for Macedonia but only a higher level of autonomy for Macedonia under the Sublime Porte.⁴ He had naively thought that Ottoman rulers would respect the Macedonian faith and even “encourage their national development”. On the other hand, he was afraid of partitioning Macedonia, though he believed it would never happen since the Russian government always helped the Macedonian people (Misirkov 1974: 21, 58).⁵ His support for *status quo* was against the ideals

² The very dispute about the possession of Macedonia has been known as the Macedonian Question (cf. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <www.search.eb.com.nukweb.nuk.uni-lj.si/eb/article-9000988>, retrieved October 2009).

³ Nowadays the nation is seen only as a metaphoric kin group (Eriksen 2001: 278).

⁴ The euphemism used for the Ottoman Empire.

⁵ Actually Balkanization happened only 10 years after his book was published. However, a few pages later he wrote: “From the Macedonian point of view, the unification of all Macedonia with Bulgaria, Serbia or Greece is not desirable, but neither is it particularly frightening” (Misirkov 1974: 32, 38).

of the revolutionaries who led the Ilinden Uprising (1903) and who were ready to sacrifice their lives for a free Macedonia. However, he thought that “after the fight in the field of battle comes the fight in the field of culture” (Misirkov 1974: 24). Misirkov (1974: 28) considered cultural work to be more difficult than revolutionary work since “the former is mental and the latter physical”. Success is not a matter of freedom but a matter of work (Misirkov 1974: 27).

Misirkov's plan to attract European governments to support the idea of a special national identity was very difficult. He wrote that “up to 1878 everybody, including the Russian government, claimed that Macedonians were Bulgarians” (Misirkov 1974: 10). It is not an exaggeration if we affirm *On the Macedonian Matters* to be full of stereotypes and prejudices about Bulgarians (*cf.* Misirkov 1974: 36). In his view, Bulgaria was a “political disaster” (Misirkov 1974: 37). Misirkov (1974: 11) blamed the Bulgarian politicians for the passive attitudes of European political leaders during the Ilinden Uprising. The Bulgarian government decided to support the Uprising in Macedonia “because it suited their interests and not because it suited our needs” (Misirkov 1974: 33).⁶

Misirkov (1974: 17) recognized the important role of Macedonian intellectuals in the process of creating a Macedonian national identity. Another important point for him was religion, not every religion, but the Orthodox religion, “the oldest, the most widespread, the basic faith of all the nationalities of Macedonia” (Misirkov 1974: 19). He believed the Orthodox religion was one of the bases on which Macedonian national identity should be created. Misirkov was also aware that every nation needs its own language, so he (1974: 18) proposed that the central Macedonian dialect “should become the literary language of Macedonia”.⁷ He knew that “science and literature are the most important factors in the development of any people” (Misirkov 1974: 27).⁸ He acknowledged the need to form a Macedonian Society with the main task of conducting ethnographic, geographic and historical examinations of Macedonia and Macedonians (Misirkov 1974: 39). Misirkov was deeply aware that this is not the only condition for independence. “Macedonians” also needed to cut their connection with all Balkan nations and needed to cultivate “everything that is original and that belongs to us: our language, our customs, our history, our literacy, our Slav nationality, etc.” (Misirkov 1974: 47). At that time no Macedonian language or written history existed. As we know

⁶ His opinion about Serbian help was completely different (*cf.* Misirkov 1974: 33).

⁷ The reason which he mentioned for choosing this region is a great example of how national language is not something given from above but is chosen by some intellectual or political elites. That Misirkov (1974: 66) was aware of this fact is obvious from his words at the very end of the book where he explained some principles which “should guide us in creating our literary language and orthography.”

⁸ As Benedict Anderson stresses, the role of print-capitalism was of great importance in the process of creating national identities. With the development of mass media and more especially printed books, “a standardization of language and a world-view on a huge scale thus becomes possible” (Eriksen 2001: 278).

today, concepts like nation or national language are inventions *par excellence*. Misirkov probably knew that revolutionaries in Kruševo fought under the Bulgarian flag against Ottoman and Albanian troops. Surprisingly, about six months later he claimed there were no Bulgarians in Macedonia (Misirkov 1974: 47).

Despite this defeat, or maybe because of it, Misirkov (1974: 48) treated the beginning of the 20th century as a perfect moment to remove the terms Serb, Bulgarian and Greek from Macedonia and to replace them with “a name common to all Macedonian Slavs, the name *Macedonian*”. For him (Misirkov 1974: 50):

These trends first take root in the lower classes and among people who are free from prejudice and who are ready to fight against prejudice to protect the new ideas which must be realized in order to ensure their happiness and the happiness of the people.

Misirkov (1974: 44) pointed out the methods of Serbian propaganda which played a main role in the development of Macedonian national awareness. When it started to compete with Bulgarian propaganda for popularity among Macedonian Slavs, people in Macedonia became aware they were not Serbs nor Bulgarians, but something different. According to Misirkov (1974: 44):

In the midst of this endless dispute between these two brotherly neighbouring states the Macedonian Slav population, on account of whom they were quarrelling, gradually began to develop their sense of national self-awareness and endeavoured to liberate themselves from the influence of the neighbouring peoples in order to be able to take their fate independently into their own hands.

It is obvious from his statement that Misirkov realized that the construction of a Macedonian national identity was a new idea and that something like a Macedonian language still needed to be invented. His book is a great compendium of reasons to assert the need for a Macedonian national identity, but on the other hand it contains many stereotypes and prejudices about the other ethnic groups within Macedonia. As we all know Macedonia was, and still is, a region with a great mix of different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, Misirkov (1974: 18, 47) claimed that only people of Slav origin and who considered themselves members of the Orthodox Church had the right to be called Macedonian. With such a view on Macedonian national identity he excluded all inhabitants of Albanian, Greek, Vlach, or any other non-slavic origin. Despite Misirkov's (1974: 26) claim that Macedonians were the majority in Macedonia, he admitted that, contrary to the Vlachs who lived predominantly in towns, “most of our people live in the villages, as farm labourers.” At the time

when he was writing his book, Misirkov (1974: 32) found it difficult to construct a new national identity in the southern Balkan Peninsula. He blamed his predecessors for not realising its importance before when the neighbouring “nations” were inventing it. But it was not because of his forefathers, but because of the very structure of the Ottoman Empire that its construction was difficult, since it had divided its inhabitants according to their religious, not their national, identity. As it is clear from the analysis above, Misirkov fought fiercely against Serbian and Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia, but he also created his own. From this point of view his idea about Macedonia has never been completely realized.

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Consumption of the Japanese Movie in South Korea

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Introduction

The South Korean government has accepted the import of Japanese popular culture since 1998, although previous to 1998 it had taken a strong position to restrict Japanese popular culture. The Japanese movie was one of the popular cultures which had been limited. In this presentation, I aim to research the transformation of Japanese soft power through the consumption of the Japanese movie in South Korea. In addition, I hope this presentation will provide a certain understanding of how Japanese soft power is diffused in Asian nations.

What is soft power?

Soft power is the ability to obtain a desired result through co-option and attraction. It is in contrast to hard power which is the use of coercion and payment. Moreover, it is assimilated gradually through a commodity and cultural contents, and not forced by an authority. In other words, soft power changes people's sense of values and ideas according to a power that transcends invisible national borders. The term was proposed by Joseph Nye of Harvard University in his book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, which was published in 1990, and he further developed the concept in his book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, published in 2004.

Changing South Korean society and reception of Japanese popular culture

South Korea officially accepted Japanese popular culture in 1998. The popular culture of Japan was completely prohibited before then. The reason is based on historical relations between Japan and South Korea. South Korea was a colony of Japan in the beginning of the 20th century, and even today some Korean people still feel an antipathy towards Japanese imperialism. Moreover, South Korea was a military regime until 1992, and in order to unite the people, the military regime used the concept of Japan as an outside enemy. However, relations with Japan changed rapidly with the introduction of a democratic government in South Korea. In brief, the

change of policy towards Japanese popular culture was the first step for South Korea to construct international relations in the present global age.

Consumption of Japanese movie in South Korea

As for the cultural policy of the South Korean government, many specialists were concerned about Japanese soft power because Japanese popular culture has developed steadily since the end of World War II. However, as for South Korea, the military regime suppressed such a process. In brief, specialists in South Korea were concerned about cultural control by Japan, following political control in the beginning of the 20th century and economical control in the 1960's. In the decade since its opening, there has been some opposition to Japanese popular culture. However, Japanese popular culture has not had a strong influence in South Korea. For instance, consumption of the Japanese movie did not increase in proportion to the import of movies. In brief, the popular culture of Japan did not have a strong influence in South Korea which was contrary to first expectations.




Table 1. Number of movies screened in South Korea¹




Table 2. Number of film audience in South Korea²

¹ Korean Film Council Total Computer Network (2006).

² *ibid.*

The reason why Japanese popular culture has not been generally accepted in South Korea

Most previous studies refer to nationalism as the reason why Japanese popular culture has not generally been accepted in South Korea. However, young people, the main consumers of popular culture, have no preconceptions about Japanese imperialism. Moreover, the majority of young people have a favorable view of Japanese popular culture. In other words, nationalism could explain the poor consumption of elderly people or of conservative people; however, it cannot explain that of young people. In brief, nationalism alone is insufficient for an analysis of the present situation.




Table 3. Young people's preconceptions about Japan³

Film industry of South Korea and South Korean sense of culture

I assume that one of the reasons for this situation is a government policy of South Korea. The South Korean government determines a 'screen quota' which is a policy to screen Korean movies in movie theaters for 73 days or longer in order to protect the film industry of South Korea. As a result, the screen quota effectively limits foreign movies and South Koreans do not have the opportunity to watch a selection of foreign movies even if they choose to do so. In addition, the government has close trade relations with the United States. Therefore, South Korea must import a number of Hollywood movies in order to keep balanced and harmonious trade relations with the United States. In short, both government policy and the film industry have implications in the consumption of movies in South Korea. Besides these reasons, media as a tool for marketing and directing preference in culture in South Korea may have some influence.

³ Kim (2005).

Consumption and process of culture in the global age

In the long period before modernization, culture was often one-sidedly transmitted from a certain country to another. However, in the global age, culture is consumed in complex phases by various media which can be understood through an examination of the consumption of the Japanese movie in South Korea. Various factors have contributed to limiting the consumption of the Japanese movie in South Korea, such as cultural preference, international relations, and politics within South Korea itself. Furthermore, the countries of Asia share a same historical background and are composed of people of the same race; therefore these processes can be applied to other Asian nations. This research aims to understand the consumption of cultural contents and the transformation of soft power in the present age. There are certainly further reasons for the situation besides the reasons discussed here, such as the influence of the media and cultural differences, and these influences will be the object of future research.

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Cultural Diversity in the Modern State with regards to Slovenia and Japan

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Introduction

Today's world is facing rapid changes, opening of borders, exchanging ideas of economy and politics. In addition to the various problems ensuing from the recent situation, we have to recognise that we are entering a new age of ethnicity in which, in everyday life, we are exposed to new social situations with more foreign people and foreign things around us, ranging from foods and lifestyle to arts and information. Diversity and consequent social and linguistic plurality are essential for our social and intellectual survival.

In my paper I would particularly like to focus on the main question of our conference Living with Diversity, and discuss what diversity actually is. There are many kinds of diversity, such as cultural diversity, ethnic, religious, social, linguistic diversity and so on. We can observe diversity and commonality in any social situation in which we find ourselves, in our own society as in other societies. Diversity and plurality are not curious human phenomena or options leftover from the past. Nor is plurality, as mutual coexistence, a new and experimental programme.

Cultural diversity in the nation state

The study of diversity advances through the assertion of its existence and value in any country, through the analysis of the problems of its non-acknowledgment, and through giving it voice. The examples discussed here will show the position of Japan with some comparison with Slovenia. However, this is just the beginning of my research and there is a long way to go. The notion of diversity needs to be freed, both in theory and political and social practice, from the idea of dominant-minority relations. As Maher and MacDonald (1995: 9) state we need models of power which can encompass diversity. We need much greater understanding of the interface between people of different languages and cultures: contact, acculturation, resistance, the constant shifting interplay between similarity and diversity.

A cultural diversity is assumed to be one which espouses a view of a common humanity, one in which peoples of diverse social and historical experiences have rights of autonomy and resources; a social environment in which a diversity of physical, material, intellectual and other abilities is regarded as a source of wealth and strength. Needless to say, this sounds – and it is – utopian. It is not intended to assume responsibility for the elimination of conflict, which has always been a part of the politics of difference, although it may have implications for the expression and management of conflicts.

Cultural diversity is not just a phenomenon of the modern nation-state as Young's (cit. in Maher and MacDonald 1995: 8) influential argument might point out. It is in the modern nation-state that it was defined as problematic. This problem arises out of nationalistic programmes in which nation-building was seen to require control of the cultural and linguistic plurality which was once a part of life that was taken for granted throughout the entire world.

Modern nation-states, synonymous with the way in which people have been organized politically and economically, as well as with the interests of capitalism as the world's dominant economic system, are preoccupied with identity that implies diversity. The question as to who will be *us* and who will be *others* stems from the ways in which people have interpreted the task of nation-building. A form of Hegelian homogenized totalitarianism was a founding doctrine of nationhood and became extremely important in influencing international relations in the twentieth century. This led to the discrimination and marginalization of people who were not seen as economically or politically important, and to the dispossession of peoples in the interests of the nation's development (MacDonald 1995: 292). In the modern nation-state there are people whose cultural expression is suppressed because the nation-project planners have devalued cultural plurality.

Moreover, modernization has often been explained in the context of nationalism. National loyalties are considered modern loyalties. And an orthodox definition of nationalism reads:

Nationalism is a political creed that underlies the cohesion of modern societies, and legitimizes their claim to authority. In recent years, our understating of modernization has been forced to take a more positive view of cultural and ethnic pluralism. (Steele 1995: 46)

Introduction of two cases

In the case of Japan, the process of nation-building required the establishment of an identity which could not only weld the nation but could also provide a buffer from the imperialistic western powers which had forced collaboration on Japan. Japan is not a state which has adopted multiculturalism as a national policy. Instead, the government has affirmed the cultural and ethnic homogeneity of its citizenry as a basis for praising the uniqueness of Japanese culture. Interpreted in this context, the concept of cultural diversity becomes a marginal issue, making it essential to link the eviscerated public interest to social demand as a lens through which to filter broadcast policy. To look at social demand (Hanada 2003: 394) in such a manner is to develop a conceptual space for a culturally diverse social identity, and to examine whether broadcast policy is able to coexist comfortably inside such a space.

The problematization of identity of the nation is the creation and proliferation of mechanisms of control and discourse for reconciling the nation, and is the creation and rendering of the nation whole and unified with itself. Political discourse becomes a tool for realising the mythical personhood of the nation through discourses which question and fix the psychological traits, the unity and the character of the nation. In Japan, the discourse on *Nihonjiron*, Japaneseness, as *the myth of uniqueness* has been attributed to pressure on Japan to avoid political and ideological colonisation by western powers rather than merely an exercise in glorification (Amino 1990). The *myth of uniqueness* has, of course, been useful to the western powers themselves in their orientalisering of Japan as the other.

Today the notion that Japan is homogeneous prevails both inside and outside of Japan. This unit looks at ethnic Koreans, Ainu, Okinawans and others residing in Japan and challenges the assumption that Japan is homogeneous while also raising questions about what it means to be Japanese. We can address here two main issues: 1. Identity - how common Japanese perceptions about Japanese identity differ considerably from Japan's demographic reality; and 2. Integration of minorities - how physical and cultural similarities between ethnic groups do not guarantee that the majority group will accept a minority (*cf.* Hanada 2003: 394).

Yet uniqueness and preoccupation with *who we are* and *who are others* are themes in all nationalist ideologies, as can also be seen in the case of Slovenia which was in the past a part of different states with plural nations and which became a nation-state in the 1990s. Although today more than 90% of the population is of Slovenian ethnic origin, there are also other ethnic groups living in the country. Slovenia is one of the few European countries with both traditional minorities and recent immigrant

groups, as well as Roma communities within its territory (Fouéré 2003: 26). For this reason one of the important aims in Slovene cultural policy is to stimulate cultural diversity and facilitate pluralism of creativity (see int. sources 1, 2). The new Constitution of Slovenia (1991) established traditional rights with regard to culture, including freedom of artistic creation, cultural development and heritage protection, as well as providing cultural and linguistic rights for Italian and Hungarian minorities, rights for the Roma community and assistance for Slovenes living in neighbouring countries or elsewhere around the world (see int. source 3). Of course reality is not as poetic as the Constitutional statement, there are still violations of legal rights, as in the case of the Roma people who are sometimes excluded from decisions of local authorities, or the *Izbrisani* (The Erased)¹, a group of people who remain without legal status after the country's declaration of independence in 1991 (see int. source 4).

Belonging to a nation-state is referred to as belonging to that nation's culture² – Japanese culture, Slovenian culture – and it is this idea, as a product of a particular political-economic system which prevents us from expressing and valuing cultural diversity. It is, therefore, an idea that dehumanizes (MacDonald 1995: 296) and for this reason it is also important we ask ourselves why it is impossible to achieve diversity within the nation-state as we know it. Popular ideas about “culture” are associated with nationhood and nationalism in such a way as to prevent, or at least suppress or control, diversity. This obviously hampers the efforts of minority and indigenous peoples in expressing their own ways of being in the world.

Conclusion

Understanding cultural diversity is not about the non-Japanese in Japan, nor about who is or is not ethnically Slovenian. The question of cultural diversity is much broader. It is about working towards societies which enable the fullest and most creative expressions of humanness for the diversity of peoples who share their life-space for whatever period of time – true cultural plurality.

¹ This case is very similar to the one that occurred in Japan after WWII, when Japanese citizenship was stripped away from the Koreans who remained in Japan. Although they still pay taxes, Koreans do not have the right to vote and have no access to many welfare services. To cap it off, the Japanese continued discriminatory treatment of the colonials through new laws and regulations, of which the system of forced fingerprinting, which began in 1955, was but one example. (Nakamura: 148)

² The concept of culture that MacDonald (1995: 294) uses, refers to constellations of ideas, technologies and forms of social organization through which people express what it means to be in the world, to be social, to be human. Culture is therefore a process and a product.

As Maher and Macdonald (1995: 11) state:

It is encounters that enrich rather than suppress. It is about helping people to see that the persistence in a society of what some people chose to define pejoratively as 'difference', 'disability' or 'inferiority' is our richness not our weakness. Not to recognise what the young and old can give to each other, what people of various heritages and occupations and physical environment can give to each other, what people of varying abilities can share – this is to rob ourselves.

The key question is how to nurture a universalistic view of human beings among people in the nation-state. To attain this goal it is important to restructure peoples' thinking and their society. One possible way is through education. In particular, a certain kind of history education is necessary in the early stages of childhood. Historical reality would be taught to young people so that they could learn lessons for future relationships with other peoples, they would also learn of both the stupidity and wisdom of human beings. Thus, through history education they would be led towards a universalistic view of human beings (Maher and MacDonald 1995: 11).

Reform of the legal system is another important task in order to improve the social structure. Although various enlightened movements do play an important role in this respect, the greater initiative should be taken by politicians and government agencies (Nakano 1995: 70). Within the legal system anti-discrimination measures are designed to ensure that individuals are not treated differently from others for unjustifiable reasons (Fouéré 2003: 25). There are now binding rules defining discrimination and setting out measures required to fight it. These rules should help fight discrimination based on sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. We also have to overcome the idea of the nation-state and nationalism and think about a new social order.

With respect to diversity and pluralism, civil society is undoubtedly an important constituent in enhancing democracy within the contemporary state. At the same time, civil society's already multicultural state of fragmentation and plurality hardly guarantees trust and solidarity within the civil society, particularly in the face of power relations that appear between groups and the linkages of these power relations to other institutional moorings which over-determine civic space. It is in diversity that we find the impetus for creativity, for challenge, for exchange, for sustained life – just as the world of nature is based on and depends upon maintenance of species diversity, so too is social diversity essential to social life.

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Language Ideologies and the Concept of National Language

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Introduction

Most of us believe we know what we mean by language. For many, the idea is approached primarily from the experience of learning a foreign language: a set of problems associated with the acquisition of lexis, phonology and syntax. Awareness of this distinctive system proves to us that we are learning another language (Millar 2005: 31).

The problem, however, appears when we begin talking about *dialects*. What is the difference between *a language* and *a dialect*? To establish this we must first see what linguistics has to say about the concept of language itself. Linguists offer many defining characteristics which serve to describe language and set it off from other forms of symbolic activity. These descriptions, however, are prone to decontextualize language and view it only as a stable, immutable system of *normatively-identical linguistic forms*, which individual consciousness finds ready-made and which is incontestable for that consciousness (Vološinov 1986: 57).

History of linguistics and the problem of language

Linguists who follow this trend, which Vološinov described as *abstract objectivism*, thus put a lot of effort into analyzing syntactic structures, such as *The cat is on the mat*, paying little attention to the fact that this type of sentence is actually almost never used in real contexts, that such sentences are basically never uttered outside grammar textbook situations and, therefore, such sentences, without their context, in the general sense of the word, actually have no meaning. Oswald Ducrot pointed out in his lecture that “in the formula *words do not mean anything*, the word *mean* must be taken as having its meaning in *ordinary language*. If by *mean* you understand what is usually understood in ordinary language, then language indeed does not mean anything.” (Ducrot 1996: 16).

There were basically two different trends or views on language within the European linguistic tradition: the first view, with its origins in 17th and 18th century Cartesian rationalism, found its first sharply delineated expression in Leibniz's conception of *universal grammar*, and later on in the *structural linguistics* of Saussure and the *transformational-generative grammar* of Chomsky, while the second view, which follows the trend Vološinov termed *individualistic subjectivism*, can be traced back to the ideology of Romanticism and its most important representative, Wilhelm von Humboldt.

Seeing the linguistic approach to language as a problematic stance for achieving a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon we call *language*, the 20th century saw the emergence of other disciplines which tried to view language not only as a system of the phonetic, grammatical and lexical forms of language, but tried to observe it and analyze it within its social context.

However, though disciplines that tried to put language back into social context – disciplines like sociolinguistics – did understand the problems of decontextualized linguistics and criticized them, they usually did not question the concept of *language* itself. Within the sociolinguistic paradigm language still remained a system of normatively identical forms, in other words, languages remained clearly structured systems divided from one another on the basis of their preconceived nationally or ethnically defined speaking community, for instance German language from Dutch language or Slovenian language from Croatian language.

Language and nation

Sociolinguistics has uncritically appropriated the linguistic concept of *language* and has mostly failed to recognize its ideological connection to another invented concept, that of *nation*. Based on the existence of grammars and dictionaries, languages remained countable institutions. Though languages do not exist as real entities in the world, they are, by contrast, the inventions of social, cultural and political movements with very real and material effects (Makoni and Pennycook 2007: 2).

Languages are *invented traditions* in the sense that Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) gave to the term. There are substantial similarities between the notion of *invention* and Anderson's (1991) *imagined communities*: both point to the ways in which nations are imagined and narrated into being and both stress the role of language, literacy and social institutions in that process (Makoni and Pennycook 2007: 7).

What Anderson has missed in his analysis of imagining national communities is that both nations and languages are dialectically co-constructed as Joseph (2004: 124) pointed out in his critique of Anderson:

Anderson's constructionist approach to nationalism is purchased at the price of an essentialist outlook on languages. It seems a bargain to the sociologist or political scientist, to whom it brings explanatory simplicity not to mention ease. But ... it is a false simplicity. National languages and identities arise in tandem, dialectically, if you like, in a complex process that ought to be our focus of interest and study.

Language and dialect

When linguists discuss certain languages, like English or Japanese, they realize immediately, of course, that different speakers within these certain linguistic groups do not speak in the same way. So they are quick to conclude that languages have different *dialects*. Linguists then proceed to discuss the reasons for these dialectical variations within certain languages, for instance why Slovenian or Japanese languages are so diverse. Linguists seem to have no trouble whatsoever in saying that Slovenian language has a great variety of regional dialects (among which some are mutually less comprehensible than for instance between standard Slovenian and standard Croatian) or that there are a great many German dialects (among which there can be bigger differences than between standard Dutch and standard German for example) when they discuss these *languages*.

Linguists discussing dialectical diversity propose many different models to define the difference between *language* and *dialect*, from Ferguson's algebraic model to more terminological and functional approaches in the manner of Heinz Kloss, who proposed terms such as *Abstand* or *Ausbau* languages, where *Ausbau* refers to a variety having its own standardized form which is used autonomously with respect to other related languages. *Abstand*, on the other hand, refers to the distance between languages as regards mutual intelligibility.

However, no matter how many elaborate definitions are put forward, in the last instance the relationship between language and dialect is usually defined simply in the terms: "a language

is a collection of mutually intelligible dialects". Yet such definition cannot be based upon any objective linguistic criteria, as we have seen for instance in the case of Scandinavia, where considerable mutual comprehension exists between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish, or in the case of Serbian and Croatian or Macedonian and Bulgarian, while on the other hand a variety such as Sardu in Sardinia, which has little mutual comprehension with any Italian dialect is still considered a dialect of standard Italian.

Though sociolinguistics tries to put language, that general linguistics has decontextualized, back into context, it nevertheless sticks to the concept of *language*, and fails to recognize its basic reliance upon non-linguistic ideological criteria, namely, those of ethnic or national community.

In short, Sardu is a dialect of Italian because Sardinia is part of the political entity called Italy. The fact that the so-called Italian language is only a literary standardization of a certain Tuscan dialect hundreds of miles away from Sardinia seems to play no importance in the linguistic pursuit of a definition of language. Yet there is no doubt in the minds of linguists, that the so called standard languages are just historical dialects that were lucky enough to make it into written form and were consequently awarded with a grammar, a dictionary, an orthography and have thus attained the status of an immutable system of normatively identical forms.

Conclusion

The problem thus appears to be, that linguists and sociolinguists alike argue from two different ideological perspectives without noticing they are mutually contradictory. On the one hand, they are fully aware that the *standard language* is just *one dialect* that through historical coincidence attained the status of a standard (in the case of Slovenian it was for instance the dialect of Primož Trubar who first wrote books in the *Slovenian language*, while in the case of modern Japanese it was the Tokyo dialect with first attempts at colloquial writing in the late 19th century in the context of the *genbun'itchi* movement), while on the other hand they just forget this fact and with all seriousness discuss historical processes and reasons for dialectical diversity of that *language*.

Languages (Japanese, German, Slovenian ...) are in a certain meaning artificial constructs of a written expression identified as *national languages* belonging to their respective *national*

communities (the Japanese, the Germans, the Slovenians ...). However, when we try to discuss socio-linguistically *living speech* we should argue beyond the ideological concepts of *national language* and national identity and acknowledge linguistic continua of linguistic communities on the one hand and linguistic idiosyncrasy of individual speakers on the other and propose a completely new theory of language or do away with the concept altogether.

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Reiterant Speech in Language Studies and its application to Japanese

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Abstract

Reiterant speech, or nonsense syllable mimicry, is a well-known tool used to study language prosody, particularly syllable and word durations, unconfounded by segmental influences. This presentation gives a critical review of the research that employs such methods, discusses its application to Japanese through acoustic comparison with Slovene, and proposes a revised definition.

Reiterant speech (Larkey 1983) might not be well-known by its name though it is a very common research tool in language studies, particularly in studies on language prosody, as it eliminates segmental effects of speech. Also called nonsense syllable mimicry (Liberman & Streeter 1976), it is found in studies on native language acquisition (Smith et al., 1989; Dohen et al. 2004, etc.), second language acquisition (Bateson & Kelso 1985; Tajima et al. 1996; Warner 1997; Tajima & Port 1998, etc.), comparative linguistic studies (Bradlow 1993; Sluijter & van Heuven 1996; Golob 2005; etc.), and many others.

The definition of reiterant speech is that of a stylized form of speaking in which every syllable is replaced with a standard syllable consisting of a consonant (C) and a vowel (V), most likely [ma] or [ba] (Liberman & Streeter 1976; Larkey 1983). Thus the word *computer*, a 3-syllable word (com-pu-ter), would be interpreted as *mamama*, keeping all the prosodic characteristics of the original word.

The problem arises when we compare the word *London* in Japanese and Slovene. Both, Japanese /rondon/ as well as Slovene /london/, may be interpreted as a construct of two syllables, and should consequently take the same phonotactic form in reiterant speech, namely the CVCV or *mama*. However, any Japanese with at least some language instinct would interpret the word *London* with four CV sequences, as *mamamama*.

Native language instinct is to be examined through everyday language phenomena such as language games, speech errors, loan words, poetry, or writing. A familiar Japanese language

game, a ‘babibu’ language (there is a similar game in Slovene employing pa-pi-pu), would change *sinbun* (meaning *newspaper*) into *sibinbububunbu* (Tsujimura 2007). This suggests that Japanese /N/ (written with the 「ん」 kana letter), following a vowel and /usually/ antecedent to a consonant or, in other words, undertaking a coda position in a closed syllable, carries prosodic characteristics equal to any other CV syllable. Such an individual status can also be attested with native speaker’s speech errors (an example of transposition: dangai saibansyo → daigan saibansyo, Kubozono 1985), and reconfirmed by the structure of *tanka* poems and a *kana* letter on its own.

In phonology Japanese /N/ is called *moraic nasal*. In its narrow sense, this means that /N/ takes one moraic unit, a unit of length, the same as any other CV structure. In its broader sense, it is an indispensable unit in Japanese accentuation, which is described through binary (high-low) opposition and constructed on moraic units rather than syllables (though accentuation rules work well when based on syllables (Kubozono 2002)).


Though this individual character of the Japanese moraic nasal has been a main discussion topic in countless research papers, it has, surprisingly enough, not yet found its way to reiterant speech. Most of the literature undertaking Japanese through reiterant speech avoid examples that would include moraic nasal and in this way avoid the problem of its status.

The aim of this paper thus is to point out the phonological status of moraic nasal in Japanese, propose its appurtenant CV structure in reiterant speech, and finally reconsider the definition of reiterant speech. Differences in prosodic phenomena of Japanese and Slovene (and English for that matter) are to be shown through acoustic characteristics of pitch.

Stimuli were taken from my previous research, Golob 2005. 10 native speakers, Japanese and Slovene respectively, pronounced words of two and three consecutive *ma*-s, strictly following pronunciation of real lexical words (ex. *mamama* was pronounced as *banana*), once as a declarative and once as an interrogative. Furthermore they pronounced reiterant words that contained nasal /n/ either in between *ma*-s, or at the end of the word, fitting real lexical words respectively (ex. *manta* for *sanma* (saury), *maman* for *gohan* (meal)), again in declarative and interrogative intonation.

The two types of intonation were chosen for their specificity in pitch patterns (for details see Table 1 below). Attention was drawn to interrogative intonation, while words in declarative intonation were included for clearer presentation.

Table 1: Modelled patterns of pitch for Japanese (left) and Slovene (right) according to Golob 2005. Words of 1-, 2-, and 3- syllables (or moras) with different accent patterns were subject to experiment. A solid line represents declarative intonation and a dotted line interrogative. Dots are placed above the accent place. Vertical line for Japanese shows the time line where declarative and interrogative intonation take different directions, and arrows for Slovene point at accent place where the two intonations are most apart.



The nasal was hypothetically interpreted once as an individual prosodic unit (moraic unit), for where it was expected to match any other *ma*'s acoustic characteristics, and other times as a syllabic coda (a final part of a syllable), in which case it would bear characteristics of any other *ma* together with the antecedent *ma*.

Results are shown in the following order: Japanese is shown in Figures 1a, 1b and Figure 2, and Slovene in Figures 3a, 3b and Figure 4.




Figure 1a, 1b: Fo curves (bold lines show average pitch pattern) of Japanese ‘maman’ as a 3-unit-word (left) and as a 2-unit-word (right), compared to Fo patterns in CV structure (Figure 2). Pitch pattern in Figure 1b reveals a double change (rise-fall-rise) within second /hypothetical/ unit, which is unacceptable in Japanese.




Figure 2: A word of CV-CV-CV sequence as the only word comparable to the one in Figure 1a.




Figure 3a, 3b: Fo curves (bold lines show average pitch pattern) of Slovene ‘manta’ as a 3-unit-word (left) and as a 2-unit-word (right), compared to Fo patterns in CV structure (Figure 2). Pitch pattern in Figure 3a reveals pitch peak on the boundary between two /hypothetical/ units, the realization not found in Slovene.




Figure 4: A word of CV-CV sequence as the only word comparable to the one in Figure 3b.

As it is clear from the above figures, Japanese moraic nasal carries individual characteristics of pitch that are comparable to any other CV pitch pattern, which was proven different in Slovene. Acoustic facts are thus yet another evidence for the existence of different prosodic units across languages.

The fact that syllable is not the only possible prosodic unit should receive more attention in research studies concerning reiterant speech. On the other hand, the definition of reiterant speech should broaden its definition and allow moraic unit to gain equal status to syllable.

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DISCUSSION 2.

GOVERNANCE AND FLEXIBILITY

in dialogue with

. THE CONCEPT OF NATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL

. LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY

Report on the Presentations and Final Discussion around the Theme: Governance and Flexibility

Discussion members: *Akiko Takahashi, Kyoungtaek Lee, Lea A. Vrečko, Maja Veselič, Minori Takahashi*

- Akiko Takahashi tried to examine the concept of “multiculturalism” in relation to Japanese education policy towards resident foreigners. Particularly she focused on the Japanese education policy towards Koreans living in Japan.
Key word: multiculturalism
Point of Discussion: the meaning of language education policy for minorities
- Kyoungtaek Lee attempted to analyze Nye’s concept of soft power through the Confucius Institute – China’s institute for foreign language - and suggested dividing the concept of soft power into two : ‘soft’ and ‘power’.
Key word: soft power
Point of Discussion: the meaning of foreign language policy
- Lea A. Vrečko dealt with the historic moment of emergence of citizenship as a category or a concept, presented the development of citizenship and showed that T.H. Marshall’s thesis is still highly valid today.
Key word: citizenship
Point of Discussion: the meaning of citizenship in society
- Maja Veselič examined the influence of bilingual education on ethnic identity formation among the Uyghur minority group in Northwest China through the viewpoint of the Uyghur’s sense of belonging and their expression.
Key word: language policy
Point of Discussion: the meaning of language education policy for minorities
- Minori Takahashi focused on the EU’s regulatory empire-ness in the context of the whaling controversy among the EU, its signatory Denmark, and Denmark’s dominion Greenland.
Key word: regulatory empire
Point of Discussion: the meaning of governance

We started the discussion with the presentation given by Minori Takahashi. He talked about the concept of the regulatory empire as developed by Kazuto Suzuki since 2006. The regulatory empire concept focuses on the standard formation ability of the EU and points to the fact that the EU has emerged as a global governing body.

We then moved to the theme brought up by Akiko Takahashi. She introduced in more detail the educational situation and policy in relation to different groups of foreigners in Japan. In her presentation she discussed the key concepts of multiculturalism and modern societies as well as the way these two terms combine in present-day Japan.

This led us to consider another important aspect of multiculturalism, the influence of state language policies (i.e. bilingual education) on minorities' ethnic self-perception, which was the discussion theme brought up by Maja Veselič. She compared the situation in China with the Slovenian cases of bilingual areas on the borders with Hungary and Italy.

The above-mentioned examples of Japan, China and Slovenia on different conceptions of state and the sort of basis for inclusion/exclusion of their inhabitants (in terms of access to goods, services and rights) they form, can serve as case studies on the topic of citizenship as presented by Lea A. Vrečko. While exploring T. H. Marshall's understanding of citizenship, her main point was that the concept of citizenship varies among nation states. Her particular interest lies in the strong distinction in countries all around the world between citizens and those who are left out by focusing on the status of legally accepted citizenship.

To sum up our discussion's main points:

1. Governance of the regulatory empire
Regulatory empire would be more cost-effective and low risk to manage inter-states or organizations.
2. Comparison of the situation in Japan, China and Slovenia
In particular, citizenship and migrants, integration policies, educational system, language courses, breaking down the stereotypes
3. Education system in EU and Japan
Education policy towards foreigners, cultural literacy

To conclude, our session theme was called “Governance and Flexibility” but why was governance and its flexibility or the concept of a flexible governing body invoked in this session?

In general, international power relations have been widely redefined during the post-post Cold War era. A new international political framework gained a foothold in the United States but declined as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wore on. However, the United States is not only a power from military and economic perspectives; it is also a powerful cultural body – a dimension that must be considered when analyzing the world order. Around the same time, Russia began regaining its reputation as a great power, a trend that has been aided by remarkable economic growth in both China and India. Moreover, there is also the examination of the standard formation ability of the EU. The EU keeps demonstrating that its market force is its standard, that is, the EU respects self-determination, uses discourses of universal values and norms and lets subordinate states take action to comply with EU rules and regulations. Up to now, the commonly accepted examinations of the flexible governing body have referred to today’s international order as it appeared at the end of the post-post Cold War. In this respect, we believe that if certain communities are to maintain political validity in the present time, irrespective of the problem whether such validity is direct or indirect, they have to adopt the concept of the right to self-determination. Doing so is linked to recognizing diversity because since the post-post Cold War era, the interests or national interests of each actor are especially likely to be at odds, and no “rational” choice that an actor makes can function in the community without diversity.

The key concepts of our session are, therefore, “governance and its flexibility”, more specifically, the diversified community in the context of the governance policies and their flexibility as well as the bases of the argument on the flexible governing body – a topic frequently considered in the discussions of today’s international order.

Japanese Education Policy towards Resident Foreigners

Akiko TAKAHASHI


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The education of foreign children in Japan

The movement of people across borders has increased rapidly since the latter half of the 1980's. The use of the term *multi-culture* has become more widespread as this transnational movement has become more frequent. However, we should not begin discussion without first deeply considering the original meaning of the word multi-culture as against its present convenient usage in Japan. Now I believe we should re-examine the essence of what constitutes a multi-cultural society. Therefore, I will examine the situation of resident foreigners in Japan and the educational policy towards them from the postwar period to the present time.

Table 1. Top five nationalities of aliens registered in Japan



Ministry of Public Management, March 2008

As we can see from the above table there are a large number of Korean and Chinese nationals. The largest proportion of resident foreigners is made up of Koreans. To give some background: in 1945, just after the war, the number of Koreans in Japan was 2.3 million. There was a movement to return to Korea after the war but only 600,000 of those who were living in Japan did in fact return to Korea. Therefore Koreans still comprise the majority of foreigners in Japan.

After the war, the first change in status for Koreans was the loss of suffrage. Until then, Korean and Taiwanese living in Japan had the right to vote. The House of Representatives and local lawmakers, however, amended this in December 1945 and people from the former colonies lost the right of suffrage. Then, secondly, an Alien Registration was imposed on these peoples. From these two points we can see that for education purposes they were then considered foreign as opposed to Japanese, whereas until 1952 they had enjoyed dual status. Thus, in 1952, Koreans in Japan became foreigners, and the Japanese government was released from any educational obligations towards them.

The situation of ethnic education

The number of Korean children who did not know the history of Korea, to say nothing of the language and the culture, increased as a result of integration policies during the colonial period. Therefore, after the liberation of Korea from Japan, Koreans in Japan appealed for the rehabilitation of their language, their culture, and their ethnicity, and places for mother-tongue courses were established. These quickly became public ethnic schools.

However, public ethnic schools later had to close because the Japanese government imposed “Compulsory school attendance in line with Japanese education”. In 1966, 32 public Korean schools had to close in Japan and re-register as independent schools.

The educational policy towards schools for foreigners and ethnic schools

From the latter half of the 1970's, the number of foreigners living in Japan has increased and Japanese society has gradually changed. Graduation requirements for children from Korean schools also changed, and in 1998 Kyoto University permitted graduates of the Korean University School to sit the Kyoto University graduate school examination. Moreover, the following points were included in the investment promotion plan of 1999.

1. Increase of international schools by the conversion of closed public schools.
2. Tax preference for international schools.
3. Wider admission of foreign children to Japanese high school and university.

(From the Nihon Keizai Shinbun April 2, 1999).

In addition, sixteen international schools, two South Korean schools, two Chinese schools, and one German school, one French school, and certain Brazilian schools (conditional) were accorded educational establishment status in 2003. However, though the educational environment surrounding foreign children has changed gradually, there has been no change in the Japanese government's position towards ethnic schools.

Foreign children attending Japanese schools

Next, I would have liked to discuss the comparative situation of Japanese schools. Unhappily this has not been possible because no studies of the actual situation have yet been realized, in part due to the fact that, as mentioned above, the Japanese Government has no obligation to educate foreign children. According to statistics from a Brazilian school official, 35,000 Japanese-Brazilian children in Japan have reached school-age, of which "7000 attend the Brazilian school, 15,000 attend Japanese public schools, and 13,000 do not go to school". (Chosen Shinpo, March 19, 2003).

Since 2000, however, the Japanese government has begun examining the number of foreign students in Japanese schools for whom Japanese guidance is necessary, which indicates that measures directed at multi-nationalization of students have started to be implemented by the government, though these measures are still by no means enough.

Conclusion

The definition of multi-culture and a reconsideration of its concept, together with the educational policy towards foreign residents in Japan have been discussed. Recently, there has been a movement to advance and discuss multi-culture putting aside its fashionable connotations.

If people of various nationalities live in one country can this society be termed multi-cultural? The problem is not so simple. We already have the situation where people transcend national borders and where money and movement across borders exists, but the basic attitude towards a multi-cultural situation has not changed.

Because of the ever-increasing number of foreigners resident in Japan, much more discussion is needed. It could be important for us here to deepen our research and further reconsider the concept of "multi-culture".

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Towards a New Framework for Soft Power: The Case of China's Confucius Institute

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In this paper I would like to suggest a new framework for the understanding of the concept of soft power. More particularly, I will focus on Nye's concept of soft power. There are many controversial and differing opinions concerning Nye's concept of soft power which have led to some confusion in understanding the real nature of soft power. I will analyze Nye's concept of soft power and suggest dividing this concept into two distinct elements. To explain this different understanding with regards the idea of soft power, I will examine a specific government agency, that of China's Confucius Institute, which clearly enunciates its goal as a tool for promoting soft power.

Ambiguity in the term *Soft Power*

The term soft power was put forward in 1990 by the neo-liberalist Joseph S. Nye (1990; 2004), a researcher in interdependency in international relations.¹ Nye defined soft power as a country's power promoted by that country's political values and cultural attraction. He pointed out that soft power is more important than hard power in the present post-cold war era. In this manner Nye proposed three elements as constituting sources of soft power, elements which he also considered sources of new diplomacy in today's world, i.e. a country's: culture, political values, and foreign policies.² Among these three sources the most fascinating source is a country's culture which, until now, has not been seriously regarded as a factor in international relations. In my examination of Nye's definition of soft power, there are at least two salient points. One is that Nye treats soft power within the usual power concept. The other is that he highlights culture as the new source of power. Nye's soft power comprises not only the concept based on traditional power but also the new concept which includes a country's interest obtained through cultural exchange.³ Despite the words, the term soft power itself is ambiguous in

¹ Jackson and Sørensen (2003: 49).

² Nye (2004: 11).

³ Nye (2008: 63-84).

meaning. Certain scholars and administrators accept soft power only within the traditional concept of power. Their focus is on how to utilize their country's culture exclusively for their own country's interests.

The Confucius Institute as an example of ambiguity in soft power

To verify these different approaches in understanding Nye's concept of soft power, I will take the example of a specific agency which clearly enunciates its role as a tool for the promotion of its own country's soft power. The example is China's Confucius Institute, established in 2004 supposedly in order to diffuse the Chinese language worldwide. Though I take China's Confucius Institute as an example, we can also refer to similar cases analyzed by other scholars, for instance the British Council analyzed by James M. Mitchell,⁴ and the Goethe Institute by Ulrich Ammon,⁵ and so on.

Through an examination of various documents, I could find two objectives which the Confucius Institute itself describes as being goals of soft power, that of political effect and that of economic effect.

The implantation of Confucius Institutes is deeply related to the geographical region which the Chinese government considers important from a political point of view. For example, a number of Confucius Institutes are found in the regional area near China, such as Japan (14), Thailand (14), South Korea (13). Others are found in bigger polities such as the EU (55) and the US (18).⁶ Over 60% of the 165 Confucius Institutes is concentrated in these three areas.

According to a Chinese news article,⁷ the goals of the Confucius Institute are described as methods for increasing the demand of the Chinese language and for developing Chinese cultural contents business. Through an examination of some materials⁸ concerning the Confucius Institute, it became clear that the plan to establish the Confucius Institute was deeply associated with the development of the Chinese proficiency test, the HSK. A language proficiency test is generally accepted as a necessary tool for learning a language, regardless of considerations of the huge revenue it generates. Needless to say, the American ETS series of language proficiency

⁴ Mitchell (1990).

⁵ Ammon (1992).

⁶ <www.hanban.org/cn_hanban/kzxy_list.php?itdh=gzky>, accessed 2009.1.10

⁷ thebeijingnews.com (2007.1.14). *Kongzixueyuan Waidejiaoliang* 孔子学院外的较量 [Confucius Institute: Competing With The World]. <news.thebeijingnews.com/0582/2007/01-14/031@235624.htm>

⁸ Cheng (2005: 89)

tests is generally accepted as a big education business.⁹ Moreover, the Chinese government admits that the English education business is its principal business rival.¹⁰

Side effects of soft power

Even if the main goals of the Confucius Institute are for political and economic effect, it covers its goals with the concept of soft power which, straddling traditional power and the new concept of power, is clearly an ambiguous term. Such ambiguousness in soft power obscures objectives and intents. Moreover, this ambiguity also provides a way to escape accountability (such as the Confucius Institute works only for its country), because Nye's concept of soft power itself admits the function of soft power for a country's interest. Critics could not find anything wrong here but warn against inappropriate usage of the concept soft power. Nye tried to fuse the two meanings of soft power, but I believe this concept of soft power merely gives a broader working space for hard power, as can be seen in the example of the Confucius Institute.

New suggestion

I would, therefore, like to suggest a new framework for soft power along the lines of a similar proposition put forward by Nancy Snow with regards to 'Public Diplomacy'.¹¹ This framework will enable us to understand the two different meanings of soft power far more. Firstly, when 'soft' is emphasized in the term SOFT power, SOFT power is considered as being an effective tool for the realization of mutual understanding through activities such as intellectual exchange and cultural relations.¹² Secondly, when 'power' is emphasized in the term soft POWER, soft POWER is generally used only for a country's interest. In this case, soft POWER includes grasping political leadership in given areas and also includes business by using cultural contents, such as movies, comics and so forth which contribute to enhance a country's financial ability and its refined image.

⁹ Educational Testing Service (ETS) founded in 1974, American NPO. It developed the English tests TOEFL, GRE, etc., its revenues are estimated at \$600 million a year. <www.ets.org/>.

¹⁰ 'Multilateral forum about cultural relations 2006' (2006.8.31) held in Beijing sponsored by Chinese Foreign Ministry.

¹¹ Snow (2009: 9).

¹² Mitchell (1990).

Concluding comments

Using this framework of soft power, we can judge a given country's foreign policies labeled as soft power. Especially when 'power' is emphasized in the term soft POWER, we can see that such policies are not effective for mutual understanding and world peace. I believe this research could provide a theoretical scale with which to contest the cultural uniformity of a country's forceful leadership.

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Citizenship: Concept of Equality or Inequality?

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Citizenship as a concept was put forward in the 1950's by T. H. Marshall (1992: 5) who proclaimed that citizenship can be divided into three aspects according to its development in history. First was the civil aspect of citizenship, relating to freedom of speech, thought and faith. The institutions that were important for laying the ground for these rights were the legal courts. The second aspect was the political one, concerning rights such as the right to participate in the process of decision making in politics and active and passive rights to vote. Institutions corresponding to these rights are parliaments and councils of local communities. The third and the last aspect of citizenship that was established was the social aspect which reaches down to welfare, social security, the right to education and other rights that enable individuals to live as civilized human beings. The important institutions for this aspect of citizenship are educational institutions and social services.

In the past, all three aspects or elements were united, and throughout history rights differentiated and individuals first gained civil, then political and at the end (in the 20th century) social rights. In the field of civil rights freedom of the press is very important, in the field of economics the right of work is very important.

By the beginning of the 19th century the principle of economical independency of individuals became self-evident. Once freedom of the individual became universal – that means freedom of women as well – citizenship outgrew the local framework and developed into a national framework. Political rights in the 19th century were not yet universal; to begin with they had to be widened to all men, first to those of the noble classes, then to all who owned property, and later on political rights were given to women who owned property. Before all men and women gained the right to vote and to be voted for, political rights were given to men and in most countries in the first half of the 20th century women got these rights as well.¹

¹ Women in different countries won political rights at different periods depending on the specific situation in each country.

Marshall (1992: 18) said that citizenship did not abolish inequalities of different kinds; however it helped take a step in the right direction.

Persons or inhabitants with the status of citizen within a certain country are, at least legally, equal to all other citizens of the same national country. This means that according to national legislation citizens have the same rights as well as duties.

If we take a look at the laws and legislation of countries around the world, each country has laws regulating aliens or foreigners. Countries have a system of permit of residence for foreigners and have a system which differentiates people on the status of citizenship. Thus immigrants face a great many problems when they try to get a better life outside their own country, and when they reside in other countries they face stigmatization and trouble integrating into the host country.

Regarding the Aliens Act of the Republic of Slovenia² third-countries are all countries which are not members of the EU-27. In the 1970's most immigrants in Slovenia were from other Yugoslav countries and that situation was still the same at the beginning of the 1990's. The number of immigrants from these countries is still high today, but recently immigrants come from other European countries as well, such as Slovakia and Romania.

Slovenia is geographically as well as historically a transition country and that also affects migration movements. Before Slovenia joined the European Union, immigrants were mainly part of a transient population on their way to other European countries. That was the fact for most of the immigrants from the Middle East, Turkey, Iraq, Iran etc, but that changed to some point when in May 2004 Slovenia joined the European Union and became a country of final destination for immigrants.

Although immigrants from the former Yugoslav republics are still in the majority and immigrants from Africa are still in the minority, more and more immigrants are coming from other parts of the world. The number of immigrants from Asian countries, especially from China and Thailand, is increasing. Mostly these people find work in the Chinese restaurants which have cropped up all over Slovenia, and many women from these countries find work in spas and wellness centres as masseuses. There are not only assumptions but evidence as well that these women are involved in the sex industry. The same problems arise for women from the Ukraine, Russia or the Dominican Republic as they are often hired as dancers in clubs, but there is not enough or almost no

² <zakonodaja.gov.si/rpsi/r09/predpis_ZAKO1479.html> (October 2009)

supervision over what these women in fact do once they are hired. There have been cases where women were hired as dancers but were in fact expected to work as prostitutes.

The Alien Act of the Republic of Slovenia defines three different types of status for foreigners: temporary and permanent residence permits, and a permit to remain. According to the Act, permanent residence permits can be obtained when the conditions of permanent employment are satisfied in association with the necessary period of temporary residence in Slovenia. The majority of third-country nationals come to Slovenia for economic reasons, and only a minority of them are asylum seekers. According to the terms of the abovementioned Act, it is almost impossible for an individual from a third country to come to Slovenia to seek work on his own. If he or she wants to obtain a permit to remain and later on acquire a temporary or permanent residence permit, the person must first have a work permit, which is a condition for a residence permit. People can come as tourists for shorter periods but they need a visa to enter Slovenia and this can only be obtained if a Slovenian citizen accepts to be a guarantor for him or her (place to stay, financial guarantee, etc.). These aggravating circumstances force third-country nationals to come to Slovenia through different networks of employers or persons who organize work, residence and work permits for them. Third-country nationals have to trust these organizers; to believe them when they affirm they are not dealing in human trafficking, which is especially a problem for women and children. Even worse, these circumstances often force third-country nationals to enter Slovenia illegally, which is often the case of immigrants from the Middle East. If they are caught they are immediately deported back to their own country which consequently means they face even worse living conditions than they did before they decided to go abroad illegally (since people sell all their property to pay off organizers).

When an immigrant acquires a work permit and it is based on a residence permit, another problem arises. According to the Citizenship Act of the Republic of Slovenia³ third-country nationals can obtain a permanent residence permit after eight years of residence in Slovenia, based on a temporary residence permit. This permit equalizes third-country nationals in some points to Slovenian citizens. Slovenian citizenship can be obtained after ten years of legally residing in Slovenia, or after five years of being married to a Slovenian citizen.

A large part of labour migration to Slovenia is temporary or seasonal and is mainly in response to labour shortages in the Slovenian economy. In the majority of cases these are men with lower education who are employed in less respected and less well-paid jobs, and this fact holds true for

³ <www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=200724&stevilka=1211> (October 2009)

women of third countries as well. Traditionally and stereotypically, an immigrant woman from a third country works as a cleaner and a man as a construction worker.

Native Slovenian employees usually have a higher education than third-country nationals but that fact is slowly changing. However, although some third-country nationals have higher education in comparison with those from the 1970's and the 1990's, they often face the problem of non-recognition of qualifications, so, even if they have higher education obtained in their birth country, many obstacles arise when claiming recognition of their education. It is difficult for third-country nationals with higher education to get a job which suits their qualifications, and they are in many cases forced to do less well-paid and respected jobs. This is especially true for women who join their husbands with their children or for women from third countries married to Slovenian citizens. Many of these women are unemployed and if they get a job it is often less respected and less well-paid, usually as a consequence of inadequate language proficiency.

In 2002 Slovenia accepted a Resolution on Migration Policy of the Republic of Slovenia,⁴ but not much has been done in putting it into practice. For efficient integration of immigrants, systematic language courses should be organized. It is hard for third-country nationals to learn a new language, particularly if they live with other immigrants in shared apartments when single, or if they live with their families. If they are employed in the typical branches for third-country nationals, such as construction, metallurgy, the industrial sector or cleaning services with regard to female immigrants, they are not in contact with the Slovene language because the majority of their co-workers are also from abroad, generally the same or neighbouring country (the case of former Yugoslav immigrants). Many third-country nationals, especially when not living with their families, face problems of living conditions. At the end of 2008 some articles appeared in the Slovenian media about the disastrous living conditions of third-country nationals, mainly from the former Yugoslav Republics. The men interviewed were construction workers living with three to five other people in one small room. Not only was there no privacy, some of them were living in damp rooms with no heating. Many employers rent rooms for their workers without reporting it to the state, and there is not enough supervision over the living conditions of third-country nationals. Often such nationals work for minimal wages, where the company makes a minimal wage money transfer to the employee's account while paying the rest in cash. This way the company benefits when paying taxes and pension contributions on a lower wage, which means smaller pensions for employees and therefore they are more vulnerable to poverty in old age.

⁴ <zakonodaja.gov.si/rpsi/r00/predpis_RESO20.html> (October 2009)

We can clearly see that citizenship as a concept is a basis for equality, but citizenship as a legal status of certain persons can be both a basis for equality and inequality when foreigners are in question. It can be said that citizenship as a status is a basis for differentiation within a certain nation-state when foreigners or immigrants are in question.

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China's Bilingual Education Policy and Uyghur Ethnic Identity

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Numbering close to 8.5 million people according to government statistics (ZMSW 2005), the Uyghur are one of the largest officially recognized ethnic minorities (*shaoshu minzu*) in the People's Republic of China (PRC). They reside in the far Northwestern part of the country – the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Together with Tibetans, Mongols and various other small groups of Western and North-western regions they represent the largest concentration of non-Chinese speaking population within China. Areas inhabited by these groups lie historically and culturally beyond China proper. In the process of (re)drawing the boundaries of the modern Chinese nation-state from the late 19th century onward – a process that has been taking place both on the maps and in the minds – they have thus become an object of special attention of various nation-builders. In order to ensure their loyalty, the PRC devised a number of preferential policies for those groups that were granted the official status of ethnic minority,¹ for example in regard to education, language use, regional autonomy and one-child policy.²

While most of the 55 such groups express little or no complaint or even claim satisfaction with the state's treatment, a few groups are particularly loud in voicing their grievances. Most notable among them are Tibetans and Uyghur, both of whom are considered as a serious security threat by the Chinese state. But while the former are often represented in worldwide media reports and public commentaries, the situation of the latter remains relatively unfamiliar to Western audiences.³ It is only events such as the large violent protests that took place in the XUAR capital of Ürümqi/Wulumuqi in July this year that

¹ Previously, they were referred to as minority nationalities in the official English language publications.

² For a comprehensive overview of the PRC ethnic policy see Mackerras 1994 and documents published by the PRC's State Ethnic Affairs Commission <www.seac.gov.cn>, for Xinjiang specifically see Sautman 1998.

³ The situation is quite different within China, in the Turkic-speaking countries of Central and Western Asia and in many other Muslim-majority countries.

brought Uyghur worries to the attention of the international public. Yet the grievances of Uyghur and Tibetans are very similar, the chief among them being forced assimilation into Han Chinese culture, as well as exclusion from the political decision-making process and economic development of the respective autonomous regions. If the PRC's ethnic policy was in principle designed to gain the loyalty of ethnic minorities through fair treatment, why is it failing?

This paper focuses on one of the most important and well-developed aspects of minority policy – bilingual education, and examines its influence on the ethnic identity formation among Uyghur. First, it offers an overview of the development of the PRC's language policy and the recent changes in its implementation. It then contrasts experiences of those Uyghur who have completed their schooling in the mother tongue with those who did it in Chinese, paying special attention to differences in their sense of belonging and the ways they express it. The paper is based on interviews and informal conversations with Uyghur students, parents and teachers I conducted during my doctoral dissertation fieldwork at the campus of Northwestern University for Nationalities (*Xibei minzu daxue*) in the city of Lanzhou between 2005 and 2007 as well as during a month-long research trip to central Xinjiang in 2006.

PRC's minority language policy

Language policy and language planning are one of the most effective tools for enacting social and public policy. As many theorists of nationalism have shown, they are often central to national consolidation as they affect domains, status, and use of language varieties and the rights of their speakers.⁴ Language policies can be overt, covert or both. While the overt are disseminated through legal documents, legislation and official administrative bodies, the covert are unwritten, even undiscussed and can be inferred from the actual implementation of overt policies, from media statements and from popular language attitudes. They are systematically implemented in one or more domain (such as education or the media) over a period of time (Dwyer 2005: 6). The PRC's policy of bilingualism should therefore be examined with regard to both aspects.

⁴ Highly relevant to the issues touched upon below is Luka Culiberg's discussion on the definition of language in this volume.

The PRC was founded on the principles of egalitarianism and unity of all officially recognized ethnic groups, and Article 53 of the September 1949 Common Programme (Interim Constitution) stated that in addition to a degree of local autonomy in areas with concentrations of minority populations, national minorities should have the “freedom to develop their dialects and languages” (quoted in Dwyer 2005: 7). This principle is retained in a slightly reformulated form in Article 4 of the current constitution. However, unlike earlier documents, the current constitution also states that Standard Chinese (*putonghua*) must be used by all nationalities. Other articles guarantee the use of minority languages when dealing with state organs and courts in autonomous areas (i.e. regions, prefectures and counties) (ZRGX 1982). Further legal provisions dealing with the use of minority languages in public domains include the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (issued in 1984) as well as various regulations and measures adopted at regional and local levels.

In the early years of the PRC, the emphasis in language policy was placed on reforming existing orthographies for minority languages or developing new ones for those which hitherto did not have a written form. Bilingual education for certain languages with larger numbers of speakers was already established but was not highly systematized. Minority languages were seen as especially useful in quickly raising literacy and educational levels of large segments of minority populations. Yet at the same time the standard Mandarin Chinese was being widely promoted and older notions of the superiority of the Chinese language and Han culture were maintained, thus marking minority languages as lower in status than Standard Chinese. They were perceived as inadequate for the rigorous communicative demands of modern life, especially modern science. The expansion of communicative domains of Standard Chinese led to the shrinking of space for minority languages, thus providing further proof for the claims of their inherent uselessness.

As demonstrated by the American linguist Arienne Dwyer (1998) the hierarchy of languages mirrors the vertical basis of power in today’s China. She identifies five different levels. At the pinnacle of the pyramid is the national standard (*putonghua*); followed by regional *linguae francae* – quasi-standards that include regiolects of Chinese (such as Standard Cantonese) as well as standards of minority languages; followed by primary minority languages – i.e. those with historical and/or modern prestige and a large number of speakers and some political significance; then followed by secondary minority languages – the remaining ones with low prestige, often without written form, with a small number of speakers and no political weight at all; and, finally, unrecognized languages without official status.

Standard Uyghur is positioned close to the top, just below the national standard. Not only is it the native language of Uyghur in Xinjiang, the long established Uyghur communities in Central Asia and the recent emigrant communities elsewhere, but it is also widely used for intercommunication among other inhabitants of XUAR whose mother tongues belong to Turkic, Tungusic, Iranian and Mongolic language groups.⁵ Furthermore, Uyghur has high mutual intelligibility with Uzbek and Kyrgyz, thus offering a great advantage in learning other Turkic languages, while its Arabic-based orthography allows those literate in Uyghur the access to a rich Central Asian historical heritage. Yet, as Dwyer's (2005: 30-32) analysis of covert language policies shows, such pan-Turkic historical, political and cultural connections are purposefully ignored, even denied by the state and all in all Uyghur remains perceived as less important. This has not changed even as the concept of bilingualism was adopted with regard to minority language instruction in the 1980s from Western literature.

Instruction in Uyghur and Uyghur ethnic identity

There is no consensus among Chinese scholars and professionals on how bilingualism should be practiced. While some advocate full mother tongue instruction in primary and secondary schools⁶ many more see educational use of anything but Standard Chinese as an undesirable yet unavoidable tool to help children make the transition from their mother tongues to the national standard; still others urge the abandonment of bilingual education as early as possible (Stites 1999: 103-4, 110). Nevertheless, proponents of such varied viewpoints can all find support for their claims in the overt language policies. It is therefore important to pay close attention to the way written policies are carried out in practice.

In autonomous areas of China, generally two types of primary and secondary schools can be found: those that use exclusively Chinese as the language of instruction and those that use a combination of a minority language and Chinese. Since secondary school entrance exams and university entrance exams can be taken in certain minority languages (this basically being determined by the type of school one attended), minority students who graduate from the former are referred to as *minkaohan* (minorities tested in Chinese), and those from the latter are called *minkaomin* (minorities tested in minority language). In XUAR, Uyghur is

⁵ Furthermore, it is one of the five languages in which the phrase "People's Republic of China" is rendered on Chinese paper currency (others being Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan and Zhuang).

⁶ Good command of Standard Chinese is necessary for tertiary education even in autonomous regions and at minority-targeted universities where minority languages and literatures are offered as full courses of study.

the most wide-spread minority language used in instruction. In comparison to others it also has the best pedagogical materials, yet the science textbooks remain unsatisfactory and many others are simple revisions of translated Chinese textbooks.

Before 1984 pupils in minority schools began formal study of Chinese in the first year of secondary school (year 7). Then, however, the XUAR Communist party voted to expand the Chinese language curriculum at all levels of education, so children started learning it in the third grade. Today, they mostly do so from the first grade on. The implementation of this policy has not only served to intensify the study of Chinese (as a second language), but has been gradually displacing Uyghur as the language of instruction. If previously Uyghur was used to teach all subjects except the Chinese language, now Chinese has become the main language of instruction from the third grade on, while Uyghur is being taught as a second language.

Such changes could be observed in the mid-1990s in the capital and other urban centres in Eastern Xinjiang, but the same pressures are now being exerted in rural areas and Uyghur-dominated Southern Xinjiang. During my stay in Lanzhou I befriended a group of 150 Uyghur primary school teachers from Kocha/Kuche who were sent to China proper for a year in order to improve their Chinese skills. They came from different schools and taught different subjects. They attended daily language classes and had to pass the HSK (*Hanyu shuiping kaoshi*) – the Chinese proficiency test designed for non-native speakers. They were threatened with a salary cut should they not show a sufficient level of competence and would be forced to take another test six months after their return home. Should they fail again they could lose their jobs. All of those I talked to over the year expressed great disagreement with the language course that was forced upon them as well as with the goal of eventually teaching only in Chinese, using Uyghur only when absolutely necessary.

As the process described above is slowly rendering the difference between Chinese language schools and minority language schools obsolete, its possible consequences for Uyghur ethnic identity and self-expression can be examined through different experiences of Uyghur *minkaohan* and *minkaomin*. Since the 1980s most urban parents in Xinjiang had a choice of sending their children to either of the two types of schools mentioned above. Those who decided for Chinese language schools did so in order to ensure that their children would gain a higher linguistic and cultural competence in the dominant society and, consequently, would have better job opportunities. While *minkaohan* certainly tend to speak, dress and act more like Han Chinese, thus achieving higher status in the eyes of Han than

their *minkaomin* counterparts, the increase in their social mobility remains a highly contested issue. Many of my interlocutors reported that in spite of their education they are often excluded from job application processes simply for being Uyghur. Their ethnic identity also reflects negatively on the way Han Chinese perceive their Chinese language skills. I was surprised to learn that an Uyghur master student who was a *minkaohan*, grew up in a Han-dominated military neighbourhood, spoke perfect Chinese, and taught university students was applying for an HSK test as well as the oral test of Standard Chinese. She told me: “It doesn’t matter that I had my whole education in Chinese, as soon as an employer sees that I’m an Uyghur they doubt my Chinese. So I had better have an extra piece of paper to prove it.”

On the other hand, *minkaohan* are also viewed disparagingly by other Uyghur. Though envied for their competence in Chinese, they are criticized as being too assimilated in dress and behaviour. Particularly strong resentment is directed at those *minkaohan* with poor Uyghur language skills. The inability of their children to read and write Uyghur or even to express themselves fluently in their mother tongue was often mentioned by parents as a source of great sadness and embarrassment. Some arranged Uyghur language tutors or tried teaching children themselves, others felt their children were overburdened with school work as it was and hoped longer holiday stays with the relatives in the countryside would improve their sons’ and daughters’ Uyghur. Contrary to their parents’ expectations, many university students remembered such experiences as unpleasant, even terrifying since they were the butt of jokes and were bullied by their cousins for their city ways and poor Uyghur.

One Uyghur professor from Xinjiang University recounted her way of dealing with this issue: “Both me and my husband are Uyghur and we always spoke only Uyghur with our daughter, so we thought it would be to her advantage to send her to an ordinary school. But as she went on to junior high, I started noticing how Chinese she was becoming; she only listened to Chinese pop music, disliked Uyghur fashion and even started to speak with me in Chinese. So, I decided it was best to change schools, to enrol her into a Uyghur-language school. Of course I was scared how she would take it, the complete change of environment, the loss of her friends. It was a little rough in the beginning but now she has found her way and she’s doing great. She still sees many of her Chinese friends and she made new Uyghur ones. Her Chinese is really good and so is her Uyghur. I think she has the best of both worlds. Maybe this is the best way to true bilingualism.”

A Uyghur *minkaohan* student shared a similar experience after she started studying Chinese-Uyghur translation at university. Although she spoke decent Uyghur before, it was there that she learned to read and write Uyghur, starting to feel at home in the language. The fact that she was in the class with other *minkaohan* students whose Uyghur was shaky reduced the pressure and embarrassment of making mistakes. One of her favourite memories from those beginnings is the first time she wrote her father a letter in Uyghur. He was so touched he phoned her, in tears. However, although she reconnected to a large extent with the aspects of Uyghur history and daily life that are widely considered as markers of proper Uyghurness, she continued to consider herself as a different kind of Uyghur, but Uyghur nonetheless. And, like many other young Uyghur adults of *minkaohan* background, this was most strongly reflected in her hope to find a *minkaohan* partner.

Conclusion

To conclude, Chinese language policies reflect a tension between the egalitarian principles recognizing the rights of all ethnic groups that constitute a multiethnic Chinese nation on the one hand, and the concerns with standardization and assimilation justified as economic necessity on the other. The example of Uyghur bilingual education demonstrates how little is left of the ideas of equality in current language policy implementation. The quick and forcefully imposed nature of the decline in the public status of their language is a source of great resentment for many Uyghur. It is also one of the important reasons for an increasing identity polarization that found its expression in the protests of last summer. Interestingly, such policies have an alienating affect also on those Uyghur who had their education in Chinese and often feel closer to it than to Uyghur language. These *minkaohan* are supposed to be the competent, modern and loyal citizens the state wants to create. They perceive themselves and are perceived by others as different from both Han and traditional Uyghurs. Theirs is a sort of hybrid identity, so they have become popularly known as the 14th nationality of Xinjiang (in addition to the 13, which traditionally reside there). Yet they, too, consider the above-mentioned policies as a cultural attack, a feeling intensified by the limitations on social mobility they face despite their education. To sum up, in the case of Uyghur the present implementation of minority policies, including those in education, only works against the goals of unity and stability the government is trying to achieve in the resource-rich, ethnically diverse Xinjiang.

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Whaling, a Battleground: The EU as a “Regulatory Empire”¹

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Introduction


In the present paper, I would like to discuss EU “empire-ness”/regulatory empire-ness in the context of the whaling controversy among the European Union (EU), its member state Denmark and Denmark’s dominion Greenland.

At the Environment Council of Luxembourg on June 5, 2008, the EU stated its “common position, *fælles EU-holdning*” in support of maintaining the moratorium on whaling (*European Union* 2008, *EUobserver* 2008). In essence, the EU clearly presented the standard “protection of whales” as the “common position” held by all member states, at the same time the EU also pledged to respect “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling”. However, regarding this common position, we would like to point out the particular stance of Denmark on whaling. Denmark does not openly play a role either in the “protection of whales” or in “pro-whaling”, indeed, it is the only EU country that maintains a “politically neutral” standpoint² on the issue. This is due to the existence of Denmark’s dominion Greenland. Greenland presents a special case as its whaling activities are allocated “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling” status under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, clause 13, which means that Greenland is an exceptional region where whaling is permitted. The situation, however, is further complicated by the fact that Greenland withdrew from the EU, or more accurately from the EC, in 1985, which also means that this island is an exceptional region where EU common policy should not apply (Takahashi 2008, 2009b). For these reasons, the position that Denmark generally holds over the whaling issue is strongly influenced by Greenland’s dual status (see Figure 1). Therefore, and this is the position that this paper takes, Denmark’s politically neutral standpoint concerning whaling reflects the so called “regulatory empire-ness” of the EU.

¹ Full versions of this paper appear in Takahashi (2009a) and Takahashi (unpublished).

² Interview with Ole Samsing, Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet). (August 25 and September 4, 2009)

Figure 1: Triangular relation



Definition of terms: regulatory empire

What is then, a regulatory empire? In short, it is an empire³ which also allows for the right to self-determination. The concept of regulatory empire was first presented in 2006 by Kazuto Suzuki of Hokkaido University in his analysis of EU “empire-ness” (Suzuki 2006, 2008, 2009). Suzuki states that a regulatory empire is first of all an empire that imposes its market regulations on other territories through the sheer size of its economy thereby creating the “gravity” that attracts goods and investment. That is, for the EU for example, he defines the influence of a regulatory empire as something that is exercised outside of the EU. However, in order to take this argument further, in this paper, I would like to point out that the influence of the EU as a regulatory empire is likely to be exercised not only towards outside territories but also within the EU over its own member states. This point will be taken up again later.

The concept of the EU as a regulatory empire can be supported by the following three features. First of all the strength of “gravity” of the EU market, that is the EU’s strong market force in the context of a globalizing market economy, specifically the EU has 27 member countries, with a population of 500 million people, and is the world’s largest economic market with a GDP of about 11 trillion Euros; secondly, the “universality of values and norms” and the argument that the acceptance of these values and norms promotes both national and universal interests (in other words, *EU normative power*, Manners 2001); and thirdly, countries submitting to EU regulation voluntarily accept to come under such regulation. These three points are the overarching points of the discussion of this paper and epitomize the very influence that the EU

³ In this context, “empire” means “relationship, sphere of influence and order which are made by an integral power which reigns beyond plural communities, tribes, societies, regions, powers, and states” (Suzuki 2009: 142).

manifests in presenting the discourse on universality and validity of values that defines the power of the regulatory empire as the member states' common position, while relying on its economic power as its foundation.

EU regulatory empire-ness

Given the strong market force of the EU in the context of a globalizing market economy and that the protection of whales standard currently held by the EU as its common position also represents the view of both the IWC and the wider global community, Denmark and Greenland recognize the fact that if they do not follow EU standards they are likely to be excluded from this market of 500 million people and therefore, voluntarily subordinate themselves to the EU.

Ambiguity of regulation

It should be noted that the EU as a regulatory empire only has “indirect” influence over whaling in Greenland. In this respect we believe the regulatory empire concept is useful because it makes clear the predominant influence achieved by the regulatory empire of the EU. In a word, the EU has adopted a contradictory standard: by taking the whale protection stance as a common position on one hand, and by respecting “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling” on the other. This respect originates from the nature of the EU’s regulatory empire-ness.

As mentioned above, EU has adopted the right to self-determination. In such circumstances the EU becomes a regulatory body that imposes its standards on “the other” but at the same time respects the right to self-determination of individual member states. An example of this can be seen in the rejection of the request for a 10-humpback whale catch quota under the “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling” framework during voting at the IWC annual meetings of 2008 (which was set at 10 per year for humpback whales based on the advice of the IWC-Scientific Committee, IWC 2008) and 2009 (IWC 2009a, 2009b, 2009c) when all EU member states, with the single exception of Denmark, voted against this quota as “one block”, even though it was proposed by Denmark/Greenland within the legally accepted “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling” framework.

Table1: Votes on GL. Humpback Quota at the IWC 2008 meeting⁴

	Yes	No	Abstention
EU	1	19	0
Other	28	17	2
Total	29	36	2

So what does EU respect for self-determination mean? In the context we have examined, EU “regulatory empire-ness” clearly exists. Namely, the EU was able to exercise its “influence as a regulatory empire” even though the legal regulations concerning whaling could not be enforced on Greenland due to the latter’s withdrawal from the EU and hence its independent status. In a sense, EU “empire-ness” can seem moderate or even invisible. However, even if it is moderate or invisible, EU “empire-ness” cannot be ignored. For this reason, I believe the issue of Greenland’s whaling is an appropriate case for determining the influence of the EU as a regulatory empire.


Summary

To sum up this paper’s main points:

- 1) The EU Environment Council designates whale protection as a “common position”.
- 2) Legal binding power is generated for EU member states.
- 3) The EU as a regulatory empire, acting as “one block”, exercises whale protection regulation outside its borders and Greenland (which withdrew from the EC in 1985) accepts this EU regulation.
- 4) EU regulation on whale protection is reflected back on the EU member Denmark because Greenland is part of the Danish Realm, *Rigsfællesskabet*.

⁴ Poll results offered by Ole Samsing, Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Udenrigsministeriet). (September 4, 2009).

Figure 2: Summary



Concluding remarks

As can be seen here, it would indeed seem that the influence of the EU as a regulatory empire is also exercised within the EU itself. This kind of EU regulatory empire-ness would enhance our understanding of the present EU. EU respects self-determination, uses discourse of universal values and norms and leaves each member state to take action to comply with EU rules and regulations because the acceptance of these rules and regulations would promote national and universal interests. Given the nature of these universal values and norms it is difficult for member states to reject or avoid them. This factor represents the specific characteristics and actual conditions of the present EU. Consequently, the EU member state Denmark is strengthened in terms of its legal influence in the region while at the same time, because of the existence of Greenland, it is influenced by the EU as a regulatory empire in respect of the whaling issue (more specifically, EU regulation is reflected back to the EU member state Denmark because Greenland is part of the Danish Realm). Greenland has shown its distrust of the EU as a regulatory body (this distrust is embodied in Greenland's withdrawal from the EU and its subsequent independent status). However, it can be said that, despite its independent status, Greenland is placed in a situation where it experiences the predominant influence of the EU as a regulatory empire.

This kind of situation appears not only in Denmark/Greenland, but needless to say also in other member states, as for instance with regards to environmental issues and capital punishment. Therefore, further thought needs to be given to assess how this particular characteristic of the EU could be linked to the problem of EU political validity. In this respect, the June 2008 protection of whales as a common position, in itself calls for a re-examination of the EU's

concept of flexibility and calls for a re-examination of the EU's future ability to have a single decision-making framework. In addition to this re-examination, the EU will have to consider how to maintain its own validity and its own influence, because the EU framework of governance is closely linked to the problem of future political validity of EU member states.

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Soft Power: A Motive for Japan's Foreign Aid Policy towards Uzbekistan

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This article aims to give a short description of Japan's foreign aid policy in order to discuss soft power and its concept as a motive for a donor's (specifically Japan) offering aid.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the main channel of Japan's foreign aid and one of the most important components of Japan's Foreign Policy. The main part of Japanese aid is directed to Asia, a region with a close relationship to Japan and which can have a major impact on Japan's stability and prosperity. The objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity.

In order to facilitate the transition from planned economies to market economies, Japan provides assistance focusing on the establishment of legal institutions for establishing the rule of law, human resources development for shifting to a market-based economy, and infrastructure development for promoting economic development in the countries of Central Asia.

Chart III-15. Japan's Assistance in the Central Asia and the Caucasus Region



2007 (calendar year)

(Net disbursement basis, unit: US\$ Million)

2007 (calendar year)		Grants				Loan aid			
Rank	Country or region	Grant aid		Technical cooperation	Total	Amount disbursement	Amount received	Total	Total
			Grants provided through multilateral institutions						
1	Armenia	0.08	—	1.46	1.54	83.68	—	83.68	85.23
2	Uzbekistan	6.25	—	8.75	15.00	55.29	13.97	41.32	56.32
3	Kazakhstan	0.94	—	7.31	8.25	47.14	12.08	35.05	43.31
4	Kyrgyz Republic	5.53	—	7.98	13.51	2.18	—	2.18	15.68
5	Azerbaijan	7.68	—	1.02	8.70	2.66	—	2.66	11.36
6	Tajikistan	4.78	—	4.65	9.43	—	—	—	9.43
7	Georgia	0.94	0.08	1.89	2.83	4.18	—	4.18	7.01
8	Turkmenistan	—	—	0.38	0.38	—	0.93	-0.93	-0.54
	Multiple countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus	—	—	0.37	0.37	—	—	—	0.37
Central Asia and the Caucasus region total		26.21	0.08	33.81	60.01	195.12	26.98	168.14	228.15

Notes: (1) Region classifications are determined by MOFA.

(2) Due to rounding, the total figure may not match the individual parts.

Source: Japan's Official Development Assistance, *White Paper 2008*, Japan's International Cooperation, retrieved 12 November, 2008, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2008/ODA2008/html/honpen/index.htm>

The Japanese government is quite active in promoting Japan amongst Uzbekistani people. With respect to assistance for the establishment of legal institutions, there is a variety of technical cooperation for improving civil codes and administrative laws in Uzbekistan. With respect to infrastructure development, Japan has heretofore assisted in the development of roads, airports, and railroads. A Human Resources Development Centre (Japan Centre) has been established in Uzbekistan as a base for human resource-development assistance. Experts are dispatched to this centre from Japan to offer business courses as well as Japanese language lessons so as to share Japan's experiences with Uzbekistani people who contribute to develop human resources that can respond to the introduction of a market economy in the region. Japan also accepts at its own expense exchange students from Uzbekistan (like Monbukagakusyou, Jusso and other programs between universities) who could in the future play a key role in future nation-building.

However, this article will focus on the motivations that power the extensiveness of Japan's aid towards Uzbekistan. The term soft power plays a vital role here and will serve as a theoretical framework of the research.

The term *soft power* was introduced in 1989 by Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. with regard to the policy-making of the USA, however this concept can most probably be applied to the policy-making of other countries. In this work the term soft power is used regarding Japan's foreign policy towards Uzbekistan and it will be assumed that the Japanese state plays a key role in the promotion of Japan's soft power in Uzbekistan. In my definition, soft power is a sort of power which helps obtain a desired result through attraction rather than through coercion or payment. Of the three ways to affect others' behaviour – coercion, inducement, and attraction – Nye used the term soft power for the third. The soft power of a country “rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”.¹ It can be found in culture, economic resources and even sometimes in military resources. However regarding culture, a distinction must be made between cultural resources and the behaviour of attractions. For example, the popularity of the Pokemon games does not assure that Japan will get the policy outcome it wishes.

Historically, after WWII, Japan was put in a position where it had to rely on soft power more than other countries. Because Japan came off a long recession in the 1990s and has been constrained by a “peculiar culture of anti-militarism”, casting foreign policy in terms of soft power appeals greatly to policy makers eager to raise Japan's status in world affairs. This might be the reason why Japan is one of the biggest ODA donors in present times.

My research is not finished yet, but some preliminary findings point towards some possible reasons for Japan's interest in Uzbekistan. First of all, geopolitical interest. Due to its bordering on all Central Asian republics and its close location to Russia and China, Uzbekistan occupies a geopolitically vital place at the center of the Eurasian continent. Hence, Uzbekistan can serve as a “buffer region for the maintenance of peace”,² the balance of power and stability in eastern Eurasia. Therefore, Japan's presence there, “would be a good diplomatic asset for Japan”.³

¹ Nye (2004: 11).

² Len, Uyama and Hirose (2008: 36).

³ *ibid.*: 17.

Equally important is Japan's particular interest in Uzbekistan's energy and gas resources, and also a pro-Japanese view of Japan may provide Japan with an extra supportive vote in the United Nations Organisation (UNO) in its bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.⁴

Thus, it can be said that Japan's soft power amongst Uzbekistani people is increasing over time. With the political initiative of "Central Asia plus Japan" there is an increasing number of Japan-Uzbekistan projects in economic, social, educational spheres and people who have experienced life in Japan, etc. In other words, as Kawato Akio noticed regarding Central Asia, this is now a region with "prevalent pro-Japanese attitudes".⁵

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"Uzbek President Islam Karimov has expressed interest in supporting Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council ..."

⁵ Len, Uyama and Hirose (2008: 27).

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FORUM EVALUATIONS

General Summary

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The 2nd Slovenia Japan University Cooperation Network Graduate Student Forum was held at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, on October 20th and 21st, 2009. Thirteen graduate students of different nationalities participated: six Slovenes from the University of Ljubljana, one Chinese and two Koreans, and four Japanese, from the Universities of Gunma, Tokyo Foreign Studies and Tsukuba respectively. English language was the medium of communication of the Forum.

The opening address was given by Professor Valentin Bucik, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. The presentation programme of the first day was divided into the following three sessions:

- Session 1: The Concept of Nation and the Individual
- Session 2: Governance and Flexibility
- Session 3: Language, Ideology, and Identity

In each session, contributors from a wide range of differing domains discussed their research and the problems they encountered, often concluding with questions to the audience. This generated a lively exchange and led to themes for discussion on the second day.

For the parallel discussions of the second day many participants desired to discuss across the session themes, the organizers, therefore, decided to regroup into two rather than three parallel discussion sessions. This is why the reports on presentations and discussions look a little confusing. However, the regrouping allowed for a greater flexibility and effectively contributed to an active and friendly exchange on the various discussion themes. Detailed reports of the discussion sessions and projects for further research were presented in a final collective session in the presence of his Excellency Mr. Shigeharu Maruyama, the Ambassador of Japan to Slovenia.

We were very glad to see the conference room full of undergraduate students from the University of Ljubljana and Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. They were very much interested in our event and gave us some interesting feedback on the Forum, its theme and its future development. We were very happy too to receive Forum evaluations from two of these students, each representing their respective group. The evaluations are given after this summary. On the other hand, however, it was great a pity that for unavoidable reasons some applicants could not attend the Forum, we missed both them and their research themes.

All the participants spent several months not only in preparing their presentations but also in working on the organization of the Forum. We should perhaps have included a report on the preparation process, but this was rather difficult to collate as in almost all cases, each participant only knew of his or her own sphere of work. Eventually, we hope the students, with the appropriate support of course, will be able to handle the organization process by themselves. We will probably need to re-evaluate our organization process in the future.

Finally, on behalf of all the participants and the organizing committee, Nataša and Luka for Slovenia and myself for Japan, we would like to thank Professor Andrej Bekeš and Professor Saburo Aoki who proposed this series of forums, Professor Valentin Bucik who gave us his full administrative support, Professor Yuichi Sunakawa, Professor Shinji Yamamoto, Professor Jelisava Sethna, Professor Hiroko Sawada, and Ms. Vivian Nobes who supported the participants from Japan in every respect. We hope that as the Forum series develops, it will contribute towards furthering academic exchange between Slovenia and Japan, as within the larger context of Europe and Asia.

Presentation Summary and Opinions

Mihael ŠINKOVEC
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The 2nd Slovenia Japan University Cooperation Network Graduate Student Forum, titled *Living with Diversity*, took place on the 20th and 21st of October 2009 at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. It was sponsored by the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana and IFERI Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba. There, speakers from Japan, Slovenia, China and South Korea presented their chosen topics in three sessions of lectures.

The first session was titled *The Concept of Nation and the Individual*, the second *Governance and Flexibility* and the third *Language, Ideology and Identity*. I attended the first and last sessions; and will summarize the presentations of the first session and add my own opinion at the end of every summary.

The first session started with a subject titled *The Culture of Tea in China and Japan as a Medium of Cultural Exchange* by Jia Chai. The purpose of this study was the promotion of cultural exchange between countries through an understanding of the history and the spirit of Eastern and Western tea culture. Also Chai wanted to show how tea as a symbol of Asian life can be a useful and effective tool in bridging the cultures of the East and the West, as well as those of China and Japan. Tea thus represents not only the natural world as understood in Eastern tradition but also the daily life of common people, and in such way unites different people and nations through the whole Asian continent and reminds us of the bonds created between them through the centuries.

Jia Chai also presented the evolution of tea culture which started in China where it developed into the tea art *Cha Do*. Later on, this form of tea culture was taken by the Japanese people who developed it into their own tea ceremony tradition. Over time differences appeared between these two tea cultures. The Japanese tea ceremony became a high form of art, designed mostly for learning etiquette, with deep spiritual meaning. Great emphasis is put on the search for harmony, purity, respect and tranquility. Tea ceremony became especially important after the Second World War, when the influence of the West intensified in Japan and there was a danger of the Japanese losing their tradition and culture. Tea ceremony

reminded the Japanese people of their own culture and traditions, preserving them through its practice. In China however tea culture is meant more for pleasure and everyday needs for relaxation. Asian culture and tradition were presented to the West through the book titled *Book of Tea* written by a Japanese scholar Kakuzo Okakura.

I believe that in today's world, tea culture could aid in bridging cultural obstacles as it enables a pleasant form of personal way of associating with others and in this fast world a much needed space for relaxation. Furthermore the traditional Japanese tea ceremony could contribute in the search of one's inner balance and peace as it can be used as a form of meditation. I believe that tea culture could be especially successful in initial contacts between cultures because of its simplicity and its spread in a variety of forms throughout the world.

The session was continued by Moe Noda with the theme titled *Crisis of Identity: A study of Tarchetti's work and the Doppelgänger motif*. Moe presented an Italian novelist Iginio Ugo Tarchetti (1839-1869), the first author in Italy to write fantasy novels. He lived in the Risorgimento period, the Italian independence war. He wrote many antiwar novels and was a typical representative of the Scapigliatura School which was a movement animated by a spirit of rebellion against traditional religion and culture. He also wrote fantasy stories centered on the spiritual world and para-psychological phenomena.

As we can see from the title, Moe Noda focused on works depicting the para-psychological phenomena called the Doppelgänger. We can find two different types of Doppelgänger in Tarchetti's work. The first one is separated from the body and the second one is inside the body. For the first group Moe Noda presented the *Story about a Leg*, in which a man is forced to amputate his leg and is later haunted by the manifestation of the said leg. The spirit of the leg tries to force the man to reattach his lost leg which would mean death for the man. For the other group Moe Noda presented the story of *A Spirit in a Raspberry*. One of the more famous motifs of the inner Doppelgänger is the novel *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, written by Robert Louis Stevenson.

What is a Doppelgänger then? Moe Noda explains that a Doppelgänger was at first some soul, spirit or inner replica of every man, usually appearing as a bird or a beast, representing a mischief maker. Later on, however this idea turned into a representation of danger and destruction. Moe Noda further explains that a Doppelgänger represents an unclear and indefinable existence of a being that wanders between life and death, seeking completeness and the return of a being into one whole, meaning it strives towards death.

The Doppelgänger motif does not necessarily appear only on a personal level, but also on a national level. In Tarchetti's time, Italy was divided between many small, strong regions that, in search of national identity and striving for completeness, fought one another in order to achieve dominance of a viewpoint which would later become the national identity. A similar phenomenon happened in Japan in the 19th century after the end of Japan's isolation and its early contacts with Western culture which "forced" itself onto traditional Japanese culture, thus creating a rift among Japanese people. Japan divided into two opposing sides, those supporting the emperor and his acceptance of Western culture (Doppelgänger) and those who wished to stay loyal to tradition. In the struggle to become united there is battle and much death before one side wins and restores balance again. Again a similar phenomenon happened in Slovenia at the time of the Second World War and the period immediately following it when two opposing sides emerged; the partisans and the home-militia. Both strove for the same goal – freedom, however they chose different ways to achieve this (the nation divided itself) which later, in the aspiration for a common identity, led to much massacre.

As on the national level, this phenomenon can be observed at the personal level as well, when striving after identity often leads to rifts between different views, different ways..., which later leads to a split person in the same manner as a split nation. In this division all still strive to become one whole again, still strive after harmony and balance. However, because of the wish for dominance of one side over the other this often leads to issues or problems that can result in an even greater crisis or even greater loss of a part of oneself, part of a nation, tradition. Therefore it is necessary when trying to repair the rift that we find a middle way which minimizes the loss and damage and does not make things worse.

The third speaker in the first session was Hideaki Matsumoto with his theme titled *Identity: the Individual and the Group*. The main subjects of this topic were the forming of identity and interrelation between an individual and his environment during the process of forming the idea of identity. Matsumoto approached this topic through Berlin's study of Herder. Berlin's study of Herder clearly shows the view of belonging; what it means to belong to a certain group. When explaining the nature of affiliation to a group Matsumoto refers to Berlin's concept of 'populism'.

The group as an environment exerts influence on the individual and co-shapes his individual identity and at the same time the individual helps to co-shape his environment (group) with his identity. Individuals can create two kinds of bonds in a group. The first one is populism, the natural bond, and is patriotically directed. It is created within groups with similar interests.

Such a group allows free expression of an individual's views, emotions, and perceptions and is not aggressive. When forming a natural identity, it is important that the group and the individual be given the possibility of self-expression, as with expression culture is formed, which in turn shapes the group.

The second bond that can form within a group is nationalism. This is an artificially created relationship based on politics and strives after only one given goal. Here, expression is prevented and the individual is oppressed and crushed. Artificially created identity is forced onto the individual, destroying any diversity. This relationship is based on aggression and is a distortion of the natural relationship.

When populism is faced with an "enemy", as some other group that is seen as a threat or invasion to their environment or when there is a crisis in an environment, populism can easily change into nationalism. A visible example of nationalism is communism in China, where, after Mao Zedong took over political authority and carried out his Cultural Revolution, all free expression and diversity was crushed, and free and critical thinking was marked as dangerous and persecuted. People were forced to accept the concept of national identity as created by Mao Zedong.

Even in Europe populism often changes in weaker forms of nationalism when we turn against "inner enemies", national identity is threatened due to large migrations of foreigners which become minorities and further the influence of their own culture (food, music ...) onto the autochthonous culture. The most visible examples are France and the USA. Foreign cultures become a threat when they start to force representation of their cultures and national identity. Therefore diversity can only exist when one nation's culture is not threatened of suffocation by another nation's culture.

The last theme but one in the first session, presented by Klemen Senica, was titled *Krste Petkov Misirkov and Macedonian national identity*. Senica presented the Macedonian intellectual Krste Petkov Misirkov and his role in the creation of what is known today as Macedonian national identity. In 1903, his most famous book *Za Makedonckite Raboti (On Macedonian Matters)* was published. This was the first written document that clearly asserted Macedonia's own national identity. Therefore the book was forbidden and was almost unknown until after the Second World War. Even though this book represents the beginning of the Macedonian state, political elites in the former Yugoslav republic still do not recognize the importance of this work.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, there were two countries, Serbia and Bulgaria, which tried to claim Macedonian territory. However the Macedonians managed to create their own unique identity and later on their own sovereign country despite the partition of their people and territory, which shows the strength and the bonds of the people that made it possible.

Last in the first session was Nataša Visočnik, who spoke about the topic titled *Cultural diversity in the modern state with regards to Slovenia and Japan*. Is diversity in today's world a utopia? The world in this present age is changing really fast, borders are opening, there are exchanges of economical and political ideas, and so on. We need to realize that we are entering a new age of ethnicity in which we are exposed in daily life to new social situations with more and more foreign people and things, ranging from foods and lifestyle to arts and information. Diversity and consequently social and linguistic plurality is essential for our social and intellectual survival. Therefore, according to Nataša Visočnik, in diversity we can find impetus for creativity, challenges, exchange and sustained life.

People from different social and historical experiences have the right to autonomy and material goods. However, social environments where diversity is great can succumb faster to problems and situations which form under the influence of many cultures growing one beside another and require more and more space to evolve. A question arises: is it possible to achieve perfect and complete diversity? It is quite possible that under such circumstances, when perfect and complete diversity are achieved, that the national identity of the primary nation would disappear, and all that would be left would be identities of individuals and minorities.

I believe that what is needed here is *aurea mediocritas* – the golden middle, which would allow diversity to a point, where the minorities with their cultures would not supersede the primary culture and they would not force themselves onto the autochthonous people. However, strong legislation covering minority issues would be needed in order not to deprive the minorities of their right to express their culture.

In spite of the fact that diversity enriches us, there is still a need for some fundamental national community which manages national affairs; and minorities should adapt to this community to the point where they can efficiently function (politically, legally, etc.) but at the same time where they can still preserve their own traditions and culture. With great diversity, great tolerance is also required, of which I believe we are still in lack of. Through education and a gradual change in social and legal systems, diversity could be increased further, but not to the point where certain cultural elements would start to disappear.

This forum opened many up-to-date questions about the identity and culture of an individual and a nation, on preserving them and about the diversity of cultures and bridging the differences between them. All these are topics that we do not think about or discuss enough but which are extremely important for our cultural and social evolution and existence, as it is these issues that often tend to cause the not so little rifts and disputes between different individuals and nations.

Living with Diversity: The Importance of Accepting Others

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First of all, I would like to thank Atsushi TOBE from the University of Tsukuba and Professor Shinji YAMAMOTO of my university who invited us three students at present studying in Italy to this special forum. I am not a graduate student and I had never studied about Slovenia, but this forum absolutely opened my mind and gave me much to think about. I could also meet many fantastic people. It was a great opportunity for me, although I did not do anything but take photographs.

Living with Diversity, the theme of this forum, was so difficult, even for our small group. During the discussions I could see the real difficulty of accepting ideas that are different from our own. It made me think that we have to accept others who have different ideas from our own and we have to take our images of each other to a higher place together. It is so simple but so difficult to realize in our lives, but we should try harder.

Thank you everybody and I hope to meet you soon.