

CHAPTER 8

**Defining and Redefining
Svalakṣaṇa: Dharmakīrti's
Concept and its Tibetan
Modification**

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Recent contributions to the Tibetan development of Buddhist philosophical systems have attracted considerable attention, not only because of their significant results but also because of their methodological consciousness that any intellectual tradition must be examined in light of its historical and cultural circumstances. Continuity and discontinuity of thought as well as the characteristics of Tibetan interpretations first become clear through a thorough investigation of both Indian and Tibetan traditions, and yet the significance of individual thought is finally to be considered in its contemporary context. In this respect, the latest studies of the Tibetan development of Dharmakīrti's (7c.) epistemology were most successful in indicating the consistency and inconsistency of Tibetan interpretations with Dharmakīrti's original ideas.¹ Special attention has been paid to the originality of dGe lugs pa thinkers. They indeed made several theoretical modifications to, reinterpretations and reevaluations of Indian original thought, especially with regard to logicoepistemological

issues in both major fields of Buddhist philosophy, viz., the Madhyamaka system and that of Dharmakīrti.² In order to gain a clear picture of the dGe lugs pa position on these Buddhist philosophical systems, we have attempted to reveal what might actually underlie their problematic commitments to traditional teachings, i.e., to reveal its historical background, probable textual sources, possible misinterpretations and wrong transmissions of text, as well as particular aims and motivations they may have had in mind.

The present paper too is an attempt to clarify the way dGe lugs pa scholars redefined the concept *svalakṣaṇa* (*rang mtshan*) and to specify the reasons for this redefinition on the basis of the writings by the three main figures from the earlier period of the school, i.e., Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357-1419), rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po. (1385-1438).³ I also wish to consider the question of how Dharmakīrti and these Tibetan thinkers understood the meaning of the individuality and reality of existents under the concept of *svalakṣaṇa*, since defining *svalakṣaṇa* is none other than defining what an individual and real entity is. Through the following discussion, one will see that both Dharmakīrti and the dGe lugs pa thinkers define *svalakṣaṇa* not in isolation from, but in complete accordance with, their respective considerations of relating philosophical issues. As for the dGe lugs pa, however, it can be said that they aimed to comprehend such fundamental concepts as *svalakṣaṇa* from a wider perspective, namely they tried to formulate a version of individuality and reality which holds true not only for the Sautrāntika tradition of Dharmakīrti but for Buddhist philosophical systems in general, including Madhyamaka. I would like to focus on this point in the last part of the paper.

1. Dharmakīrti on *svalakṣaṇa*

Little needs to be said about the considerable significance of the term *svalakṣaṇa* which literally means 'own characteristic', and comes down to term for 'particular' or 'individual'. *Svalakṣaṇa* is characterized by Dignāga (6c.) as the object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), i.e., the object of a cognition which is free of conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*).⁴ Dharmakīrti added to this epistemological notion a clear ontological ground by

identifying it with that which has causal efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*, *arthakriyāsakti*. *don byed nus pa*), that is, an ability to produce an effect. He explicitly defines this alone (*eva*) as ultimately existent (*paramārthasat*) or as a real entity (*vastu*), in contrast to the 'universal' or 'common characteristic' (*sāmānya* or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). The latter, in contrast to *svalakṣaṇa*, refers to the object of conception or of words that lacks causal efficacy and hence is considered to be merely conventional and unreal.⁵ We may be able to give the broad outlines of the development of the idea from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti, or from the epistemological to the ontological characterization of *svalakṣaṇa*, as follows: The fact that a thing is actually perceived by someone, sometime and somewhere indicates that this thing exists at that moment at that place, unless this perception is proven to be false by someone else. Since this thing causes a direct perception of its own image, it is admitted to be causally efficacious. Furthermore, this thing must be allowed to be real, for unreal things such as a horn of a rabbit or an abstract concept like 'eternity' cannot cause any direct perception. In other words, the arising of a direct perception should properly presuppose the presence of something real as its object. Hence the object of direct perception proves to be existent in reality. In this way, a *svalakṣaṇa* to be cognized by a direct perception can be identified as a real entity.

The term *svalakṣaṇa*, as opposed to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* or common characteristic, entails from the beginning that the phenomenon is individual, unique and distinct. Dignāga's description of *svalakṣaṇa* as the object of direct perception may well reflect the idea that *svalakṣaṇa* is a substantially individual thing, since it is the function of perception to make substantial distinctions among its objects. To this extent, one could also say that *svalakṣaṇa* is a spatiotemporally individual and unique occurrence, which necessarily occupies a certain location in space and time, in contrast to a merely imagined object. The more strict spatiotemporal qualification of *svalakṣaṇa* can be derived from Dharmakīrti's definition of a real existent as having causal efficacy, if this qualification is linked to the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), viz., that whatever is existent in reality is exclusively momentary.⁶ It is theoretically consistent to interpret *svalakṣaṇa* as a unique and single phenomenon that occurs and disappears every single

moment, since *svalakṣaṇa* is a real existent to be defined as that which has causal efficacy, although such a momentary thing is far beyond the range of perceptual object.

Besides *svalakṣaṇa* being distinguished the one from the other in virtue of their distinct substances, we can also understand from the literal sense of the word that *svalakṣaṇas* are known to be unique because of their characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*). Although it is beyond the function of perception to specify the features of an entity as, for instance, being a pot, being gold, being round, and so on, these kinds of unique features of one *svalakṣaṇa* can be perceived through its image as a whole and help to differentiate this *svalakṣaṇa* from other *svalakṣaṇas*. Theoretically speaking, such a distinction of *svalakṣaṇa* by its nature too is grounded in its causal efficacy, because, according to Dharmakīrti, the difference of nature consists in the difference of causal efficacy⁷ in the following manner: a *svalakṣaṇa* is known as individual and unique by its essential nature (*svabhāva*), since the essential nature of a real entity is determined by a particular ability of its cause to produce this entity, and this entity in turn arises being endowed with a particular ability that is its essential nature.⁸ Thus considered, it may be proper to say that Dharmakīrti's identification of *svalakṣaṇa* as that which has causal efficacy provides a clear theoretical ground for both the reality and the individuality of the entity that is defined by Dignāga as the object of direct perception.

2. The dGe lugs pa on rang mtshan

The dGe lugs pa thinkers formulated the definition of *rang mtshan* according to their own interpretation of individuals and real entities. Let us look at the following definition, which mKhas grub proposes for *rang mtshan*, still claiming it to reflect a Sautrāntika position:

“In their own system [of the Sautrāntika], the definition of *rang mtshan* is the thing (*dnegos po*) which consists (*gnas*), not being conceptually imposed, but from its own side [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature (*rang bzhin*) uncommon [with other things].”⁹

Neither the object of perception nor causal efficacy is men-

tioned here as the definiens or the defining characteristic. Nor is it possible to interpret the phrase ‘consisting in its essential nature’ as implying ‘consisting in its own causal efficacy’ and the phrase ‘not being conceptually imposed’ as implying ‘being directly perceived’, once one takes account of the views peculiar to the dGe lugs pa with regard to *rang mtshan* and *spyi*.

One should first recall the dGe lugs pa position that *rang mtshan* is identical with a real existent which has causal efficacy (*don byed nus pa*), but not only *rang mtshan* is counted as real, nor is it determined for the object of direct perception alone, for they maintain that there exist real universals (*sāmānya, spyi*),¹⁰ and that a *rang mtshan* appears in a conceptual cognition. Even it is not contradictory that one and the same thing is *rang mtshan* as well as universal (*spyi*) in its different aspects. They are not opposing notions but are relative. A pot, for instance, is a particular (*rang mtshan*) in relation to its property of being impermanent (*anitya, mi rtag pa*), but at the same time it is a universal as well in relation to its individuations, since the property of being a pot is common to all kinds of pots such as golden pots, silver pots, copper pots, and the like.¹¹ Under this condition, the dichotomy between *rang mtshan* and *spyi* according to whether it is real or unreal, or whether it is cognized by direct perception or conceptual cognition is on no account conducive to clarifying the dGe lugs pa idea of individuality and reality.

Nor can causal efficacy define the reality of *rang mtshan*. Although the dGe lugs pas accept the concepts ‘that which has causal efficacy’, ‘that which is ultimately existent’ and ‘*rang mtshan*’ as synonyms in accordance with the statement of *Pramāṇavārttika* III 3, they explicitly note that neither causal efficacy nor *rang mtshan* is taught by Dharmakīrti as a definiens or a defining characteristic of ultimate reality, but just as an instance of those which are to be defined as such (*mtshan gzhi*).¹² That is to say, whatever is ‘that which has causal efficacy’ or ‘*rang mtshan*’ is a real entity, but it is not just this alone that is ultimately real, since there are universals that exist in reality. Yet the dGe lugs pas maintain that the individuality of *rang mtshan* in the sense of ‘consisting in its essential nature’ is grounded in reality, as suggested in the aforementioned mKhas grub's definition of *rang mtshan*, for the notion of ‘not being

conceptually imposed but from its own side' is adopted as the defining characteristic of ultimate reality (*don dam bden pa, parmārthasatya*) by Tsong kha pa:

"The definition of ultimate reality is that which is not merely conceptually imposed (*rtog pas btags pa*), but established from the side of the object itself (*yul rang gi ngos nas*)."¹³

A *rang mtshan* is a real existent insofar as it meets this condition. In the same way, the *rang mtshan* is established as an individual insofar as it is intrinsically abiding in its essential nature. The essential nature is, however, not necessarily confined to causal efficacy, since mKhas grub propounds the aforementioned definition of *rang mtshan*, after having denied causal efficacy together with the spatiotemporal uniqueness as being the defining characteristics of *rang mtshan*, by saying:

"Such definitions of *rang mtshan* on which others insist as that which exists, without sharing (*ma 'dres par*) place, time and essential nature (*yul dus rang bzhin*) [with other things] and that which is causally efficacious are unacceptable."¹⁴

Neither substantial individuality nor causal efficacy is the definiens of *rang mtshan* either.¹⁵ The uncommonness of essential nature is rejected here just because, in my conjecture, it lacks the qualification of being intrinsic (i.e., *rang ngos nas mthun mong ma yin pa'i rang bzhin du gnas pa*) in contrast to mKhas grub's own definition, for, as will be discussed below, the non-intrinsic or conventional uncommonness of essential nature is also accepted by those who refuse the real existence of *rang mtshan*. Accordingly, for the dGe lugs pas, *rang mtshan* is an entity that is individual and unique in reality solely because of the intrinsic abiding in its essential nature.

What then is the essential nature that determines a thing as an individual or *rang mtshan*? Let us consider this question with the example of 'golden pot' (*gser bum*), which the dGe lugs pas use for *rang mtshan* when explaining the theory that a *rang mtshan* appears to a conceptual cognition.¹⁶ Since we have closely analyzed this problematic presentation in our previous studies,¹⁷ I would just like to reconsider what it means to say that 'golden pot' is an example of *rang mtshan*.

First, one should note that such an example of *svalakṣana* would not be acceptable to Dharmakīrti. Even not appealing to the theory of momentariness, the word 'golden pot' (*gser bum*) cannot directly refer to any substantially individual entity, which is the object of direct perception, but according to the *apoha* theory it solely refers to the universal. For the dGe lugs pa thinkers, however, 'golden pot' is an example of a particular (*rang mtshan*), and 'pot' is a universal (*spyi*). In Tibetan, this example is always simply given as 'golden pot', i.e., 'golden pot', which is not accompanied by a demonstrative pronoun, nor by an indefinite article, nor by a suffix designating the plural. That is, neither 'this or that golden pot' (*gser bum di/ de*), nor 'some golden pot' (*gser bum zhig*), nor 'golden pots' (*gser bum rnams/ dag*) is specifically intended. Since the Tibetan language has no definite articles and only rarely use the indefinite *zhig*, the expression 'golden pot' signifies either a golden pot or the golden pot in the sense of a generic singular (viz., a golden pot or the golden pot in general), which is to be cognized as such by its properties of being a pot and being gold. These properties are, on one hand, essential characteristics of a golden pot, whereby a golden pot is distinguished from other things such as silver pots, copper pots, glasses, tables, and so on. On the other hand, they are also common properties to all golden pots, viz., 18-carat golden pots, gold-plated golden pots, small golden pots, big golden pots, and so on. That is to say, any individuation or differentiation among individual golden pots is not, and cannot be, indicated by the expression 'golden pot'. The fact that this example is nevertheless repeatedly applied to *rang mtshan* means that it completely meets the conditions of *rang mtshan* for the dGe lugs pa. That is to say, a golden pot consists in the essential nature of being a pot and being gold from its own side independent of any conceptual construction. To sum up, the essential nature in perspective of the dGe lugs pa does not actually differ from common properties, which are identical with real universals to be signified by generic concepts.

Despite the fact that their understanding of *rang mtshan* obviously deviates from that of Dharmakīrti, the dGe lugs pa scholars seem to have formulated such an idea of essential nature on the basis of Dharmakīrti's own words in *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40. It is even not far from the truth to speculate that mKhas grub's

definition cited previously is a modification of *Prāmāṇavārttika* I 40. Let us compare them with each other:

Prāmāṇavārttika I 40) "Since all things (*sarvabhāva*) by nature consist in their respective essential nature (*svabhāva*), they are distinguished from their homogeneous and heterogeneous [things]."¹⁸

(mKhas grub's definition) "The definition of *rang mtshan* is the thing (*dnegos po*) which consists (*gnas*), not being conceptually imposed, but from its own side [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature (*rang bzhin*) uncommon [with other things]."

The similarity in expression is evident. Taking the subject of *Prāmāṇavārttika* I 40, 'all things' (*sarvabhāva*), to be identical with *svalakṣaṇas* in the sense of real existents,¹⁹ the dGe lugs pa interpreters understand this verse to be intended to teach the mode of existence of real entities (*dnegos po'i gnas lugs*).²⁰ In this regard, it seems reasonable to assume that they took this verse to describe the essential characteristic of *svalakṣaṇa* and adapted it to their own definition of *rang mtshan*. To conclude this section, I would like to propose the following tentative illustration of *Prāmāṇavārttika* I 40 with the example of 'golden pot' in accordance with the dGe lugs pa interpretation: "The *svalakṣaṇa* such as a golden pot consists in its essential nature of being a pot, being gold, being impermanent, and so on. Therefore it is different from such homogeneous things as a silver pot as well as from such heterogeneous things as a table, space, etc."²¹ So would the verse be elucidated by the dGe lugs pas.

3. Reasons for redefining *svalakṣaṇa*

From the theoretical point of view, the dGe lugs pa interpretation of *svalakṣaṇa* apparently goes beyond the range of sound interpretation. It is not exaggerated to regard it as a systematic revision of the Sautrāntika doctrine. This revision is, however, certainly an outcome of various external and internal factors. Such a realistic position as the dGe lugs pa thinkers have is actually considered to have originated with some Indian scholars and have been carried over by Tibetan gSang phu tradition.²² The lack of semantic interest may also be described as a general

tendency of this Tibetan scholastic tradition. Of course one should also clarify, in addition to this historical background, the theoretical grounds for the dGe lugs pas' redefinition of *svalakṣaṇa*. We will devote the last section of the present paper to this inquiry.

mKhas grub explains the reason for his rejection of causal efficacy as a defining characteristic of real entity as follows:

"The dBu ma thal 'gyur ba (i.e., the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika) maintains that *rang mtshan* is the main [subject] to be negated (*dgag bya*) through the logical reason (*rtags*) to investigate the ultimate [reality]. Accordingly, he maintains that the ultimate reality consists in the negation of that very concept (*don ldog*) of *rang mtshan* asserted by substantialists (*dnegos smra ba*). Hence, whatever is asserted by the substantialists as the very concept of *rang mtshan* is [none other than] that which the dBu ma thal 'gyur ba asserts to be unestablished as a [real] basis (*gzhi ma grub*) even according to verbal conventions (*tha snyad du yang*), for such [things] as that which [exists] not sharing (*ma 'dres pa*) place, time and essential nature [with other things], and that which is causally efficacious are, on the contrary, accepted by the dBu ma thal 'gyur ba too [according to verbal conventions]. Therefore, these [things] are the instances of that which is to be defined [as *rang mtshan*] (*mtshan gzhi*) but are not the definiens of *rang mtshan* here in the case (*skabs 'dir*) [in which the Sautrāntika tenet is treated]."²³

Insofar as *rang mtshan* is a real entity, the 'concept of *rang mtshan*' or the defining characteristic thereof must, on one hand, correspond to the condition of real existent, the establishment of which the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika refutes even conventionally. In other words, the concept of *rang mtshan* is, for the dGe lugs pas, from the beginning determined as the object of refutation (*dgag bya*) from the Madhyamaka point of view, since the core of the Madhyamaka ontology consists in negating such a substantial or real existent. On the other hand, the 'concept of *rang mtshan*' or the defining characteristic thereof may not correspond to that which the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika accepts on the conventional level, for, supposing that such a thing be the defining characteristic of *rang mtshan*, it would follow that the

rang mtshan itself must be conventionally accepted by the Mādhyamika too, which, however, contradicts his position in which the real existence of *rang mtshan* is not acknowledged, neither ultimately nor conventionally. Moreover, it is also an important thesis for the dGe lugs pas that, in the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system, all causal relations as well as causal efficacy are conventionally established. Hence the dGe lugs pas exclude causal efficacy from the defining characteristics of *rang mtshan* and ultimate reality.²⁴

In relation to these Madhyamaka positions, the dGe lugs pas evaluate the ontological views of other schools, viz., Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, as being substantialist, for the reason that the latter assert such substantial or real entities as being *vastu* (*dnogs po*) or *svalakṣaṇa* (*rang mtshan*), because they are 'not merely conceptually imposed but established from the side of the objects themselves' (*rtog pas btags pa tsam ma yin par yul rang gi ngos nas grub pa*).²⁵ In this manner, in order not only to include universals in the domain of real existents, but also to hold the consistency with the Madhyamaka ontology, the dGe lugs pas redefine even the most important concept of Dharmakīrti's tradition.

What the dGe lugs pa scholars thereby finally aimed at is, in my opinion, a systematization of the Buddhist philosophical teachings of the four main traditions, i.e., the Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka. For the dGe lugs pas, the question of what is a real entity or what is the reality should be answered not within the narrow scope of one tradition, but in a range of knowledge that extends over the entire historical development of Buddhist philosophy. In other words, the dGe lugs pas intended to connect the different systems, which had developed separately in different periods in India, by reinterpreting them systematically from one common perspective. What they actually did, however, is to reevaluate the teachings of other schools in light of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka of Candrakīrti (7c.), which they estimated as the highest among Buddhist philosophical systems.

This kind of attempt to systematize various philosophical thoughts in light of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka doctrine, indeed, can be seen in several discussions in the dGe lugs pa exegeses.²⁶ In its

historical aspect, it is to be considered as a result of the fact that Candrakīrti's system had won a certain popularity among Tibetan Buddhists by the period of Tsong kha pa. At the same time, however, this attempt in turn resulted in accelerating the reevaluation of Buddhist philosophical traditions in the eyes of Tibetan thinkers. Firmly bound to tradition, but also creative, Tibetans intensively engaged themselves in the development of Buddhist philosophy. It is a remarkable phenomenon in Tibetan intellectual history that they rediscovered and reinterpreted many Buddhist philosophical concepts. Redefining *svalakṣaṇa* is one of Tibetan challenges to the traditional system of Indian Buddhist philosophy. In this regard, it remains a fascinating task for us to discover and analyze their philosophical commitments and their underlying motives. In this fashion, we can better establish the significance of the Tibetan developments in the history of the transmission of Buddhist thought.

NOTES

1. Cf. e.g., Georges Dreyfus, "Universals in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism," in Sh. Ihara and Z. Yamaguchi (eds.), *Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Narita 1989*, Naritasan Shinshoji, 1992, vol. 1, pp. 29-46; Id. (ed. in collaboration with Sh. Onoda), *A Recent Rediscovery: Rgyal-tshab's Rigs gter rnam bshad, a Facsimile Reproduction of Rare Blockprint Edition*, Kyoto, 1994; Id., *Recognizing Reality, Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations*, Albany, 1997; Tom Tillemans, "On the So-called Difficult Point of the Apoha Theory," *Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques* 49-4, 1995, pp. 853-889; Chizuko Yoshimizu, "Tsoṅ kha pa on *don byed nus pa*" in E. Steinkellner et al. (eds.), *Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 7th International Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies Graz 1995*, Wien, 1997, Vol.2, pp. 1103-1120; Id., "Gelukuha ni yoru Kyōryōbu Gakusetsu Rikai (1) Nitaisetsu" (The dGe lugs pas' Interpretation of the Sautrāntika System (1): The Theory of the Two Kinds of Reality), *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 21, 1998, pp. 51-76; Id., "Pramāṇavārttika I 40 no kaishaku ni suite" (On the Interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40), *IBK* 47-2, 1999, pp. (97)-(101); Id., "*Dr̥ṣya* and *vikalpya* or *snang ba* and *btags pa* Associated in a Conceptual Cognition," in Sh. Katsura (ed.), *Proceedings of the 3rd International Dharmakīrti Conference, Hiroshima 1997*, Wien, 1999, pp. 459-474; and Id., "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2) Fuhen jitsuzai ron" (The dGe lugs pas' Interpretation of the Sautrāntika

- System (2) The Theory of Real Universals), *Bukkyō bunka kenkyū ronshū* (Studies of Buddhist Culture) 4, 2000, pp. 3-32.
2. As for the dGe lugs pa interpretation of Candrakīrti's negative position on the logical method to investigate reality, cf. e.g., Shirō Matsumoto, "Tsong kha pa no jiritsu ronshō hihan" (bTsong kha pa's Criticism of the Independent Argument), in Z. Yamaguchi (ed.), *Chibetto no bukkyō to shakai* (Buddhism and Society in Tibet), Tokyo, 1986, pp.475-508; David Seyfort Ruegg, *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy*, Part 1, Wien, 2000; Kōdō Yotsuya, *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsongkha-pa*, Stuttgart, 1999; Chizuko Yoshimizu, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Prāsāṅgika-Madhyamaka nach dem Tshig gsal ston thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bśad des 'Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa'i rdo rje*, Wien, 1996; and Id., "Tsong kha pa's Reevaluation of Candrakīrti's Criticism of Autonomous Inference," in G. Dreyfus and S. McClintock (eds.), *The Svatantrika-Prāsāṅgika Distinction, What Difference does a Difference Make?* Wisdom Publication 2002, pp. 257-288.
 3. This paper was presented at the University of Lausanne on the 26th of March, 2002, and originally written on the basis of my previous two Japanese articles, i.e., "Gelukuha ni yoru Kyōryōbu Gakusetsu Rikai (1)" and "(2)" as well as a German paper, "Das Individuelle und das Wirkliche bei den dGe lugs pa: Grundbegriffe buddhistischer Philosophie in tibetischer Modifizierung", read at the University of Munich on the 22nd of November 2001. For this revised version, I would like to thank Prof. Tom Tillemans for his valuable suggestions regarding both contents and English expressions.
 4. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti ad Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 2 (Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*. Cambridge, 1986, p.79 n.1.14): *na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ anyat prameyam asti. svalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ hi pratyakṣam sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ; Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 3c (Hattori, op.cit., p.82 n.1.25): *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham.*
 5. *Pramāṇavārttika* I 166abc and its *Svavṛtti* (in *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary, Text and Critical Notes* ed. by R. Gnoli, Rome 1960): *sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ. idam eva hi vastvavastuyor lakṣaṇaṃ yad arthakriyāyogyatā 'yogyatā ca.; Pramāṇavārttika* III 3 (in "Pramāṇavārttikakārikā, Sanskrit and Tibetan," ed. by Yūsho Miyasaka, *Acta Indologica* 2, pp.1-206): *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe //*
 6. Cf. e.g. *Pramāṇavārttika* I 269ab: *sattāmātrānubandhitvān nāśyānityatā dhvaneḥ; Hetubindu* (in *Dharmakīrtis Hetubinduḥ, Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text* ed. by E. Steinkellner, Wien 1967) 4*, 6f.: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve 'rthakriyāvirodhāt tattlakṣaṇaṃ*

- vastutvaṃ hīyate*. Regarding the theoretical link between impermanence and real existence in the proofs of momentariness, cf. e.g. E. Steinkellner, "Die Entwicklung des Kṣaṇikatvānumāna bei Dharmakīrti", *WZKS* 12/13 (1968-69), 1968, pp. 361-377; Chizuko Yoshimizu, "The Development of *sattvānumāna* from the Refutation of a Permanent Existent in the Sautrāntika Tradition", *WZKS* 43, 1999, pp.231-354; and Id., "Kōjō na mono wa naze munōryoku ka—Setsunametu ronshō no riron teki haikai (Why is a Permanent Thing Inefficacious?—The Theoretical Background of *kṣaṇikatvānumāna*)", *IBK* 48-1, 1999, pp. (196)-(200).
7. One may take *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40 (cited in n.18 below) to state the uniqueness of *svalakṣaṇa* in this sense, as the dGe lugs pas do, if one supposes that the subject of this verse (*sarvabhāva*) refers solely to *svalakṣaṇa*.
 8. Cf. E. Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti," *WZKS* 15, 1971, pp.179-211, p.183f., 188f. and Yoshimizu, "Kōjō na mono wa naze munōryoku ka", p. (197)f.
 9. *Yid kyi mun sel* (in mKhas grub rje's *gSung 'bum Tha*, lHa sa Zhol version) 2lb2f. (tr. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, p.117): *rang lugs la / rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid rlog pas btags pa min par rang ngos nas thun mong ma yin pa'i rang bzhin du gnas pa'i drugos po'o //* A similar description occurs in rGyal tshab's *Thar lam gsal byed* (in rGyal tshab rje's *gSung 'bum, Cha*, lHa sa Zhol version) 45b3f. with regard to the subject (i.e., *sarvabhāva*) of *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40 (see n.18 below), where rGyal tshab identifies as *rang mtshan* as 'the thing which consists, not being conceptually imposed but from its own side, in its essential nature uncommon [with other things]' (*rlog pas btags pa tsam min par rang bzhin gyis gzhan dang ma 'dres par rang gi ngo bo la gnas pa*, cf. Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2), p. 23).
 10. The dGe lugs pas differentiate *spyi* (*sāmānya*) from *spyi mtshan* (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). The latter signifies solely unreal, unconditioned and imagined object like space (*nam mkha'*, *ākāśa*). Cf. Tillemans, op.cit., p.865f., Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, p.181, and Yoshimizu, "Tsoñ kha pa on *don byed nus pa*", p. 1114 n. 39.
 11. As for the relation between *rang mtshan* and *spyi* for the dGe lugs pas, cf. e.g. *Yid kyi mun sel* 33a4 (tr. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, p.181 and Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2), p.15 n.19): *rang mtshan yin kyang rang gi gsal ba la rjes su 'gro byed pa'i spyi yin par mi 'gal zhing/* Cf. also Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, p.173ff. and note 16 below.
 12. Regarding the synonyms of *rang mtshan*, see the explanations by dGe lugs pas cited in Yoshimizu "Gelukuha ni yoru Kyōryōbu Gakusetsu Rikai-(1)", pp.58 and 63 n.9. As for their commitments to *Pramāṇavārttika*

- III 3, see *Thar lam gsal byed* 210b6f., *mNgon sum le'u t̄ik* (in *The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa* 22 of bKra shis lhun po version ed. by Ngawang Gelek Demo, New Delhi 1978) 17a5f., *Yid kyi mun sel* 44b 1 ff. (cited and translated in Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.65 n.14). Concerning the problematic Tibetan translation of *arthakriyāsamartham* in *Pramāṇavārttika* III 3 as *don dam don byed nus pa* and its interpretations, cf. e.g. *mNgon sum le'u t̄ik* 166b1-4, *Thar lam gsal byed* 211a3ff. and the references cited in Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.61 n.8. rGyal tshab states the opinion in his *Thar lam gsal byed* 211a3ff. (cited and translated in Yoshimizu op.cit., p.62) that the qualification of 'being ultimate' is made to causal efficacy in *Pramāṇavārttika* III 3 in order to eliminate the 'false' conception that the causal efficacy is solely conventionally (*kun rdzob tsam du*) accepted. This 'false' conception most likely belongs to the Mādhyamikas, as will be discussed later. In this regard, it is interesting to remark that Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan propounds the definition of ultimate reality as that which ultimately has causal efficacy (*don dam par don byed nus pa'i chos*) in his *Grub mtha'* (in *Textbooks of Se ra Monastery* ed. by Tshulkrhim Kelsang & Shunzo Onoda, *Biblia Tibetica series*, Kyoto 1985) 4b3 (cited in Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.64 n.11).
13. *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* (in *The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa* 22 of bKra shis lhun po version ed. by Ngawang Gelek Demo, New Delhi 1978) 34a1f.: *don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid rtog pas btags pa tsam ma yin par yul rang gi ngos nas grub pa* / Cf. also *mNgon sum le'u t̄ik* 17a6f.: *don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid rtog pas btags pa la ma ltos par rang gi ngos bos dpyad bzod du grub pa* / Parallel definitions by other dGe lugs pas are cited in Yoshimizu, op.cit., pp.53 and 64 n.11. The dGe lugs pas presumably define the two kinds of reality on the basis of Dharmakīrti's own words in *Pramāṇavārttika* I 68-91, especially 68-70, as I have previously discussed in Yoshimizu, op.cit., pp.52-57 and "*Dr̄śya and vikalpya*", p.460 n.5.
 14. *Yid kyi mun sel* 21a5f.: *gzhan dag yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres par gnas pa dang / don byed nus pa sogs rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid du 'dod pa mi 'thad do//* One should note the fact that the similar definitions of rang mtshan appear in the *sDe bdun 'jug sgo Yid kyi mun sel* (in *The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa* 27 of bKra shis lhun po version ed. by Ngawang Geleg De mo, New Delhi 1977) 3b6, which is a glossary of terms, concepts and their definitions ascribed to Tsong kha pa, but probably descended from Phya pa's tradition of gSang phu monastery. Yet it seems more plausible to assume that mKhas grub denies the traditionally acknowledged definitions, which Tsong kha pa and he himself have learned from their teachers, rather than to jump to the conclusion that mKhas grub thereby rejects Tsong kha pa's view, because, as will be seen below, mKhas grub

- gives his own definition with a clear consciousness of the theoretical consistency with Tsong kha pa's fundamental ontology as well as his understanding of causal efficacy. Thus considered, the fact that the old type of definition of *rang mtshan* is found in the *sDe bdun 'jug sgo* might support the originality of mKhas grub's definition, as I have suggested in Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2)", p.24f.
15. The substantial distinction according to place and time mentioned here by mKhas grub is, however, on no account concerned with momentary existents, since he himself describes the difference of place and time as a rough incompatibility of location such as east and west and morning and afternoon. See *Yid kyi mun sel* 33a1ff.: *snga dro'i ka ba phyi dro med pa dus ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi / ... shar la reg pa'i rdzas des nub la ma reg pa lta bu / yul ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi / ... khra bo la yod pa'i rang bzhin de ser skya la med pa sogs / rang bzhin ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi /* Cf. also a parallel explanation in rGyal tshab's *Thar lam gsal byed* 451a-4 and the discussion in Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, p.117ff. Moreover, it must be noted that the momentariness itself is differently understood by the dGe lugs pas as having a certain duration. Cf. e.g. *Yid kyi mun sel* 34a2, 34b5ff. (cited in Tillemans, 17 op.cit., p.884, Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.17 n.23) and the discussion in Dreyfus, op.cit., pp.109-114.
 16. This explanation occurs for the first time in *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 19a3f.: *rtog pa la yul ji ltar snang zhing 'jug pa'i tshul ni / gser bum bum par 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gser bum yang bum par snang zhing rang gi dr̄ngos kyi gzung bya de'ang bum par snang la snang ba'i ngo na de gnyis gcig tu 'dres nas snang zhing snang ngor so sor dbyer med pas snang btags gcig tu bsres pa zhes bya ste snang ba rang mtshan dang btags pa sgra don no //* Cf. also *Yid kyi mun sel* 35a3ff., lCang skya's *Grub mtha'* (in *mDo sde pa* Chapter of Peking version, *Buddhist Philosophical Systems* ed. by Lokesh Chandra, *Śata-Piṭaka-Series* 233, New Delhi 1977) 74b1ff., and *Thar lam gsal byed* 59b5-60a3. This passage indeed has raised discussions among scholars because of its remarkable assertion that a *rang mtshan* appears to a conceptual cognition. For the details, see the references cited below in n.17.
 17. As for the close analysis of this passage, cf. Tillemans, op.cit., p.866, Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, p.323, Yoshimizu, "*Dr̄śya and vikalpya*," p.466 and "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2)", p.11f.
 18. *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40: *sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṃ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāgināḥ /*
 19. See *Yid kyi mun sel* 41b6f and *Thar lam gsal byed* 45b3f. (cited in Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.22f.). It is Śāṅkaranandana who interpreted 'all things' to refer to both individuals and universals (*Pramāṇavārttika* D152b6). However, this does not necessarily suggest that

- Śānikaranandana asserts the existence of real universals, for, to my knowledge, he expresses nowhere such a realistic view. He includes universals into 'all things' presumably in a hypothetical sense in accordance with Dharmakīrti's postulation '*sati vā*' in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 25, 12. For this issue, cf. Yoshimizu, "Pramāṇavārttika I 40 no kaishaku ni tsuite", p.(101) n.10 and "*Dṛśya and vikalpya*", p. 463 n.19.
20. See e.g., *Tharl lam gsal byed* 46b1. *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40 introduces together with 41abc (*tasmād yato yato 'rthānām vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāh/ jātibhedāh prakalpyante*) the idea that such concepts of properties as 'being impermanent' (*anityatva*) and 'being produced' (*kṛtakatva*) are formulated on the basis of the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of things, although the real existence of universals, which are identical with or different from particulars, is unacceptable. Dharmakīrti is thereby demonstrating that an inference based on the essential property as a logical reason (*svabhāvuhetu*) is valid for establishing the reality of entities such as their being impermanent. In fact, he opens with this verse the long discussion of the *apoha* theory. rGyal tshab, however, interprets this *apoha* section of *Pramāṇavārttika* I as contributing to the establishment of the two kinds of reality (see Yoshimizu, op.cit., pp. 460-463, 470 Appendix 2). As regards *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40 in commentarial tradition, cf. also Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, p.118, Yoshimizu, "Pramāṇavārttika I 40 no kaishaku ni tsuite" and "*Dṛśya and vikalpya*," p. 463 n. 19. For the dGe lugs pas, the question of how one can establish reality by means of inferences, if the meaning of words is mere elimination of others (*anyāpoha*), overlaps with the question of how the Mādhyamika can prove the non-substantiality and emptiness by means of empty words (cf. Yoshimizu, op.cit., p. 462 and "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2)", p. 28).
21. It is interesting to note that both rGyal tshab and mKhas grub offer a similar elucidation in their respective commentaries on *Pramāṇavārttika* I 40, as I have pointed out in Yoshimizu, "Pramāṇavārttika I 40 no kaishaku ni tsuite", p.(101) n.10 and "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2)", p. 22f.
22. Cf. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, pp.193-200 and the references cited in Yoshimizu, "*Dṛśya and vikalpya*," p. 459 n.1.
23. *Yid kyi mun sel* 21a6-21b2 (cited and translated in Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyōryōbu gakusetsu rikai (2)," p. 19): *dbu ma thal 'gyur ba / rang mtshan don dam dpyod pa'i rtags kyi dgag bya'i gtsō bor 'dod pas / dngos smra ba 'dod pa'i rang mtshan gyi don ldog de bkag pa don dam bden par 'dod pa yin la / de'i phyir dngos smra bas rang mtshan gyi don ldog tu gang 'dod pa de / dbu ma thal 'gyur ba tha snyad du yang gzhi ma grub par 'dod pa yin la / yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres pa dang*

- don byed nus pa sogs dbu ma thal 'gyur ba yang khas len pa'i phyir ro// des na de dag skabs 'dir rang mtshan gyi mtshan gzhi yin gyi mtshan nyid min no //*
24. Cf. the discussions and textual sources cited in Yoshimizu, "On *rang gi mtshan nyid kyiis grub pa* III," *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 16, 1993, pp.129, 132f and *ibid.*, 17, 1994, p. 327, n.67.
25. This kind of real entity can be properly identified with 'that which is intrinsically established' (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyiis grub pa*) in opposition to the unreal, mere conceptual existent (*blags yod*) or that which is postulated by names and signs (*ming dang brdas rnam par gzhag pa*). The expressions '*rang gi ngos nas grub pa*' and '*rang gi ngo bos grub pa*', which they use in their definitions of *rang mtshan* and ultimate reality, are no doubt synonyms of the former, i.e., '*rang gi mtshan nyid kyiis grub pa*'. Also the expression '*rtog pas blags pa*' means the same as the '*blags yod*'. Cf. Helmut Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsōn kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, Wien, 1995, p.124 n.262 and Yoshimizu, "Tsōn kha pa's Reevaluation," Appendix.
26. Cf. e.g., the synthesis of the Madhyamaka ontological doctrine of non-substantiality and the logicoepistemological system of Dharmakīrti's tradition by dGe lugs pa scholars, which is the object of studies such as Yoshimizu, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Prāsāngika-Madhyamaka* and Seyfort Rungg, *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy*.