Form, Meaning, and Discourse: The Semantics and Pragmatics of Conditional Constructions in English and Japanese

A Dissertation
Submitted to the University of Tsukuba
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

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2011
Acknowledgements

Since this dissertation is a summary of my linguistic study, let me begin with self-examination. My first experience of English linguistics began in 1992, when I entered Utsunomiya University, having a dream of becoming a junior high school teacher. As an undergraduate, I briefly studied English linguistics: traditional grammar, phonetics, phonology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. To my regret, however, I paid little attention to the field of English linguistics in those days: English linguistics seemed to me so difficult and complex that I did not find it necessary in teaching English. Unfortunately, in 1996, I had to leave Utsunomiya University for a financial reason. That is, I left the university with insufficient knowledge of the English language and English linguistics.

Right after leaving Utsunomiya University, I started my career as an English teacher at a cram school for university entrance examinations. While teaching English to high school students at the school, I keenly realized that I had been wrong: the knowledge of English linguistics is not only useful but also essential in teaching English and in my life as well. Since then, my dream has altered: I have decided to become a linguist some day.

In 2005, I was given a big chance to step into my new dream: I entered the University of Tsukuba as an undergraduate. There I met many young ambitious friends and competed with them. I led a full, excellent school life.

Time flies: about seven years have passed since I resumed my intellectual journey at the University of Tsukuba, and about four years have passed since I began to study English linguistics as a graduate student. During those years, I have
experienced many intellectual pleasures and surprises through the study of linguistics. It goes without saying that I have been supported by countless people including my teachers, seniors, and friends, without whom I could not have completed this thesis.

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Yukio Hirose, the chair of my committee, for his encouragement and for providing me with insightful information and valuable comments. Above all, I am much obliged to him for sharing his time and his deep insights with incredible generosity. He has had the greatest influence on me since I started my second academic life as an undergraduate at the University of Tsukuba. Not only his works but also his compassionate advice has given me a new insight into linguistic phenomena.

Here let me provide an anecdote. One day, when I was a sophomore in the undergraduate program, I visited Professor Hirose’s office to submit a term paper on adjectival passives, wherein my argument was based on the insufficient knowledge of generative grammar. Glancing through the paper, Professor Hirose said to me, “Shizawa-kun, you don’t have to use tree-diagrams to deal with this phenomenon. Take semantics and pragmatics into account, OK?” At first, I was confused at his word, because I had never been concerned with semantics and pragmatics until then. However, this simple, but valuable comment changed me a lot and brought me a new insight into linguistic phenomena. After several attempts, I was given the first opportunity to present my paper at the 25th Conference of the English Linguistic Society of Japan. Without the wonderful encounter with Professor Hirose, I am sure that I would not have been interested in the fields of semantics and pragmatics, and this thesis would have never seen the light of day.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Naoaki Wada, another member of my thesis committee, who has always taken care of me since I was an undergraduate.
I am immensely grateful for his advice and for our many interesting and helpful discussions, which have deeply influenced my work. The influence of his works will be found here and there in this thesis. I have learned from his enthusiasm about English tense phenomena that persistent efforts enable us to break through our limitations.

Many thanks are also due to the other members of my committee: Nobuhiro Kaga, Masaharu Shimada, and Priscilla Ishida. I am obliged to them for their sound criticisms and encouragements. They have taken great care of me since I was an undergraduate. Their constructive comments were from different viewpoints, so that the discussion with them brought me new ideas which I had never thought of. In particular, I am grateful to Priscilla Ishida not only for agreeing to be a member of my committee but also for kindly acting as an informant.

I am also indebted to Professor Yasuaki Fujiwara of Seitoku University, who has always taken great care of me ever since I was an undergraduate. Professor Fujiwara always tells me the importance of seeing linguistic phenomena not only from a synchronic but from a diachronic viewpoint. The most important lesson I learned from him is that in order to be a true researcher, one must have an enthusiastic attitude toward one’s work. I admire him for his earnest attitude toward academic research and the students of Seitoku University.

Furthermore, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Norio Yamada of Mejiro University. If Professor Yamada had not been one of the interviewers of the Admission Center Examination held in October, 2004, I might have lost the chance of resuming my linguistic research. He has provided me with a lot of insightful advice on my writing and ideas. I hope that this thesis lives up to his expectation.

My gratitude extends to the following people for their helpful comments on
earlier versions of each chapter of this thesis: Izumi Yasui, Masao Okazaki, Seizi Iwata, Koichi Nishida, Manabu Kusayama, Hiroaki Konno, Masaru Kanetani, Ken-ichi Kitahara, Hiroyuki Iwasaki, Mai Osawa, Tetsuya Kogusuri, and Suguru Mikami. I am also grateful to Masaki Yasuhara and Keita Ikarashi, who spent a lot of time discussing with me a variety of topics in linguistics over coffee and curry.

Not least to be thanked are my younger friends, Takashi Kojima, Takafumi Omori, who graduated from the College of Humanities at the University of Tsukuba in March, 2008. They, together with Masaki Yasuhara, worked very hard by competing with me when we were in the undergraduate program. Without them, my life as an undergraduate would have been completely different from what it was.

I’m indebted to Kim Inhwa for providing me with valuable Korean data and helpful insights. My thanks also go to Kevin Moore of San José State University for kindly acting as an informant.

Last, but not least, I dedicate this thesis to the following people: my academic father, Kiyoshi Tajima (Emeritus Professor at Utsunomiya University), my grandparents, Yukieko and Rihei Kawanobe, my aunt, Ayako Miyazawa, and my parents, Akio and Yoko Shizawa, for their support and deep affection. In particular, I am much obliged to Emeritus Professor Tajima for his ceaseless mental and financial support.

Takashi Shizawa

Tsukuba

December 2011
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Overview

As Athanasiadou (1997) states in the introductory chapter of the volume *On Conditionals Again*, the semantic concept of conditionality and conditional constructions have long been central concerns of various disciplines including linguistics, psychology, and philosophy. They have been approached from remarkably different angles, thus exhibiting their multifaceted function and their crucial role in our understanding of language. In a word, conditionals and related phenomena have been a central and controversial topic, and thus have attracted many researchers.

Traditionally, it has been assumed that conditional constructions directly reflect the characteristically human ability to reason about alternative situations, to make inferences based on incomplete information, to imagine possible correlations between situations, and to understand how the world would change if certain correlations were different (cf. Traugott et al. (1986:3)). In a word, the conditional construction is regarded as an epitome of human rational capacity. Behind this traditional view is the Western academic background wherein the inquiry into truth and how to find truth through valid reasoning and logical argumentation has been a primary concern since the time of the ancient Greeks (cf. Akatsuka (1997: 323)).

Thus, in the field of logic, conditionals (or material implications) are defined as

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1 The term *construction* in this thesis refers to any pattern, at level of generality, in which units are connected in syntax (cf. Matthews (2007:75)).
a relation between two propositions, the protasis \((p)\) and the apodosis \((q)\), such that either \(p\) and \(q\) are both true, or \(p\) is false \(q\) is true, or \(p\) is false and \(q\) is false; excluded is the possibility of \(p\) being true while \(q\) is false (Comrie (1986:78)). In the field of linguistics, conditionals are roughly defined as complex sentences composed of a main clause (apodosis) and a subordinate clause (protasis) (cf. Dancygier (1998:1)), and the following characteristics are generally recognized as semantic/pragmatic components for the interpretation of (open) conditionals:

\[(1)\]

a. Invariant meaning: the truth values of \(p\) and \(q\) are related in such a way as to exclude the combination where \(p\) is true and \(q\) false.

b. Consequence implicature: \(q\) is a consequence of \(p\).

c. Only-if implicature: if not \(p\), then not \(q\).

d. Don’t know implicature: the speaker doesn’t know whether \(p\) and \(q\) are true or false.

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002:739), with slight modifications)

As can be understood from (1), what Huddleston and Pullum (2002) refer to as invariant meaning, i.e. (1a), is inherited from the traditional view of logic. The other components, too, indicate that conditional constructions in natural language have been seen from the viewpoint of truth-values and that there is some interdependency between \(p\) and \(q\) in conditionals.

Furthermore, conditional constructions have been mainly investigated from the following two viewpoints in combination with the truth-conditional view: one is concerned with the question of how to capture reality or factuality, and the other is

---

2 For more details about the historical aspect of linguistic study of conditional constructions from the Western viewpoint, see Traugott et al., eds. (1986), Athanasiadou and Dirven, eds. (1997), and Declerck and Reed (2001). See also Arita (1993) for the history of the study of Japanese conditionals.
concerned with the relationship between protases and apodoses such as causation. With regard to the first view, for example, many researchers have tried to deal with logic-sentences, i.e. conditional sentences and reason sentences (sentences with *because* or *since*), in terms of the distinction between reality (or *realis*) and hypotheticality (or *irrealis*) (cf. Sakahara (1985), Chung and Timberlake (1985), Athanasiadou and Dirven (1997), Wierzbicka (1997), Maeda (2009), among others): traditionally, conditional sentences are regarded as hypothetical, while reason sentences are regarded as real or factual.

The second view is concerned with the correlation or interdependency between the protasis and apodosis. Masuoka and Takubo (1992:192), for example, define conditional expressions as “interdependency between two events.” In particular, recent studies (Sweetser (1990), Masuoka (1993), Tsubomoto (1993), Nakau (1994), Dancygier (1998), Tsunoda (2004), Dancygier and Sweetser (2005), among others) are concerned with the relationship between human cognitive structure and clause linkage. That is, those studies take notice of the polysemous characteristics of conditional constructions, and ascribe such characteristics to human cognitive structure.

In short, conditional constructions have been investigated from multiple viewpoints: truth-values, semantic concepts such as actuality/factuality and hypotheticality, and eventual/conceptual interdependency between protases and apodoses.

1.2. The Scope and the Aim of this Thesis

1.2.1. Scope

This thesis attempts to provide a description of conditional constructions in English and Japanese from a viewpoint slightly different from the traditional view.
reviewed above. Specifically, although innumerable researchers have been paying attention to conditional constructions, the conditional constructions that will be dealt with in this thesis have not been investigated in great detail. They are illustrated below:

(3) a. If you’re hungry, (I tell you) there are some biscuits on the sideboard.
   b. onaka-ga suiteru-nara (osieru kedo), syokkidana-ni bisuketto-ga aru-yo.

(4) a. If you don’t know, (I tell you) it’s Saturday today.
   b. sira nai-nara *(osieru kedo), kyoo-wa doyoobi-da.

(5) Harry saw, in his mind’s eye, the expression on Hermione’s face if she ever heard about this abuse of house-elves, and decided never to mention it to her.

(J.K. Rowling. *Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince* [italics are mine])

(6) If anyone can help us, it’s John. 

(Declerck and Seki (1990:19))

(7) sikaku-nara Yuukyan

„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.’

The pairs in (3) and (4) are what Sweetser (1990) calls speech-act conditionals. In (3) and (4), the (b)-sentences are the Japanese counterparts of (a)-sentences. Speech-act conditionals have been investigated by many researchers from different angles (cf. Van der Auwera (1986), Sweetser (1990), Dancyger (1998), Declerck and Reed (2001), Dancyger and Sweetser (2005), Sakahara (1985), Nakau (1994), Tsunoda (2004), to name a few). Nevertheless, there are some interesting phenomena left uninvestigated. The examples in (3) and (4) indicate that (i) the occurrence of speech-act verbs is optional or, more precisely, the non-occurrence of speech-act verbs is unmarked, in English speech-act conditionals and that (ii) Japanese speech-act conditionals can be divided into two classes according to the occurrence of speech-act
verbs.\textsuperscript{3} The question of what gives rise to phenomena (i) and (ii) has been left untouched.\textsuperscript{4}

The example in (5) is referred to as adnominal conditionals in Lasersohn’s (1996) term. This example shows a marked use of conditional \textit{if}-clauses: \textit{if}-clauses can modify nominal expressions as well as (main or matrix) clauses. Despite their peculiarity, the nature of adnominal conditionals has not been investigated adequately.

Let us turn our attention to example (6). This is what Meier (1988) refers to as the \textit{if}-cleft sentence. As is shown, the \textit{if}-clause is followed by a truncated \textit{it}-cleft sentence. Some researchers such as Meier (1988) and Declerck and Seki (1990) investigate the semantics and pragmatics of \textit{if}-cleft sentences, but the correlation between their form and discourse function has not been fully explained.

Example (7) is a peripheral example of conditional expressions in Japanese, i.e. \textit{N}_1\text{-}\textit{nara} \textit{N}_2 conditionals. The \textit{N}_1\text{-}\textit{nara} \textit{N}_2 conditional has been treated as an exception in the study of conditionals in Japanese linguistics in that its status as a conditional expression is unclear. It should be clarified what licenses the construction and what gives rise to its interpretation as a phrase of recommendation.

\textbf{1.2.2. Aim}

To the best of my knowledge, those phenomena exemplified in (3) to (7) have attracted little, if any, attention of linguists. The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on long-ignored or overlooked characteristics of the conditional constructions in semantic and pragmatic terms, whereby I verify the following hypothesis:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{3} What I refer to as speech-act verbs in this thesis is terminologically equivalent to what is referred to as \textit{performative clauses} (cf. Ross (1970)).
  \item \textsuperscript{4} A number of researchers such as Sakahara (1985), Nakau (1994), and Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011) notice the phenomena in (3). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, they do not investigate in detail what gives rise to the difference at issue between English and Japanese.
\end{itemize}
Linguistic form is not independent of the meaning it conveys; it is well-motivated by semantic and/or pragmatic principles.

In connection with the hypothesis in (8), let me clarify my position. As the title of this thesis indicates, my primary concern is with the interaction of linguistic form, meaning, and discourse. Specifically, I am concerned with how semantics and pragmatics influence linguistic form or grammar. It is well accepted in the field of linguistics since Chomsky (1957), especially in the school of generative grammar, that syntax and semantics are independent systems, related only by the semantic component interpreting syntactic representations (i.e. interpretive semantics).

However, my position is quite different from such a view, although I will not challenge the fundamental thesis of generative grammar, i.e. the existence of universal grammar (UG) and parametric variations: my approach is, so to speak, semantic/pragmatic-based syntax, i.e. investigating linguistic form (syntax) in terms of semantics and pragmatics.

In my framework, linguistic expressions are regarded as the realizations of the speaker’s (conscious or unconscious) intention or meaning in a broader sense. That is to say, linguistic meaning is not only to be interpreted; rather, it should be regarded as the *raison d’être* of linguistic expressions. The speaker selects appropriate linguistic forms according to what s/he wants to say and how s/he wants to communicate it. What is relevant here is not how linguistic forms are interpreted but what linguistic forms are selected by meanings (including the speaker’s intention).

However, my approach does not deny what is called “the autonomy of syntax” per se. It is one thing that semantics and pragmatics influence linguistic form and it is another that we, human beings, have a certain innate mechanism to generate or realize a variety of linguistic expressions.
well-motivated by semantic and/or pragmatic factors, it does not mean that we do not need some system to combine linguistic elements properly and generate well-formed expressions. Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to unveil a new theory of a language, or even to present a new synthesis that ties syntax-centered approaches and semantics/pragmatics-centered approaches together, I must stress that there is no contradiction between the two approaches.

In this connection, Newmeyer’s (1998) view is quite suggestive and compatible with mine. Newmeyer illustrates the interrelationship between linguistic structures and their motivations as follows:

\[
\text{Structure}_a \rightarrow \text{Motivation}_a \\
\text{Structure}_b \rightarrow \text{Autonomous Motivation}_b \\
\text{Structure}_c \rightarrow \text{system Motivation}_c \\
\text{Structure}_d \rightarrow \text{Motivation}_d
\]

A view of the structure-motivation interrelationship compatible with both autonomy and external explanation

(Newmeyer (1998:163))

He claims that the autonomous structural system intermediates between linguistic structure and its motivation: linguistic structures are generated by the autonomous system in response to semantic/pragmatic motivations (for more details, see Newmeyer (1998) and Takami (2008)).

For a better understanding of my approach toward the relationship between linguistic form and meaning, let us take the formation of *adjectival passives* in English for example:

(10) a. the truck is loaded with brick
    b. the bricks are loaded onto the truck
(11) a. the brick-loaded truck
    b. * the truck-loaded bricks

(Shizawa (2008:228))

The examples in (11) are categorized as what is referred to as compound adjectival passives (CAPs). The expressions (11a) and (11b) are derived from those in (10a) and (10b), respectively. In syntax-centered or rule-based approaches, many researchers have tried to formulate the rule of Adjectival Passive Formation (APF). For example, to explain the formation of CAPs like those in (11), Roeper and Siegel (1978) propose First Sister Principle and Compound Rule:

(12) First Sister (FS) Principle

All verbal compounds are formed by incorporation of a word in the first sister position of the verb. (Roeper and Siegel (1978:208))

(13) Compound Rule

\[
\begin{align*}
[[\text{empty}] + \text{verb} + \text{affix}] & \Rightarrow [[+,\text{word}] + \text{verb} + \text{affix}] & W \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 4 & 2 & 3 & \phi & 5
\end{align*}
\]

where \( W \) ranges over subcategorization frames and \( X_{+N} \) stands for lexical categories N, A, Adv.

Example: \( [[\text{empty}] + \text{make} + \text{er}]_{N} \text{coffee} ] \Rightarrow [[\text{coffee}] + \text{make} + \text{er}] \]

(Roeper and Siegel (1978:209))

In terms of the rules in (12) and (13), the expression in (11a) is derived by incorporation of the word \( \text{brick} \) into the empty position just in front of the word \( \text{loaded} \). However, the rules can neither predict nor explain the ungrammaticality of the example in (11b). In fact, because the word \( \text{truck} \) can be regarded as the first sister of the passivized verb \( \text{loaded} \) in (10b), the rule in (13) mistakenly produces example

\(^5\) For more details, see Shizawa (2008).
To explain the difference between examples (11a) and (11b), Shizawa (2008) proposes semantic licensing conditions like the following:

(14) Licensing Conditions of CAPs

The construction \(X-Ved\ N\), where \(X\), \(V\), and \(N\) stand respectively for the first element of CAPs, the base verb, and the head noun, is subject to three constraints like the following:

a. Conceptual Subsumption Constraint

The following relationships must hold: \(X-Ved\ N \subseteq Ved\ N \subseteq N\)

b. Holistic Participant Constraint

The referent of \(X\) (i.e. \(N\) or \(A\)) must participate or be involved in the whole process (including the resultant state) of the activity denoted by the base verb.

c. Whole-Part Relationship Constraint

\(X\) and \(Ved\) should be construed as attributes corresponding to parts of the entity denoted by the head noun \(N\).

The ungrammaticality of example (11b) can be explained succinctly. Example (11b) violates all three constraints in (14): (i) the incorporated element \(truck\) does not contribute to the classification of the referent of the noun \(bricks\) (the violation of (14a)), (ii) the incorporated element \(truck\) should be construed as the goal to which \(bricks\) move, which means that \(truck\) is involved not in the whole process but the end-point of the activity denoted by the verb \(load\) (the violation of (14b)), and (iii) the referent of \(truck\) cannot be construed as an attribute of the referent of the noun \(bricks\) (the violation of (14c)). In this way, the conditions in (14) correctly predict and exclude
the ungrammatical expression in (11b).\(^6\)

However, note that this approach refers to nothing about syntactic or morphological formal mechanisms concerning CAPs. In a sense, the semantic constraints in (14) work complementarily with formal rules like (12) and (13). Thus, although my central concern in this thesis is with the clarification of semantic and pragmatic influence on the system of grammar, it does not mean the denial of the existence of formal rules combining linguistic elements to generate a variety of linguistic expressions.

From the perspective outlined above, I will make the following claims on the basis of hypothesis (8):

(15) a. The difference between English and Japanese speech-act conditionals as to the (non-)obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs should be ascribed to the difference in their unmarked modes of expression: the unmarked mode of expression in English is “public expression” (Hirose (1995)), that is, expression for communication, while the unmarked mode of expression in Japanese is “private expression”, that is, expression for representation of thought, not communication.

b. Conditional constructions can be examined in parallel with specificational copular sentences; that is, conditionals in general, if not all, have the function of specifying values for variables in a broader sense. As such, the concept of specification plays an important role in investigating conditional constructions.

The claims in (15) follow from the findings of the detailed investigation of the constructions exemplified in (3) to (7). The discussion of each of the following

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\(^6\) For more details and remaining problems with this explanation, see Shizawa (2008:232-233).
chapters will corroborate the hypothesis in (8).

1.3. Organization

This thesis consists of ten chapters, organized into two parts to the exclusion of the present and the last chapters. Part 1, which is composed of three chapters, i.e. Chapters 2, 3, and 4, provides evidence for the hypothesis in (8) by examining speech-act conditionals in Japanese and English, thus making claim (15a).

The organization of Part 1 is as follows. Chapter 2 gives introductory remarks on the phenomena examined in Part 1. In Chapter 3, which is a revised version of Shizawa (2009a), I will deal with the question of what is the difference between the Japanese speech-act conditionals which require speech-act verbs and those which do not. Put more concretely, I will focus on speech-act conditionals in Japanese and classify them into two types: Type 1 and Type 2 speech-act conditionals. Roughly speaking, they are classified by the following criterion: Type 1 does not require speech-act verbs, and Type 2 does. Based on this classification, I will discuss the basic characteristics of the two types of speech-act conditionals, and clarify the functions to be fulfilled by speech-act verbs such as yuu ‘tell’ or osieru ‘inform’. The underpinnings to be adopted in this chapter are Langacker’s (1993) reference point and Akatsuka’s (1998) Desirability Principle.

In Chapter 4, which is a substantially revised version of Shizawa (2009b), I deal with the question of what mechanism gives rise to the difference between Japanese and English speech-act conditionals as to whether the occurrence of speech-act verbs is obligatory or optional. Specifically, in addition to the findings of Chapter 3, it will be clarified that the difference between the two languages observed in Type 2 speech-act conditionals can be reduced to the difference of addressee-orientedness or
public/private-self centeredness, a fundamental characteristic differentiating between English and Japanese in terms of linguistic typology. The basic assumption adopted here is that Japanese and English are quite contrastive in their communicativity (cf. Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000), Wada (2005, 2008, 2010)): English, as a public-self centered language, is communicatively stronger than Japanese, as a private-self centered language. Furthermore, I will point out that there seems to be a correlation between public-self centeredness and sensitivity to metonymic operation on the basis of the ideas developed by Yasui (2005) and Halliday (1994). Lastly, I will argue that the analysis carried out in this chapter can be applicable to other conjunctions denoting causality such as because and since, and point out the possibility that the obligatory vs. optional occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 speech-act conditionals can serve as a criterion of linguistic typology.

Part 2, which is composed of five chapters, i.e. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, provides evidence for the hypothesis in (8) by examining so-called peripheral conditionals in English and Japanese.

The organization of Part 2 is as follows. Chapter 5 gives introductory remarks on the phenomena examined in Part 2. Chapter 6, which consists of revised versions of Shizawa (2010a, 2011a), investigates adnominal conditionals and proposes their licensing conditions from a semantic and pragmatic point of view. Chapter 7, which is a substantially revised version of Shizawa (2010b), examines if-cleft sentences and clarifies their discourse function, showing that their raison d’être is pragmatically motivated. Chapter 8, which is a revised version of Shizawa (2011b, 2011c), deals with N₁-nara N₂ conditionals and proposes their semantic and pragmatic licensing condition. Furthermore, I will deal with related constructions such as N₁-wa N₂ constructions and N₁-no N₂ constructions, pointing out that all three constructions...
share basic properties. Based on the findings of the preceding chapters (Chapters 6 to 8), Chapter 9 proposes a new perspective on conditional constructions; that is, it analyzes conditional constructions from the viewpoint of specification. In particular, I will point out that conditionals and specificalional copular sentences share some characteristics, thus making the claim in (15b). Chapter 10 concludes the dissertation with a summary of the claims and an outlook for future research.

As stated above, conditional constructions and related phenomena have been one of the most intriguing topics in the field of linguistics. One reason for this is that conditionals reflect our way of rational thinking in a straightforward way. In fact, as Akatsuka (1997:323) states, the inquiry into “truth” and how to find “truth” through valid reasoning and logical argumentation has been a primary concern in Western academia since the time of ancient Greeks: conditionals have been regarded as epitomes of human rational capacity. Thus the conditional sentence in human language has been typically compared to the mathematical conditional, “p ⊃ q”, where the relevant notions are truth-values.

However, it should not be the case that conditionals are simply analyzed from the viewpoint of mathematics or logics alone. Conditionals, as epitomes of human rational capacity, show many facets and characteristics that cannot be dealt with mathematically. I think that some of such facets are reflected on the conditionals addressed in this thesis. I hope that this thesis will shed light on some facets of the relationship of human thought, reason, and language beyond the traditional mathematical view.
Part 1

Speech-Act Conditionals in Japanese and English
Chapter 2

Introduction of Part 1

2.1. Introduction

Part 1 of this dissertation is an attempt to provide a description of a certain fragment of the grammars of Japanese and English, namely, speech-act conditionals.

As already stated in Chapter 1, conditionals in general can roughly be defined as complex sentences composed of a main clause (sometimes called $q$, or the apodosis) and a subordinate clause ($p$, or the protasis) (cf. Dancygier (1998:1)). In many cases, the subordinate clause is introduced by a conjunction functioning as a conditional marker. In English, the least marked conditional conjunction is *if*, while in Japanese, the four conjunctions (*re*)ba, *tara*, *to* and *nara* are most common. It is generally acknowledged that there is interdependency between the protasis and apodosis. In other words, a causal relation is assumed between the two clauses: the fulfillment of the protasis, likely or unlikely, is a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of the apodosis (Sweetser (1990:115)).

However, a closer observation reveals that some conditional constructions, at least on their surface structures, do not clearly show such a relationship. Let us observe the following examples:

(1) a. If it will make you feel better, we know it wasn’t your fault.

b. If you want to know, I haven’t seen him.       (Palmer (1988:154))

There seems to be no causal relation between the protases and the apodoses of the sentences in (1). In (1a), the state described in the protasis *it will make you feel better* does not condition the realization of the state in the apodosis *we know it wasn’t your fault*.
Likewise, in (1b) the state described in the protasis *you want to know* does not condition the realization of the state in the apodosis *I haven’t seen him*.

Then, a question arises: how should the sentences in (1) be interpreted? The conditional sentences in (1) are generally referred to as speech-act conditionals in the terminology of Sweetser (1990). According to Sweetser (1990:121), speech-act conditionals are appropriately paraphrased by “If [protasis], then let us consider that I perform this speech act (i.e. the one represented as the apodosis).” To put it simply, the paraphrase given by Sweetser can be schematized as “If X, I SAY Y”. Thus, sentence (1a) can be interpreted as “If it will make you feel better, I SAY we know it wasn’t your fault,” and sentence (1b) can be interpreted as “If you want to know, I SAY I haven’t seen him.

The “If X, I SAY Y” relationship can be linguistically realized as *I tell you* or *I inform you*. Let us investigate the following examples:

(2)  
a. If it will make you feel better, *I tell you* we know it wasn’t your fault.  
b. If you want to know, *I tell you* I haven’t seen him.

Sentences (2a) and (2b) are the counterparts to (1a) and (1b), respectively. In (2) the “If X, I SAY Y” relationship is linguistically realized by virtue of the phrase *I tell you*. The intended meanings in (1a)/(1b) and (2a)/(2b) are almost the same: the presence of the phrase *I tell you* does not usually alter the interpretation of the sentences in any obvious way. In this sense, the phrase denoting a speech act, i.e. *I tell you*, can be regarded as optional.

Let us turn to Japanese speech-act conditionals. Japanese speech-act conditionals show a contrastive behavior as to the occurrence of speech-act phrases. Examine the following examples:

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1 The abbreviations used in the glosses of examples in this part are as follows: Acc = accusative case
The sentences in (3) are the Japanese counterparts to those in (2). As seen in (3), the speech-act verb yuu „tell’ is realized in both sentences.\(^2\) Interestingly enough, in contrast to English speech-act conditionals, deletion of the speech-act verb yuu renders the sentences in (3) ungrammatical. Let us observe the following examples:

(4)  a. * ki-ga raku-ni nar u nara, sore-wa kimi-no see dewa-nai no-wa wakat-teiru.
    „If it will make you feel better, we know it’s not your fault.’

    b. * siri tai nara yuu ga, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai
    „If you want to know, I haven’t seen him.’

Sentence (4a) is a literal counterpart to sentence (1a), and (4b) is a literal counterpart to (1b). Both of the sentences in (4) are rendered ungrammatical by the deletion of

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\(^2\) In general, the literal translations of yuu and osieru are say and teach, respectively. However, taking the semantic characteristics of the two words into account, I use tell and inform as the translations of yuu and osieru, respectively.

\(^3\) The term speech-act verb is taken from Wierzbicka (1987) and May (2001). In what follows, I will use the term as a cover term to refer to speech-act verbs and phrases containing them, i.e. performative clauses (cf. Ross (1970)).
the speech-act verb *yuu* ',tell'. This observation suggests that the occurrence of speech-act verbs is obligatory in Japanese speech-act conditionals.

However, a closer observation of Japanese speech-act conditionals reveals that a certain type of them does not require speech-act verbs such as *yuu*. Observe the following pair:

(5)  

a. If you are thirsty, there’s some beer in the cellar.  

(Declerck and Reed (2001:3))

b. nodo-ga kawai-teiru nara, tyozooko-ni biiru-ga aru-yo.  

throat-Nom dry-AspV if cellar-Loc beer-Nom exist-Part  

‘If you’re thirsty, there’s some beer in the cellar.’

In (5a), a causal relation does not arise between the apodosis and protasis. In addition, sentence (5a) can be interpreted as “If you’re thirsty, I SAY there’s some beer in the cellar (, so you may drink the beer).” Thus, the sentence in (5a) can be categorized into speech-act conditionals. Needless to say, sentence (5a) does not demand a phrase containing a speech-act verb. What should be noted here is that sentence (5b), a Japanese counterpart to (5a), does not require speech-act verbs such as *yuu*, either. This observation leads to the assumption that speech-act conditionals should be divided into at least two types: one is the type in which speech-act verbs obligatorily occur, and the other is the type in which they do not have to occur.

2.2. Aim

Although much attention has been paid to conditionals in general and related phenomena, to the best of my knowledge, the phenomena observed in (1) to (5) have long been overlooked. To put it more precisely, some researchers (cf. Nakau (1994), Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011)) have already noticed the difference between Japanese and
English as to the obligatory/optional occurrence of speech-act verbs in speech-act conditionals and related constructions, but they have not dealt with the difference seriously.

Thus, the primary aim of Part 1 of this dissertation is to shed light on the long-ignored phenomena. In so doing, I will address the following two questions:

(6) a. What is the difference between the Japanese speech-act conditionals which require speech-act verbs and those which do not?

b. What mechanism gives rise to the difference between Japanese and English speech-act conditionals as to whether the occurrence of speech-act verbs is obligatory or optional?

As already stated, few researchers have addressed these questions. In this part, I would like to answer them from the viewpoint of semantic/pragmatic-based syntax. In particular, I would like to describe how various aspects of speech-act conditionals in Japanese and English map onto various aspects of their interpretation. Furthermore, I would like to clarify that the difference between the two languages observed in speech-act conditionals can be reduced to the difference in their typologically fundamental characteristics.
Chapter 3

Two Types of Speech-Act Conditionals in Japanese

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, our main concern is with what is referred to as *speech-act conditionals* in Japanese (hereafter, J-SACs).\(^1\)\(^2\) Observe the following examples:

(1) nanika tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo.
   something eat-want if fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part
   ‘If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.’

(2) kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no interest-Nom you-have if inform but Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen hommyoo-wa Isida Taro da.
   real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop
   ‘If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

The sentences in (1) and (2) are examples of J-SACs. These conditionals differ from so-called *standard conditionals* in that the condition expressed is not a condition for

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\(^1\) The conditionals I refer to as SACs are named differently by different researchers: utterance conditionals (Haegeman (1984), Declerck and Reed (2001)), relevance-conditionals (Johnson-Laird (1986), Palmer (1988), Huddleston and Pullum (2002)), pseudo-conditionals (Sakahara (1985)), or speech-act conditionals (Sweetser (1990), Dancygier (1998), Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)). I adopt Sweetser’s (1990) terminology as a cover term in this thesis.

\(^2\) Although there are at least four kinds of conditional markers in Japanese (i.e. *nara*, *reba*, *tara*, and *to*), I will focus on *nara* except when the other markers are used in the previous studies quoted in this thesis: as Tsunoda (2004, 2006) points out, *reba*, *tara*, and *to* are limited in their use as the indicator of speech-act conditionals. In addition, although Hasegawa (1996) points out that the connective *-te* can be used as a conditional marker (e.g. zenbu tabe-**te** 20-doru desu ,‘If you eat everything, it is 20 $’.), I will not deal with it because it does not have the SAC use.
the actualization of the action or state referred to in the main clause but one for the relevance of uttering the main clause (cf. Huddleston and Pullum (2002)). That is to say, the nara-clauses do not show causal relations with the main clauses in the sense that the events or states described in the nara-clauses do not cause the events or states described in the main clauses. In J-SACs, the protasis (i.e. the nara-clause) expresses a condition under which it is pragmatically relevant for the speaker to utter (and for the hearer to decode) the apodosis (i.e. the main clause) (cf. Declerck and Reed (2001:320)). In other words, the protasis is regarded as the proper background or felicity condition on which the speaker makes the utterance in the apodosis.

A great number of studies have been concerned with Japanese conditionals. However, almost all of them have not dealt with J-SACs as a main topic. As a result, an interesting fact exemplified in (3) has been overlooked:

(3) * kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa IsidaTaro da.

„If you’re interested, Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

Example (3) is the counterpart of example (2), where the verb osieru „inform’ is omitted. The deletion of the verb makes the sentence unacceptable. Note that sentence (1), on the other hand, is well-formed without the verb osieru. Although a number of researchers (cf. Nakau (1994), Sakahara (1985), Tsubomoto (1993), Tsunoda (2004), and Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011)) recognize the discrepancy of the acceptability between (2) and (3), it has not been dealt with seriously.

The central purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the long-ignored or overlooked phenomenon of J-SACs. In what follows, I will categorize J-SACs into two types on the basis of the presence or absence of speech-act verbs such as yuu „tell’ or osieru „inform’, and show that the phenomenon is relevant to a basic human

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3 For more details, see Arita (1993).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews two previous studies relevant to SACs. Section 3.3 points out some problems with the previous studies and classifies J-SACs into two types, Type 1 and Type 2. Section 3.4 focuses on Type 1 J-SACs and clarifies their characteristics and the mechanisms relevant to their interpretation. Section 3.5 focuses on Type 2 J-SACs and clarifies the functions to be fulfilled by speech-act verbs. Section 3.6 makes some concluding remarks and discusses related issues.

3.2. Previous Studies

As stated above, a great number of researchers, including philosophers and logicians, have addressed various problems related to conditional constructions (Akatsuka (1985, 1986, 1998), Austin (1970), Comrie (1986), Dancygier (1998), Declerck and Reed (2001), Eilfort (1987), Haegeman (1984), Masuoka (ed.) (1993), Sakahara (1985), Palmer (1988), Sweetser (1990), Tsunoda (2004), Maeda (2009), among others). However, to the best of my knowledge, many of them put their foci on the classification or typology of conditionals, and none of them notices the problem I lay out here, i.e. two types of J-SACs and their differences.

In this section, I review Sweetser (1990) and Sakahara (1985). I take up the former to introduce the notion of speech-act conditionals and the latter as a representative analysis of J-SACs.

3.2.1. Cognitive Domains and Conditionals

In this subsection, I review Sweetser (1990). She shows that the ambiguity

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4 Note here that Sweetser (1990) puts her focus on English conditionals. However, this does not
and semantic change of various expressions (e.g. verbs of perception, modals, and conjunctions) result from their being interpreted in three cognitive domains: the content, epistemic, and speech-act domains. She argues that the domains themselves are linked via a metaphor which motivates extensions of meaning from the physical into the mental and social domains (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980)). Bearing the three domains in mind, let us look at cases of conditionals in more detail below.

3.2.1.1. Content Domain Conditionals

Let us begin with the first domain, i.e. content domain conditionals. The use of conditionals in the content domain is exemplified in (4):

(4) If Mary goes, (then) John will go.

(Sweetser (1990:115), with slight modifications)

As seen in (4), a conditional if-then conjunction indicates that the realization of the event or state of affairs described in the protasis is a sufficient condition for the realization of the event or the state of affairs described in the apodosis: the event of Mary’s going will trigger or cause the event of John’s going. This type of conditionals is regarded as a prototypically standard conditional construction in the sense that a causal relation is established or implied between the event (or state) described in the protasis and the one in the apodosis.

3.2.1.2. Epistemic Domain Conditionals

Let us move on to conditionals in the second domain, i.e. epistemic domain

matter, because, as shown by Masuoka (1993), her analysis can be applied to Japanese conditionals. 5 Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) also present several domain levels similar to those of Sweetser’s. Nakau presents three domains: D(iscourse)-modality, S(entence)-modality, and P(roposition) domain; Tsunoda, on the other hand, proposes five domains: phenomenal description, speaker’s judgment, personal effect, basis of speaker’s judgment, and premise to speech acts. With regard to the details of their analyses, see Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) respectively.
conditionals. Observe the following example:

(5) If she’s divorced, (then) she’s been married.  
(Sweetser (1990:116))

In the epistemic domain, a conditional if-then conjunction expresses the idea that knowledge of the hypothetical premise expressed in the protasis (i.e. she’s divorced) would be a sufficient condition for the conclusion of the speaker expressed in the apodosis (i.e. she’s been married). In this case, note that no causal link is found between the events per se in that the event she’s divorced does not directly cause the event she’s been married. In fact, the causal relation in the real world is turned around to yield an abductive inference relation. To put it plainly, it is the speaker’s knowledge of her divorce that draws the speaker’s conclusion that she’s been married. That is, the causal link in question holds at the epistemic level in that the speaker’s knowledge causes or enables him/her to draw some conclusion.

3.2.1.3. Speech-Act Domain Conditionals (SACs)

Let us turn to the third domain, i.e. speech-act conditionals (SACs). Observe the following example:

(6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.  
(Sweetser (1990:119))

In this case, one cannot interpret the sentence as “the state described in the if-clause (i.e. you want them) brings about the biscuits’ existence on the sideboard.” Nor can one interpret it as “the speaker draws the conclusion there are biscuits on the sideboard from the premise if you want them.” According to Sweetser, it should be interpreted as “If you want biscuits, then (let us consider that) I inform you that there

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6 Example (6) is originally due to Austin (1970).
are biscuits on the sideboard.” That is, what the protasis of this conditional denotes is not a condition for the actualization of the state described in the main clause (i.e. there are biscuits on the sideboard) but an introductory remark for the speaker’s offer of the biscuits. Note here that the causal link between the protasis and the apodosis in (6) is established at a more abstract level: the conditional clause if you want them justifies, but does not realize, the speaker’s offer of the biscuits on the sideboard. That is to say, the protasis provides a felicitous or proper background on which the speech act performed in the apodosis is based.

Before going into a detailed discussion, it is worth noting here that Sweetser (1990) recognizes that there are some variants of SACs. Observe the following examples:

(7) a. Take out the garbage, if I may ask you to. (Dancygier (1998:89))
   b. If you went to the party, was John there? (Sweetser (1990:120))

According to Sweetser, the if-clause in sentence (7a) refers more overtly to the general felicity condition on the relevant class of speech acts (i.e. order or direction in this case), while the if-clause in (7b) refers to some more specific felicity condition on the particular utterance (i.e. the question was John there?). Note that sentence (7a) contains the fossilized, formulaic expression if I may ask you to, which is meant to make more appropriate the speech act in the apodosis take out the garbage. Sentence (7b), on the other hand, uses the spontaneously coined assumption if you went to the party, which provides some background for the speech act in the apodosis. In the following discussion, I restrict myself to the latter type of SACs, because in many cases, Japanese counterparts to the English conditionals of the former type are not

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As we will see below, Sakahara (1985) gives a slightly different interpretation to the Japanese counterpart of the example in (6).
expressed in conditional forms, so the phenomenon pointed out in Section 3.1 is not observed:

(7a’) warui kedo, sono gomi dasi-te

sorry but the garbage take out-Imp

„I’m sorry to ask you, but take out the garbage.’

3.2.2. Pseudo-Conditionals

Let us turn our attention to our main topic, i.e. J-SACs. In this subsection, I take up Sakahara (1985), who deals comprehensively with various conditionals in Japanese. He refers to SACs as *pseudo-conditionals*. His definition of pseudo-conditionals can be summarized as follows:

(8) A pseudo-conditional is a conditional which has the form "if p then q," but does not have the logical structure "p ⊃ q".

Sakahara argues that what the main clause in pseudo-conditionals represents is not a conclusion drawn from the premise described in the protasis but an indicator to find out an implicit conclusion. By the term *indicator*, he refers to a kind of clue that leads us to the implicit conclusion. Consider the following example:

(9) mosi onozomi-desi tara, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga

Hyp want-Pol if, sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuit-Nom

ari-masu-yo.

be-Pol-Part

„There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.’

(Sakahara (1985:139))

Sentence (9) is the Japanese counterpart of sentence (6). Sakahara claims that the main clause in (9) denotes the reason for the implicit conclusion (i.e. *tana-no ue-no*...
bisuketto-o tabetemo ii-desu-yo ,’you may have biscuits on the sideboard’), and that sentence (9) can be paraphrased into a standard conditional as follows:

(10) syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru kara, onozomi-desi tara, sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuit-Nom be because want-Pol if tabe-temo ii-desu-yo eat-Concessive may-Pol-Part

’,Because there are biscuits on the sideboard, you may have them if you want them.’

(Sakahara (1985: 140))

In (10), the reason clause corresponds to the main clause of sentence (9), and the implicit conclusion (i.e. tabetemo ii-desu-yo ,’you may have them’) is explicitly stated. According to Sakahara, the relationship between the logical structure of pseudo-conditionals and that of standard ones can be illustrated as follows:8

(11) Standard conditional: if p, because r, q ⇔ Pseudo-conditional: if p, r

On the basis of the logical structure in (11), he argues that pseudo-conditionals are generated when the speaker assumes that (i) the reason (r) for the (implicit) conclusion (q) is not yet known to the hearer and (ii) it is possible for the hearer to draw the (implicit) conclusion from the explicit if-clause (p) and the main clause (r). In (9), for instance, the speaker assumes that the hearer does not know that there are biscuits on the sideboard. S/he also assumes that the hearer can understand his/her intention to offer the biscuits without explicitly stating it. The process can be schematically represented as follows:

8 The letters p, q, r represent condition, conclusion and reason, respectively. In addition, the term standard is almost equivalent to content.
Sakahara treats SACs as variants of standard conditionals. His view is compatible with Sweetser’s in this respect, and I will not challenge the view per se. However, as will be shown below, not all SACs can be analyzed on these lines.

3.3. Problems

This section points out a few problems with the previous studies reviewed in Section 3.2. First, Sweetser (1990) focuses almost exclusively on English conditionals. It follows that she does not even notice the existence of the issue I lay out here (i.e. (3)), because this phenomenon cannot be observed in English SACs (E-SACs). Observe the following pair:

(13) a. If you’re interested, Dick’s coming to the party, too.

    b. If you’re interested, it is worth telling you that Dick’s coming to the party, too.

    (Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) [italics are mine])

Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) state that sentences (13a) and (13b) can be paraphrased by each other. Sentence (13a) does not contain any speech-act verb, while sentence (13b) does. As shown in (13), the occurrence of the speech-act verb tell does not influence the grammaticality judgment. This paraphrase seems to reflect English native speakers’ intuition and indicates that E-SACs are not significantly
affected by the presence or absence of the phrases containing speech-act verbs: speech-act verbs may be used, but do not have to be.\textsuperscript{9} Thus, as long as one concentrates on E-SACs, s/he might never notice that the presence or absence of speech-act verbs can affect the grammaticality of SACs.

Second, Sakahara (1985) deals with the problem at issue only \textit{intuitively}. Other researchers dealing with Japanese conditionals such as Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) do not pay special attention to the problem, either. Observe the following examples:

(14) a. Your slip is showing, in case you are not aware of it.

\hspace{2em} b. \textit{okizuki-de nake-reba moostiagemasu ga, sitaginosuso-ga aware-Cop not-if I tell you (honorific) but slip-Nom mietemasu-yo.}

\hspace{2em} showing-Part

\hspace{2em} (Nakau (1994:106), with slight modifications)

(15) a. If you were at the party, how’s Harry these days?

\hspace{2em} b. \textit{paatii-ni deteita nara (kiku kedo), Harii-wa saikin party-Loc attended if (I ask you but), Harry-Top these-days doo siteru-no.}

\hspace{2em} how doing-Q.

\hspace{2em} (Tsunoda (2004:59), with slight modifications)

(16) a. We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don’t know.

\hspace{2em} b. * \textit{anata-ga sira nai nara ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni you-Nom know not if now we-Top Kyoto Station-Loc orimasu.}

\textsuperscript{9} Uchida (2001) makes a similar comment in terms of relevance theory.
In (14)-(16), the (b)/(c)-sentences are the Japanese counterparts of the (a)-sentences. Nakau and Tsunoda intuitively add the speech-act verbs mousiagemasu „tell (honorific)” and kiku „ask” respectively, but they do not deal with this matter in detail, which is the reason that I use the word intuitively. Sakahara, on the other hand, remarks that sentence (16c) is greatly preferable to sentence (16b) as the translation of the sentence in (16a). However, he does not state the reason for the preferableness at all, either.

Third, there is a serious problem with Sakahara’s explanation of pseudo-conditionals: Sakahara’s mechanism presented in diagram (12) does not always work properly. For example, none of the sentences in (14)-(16) can be generated, contrary to his expectation. Observe the following:

(17) * anata-ga sira nai nara, ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu. (= (16b))

p: anata-ga sira nai nara „if you don’t know”

r: ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu „we are now at Kyoto Station”

q: ??

As stated in 3.2.2, Sakahara assumes that in the pseudo-conditional construction p-nara, r „if p, r,” the main clause r is not a conclusion drawn from condition p, but a

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10 Although I deal with Japanese examples ((b)/(c)-sentences in (14)-(16)) alone, the same is true of English examples ((a)-sentences).
reason (or a clue) for the implicit conclusion \( q \). But, in this case, no matter how hard one may think, the statement \( \text{ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu} \) „we are now at Kyoto Station” cannot be exploited as a clue to find the implicit conclusion \( q \).

One might object that it is not appropriate to refute Sakahara’s analysis by using the ungrammatical sentence in (17) in the first place. However, the problem cannot be solved even if one applies Sakahara’s analysis to the well-formed sentence in (16c):

\[(18) \quad \text{anata-ga sira nai nara iimasu ga, ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu.} \]

p: anata-ga sira nai nara „if you don’t know”

r: ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu „we are now at Kyoto Station”

q: iimasu „I tell you”

It should be noted that in (18), the phrase \( \text{iimasu} \) is assumed to be the implicit conclusion in terms of Sakahara (1985), because it is not linguistically realized in (17). In addition, it is true that the state \( \text{anata-ga (ima iru basyo-o) siranai} \) „you don’t know (the place where we are)” causes the event \( \text{iimasu} \) „I tell you.” Thus, it is not impossible to interpret the \( q \)-clause as an implicit conclusion drawn from the \( p \)-clause. Even so, however, the statement described in the \( r \)-clause cannot be interpreted as a reason for the \( q \), as shown below:

\[(19) \quad * \quad \text{anata-ga sira nai nara, ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu kara,} \]

\[ \text{iimasu.} \]

„If you don’t know, because we are now at Kyoto Station, I tell you.”

Rather, it is much better to interpret that \( p \) (anata-ga sira nai) is the reason or felicity condition for the speech act \( \text{iimasu} \) „I tell you”.

It is by now clear that J-SACs are not monolithic and they should be divided into two classes: one is the type that follows Sakahara’s mechanism and does not require speech-act verbs, and the other is the type which does not follow his
mechanism and requires speech-act verbs. Let us call them Type 1 J-SACs and Type 2 J-SACs, respectively.

I acknowledge that Sakahara’s mechanism, to some degree, works well in analyzing Type 1 J-SACs. However, it is not clear what motivates it. Put more specifically, his idea is plausible in that the main clause of Type 1 J-SACs is a manifestation of the reason for an implicit conclusion, but he does not clarify why and how the main clause can serve as a clue to the implicit conclusion. In addition, because Type 2 J-SACs, as well as Type 1 J-SACs, are treated as pseudo-conditionals in his approach, it is not clear how Type-2 J-SACs are produced and why they obligatorily require speech-act verbs. In the following sections, I will propose an alternative solution. In the next section, I will focus on Type 1 J-SACs and their characteristics, and show that Sakahara’s analysis on Type 1 J-SACs is motivated by a cognitive capacity and a pragmatic principle.

3.4. Interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs: Reference Point and the Desirability Principle

In the previous section, I pointed out that Sakahara’s (1985) explanation of what he calls pseudo-conditionals is valid to the extent that it deals with Type 1 J-SACs. In this section, I will clarify why the apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs can serve as a clue to find out an implicit conclusion; in other words, why one can interpret Type 1 J-SACs properly. I propose a solution based on a cognitive linguistic approach in a broader sense. More specifically, I will show that the reference point ability first fully discussed in Langacker (1993, 2008) and the Desirability Principle proposed by Akatsuka (1998) are involved in the interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs.
3.4.1. Apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs as Reference Points

3.4.1.1. Reference Points

To answer the question raised above, first of all, the notion of reference point should be introduced. According to Langacker (1993, 2008), setting the reference point is the cognitive ability to invoke the conception of one entity for purposes of establishing mental contact with another. For example, in the expression Sally’s dog, the possessor Sally is invoked as a reference point for establishing mental contact with one of her possessions, viz. her dog. Observe the following figure:

Figure (20) sketches essential aspects of the reference-point ability. The circled C represents the conceptualizer (i.e. language user), R is the reference point, and T the target (i.e. the entity that the conceptualizer uses the reference point to establish mental contact with). The broken arrows indicate the mental path which the conceptualizer follows in reaching the target. It should be noted that as the multiple dashed arrows from R show, a particular reference point affords potential access to many different targets. The ellipse labeled D is an abstract entity called dominion, which is defined as the conceptual region (or the set of entities) to which a particular reference point has direct access.

We can best appreciate this notion from a perceptual example. We often direct our attention to a perceptually salient entity as a reference point to help find some other entities, which otherwise be hard to locate. Observe the following example:
In (21), the speaker wants to direct the hearer’s attention to the duck, but from a distance the boat is easier to recognize. In this case, both the speaker and the hearer use the \textit{boat} as a reference point to have access to their real target (\textit{duck}). Here I assume that this basic cognitive capacity can analogously be applied to the mechanism of the interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs.\footnote{The reference point model has been applied to a variety of linguistic phenomena, including “nested locative” constructions, metonymy (cf. Langacker (1993)), and pronominal anaphora (cf. Van Hoek (1997)). For the application of the model to person deixis and temporal deixis in indirect/direct speech, see Vandelanotte (2009).}

3.4.1.2. \textit{The Main Clause of a Type 1 J-SAC as a Reference Point}

If the notion of reference point is applied to Type 1 J-SACs, the main clause of a Type 1 J-SAC functions as a reference-point: one can access an implicit conclusion via the reference point. Consider the example in (9), repeated here as (22):

(22) mosi onozomi-desita, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga ari-masu-yo.

„There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.’

As indicated in (10), (22) can be interpreted as “Because there are biscuits on the sideboard, you may have them if you want them.” The relationship among the protasis ($p$), the apodosis ($r$) (explicitly stated reason), and the implicit conclusion ($q$) can be illustrated in (23):

(23) \begin{align*}
p \text{ (mosi onozomidesi tara)} & \quad \rightarrow q \text{ (bisuketto-o tabe temo iidesuyo)} \\
& \downarrow \text{„if you want them’} \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \text{„you may have them’} \\
& \quad \rightarrow r \text{ (syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru (kara))} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad \downarrow \text{„(because) there are biscuits on the sideboard’} \\
\end{align*}
In Figure (23), the bold arrow indicates the interpretive mechanism of standard conditionals: the conclusion \( q \) is directly drawn from the premise described in the protasis \( p \). If this relation is manifested as a conditional construction, the output is like the following:

\[
(24) \quad \text{mosi onozomi-desi tara, bisuketto-o tabe temo iidesuyo.}
\]

\('If you want biscuits, you may have them.'\)

The arrow down to \( r \) in (23) indicates the interpretive mechanism of (22), and the dashed arrow denotes the mental access to the implicit conclusion \( q \): the explicitly stated \( r \) is exploited to access the implicit conclusion of the reasoning process. In this case, the statement \( r \) serves as a reference point and the implicit conclusion \( q \) is a target, as illustrated in the following figure:

\[
(25)
\]

As shown in (25), the conceptualizer \( C \) (a language user) understands or accesses the implicit conclusion (T), using the main clause as a reference point (R).

Note here that a particular reference point may potentially access many different targets. In the case of (22), for example, the phrase \textit{syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru} „there are biscuits on the sideboard” does not always lead the hearer to the intended conclusion \textit{bisuketto-o tabetemo iidesu-yo} „you may have the biscuits”: in some cases, the hearer might infer that the speaker intends to ask the hearer to fetch the biscuits for other people, or that the speaker intends to show the hearer the package of the biscuits because its design is rare, etc. This means that the reasoning process
shown in (23), i.e. \( r \) to \( q \) can be cancelled, depending on the context.\(^{12}\) What is selected as a target depends largely on contexts and the concreteness of the statement in the protasis. Contexts and the statement in the protasis help the hearer limit the number of potential targets. For instance, the statement \( \text{onaka-ga suiteiru nara} \), ‘if you are hungry’ is more directly relevant to food than \( \text{mosi onozomi-desi tara} \), ‘if you want’, and the former makes it easier for the hearer to evoke the eating act. That is, Type 1 J-SACs are founded on the common understanding between the speaker and the hearer.

3.4.2. The Desirability Principle

Let us turn to the second mechanism used in interpreting Type 1 J-SACs. As seen above, the reference point ability plays an important role in Type 1 J-SACs. However, it cannot be denied that contexts and the statement in the protasis alone are too weak to limit the number of potential targets. Observe the following examples:

(26) * \( \text{mosi onozomi-desi tara, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga} \)
\( \text{Hyp want-Pol if, sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuits-Nom} \)
\( \text{ari-masu-yo} \) (demo batu tosite tabe tewa ikemasen).
\( \text{be-Pol-Part (but punishment as eat Concessive not-Imp)} \)
\( \text{‘There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them (but you must not eat them as a punishment).’} \)

In (26), the implicit conclusion or intended speech act is the prohibition \( \text{tabetewa ikemasen} \), ‘Don’t eat’. In the actual world, there are many cases like (26), where one has biscuits but must not eat them. Furthermore, sentence (26) is not different from

\(^{12}\) In this sense, the reasoning process in (23) can be regarded as an instance of what is called default inference.
sentence (22) in that their implicit conclusions are concerned with the act of eating the biscuits on the sideboard. Thus, in principle, it is not impossible that the explicit apodosis functions as a reference point to the implicit prohibition.

Nevertheless, we can properly understand that the apodosis in (22) serves as a clue to the implicit offer, and we never interpret it as a prohibition. The problem which should be considered next is, therefore, how one can single out the proper implicit illocutionary force intended by the speaker out of a number of candidates such as offers, orders, and prohibitions. There must be some additional mechanism which helps the reference point ability work more efficiently. I argue that the additional mechanism is the Desirability Principle proposed by Akatsuka (1998).

3.4.2.1. *Desirable Leads to Desirable/Undesirable Leads to Undesirable*

In this subsection, let us review the notion of Desirability and the Desirability Principle proposed by Akatsuka (1998).

In everyday life, we perform various speech acts such as orders, prohibitions, warnings, threats and promises by using conditional constructions. It should be considered what principle works behind performing such speech acts. Let us observe the following example:

(27) If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you. (Akatsuka (1998:13))

According to Akatsuka (1998:13), sentence (27) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a promise (or offer), as shown below:

(28) a. Don’t eat my cookies or I’ll whip you. (prohibition reading)
    b. Eat my cookies and I’ll whip you. (promise/offer reading)

On the basis of our background knowledge, we usually interpret example (27) as a prohibition, as in (28a): no ordinary person likes to be beaten with a whip.
However, in some situations, sentence (27) can be interpreted as the speech act of promise or offer. If the hearer is disposed to be whipped, and the speaker utters (27) with the full knowledge of the hearer’s disposition, then such an interpretation as (28b) is quite natural.

Akatsuka assumes that there is a pragmatic principle behind the ambiguity of the sentence in (27). The pragmatic principle is what she refers to as the Desirability Principle:

(29) The Desirability Principle

a. DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE

b. UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE

As shown in (29), the Desirability Principle consists of two sub-principles. Briefly, the sub-principle in (29a) means that if the realization of the proposition described in the protasis is desirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the apodosis will also be desirable for the speaker. As a result, the speech act intended in the conditional construction will be interpreted as desirable, too. The sub-principle in (29b), on the other hand, means that if the realization of the proposition described in the protasis is undesirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the apodosis will also be undesirable for the speaker. As a result, the speech act intended in the conditional construction will be interpreted as undesirable, too.

The relationship between the values of Desirability and the interpretation of conditional constructions can be diagrammatically represented as follows:

(30) \[ \begin{array}{ccc}
 p & q & \text{if } p, \text{ then } q \\
 \text{DESIRABLE} & \text{DESIRABLE} & \text{DESIRABLE} \\
 \text{UNDESIRABLE} & \text{UNDESIRABLE} & \text{UNDESIRABLE} \\
\end{array} \]

(Akatsuka (1998:15), with slight modifications)
In table (30), \( p \) represents the proposition in the protasis and \( q \) the proposition in the apodosis. Akatsuka considers that the principle holds true for natural language in general.\(^{13}\) Note here that the principle lacks the relationships DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE and UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE.

In this connection, Akatsuka argues that there is a contingency or dependency relationship between the protasis and apodosis of a conditional construction, which blocks the two combinations. In fact, neither of them can be described in the form of conditional constructions at least in English and Japanese:\(^{14}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(31)} & \quad \text{a. * If you do what I want, I will do what you don’t like.} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \text{[DESIRABLE]} \quad \text{[UNDESIRABLE]} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \text{b. * If you do what I don’t like, I will do what you want.} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \text{[UNDESIRABLE]} \quad \text{[DESIRABLE]}
\end{align*}
\]

(Akatsuka (1998:14))

With the Desirability Principle in mind, let us return to the example in (27), repeated here as (32) for convenience of reference:

\[
\text{(32)} \quad \text{If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you.}
\]

As seen above, sentence (32) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a promise (or offer). When this sentence is interpreted as the prohibition \textit{Don’t eat my cookies}, the values of Desirability are assigned as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(33)} & \quad \text{If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you.} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \text{[UNDESIRABLE]} \quad \text{[UNDESIRABLE]} \quad \text{[UNDESIRABLE]}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{13}\) For the application of the principle to the Japanese sentence-ending particle \textit{noda}, see Ikarashi (2011b)

\(^{14}\) In English, such combinations must be expressed in \textit{even if} forms, and in Japanese, they must be expressed by virtue of \textit{temo}.
In (33), the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the speaker’s mental attitude UNDESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip you also reflects the speaker’s mental attitude UNDESIRABLE. Thus the speaker’s mental attitude reflected on the whole sentence is UNDESIRABLE. The hearer reads the attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the prohibition Don’t eat my cookies.

When this sentence is interpreted as the promise I’ll whip you, the values of Desirability are assigned as follows:

(34) If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you.

[DESIRABLE] [DESIRABLE] [DESIRABLE]

In contrast to (33), here the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the speaker’s mental attitude DESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip you also reflects the speaker’s mental attitude DESIRABLE. Thus the speaker’s mental attitude reflected in the whole sentence is DESIRABLE. The hearer reads the speaker’s mental attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the promise I’ll whip you (as a reward if you do me a favor).

In this subsection, I have reviewed the Desirability Principle, which is pragmatically relevant to the interpretation of conditionals in general. In the following subsection, I will show that the Desirability Principle, in combination with reference points, plays a significant part in interpreting Type 1 J-SACs.

3.4.2.2. A Chain of Inferences and the Desirability Principle

With regard to the interpretation of Type 1 SACs, Declerck and Reed (2001) allude to the involvement of a chain of inferences.\(^{15}\) Let us examine the following

\(^{15}\) In the following explanation, I will use the Type 1 E-SAC in (35), because I assume that the
example:

(35) If you’re hungry, the fridge is on the landing.

(Declerck and Reed (2001:320))

In order to interpret sentence (35) properly, one needs to follow the proper procedures like the following:¹⁶

(36) if you’re hungry → the fridge is on the landing → food is usually kept in the

[premise] [intermediate step 1] [intermediate step 2]

fridge → you may eat the food in the fridge

[final conclusion]

Figure (36) means that if the hearer is to read the proper intention of the speaker of (35), s/he needs to proceed step by step in the chain of inferences: on the basis of the statement *the fridge is on the landing*, the hearer gets to the intermediate conclusion *food is usually kept in the fridge*, and then on the basis of the intermediate conclusion, s/he gets to the final conclusion *you may eat the food in the fridge*. This process is what Declerck and Reed (2001) call a chain of inferences.¹⁷

It goes without saying that reference points are involved in this process: the statement *the fridge is on the landing* serves as a reference point to the target *food is usually kept in the fridge*, which, in turn, serves as a reference point to the final target

---

¹⁶ The following explanation is my own, because Declerck and Reed themselves do not discuss the chain of inferences at issue in detail. It goes without saying that there are cases wherein we proceed via other routes to reach the same conclusion. The reasoning process shown in (36) only exemplifies what seems to be a typical case.

¹⁷ In Type 1 J-SACs, the existence of inference steps like (36) is linguistically corroborated by the following example:

(i) onaka-ga suiteiru-nara, odoriba-ni reezooko-ga aru{-yo/*-ne}.
    ‘If you’re hungry, the fridge is on the landing.’

As seen in (i), *yo* can be used as a sentence-ending particle in Type 1 J-SACs, but *ne* cannot. The reason for this contrast is that the former give rise to inference, while the latter does not (cf. Nakata (2009)). This means that Type 1 J-SACs require sentence-ending particles giving rise to further inference, which corroborates the existence of inference steps like those in (36).
you may eat the food in the fridge. As just described, the notion of a chain of inferences is quite compatible with reference points. However, as pointed out in 3.4.1.2, reference points alone do not sufficiently limit the number of potential targets.

Thus, let us assume that the Desirability Principle can be applied not only to the premise and conclusion, but also to the intermediate steps. That is, the values of Desirability assigned to Type 1 SACs must be consistent through the chain of inferences. This point is presented in the form of a hypothesis like the following:

(37) **Desirability Consistency Hypothesis (DCH)**

In a speech-act conditional sentence wherein a chain of inferences is involved, the values of Desirability must be consistent throughout the chain.

Now let us see how the DCH works in the interpretation of Type 1 SACs. Based on this hypothesis, the values of Desirability assigned to the sentence in (35) are presented as follows:

(38) if you’re hungry → the fridge is on the landing → food is usually kept in the fridge → you may eat the food in the fridge

If the values of Desirability are assigned as in (38), it clarifies why one can properly understand Type 1 SACs. Put differently, it clarifies why and how the hearer can properly single out the proper illocutionary force intended by the speaker: the Desirability Principle, together with given contexts, helps the hearer narrow down the potential targets. In the case of (35), on hearing the statement *if you’re hungry*, the hearer evokes the dominion connected to food or the act of eating. At the same time,

---

18 Langacker (2008:85) refers to the process of this kind *a chain of successive reference points.*
with the help of the context where sentence (35) is uttered, the hearer makes a judgment on the value of Desirability assigned to the statement. Once the value is determined, the value holds consistently throughout the chain of inferences, as shown in (38). In this way, the hearer infers that the illocutionary force intended in (35) is a desirable one. In this case, what is desirable for the hungry person is the permission or offer to eat something. As seen above, the Desirability Principle plays an important part in the interpretation of Type 1 SACs.

In concluding this subsection, let us consider the validity of the DCH. The validity of the DCH is corroborated from the viewpoint of efficiency of communication and language acquisition. Observe the following table:

(39)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>UD</td>
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<td>UD</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (39) illustrates the patterns of the combinations of Desirability when a single intermediate step is included in a chain of inferences. In this table, p, r, and q represent the proposition in an if-clause, the proposition in an apodosis (an intermediate step in a chain of inferences), and an implicit conclusion, respectively. D and UD are the abbreviations of DESIRABLE and UNDESIRABLE, respectively,
which represent a speaker’s mental attitude toward the propositions $p$, $r$ and $q$.

Here, let us tentatively assume that the values of Desirability are assigned from $p$ to $q$.\(^{19}\) As shown in the table, if the values of Desirability are not consistent through a chain of inference, it means that there are eight routes to reach an implicit conclusion. If two intermediate steps are required in a chain of inferences, the number of routes will be sixteen. That is, the number of routes grows exponentially. This is problematic in terms of language acquisition and the efficiency of communication. Regarding the former, it is reported that even small children (2 or 3 years old) can understand the utterances in conditional constructions, including Type 1 SACs (cf. Akatsuka (1998)). As for the latter, if the number of routes to reach a correct illocutionary force intended by a speaker grows exponentially, it imposes a heavy burden on the hearer in interpreting the utterance. The patterns represented in table (39) are too complex.

On the other hand, based on the DCH, the table can be modified as follows:

\[^{(40)}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>UD</td>
<td>UD</td>
<td>UD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table (40) shows, there are only two routes to reach an implicit conclusion. Furthermore, if the DCH is valid, it means that only two routes are needed, no matter how many intermediate steps are included: once the value of $p$ is determined, the values assigned to the subsequent steps are automatically determined. This is the

\[^{19}\] The following discussion is based on the assumption that the values of desirability are assigned in a sequential order, i.e. from $p$ to $r$ to $q$. However, I am not in a position to decide whether this assumption is valid or not, because, as discussed below, there seem to be cases wherein the values of desirability are determined by the intention of the speaker conveyed in the whole utterance. I leave the issue open for future research.
very reason that the hearer can single out an intended illocutionary force and even small children can do so. In this way, the DCH is desirable and motivated in terms of language acquisition as well as the efficiency of communication.

One may argue that the hypothesis in (37) is invalid in the sense that the information in the protasis is not always enough for the hearer to read whether the mental attitude of the speaker is DESIRABLE or UNDESIRABLE. For example, when one hears the statement *if you want*, s/he can relatively easily read the speaker’s mental attitude DESIRABLE, because the attitude manifests itself as the word *want*; on the other hand, the statement *if you’re hungry* (cf. (35)) does not always evoke the speaker’s DESIRABLE attitude in the mind of the hearer.

In this connection, the following points should be taken into account. First, the value of Desirability is given exclusively by the speaker, not the hearer (Akatsuka (1998:26)). In other words, the Desirability Principle is not the hearer’s logic but the speaker’s logic. Take sentence (35) for example again. Note that the sentence is uttered to offer some food to the hearer. Thus, the apodosis *the fridge is on the landing* can be paraphrased as *I offer some food in the fridge by informing you of the fact that the fridge is on the landing*. Consider under what condition the speech act of offer works felicitously. If the hearer is full or at least not hungry, the offer is not felicitous; on the other hand, if the hearer is hungry and wants some food, the offer is quite appropriate. In this sense, the *if*-clause represents a felicity condition for the offer of food. Therefore, the condition *if you’re hungry* is a DESIRABLE condition for the offer of food. This means that the speaker picks out what s/he thinks is the most felicitous or proper condition according to her/his intention conveyed by the speech act. To put it more simply, s/he picks out *p* on the basis of *q* (a related issue
Leaving aside the question of whether or not the hearer can properly understand the speaker’s intention, the speaker presents the condition \textit{if you’re hungry} as DESIRABLE or felicitous.

However, just because the speaker assigns the value of Desirability, leaving aside the question of whether or not the hearer can properly understand his/her intention, it does not mean that the speaker ignores the hearer. Rather, the speaker gives the offer in response to the hearer’s direct or indirect request. This is the second point: SACs are classified into what is called \textit{given conditionals} (cf. Sweetser (1990:129)). By the term \textit{given}, I mean that the hearer gives the speaker some pieces of information relevant to the protasis or that a background against which the protasis is presented is already accepted or shared in the minds of the speaker and hearer. In fact, in almost all cases, the speaker utters the statement \textit{if you want} or \textit{if you’re hungry} on the basis of the hearer’s words or behaviors.

Let us take sentence (35) for instance. If the speaker utters sentence (35) without proper context (e.g. at the beginning of the conversation), the hearer may be perplexed in understanding the speaker’s intention conveyed in the utterance. At least, the hearer would not easily understand why his/her interlocutor has said so. Usually, sentence (35) should be interpreted as “If you’re hungry (as you seem to be/as you say), the fridge is on the landing (, so you may eat some food in the fridge).” As the first parenthesized expressions in the protasis indicate, the protasis expresses information which the speaker has just received from the hearer. In this case, judging from the look of the hearer or from what s/he says (by implication), the speaker infers that the hearer is hungry. It follows that in a sense, the hearer elicits the utterance from the speaker, and thus both the speaker and hearer know what is DESIRABLE or

\footnote{See also footnote 19.}
UNDESIRABLE. As argued above, Desirability is given exclusively by the speaker, not the hearer. However, in such a case as (35), it is probable that the hearer induces the speaker to make a DESIRABLE/UNDESIRABLE utterance. Thus the hearer can easily read the speaker’s mental attitude, i.e. DESIRABLE or UNDESIRABLE, even if it is not linguistically manifested.

Now, I am in a position to answer the question why one can properly interpret Type 1 J-SACs. The answer is summarized as follows:

(41) In Type 1 J-SACs, the apodosis works as a reference point for the hearer to access an implicit conclusion. In addition, the Desirability Principle helps to limit the potential conclusions and to single out the proper illocutionary force intended by the speaker.

3.4.2.3. Summary

This section has dealt with Type 1 J-SACs and the mechanism of their interpretation. I have shown that Sakahara’s (1985) analysis of Type 1 J-SACs is motivated by the reference point ability and the Desirability Principle. To put it more precisely, it has been made clear that one can properly interpret Type 1 J-SACs by virtue of these two mechanisms. Due to these mechanisms, one can properly use the apodosis of a Type 1 J-SAC as a clue to find an implicit conclusion.

3.5. The Nature of Type 2 J-SACs

Now, let us turn to the other type of speech-act domain conditionals in Japanese, i.e. Type 2 J-SACs. Before a detailed discussion, recall the characteristics of Type 2 J-SACs pointed out above:

(42) a. Type 2 J-SACs require speech-act verbs.
b. The apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs does not function as a clue to reach an implicit conclusion.

The characteristics in (42) give rise to the following questions:

(43) a. What is the function of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs?
   b. What is the status of the surface apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs?

In the following subsections, I will address the two questions in (43). The main claims are the following: (i) the apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs is *fake* in that the real apodosis is a speech-act verb, and (ii) The speech-act verb functions as a connector to establish and maintain the relevance between the protasis and apodosis.

### 3.5.1. Identity of the Apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs

In order to give reasonable answers to the questions in (43), the nature of the apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs should be considered. As a first step, let us compare the apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs and that of Type 2 J-SACs. Examine the following examples:

(44) a. nanika tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo.
   something eat-want  if  fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part
   „If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.’

   (= (1))

b. kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no interest-Nom you-have if inform but Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.
   real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop
   „If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’
As discussed above, a chain of inferences is involved in the proper interpretation of sentence (44a). In other words, the hearer of sentence (44a) uses the apodosis of the sentence as a reference point to access the implicit conclusion or illocutionary force (i.e. offer/permission in this case) with the help of the Desirability Principle. As a result, s/he may eat the food in the fridge, as expected by the speaker. That is to say, the surface expression (what is said) and the intended meaning (what is meant) in the apodosis are different (cf. Grice (1975)): superficially, the utterance is a statement, but in fact, the true illocutionary force intended by the speaker is an offer. To put it differently, this speech act embodies an expectation on the part of the speaker to get the hearer to do something. In the case of (44a), for example, the speaker expects the hearer to have the food in the fridge. Therefore, sentence (44a) is an instance of indirect speech acts in the sense of Searle (1979).

On the other hand, the apodosis of sentence (44b) is a pure statement. The purpose of uttering it is to give the information conveyed by the statement. In contrast to (44a), the speaker of sentence (44b) does not expect the hearer to do something: the speaker presents the propositional content Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo-da „Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida’ as representing an actual state of affairs (cf. Vanparys (1996:18)). In this sense, sentence (44b) has no particular illocutionary force inducing the hearer to do something.21

Furthermore, a closer examination of the examples in (44) reveals the following

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21 In general, a statement or assertion as well as a permission or offer is included in illocutionary forces. By the phrase have no particular illocutionary force, I mean that the speech act at issue does not embody an effort on the part of the speaker to get the hearer to take action. For more details on the classification of illocutionary forces in mainstream speech-act theory, see Vanparys (1996).
In (44a), the statements in the protasis and apodosis are semantically relevant in that both clauses refer to food. Put more specifically, one can easily notice that both of the statements are related to each other in terms of food, which is explicitly presented by the words *tabe(-ru) ‘eat’* and *tabemono ‘food’*.

In the case of (44b), on the other hand, there is no such direct semantic connection between the statements *kyoomi-ga aru ‘be interested’* and *Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo-da ‘Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida’*. Rather, the semantic relevance can be found between the statement *kyoomi-ga aru* and the speech-act verb *osieru ‘inform’: the semantic relation found between the two expressions, i.e. *kyoomi-ga aru* and *osieru*, is causality. Because the speaker assumes that the hearer is interested in the topic about the actor *Jun-ichi Ishida*, he/she gives the information about his real name to the hearer. In other words, the hearer’s interest causes the event of the speaker’s giving information, and the event is explicitly stated by the speech-act verb. In this sense, Type 2 J-SACs are similar to content domain conditionals.

The differences in characteristics between the apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs and that of Type 2 J-SACs revealed in this subsection can be summarized as follows:

(45) a. The apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs function as indirect speech acts, while those of Type 2 J-SACs do not.

b. The protasis and apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs are semantically relevant to each other, while those of Type 2 J-SACs are not. Instead, in Type 2 J-SACs, it is not between the protasis and apodosis but between the protasis and the speech-act verb where causality is established.

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22 In some cases, the relevance between protases and apodoses is not explicitly stated. In sentence (22), for example, it appears that there is no semantic relevance between the statement *mosi onozomi-desi tara ‘if you want’* and the statement *syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga ari-masu-yo ‘there are biscuits on the sideboard’*. However, recall that a chain of inferences is involved in this case; that is, the relevance of the two statements is established by virtue of the chain of inferences.
With these findings in mind, let me turn to the investigation of the relationships among the three components of Type 2 J-SACs: protases, speech-act verbs, and apodoses.

3.5.2. *Fake Apodosis and Connector*

In this subsection, I will show that Type 2 J-SACs are syntactically divided into two coordinated conjuncts. In addition, I will show that their “true apodoses” are not the main clause but the speech-act verb. Let us investigate the following pair:

      ’If you’re interested, Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

b. * kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa
      interest-Nom you-have if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen real name-Top
      Isida Taroo da to osieru.
      Ishida Taro Cop Comp inform
      ’If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro
      Ishida.’

(46a) is not acceptable because of the absence of a speech-act verb such as *osieru*, as previously pointed out. Interestingly enough, (46b) is also unacceptable, although a speech-act verb (i.e. *osieru* ,’inform’) occurs in the unmarked word order of Japanese (i.e. SOV).\(^{23}\) Compare (46b) with the well-formed example in (44b), repeated here as

\(^{23}\) Naoaki Wada (personal communication) has pointed out to me that the following example, wherein the speech-act verb *osieru* ,’inform’ occurs in the unmarked word order of Japanese, is more acceptable than example (46b) :

(i) ? kyoomi-ga aru-nara, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da to
      interest-Nom you-have-if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop Comp
      osieteage-masu yo.
      tell-and-give-Pol Part
      ’If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro
      Ishida.’

A possible explanation of this phenomenon is as follows. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.1.2), the grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs is dependent on the degree of addressee-orientedness. The following three expressions render sentence (i) more acceptable than sentence (46b): the speech-act verb *osieteageru* ,’inform and give’, the politeness marker *masu*, and the particle
kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.

‘If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

As the translations show, the meanings intended in (46b) and (47) are identical, but (47) alone is a well-formed expression. It is clear that the difference in their acceptability is attributed to their syntactic forms, as illustrated bellow:


b. kyoomi-ga aru nara [vosieru] ga, [sIsida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da].

As indicated in (48a), the reported clause S of sentence (46b) is embedded in the VP. In (47), on the other hand, the reported clause S is syntactically independent from the verb osieru ‘inform’ in the nara-clause, as shown in (48b). Note also that in sentence (47), the conjunction ga ‘but’ occurs. Conjunctions such as ga or kedo (see the gloss in (15b)) are generally categorized as coordinate conjunctions and used to combine two independent clauses. Thus, the reported clause can be regarded as an independent clause rather than a subordinate clause. Given this, Type 2 J-SACs are composed of three clauses like the following:24

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24 Here, I regard osieru ‘inform’ as a clause in which a subject and an object is omitted.
As illustrated in (49), the conditional sentence (CS) and the verb *osieru* constitute a closely connected set and the conjunction *ga* introduces the independent clause CLAUSE-3. In addition, as discussed in the previous subsection, it is the verb *osieru* ′inform′ that makes a semantic relationship, i.e. causality, with the *nara*-clause. It follows that the true apodosis of the *nara*-clause is not CLAUSE-3, but CLAUSE-2. Let us call such a superficial main clause, i.e. CLAUSE-3, a *fake apodosis*.

As already stated, what is directly related to the *nara*-clause is not the fake apodosis, but the speech-act verb *osieru* ′inform′. That is to say, the fake apodosis is semantically connected to the *nara*-clause through the intermediation of the verb *osieru* ′inform′. In fact, the following examples indicate that the presence of speech-act verbs is a crucial factor in the licensing of Type 2 J-SACs:

(50)  

a. *kyoomi-ga aru nara (ga), Isida Zyun‘iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.  (→*osieru* is eliminated)

b.  *kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru . Isida Zyun‘iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da. (→*ga* is eliminated)

My claim that the fake apodosis is an independent clause is corroborated by example (50b): in (50b), a pause (indicated by the period) is inserted between the verb *osieru* and its subsequent sentence. In this case, the conjunction *ga* can be omitted. Comparing (50a) and (50b), I conclude that in Type 2 J-SACs, speech-act verbs are

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25 Hiroaki Konno (personal communication) has pointed out to me that the acceptability of example (50a) is improved by inserting the word *desu* between *nara* and the conjunction *ga*, as in:

(i)  ? kyoomi-ga aru nara *desu ga*, Isida Zyun‘iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu.

In addition to inserting *desu*, the particle *da* is replaced by its polite form *desu*. The word *desu* is a polite form of the assertion marker *da*, and thus it can be regarded as a kind of addressee-oriented expression in the sense of Hirose (1995). The relationships between the acceptability of Type 2 J-SACs with no speech-act verbs and addressee-orient edness will be discussed at length in Chapter 4.
much more important than coordinate conjunctions such as *ga* or *kedo* to connect the nara-clause and the fake apodosis.

The reason for this is that the fake apodosis is the clausal argument of the speech-act verb *osieru*, and their semantic relation is still strong, even if they are syntactically separated. One might argue that it is not reasonable to regard the two syntactically-separated elements as being in predicate-argument relation. However, this is not to the point. As already pointed out in the previous subsection, the purpose of uttering the fake apodosis is to give the information stated in it, and the act of giving information is explicitly expressed in Type 2 J-SACs. The relationship between the verb *osieru* and the fake apodosis is that of the action of giving information and the information given by the action. Thus, it is safe to say that the fake apodosis is the clausal argument of the speech-act verb *osieru* "inform".26

Now, the relationships among a nara-clause, a speech-act verb and a fake apodosis can be illustrated as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{x-nara} \quad \text{speech act verb - ga} \quad Y \\
\text{connector} \quad \text{Causal Link} \quad \text{Predicate-Argument Link} \\
\end{array}
\]

‘If X, I tell you Y’

In (51), the coordinate conjunction phrase containing a speech-act verb is referred to as connector, because it functions as a “bridge” which semantically connects the nara-clause and the fake apodosis Y. As argued earlier, a causal link in Type 2 J-SACs is guaranteed by the nara-clause and the connector. On the other hand, the semantic relation between the connector and the fake apodosis is established by the predicate-argument link. That is, the connector establishes the relevance of the

26 Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) make a similar comment on the apodoses of English Type 2 SACs.
nara-clause and the fake apodosis by intervening between the two parts. If the connector is omitted, no causal relation could be expressed, and no relation could be established between the protasis and the fake apodosis, especially in the hearer’s mind. Because the statement in the fake apodosis is construed to be the effect or product of the speech act denoted by the speech-act verb, there is no direct relationship between the nara-clause and the fake apodosis in the first place.

To sum up, a speech-act verb serves as a connector relating a nara-clause with its fake apodosis. In Type 2 J-SACs, a causal link is established between speech-act verbs and nara-clauses, while fake apodoses are semantically connected to their antecedent clauses with the help of the speech-act verbs. In other words, the presence of the speech-act verbs as connectors makes it easy for us to find causal relations at the speech act level, and guarantees the relevance between nara-clauses and their fake apodoses.

3.5.3. From the Viewpoint of Mental Space Theory

As seen above, speech-act verbs such as yuu ‘tell’ and osieru ‘inform’ function as connectors relating nara-clauses and their fake apodoses. This idea is corroborated in terms of Mental Space theory (Fauconnier (1985, 1997)). In Mental Space theory, a connector is defined as an element that links mental spaces: a connector relates elements across spaces, and more generally, structures across spaces (Fauconnier (1997:39)). Here let us assume that the speech-act verbs at issue are linguistic realizations of connectors in this sense.

For a better understanding of the relationship between mental spaces and conditionals, let us observe the following example:

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27 For more details about Mental Space theory, see Fauconnier (1985, 1997).
(52) If his computer gets repaired, he’ll finish the paper by Friday.

(Dancygier and Sweetser (2000:114))

Sentence (52) is an example of content-domain conditionals. In (52), the speaker sets up a space of mental content (i.e., content-domain), which is about a possible state of affairs in the world, namely the computer getting repaired. Within this content-domain space, the speaker predicts an added aspect of the content of this mental space: the paper will be finished by Friday. This can be illustrated as follows:

As seen in figure (53), on the basis of the base space which reflects the state of affairs in the actual world, the if-clause builds the Future Space (= P) or hypothetical space, in which the speaker predicts that he will finish the paper by Friday (= Q). It should be noted that the speaker’s prediction Q is described in the circle denoting the mental space built by the if-clause. In this sense, the protasis and apodosis in sentence (52) belong to the same mental space. In other words, the protasis and apodosis are directly or internally related.

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28 In figure (53), Dancygier and Sweetser (2000) posit a Counter-Future Space (~Q) to illustrate a pragmatic phenomenon called invited inference (cf. Geis and Zwicky (1971)).
Let us turn to Type 2 J-SACs. Observe sentence (46), repeated here as (54) for ease of reference:

(54) kyoomi-ga aru nara *osieru* ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.

‘If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

As argued earlier, sentence (54) is uttered to inform the hearer of the actor’s real name. In this case, the *nara*-clause sets up a discourse context, a speech-act space wherein the hearer is interested in the actor, including his real name. At the same time, using the *nara*-clause expresses the speaker’s uncertainty about the hearer’s interest in the topic: the speaker hypothesize that the hearer is interested in Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name. In this sense, the *nara*-clause sets up a hypothetical mental space. On the other hand, the fake apodosis describes the fact that Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida. Or at least, it describes what the speaker recognizes as a fact. That is, in contrast to the case of (52), the fake apodosis belongs to a different mental space, namely, a factual space.\(^{29}\) It follows that the mental spaces H and F are not directly or internally related with each other. In order to relate the two spaces, a connector should be required. It is a speech-act verb that functions as a connector. Observe the following figure, which clearly illustrates the point:

\[
\begin{align*}
(55) & \quad \text{kyoomi-ga aru nara *osieru* ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{H-Space} \quad C \quad \text{F-Space}\]

The capitals *H*, *C* and *F* stand for the hypothetical mental space set up by the *nara*-clause, the connector and the factual mental space to which the statement in the main clause belongs, respectively. As seen in figure (55), the H-Space and F-Space

\[^{29}\text{We use } F \text{ to refer to a } \textit{factual} \text{ space in order to avoid confusion with the term } \textit{base space}.\]
are connected to each other by the connector. A parallelism can be seen between figure (55) and figure (51). From the parallelism, it is safe to say that the speech-act verbs occurring in Type 2 J-SACs are the linguistic realizations of connectors in the sense of Mental Space theory. As such, speech-act verbs play an important part in structuring mental spaces. In this way, the view that the protases and fake apodoses are semantically connected by speech-act verbs is supported or endorsed by the Mental Space theory.

3.5.4. Is the Apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs Also Fake?

As seen above, the apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs are not real but fake in the sense that causal relations are established between their protases and speech-act verbs (e.g. *osieru* ‘inform’ and *yuuo* ‘tell’). Put more precisely, there is no immediately accessible knowledge which would support causal relations between the protases and fake apodoses. It might be argued, however, that this idea is also applicable to the apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs; that is, the apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs are also fake apodoses. Observe the example in (43a) again, repeated here as (56):

(56) nanika tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo.
    something eat-want  if   fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part

    ‘If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.’

It is true that in sentence (56), there is no immediately accessible knowledge which would support a causal relation between the hearer’s wish and the existence of food in the fridge. In this sense, the apodosis *there is food in the fridge* might be regarded as a fake apodosis.

This argument is not to the point, however. Recall here that a chain of inferences is involved in the interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs, as discussed in the
previous section. That is, to interpret sentence (56), one has to follow a procedure like the following:

(57) nanika tabetai nara reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru

„if you want to eat something” „there is food in the fridge”

[premise] [intermediate step 1]

→ tabemono-wa taberu-tameni aru tabete-yoi / tabe-nasai

„food is there to be eaten’ „you may eat it / eat it’

[intermediate step 2] [final conclusion]

In interpreting sentence (56), the hearer starts his/her reasoning with the premise, goes through the two (or more) intermediate steps, reaching the final conclusion. In this process, the intermediate steps can be regarded as provisional conclusions in that they are drawn from the previous premises: intermediate step 1 is drawn from the premise as a provisional conclusion, and in turn, intermediate step 1 works as a premise to draw another provisional conclusion (intermediate step 2), and then the second provisional conclusion functions as a premise to draw the final conclusion. Thus, it is safe to say that causality is guaranteed in each step: between the premise and intermediate step 1, between intermediate step 1 and intermediate step 2, and between intermediate step 2 and the final conclusion. This means that the chain of inferences guarantees the causal relation in Type 1 J-SACs: the intermediate steps can be regarded as conclusions, if not final.

Furthermore, the view that the apodosis of a Type 1 J-SAC should be regarded as real is valid from the viewpoint of Mental Space theory. As argued above, the protasis and apodosis of a Type 1 J-SACs are semantically relevant to each other. For

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30 In this sense, Type 1 SACs are closer to epistemic conditionals. I will discuss this matter briefly in Section 3.6.
instance, the protasis and apodosis of the statement *If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge* are related in terms of food or eating act. Specifically, the clause *if you want to eat something* sets up a discourse context, a speech-act space wherein the statement *there is food in the fridge* makes sense and is taken as effective. It follows that the protasis and apodosis belong to the same mental space and are internally related, which is parallel with the case of standard predictive conditional sentences, i.e. content-domain conditionals, such as (52).

From the above discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that the apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs can be regarded as a real apodosis.\(^{31}\) This is a crucial difference between Type 1 and Type 2 J-SACs in terms of the relationship between their protases and apodoses.

### 3.5.5. Why Do Type 2 J-SACs Not Allow the Unmarked Word Order of Japanese?

Before concluding this section, I note here that there remains a problem: why should the speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs occur not after but before the fake apodoses, as shown in (46b)? Observe sentence (46b), repeated here as (58):

(58) * kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa
interest-Nom you-have if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen real name-Top
Isida Taro da to osieru.
Ishida Taro Cop Comp inform
„If you’re interested, I inform you Jun’ichi Isida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

Admittedly, I am not in a position to give any clear answer to this question. However,

\(^{31}\) In contrast with my view, Declerck and Reed (2001) refer to the apodosis of this kind as a pseudo-apodosis, because it represents an intermediate step of a reasoning process, not the final conclusion. However, this view is not valid for the reason just given.
as will be discussed in the next chapter, such verbs can be analyzed as markers of *addressee-oriented expressions* and they must occur before superficial apodoses in order to indicate that the fake apodoses are *public expressions* (speech acts given to addressees). Without them, the fake apodoses might be interpreted as *speaker-oriented expressions (private expressions)*, which is not compatible with the addressee-oriented characteristics of SACs.

This view is quite compatible with Dancygier’s (1998:91) comment that the protases of speech-act conditionals in general are stylistic devices meant to ensure appropriateness of what is communicated in their apodoses, often, not exclusively, by making them more polite. Furthermore, Tsubomoto (1993:122) states that in many cases, SACs are used as rhetorical expressions which represent the speaker’s (or writer’s) consideration for the hearer (or reader). That is to say, they are used as a kind of introductory remark. In fact, the form *X-ga/kedo „X, but’* is often used as an introductory remark, as in *sumimasen ga „Excuse me, but’, zannen desu ga „I regret to say’, kokodake no hanashi dakedo „between you and me’, and the like.* If the speech-act verbs are placed in the unmarked order SOV, it means that Type 2 J-SACs cannot function adequately as an introductory remark. Given this, it is expected that the *X nara yuu (osieru / kiku) ga-clause* in Type 2 J-SACs has, to some extent, become a fixed, grammaticalized expression, although the value of *X* in the frame is contextually assigned.

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32 The terms *addressee-oriented expression, public expression, and private expression* are drawn from Hirose (1995). According to Hirose (1995:226), an addressee-oriented expression is defined as a linguistic expression that semantically presupposes the existence of an addressee; the concepts *public expression’ and ‘private expression’ refer to two different levels of linguistic expression which correspond to two different functions of language. The former is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the communicative function of language, whereas the latter is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language. For more details, see Hirose (1995, 1997) and Chapter 4 of this thesis.

33 For more details about Japanese introductory remarks, see Tamon (2008).
3.5.6. Summary

This section has focused on Type 2 J-SACs and chiefly addressed the following questions:

(59)  a. What is the function of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs?
    b. What is the status of the surface apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs?

The respective answers to these questions are summarized as follows:

(60)  a. The speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs function as connectors: they semantically connect nara-clauses and fake apodoses, and their presence guarantees causality.
    b. The apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs is fake in that it has no direct semantic relationship with the protasis.

3.6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I argued that speech-act conditionals in Japanese (J-SACs) must be classified on the basis of their characteristics into two types, i.e. Type 1 J-SACs and Type 2 J-SACs. In Type 1 J-SACs, which do not require speech-act verbs, their apodoses serve as reference points to access implicit conclusions, i.e. speech acts intended by the speaker. In combination with reference points, a pragmatic principle referred to as the Desirability Principle plays a key role in facilitating the interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs. On the other hand, Type 2 J-SACs require speech-act verbs to explicitly express or guarantee causal relations and to establish semantic relevance between their protases and fake apodoses.

In concluding this chapter, a few further remarks should be made. First, as
alluded to above, Type 1 J-SACs are similar to epistemic conditionals in that causal relations are guaranteed at the inference level. Type 2 J-SACs, on the other hand, are similar to content domain conditionals in that causal relations are guaranteed at the event level. This alludes to the possibility that Type 1 J-SACs are developed from epistemic-domain conditionals, while Type 2 J-SACs from content-domain conditionals. The diachronic development process of J-SACs may also be an interesting issue, although I will not go into further detail here.

Second, it is worth noting that Japanese conditionals have specialized forms for the two types of SACs as well as for the conditionals in the other two domains. That is, the forms of Japanese conditionals, in many cases, reflect the difference in the three domains and the two types of J-SACs. In English, on the other hand, a single conditional form can be used in all the domains, according to contexts. Take the following English sentence for example:

(61) If Mary comes, John will go out.

If this sentence describes an event in the real world, the most natural interpretation of sentence (61) is the content domain reading: the event of Mary’s coming will trigger the event of John’s going out. In some other situations, however, (61) can be interpreted as an epistemic conditional. Imagine a situation where the speaker knows that Mary always comes when John goes out, and the speaker utters this sentence on hearing the news of Mary’s coming. In this situation, sentence (61) represents the speaker’s inference or prediction. The unmarked interpretation in this case is the epistemic reading: the speaker’s knowledge of Mary’s coming draws his/her conclusion John will go out.

Furthermore, sentence (61) can be interpreted even as a speech-act conditional in some contexts. Let us assume that (61) is uttered to a third person, namely, Tom.
The speaker knows that Tom loves Mary, but Mary herself does not know it. John’s presence prevents Tom from confessing his love to her. The speaker is informed of John’s leaving by another person. Also, the speaker is sure that if Tom is informed of John’s going out, he will tell Mary how much he loves her. In this situation, sentence (61) can be interpreted as a speech-act domain conditional, i.e. Type 1 SAC. That is, the if-clause is asserted to be a felicity condition for a speech act about the apodosis, and the apodosis embodies an effort on the part of the speaker to get Tom to confess his love to Mary, i.e. encouragement.

In this way, with regard to English conditionals, even an alleged typical example of content domain conditionals can be interpreted in three ways without changing its form, depending on the contexts where it is uttered.34 In this light, it is reasonable to suppose that the difference in the domains (polysemy, by extension) is hardly, if ever, reflected on the forms in English.

As for Japanese conditionals, this kind of ambiguity is kept to the minimum with the help of the four conditional markers (i.e. nara, reba, tara, and to) and other linguistic equipment such as addressee-oriented expressions and epistemic markers (e.g. yuu „tell”, -yo (an addressee-oriented expression), noda (an epistemic marker of assertion), and the like). That is to say, the three domains and the forms of conditionals often, if not always, correspond one-to-one to each other. Let us take, for example, the Japanese counterparts to the three interpretations of (61):

(62) a. Mearii-ga ki-tara, Zyon-wa dekakeru. (= content domain)
    Mary-Nom come-if John-Top go out
    „If Mary comes, John will go out.’

b. Mearii-ga kuru-no nara, Zyon-wa dekakeru-noda. (= epistemic)
    
34 A quite similar discussion is developed by Sweetser (1990:123-125).
Mary-Nom come-Ep if John-Top go out-Ep

‚If Mary comes, John will go out.’

c. Mearii-ga kuru nara osieteageru-kedo, Zyon-wa dekakeru-yo.

(= speech act)

Mary-Nom come if I tell you-but John-Top go out-AO

‚If Mary comes, I tell you John will go out.’

As seen in (62), Japanese conditionals in the three domains are disambiguated by different markers, represented in italics. For example, in (62a), the conditional marker *tara* is used. As Masuoka (1993:3) points out, *tara* mainly expresses the temporal interdependency of the events described in protases and apodoses, and it is a specialized marker of content domain conditionals.35 In the same way, the epistemic marker *noda* is used to indicate that sentence (62b) is an epistemic conditional. In (62c), it is apparent that the sentence is a speech act conditional by virtue of *nara* as a marker of speech-act conditionals, *osieru* ‚inform’ and -yo (an addressee-oriented expression).36

These observations suggest that Japanese conditionals are easier than English ones to disambiguate, owing to the specialized makers. It is true that Type 1 SACs in Japanese are similar to epistemic conditionals, and Type 2 J-SACs are similar to content domain conditionals in some respects; however, this raises no problem in use. In fact, their superficial similarities partly contribute to the disambiguation of

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35 The content-domain conditional markers *tara* and *reba* can be used as SACs in some restricted situations. However, the speech-act use of *tara* and *reba* is their secondary use. For more details, see Tsunoda (2004).

36 Note here that sentence (62c) is a Type 2 SAC syntactically and, at the same time, a Type 1 SAC in terms of its interpretation. As discussed in Section 3.5, the presence of speech-act verbs such as *yuu* ‚tell’ and *osieru* ‚inform’ has a lot to do with the relevance between protases and fake apodoses. With regard to this example, the relationship between the contents of the protasis and that of the fake apodosis seems to be as weak as in Type 2 SACs in general in that the causal relation established between the event in the *nara*-clause and the one in the (fake) apodosis is weak.
conditional constructions. It should be considered where the difference between Japanese conditionals and English conditionals comes from.

Recall here that the three domains themselves are linked via conceptual metaphors, as argued in Section 3.2.1. It is reasonable to attribute this difference to the difference between Japanese and English in the extensibility by virtue of metaphor: the system of grammar in English tends to be affected by metaphor, while the system of grammar in Japanese is not, compared with English. Although metaphor is pervasive in Japanese as well as in English in terms of lexical meanings, its extensibility to their grammars is different. In this connection, Yasui (2005:14) refers to Japanese as an “analytic-extension language,” which is disposed to expand its expressive variation in expression by the combination of words. That is, Japanese is not very good at extending its grammatical variations via the system of metaphor, including metonymy. English, on the other hand, is referred to as a “metonymic-extension language,” which tends to expand their grammatical variations via metonymy in a positive manner. That is, English is very good at extending its grammatical variations via the system of metaphor as well as metonymy. The ambiguity of English conditionals illustrated by example (61) can be attributed to this extensibility: English is good at extending its grammatical variations via metaphor and metonymy, which enables a single form to express multiple meanings.

In light of this, using special markers to refer to particular domains is a realization of a kind of last resort: in Japanese, there is no means to reflect the

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37 Yasui (2005) himself does not refer to the influence of metaphor on grammar. However, I assume that metonymy and metaphor can be regarded as variants of the similar cognitive system in a broader sense. In this connection, Taniguchi (2003) points out that metaphor and metonymy are not incompatible, and that they sometimes overlap with each other and constitute a moderate continuum. In addition, Halliday (1994) deals with three figures of speech, i.e. metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche, in a unified manner in terms of grammatical metaphor. For more details, see Taniguchi (2003:153-170) and Halliday (1994:340-367).

38 For more details, see Yasui (2005).
difference as to the domains other than to use the “analytic” approach. Hence, the various relationships between the protases and apodoses in Japanese SACs (and epistemic conditionals) must be explicitly expressed one by one, analytically by using specialized linguistic equipment.

As discussed so far, the influence of metaphor/metonymy on the system of grammar is an interesting theme to be investigated. English is affected by metaphor/metonymy, while Japanese is not. In the next chapter, I will focus on Type 2 SACs in Japanese and English, and conduct a contrastive study from the viewpoint of addressee-orientedness and the influence of metaphor/metonymy on the system of grammar.
Chapter 4


4.1. Introduction: Overview and Questions

To begin with, let us have a quick review of Chapter 3, because the discussion in this chapter is in part based on the classification and findings there.

In Chapter 3, I focused on speech-act conditionals (SACs) in Japanese, and classified them into two types. Let us observe the following examples:

(1)  a. nanika tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo.
    something eat-want  if  fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part
    „If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.’

   b. kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no
    interest-Nom you-have if inform  but  Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen
    hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.
    real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop
    „If you’re interested, I inform you Junichi Ishida’s real name is Taro
    Ishida.’

Sentence (1a) is classified into what I refer to as Type 1 SACs (Type 1 J-SACs), and sentence (1b) is classified into Type 2 SACs (Type 2 J-SACs). This classification is based on the following characteristics:
In Type 1 J-SACs
a. the occurrence of speech-act verbs such as yuu ‘tell’ and osieru ‘inform’ are optional; more naturally, they don’t occur.
b. their apodoses work as clues to implicit conclusions.

In Type 2 J-SACs
a. the occurrence of speech-act verbs such as yuu ‘tell’ and osieru ‘inform’ are obligatory.
b. their apodoses do not work as clues to implicit conclusions.

A closer observation has revealed the following points:

In Type 1 J-SACs, their apodoses work as reference points to access implicit conclusions. In addition, the Desirability Principle helps to limit the potential conclusions and to single out the proper illocutionary force intended.

The speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs function as connectors: they semantically connect nara-clauses and fake apodoses, and their presence guarantees causality.

The apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs is fake in that it has no direct semantic relationship with the protasis.

As seen in (2)-(5), speech-act verbs play a key role in the differentiation of the two types of J-SACs.

The comparison of Type 2 J-SACs with English Type 2 SACs (hereafter, Type 2 E-SACs) shows an interesting phenomenon concerning speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs. Let us observe the following examples:

a. If you want to know, I haven’t seen him. (Palmer (1988:154))
b. If you are interested, Gerald Ford’s real name is Leslie L. King.
Here I classify these English speech-act conditionals into Type 2 E-SACs, because their counterparts in Japanese require speech-act verbs, as shown below:

\[(7)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \quad \text{siri tai nara } yuu \text{ ga, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai} \\
& \quad \text{know want if } \text{tell} \quad \text{but, I-Top} \quad \text{him-Dat} \quad \text{see-Neg} \\
& \quad \text{‘If you want to know, I tell you I haven’t seen him.’} \\
\text{b. } & \quad \text{kyoomi-ga aru nara } osieru \text{ ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no} \\
& \quad \text{interest-Nom you-have if } \text{inform} \quad \text{but} \quad \text{Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen} \\
& \quad \text{hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.} \\
& \quad \text{real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop} \\
& \quad \text{‘If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’} \\
\text{c. } & \quad \text{anata-ga sira nai nara } iimasu \text{ ga, ima wareware-wa} \\
& \quad \text{you-Nom know not if } \text{tell} \quad \text{but now we-Top} \\
& \quad \text{kyooto eki-ni orimasu.} \\
& \quad \text{Kyoto Station-Loc are (Pol)} \\
& \quad \text{‘I tell you we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don’t know.’}
\end{align*}\]

In (7), the speech-act verbs in question are represented in italics. As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, Type 2 J-SACs require them for functional reasons. Conversely, if the speech-act verbs are deleted, all the sentences in (7) are rendered ungrammatical:

\[(8)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \quad * \text{siri tai nara, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai} \\
& \quad \text{know want if} \quad \text{I-Top} \quad \text{him-Dat} \quad \text{see-Neg}
\end{align*}\]
In this way, whether Type 2 J-SACs are acceptable or not is crucially influenced by the presence of speech-act verbs.

Let us turn to Type 2 E-SACs. In contrast to (8), Type 2 E-SACs do not require the presence of speech act expressions. Observe the examples below:

(9) a. If you want to know, I tell you I haven’t seen him.

b. If you are interested, I inform you Gerald Ford’s real name is Leslie L. King.

c. I tell you we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don’t know.

The sentences in (9) are those with speech-act expressions added to the sentences in (6). In (9), the speech-act verbs at issue, including their subjects and indirect objects, are represented in italics.¹ As seen from the comparison of (6) with (9), speech-act

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¹ As shown in the examples in (9), if speech-act verbs are expressed, their subjects and indirect objects also have to be explicitly stated in the case of English. In this thesis, however, we do not bring this matter into question.
verbs are optional in Type 2 E-SACs.  

From the observations so far, the questions to be answered in this chapter arise, as presented in (10):

(10)  a.  Why are speech-act verbs obligatory in Type 2 J-SACs?
    b.  Why are speech-act verbs optional in Type 2 E-SACs?

The main concern of this chapter is with the questions in (10). Recall that the question in (10a) has already been answered in the previous chapter: speech-act verbs are obligatorily required to explicitly express or guarantee causal relations and to establish semantic relevance between the protases and fake apodoses. However, it should be noted that this answer is not given to explain the difference between Type 2 J-SACs and Type 2 E-SACs. This chapter attempts to answer the questions in (10) from a different perspective. Specifically, I will address the questions in (10) mainly in terms of addressee-orientedness and clause linkage. Furthermore, I will refer to the expectation that the property of addressee-orientedness and the extensibility of syntactic variations via metonymic operations are closely related to each other.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 reviews previous studies and shows the scope of this chapter. Section 4.3, as the first step of our discussion, reviews the notion of addressee-orientedness on the basis of Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000). Section 4.4 gives answers to the questions in (10) in terms of addressee-orientedness. Section 4.5 investigates Type 2 J- and E-SACs in terms of clause linkage, adopting the two semantic notions Speaker Involvement (cf. Maat and Degand (2001)) and C-gravitation (cf. Wada (2005, 2008, 2010)). Section 4.6 deals

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2 It is true that some native speakers of English judge that the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 E-SACs is not optional but deviant or anomalous. Nevertheless, the difference between Type 2 J- and E-SACs I point out here still remains. At the very least, speech-act verbs are required in Type 2 J-SACs, while they are not required in Type 2 E-SACs.
with the mechanism which seems to underpin the addressee-orientedness of English in terms of metonymic extensibility (cf. Yasui (2005)) and grammatical metaphor (cf. Halliday (1994)). Section 4.7 gives some concluding remarks.

4.2. Previous Studies and the Scope of this Chapter

Before moving on to a detailed discussion, I refer to previous studies and the scope of this chapter.

4.2.1. Previous Studies

As described in Chapter 1, numerous studies have been concerned with conditionals and related issues (cf. Arita (1993) and Declerck and Reed (2001)). Among them, Nakau (1994), Tsunoda (2004), and Sweetser (1990) study conditionals from the viewpoint of polysemy and clausal linkage.

However, to the best of my knowledge, no study has paid special attention to the questions presented in (10). To put it more precisely, quite a few researchers notice the phenomenon at issue, but do not deal with it as a main topic. As a result, no study has yet answered the questions in (10).

For instance, as seen in Chapter 3, Sakahara (1985) conducts a comprehensive study of conditional constructions in Japanese and their interpretations. Although he deals with SACs (i.e. pseudo-conditionals, in his term) in detail, he just gives the following remarks on the example in (6c): the literal translation of conditionals of this type into Japanese (i.e. the literal translation of (6c) into (8c)) is sometimes “uncomfortable.” However, all he does in this connection is to point out that sentence (7c) is much more desirable or appropriate as the literal translation of (6c). He does not give the reason why sentence (7c) is more desirable or “comfortable” than
sentence (6c). Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011) also recognizes the difference between English and Japanese as to the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs and related constructions. From the viewpoint of relevance theory (cf. Sperber and Wilson (1995)), he regards the occurrence of speech-act verbs as the linguistic realization of higher-level explicatures (cf. Wilson and Sperber (1993)) and points out that higher-level explicatures are obligatorily realized in Japanese, while they are optional in English. However, he does not address the questions why higher-level explicatures are obligatorily realized in Japanese and why they do not have to be realized in English.

4.2.2. Scope

In this chapter, I will focus on Type 2 SACs, and will not deal with Type 1 SACs. The first reason is that Type 1 SACs are well-formed and acceptable without speech-act verbs, as in (11):

(11) a. nanika tabetai nara (yuu kedo), reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo.
   b. If you want to eat something, (I tell you) there is food in the fridge.

The examples in (11) show that the presence of speech-act verbs does not influence the grammaticality of Type 1 SACs. In Type 1 J-SACs, as well as in Type 1 E-SACs,

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3 Higher-level explicatures are defined as conceptual representations constructed by embedding the proposition expressed by an utterance under a speech act or propositional attitude description:

(i) a. Seriously, I can’t help you.
   b. Frankly, I can’t help you.
   c. Confidentially, I can’t help you.

Following Wilson and Sperber (1993), the higher-level explicatures of the sentences in (i) can be represented as follows:

(ii) a. I tell you seriously that I can’t help you.
   b. I say frankly to you that I can’t help you.
   c. I inform you confidentially that I can’t help you.

From the paraphrases in (ii), we can see that the sentence adverbs in (i) represent the speaker’s mental attitude toward the utterance I can’t help you. For more details, see Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Uchida (2011).
speech-act verbs are optional: they may be used, but do not have to be (or more precisely, the non-occurrence of speech-act verbs is unmarked).

Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, the interpretation of this type of SACs demands the mechanism referred to as a chain of inferences (cf. Declerck and Reed (2001:320)). Observe the following figure:

(12) nanika tabetai nara → reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru

„if you want to eat something’ „there is food in the fridge’

[premise] [intermediate step 1]

→ tabemono-wa taberu-tameni aru → tabete-yoi / tabs-nasai

„food is there to be eaten’ „you may eat it / eat it’

[intermediate step 2] [final conclusion]

Figure (12) represents (an example of) a chain of inferences involved in the interpretation of (11). In interpreting the sentences in (11), the hearer has to follow the following process: the hearer starts his/her reasoning with the premise, goes through the two (or more) intermediate steps, and reaches the final conclusion. As already pointed out in Chapter 3, the interpretation of Type 2 SACs, in most cases, does not demand such a reasoning process on the part of the hearer. From the observations so far, Type 1 SACs are left out of consideration in this chapter.4

With regard to the scope of this chapter, it should be noted that I will treat if and nara as the prototypical conditional markers used in E-SACs and J-SACs, respectively. As for English, there are few, if any, conditional markers other than if used as a marker of SACs (note that the phrase in case is used in the translation of sentence (13) below).5 The use of if is overwhelming.

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4 As pointed out in Chapter 3, some Type 2 SACs demand a chain of inferences on the part of the hearer. See footnote 36 in Chapter 3.

5 Declerck and Reed (2001:323) point out that the use of if in SACs is restricted in some cases, as in:...
As for Japanese, it is widely acknowledged that there are at least four conditional markers: *reba*, *tara*, *to*, and *nara*. As Tsunoda (2004) points out, among the four markers, *nara* is the specialized marker of J-SACs. By *specialized*, I do not mean that *nara* is the only conditional marker that can be used in J-SACs. In fact, other markers, namely, *reba* can be used as in:

```
(13) okizuki-de nake-reba moosiagemasu ga, sitagi no suso-ga aware-Cop not-if I tell you (honorific) but slip-Nom mietemasu-yo.
```

showing-Part

„Your slip is showing, in case you are not aware of it.”

(Nakau (1994:106) [italics are mine])

However, in most cases, the conditional markers other than *nara* are not be acceptable, as shown below:

```
(14) ki-ga raku-ni {naru /na-reba /nat-tara /naru to} yuu kedo, sore-wa kimi-no see dewa nai.
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„If it will make you feel better, it’s not your fault.”

The four conditional markers are represented in italics in (14). In this example, of all the four markers, *nara* alone renders the sentence grammatical.

Thus, in the following discussion, I treat *if* and *nara* as representative conditional markers and leave the other markers out of consideration, except when

(i) {In case/*If} you get the wrong idea, their wives approve and get on well when the two leaders socialise.
They attribute the absolute unacceptability of *if* replacing *in case* in this example to the fact that the *in case*-clause receives a preclusive (preventative) interpretation: the speaker wants to prevent the addressee getting the wrong idea. That is, the meaning of sentence (i) should be interpreted as “In order to prevent you from getting the wrong idea, I tell you that their wives approve and get on well when the two leaders socialise.” The use of *if* cannot cover this interpretation. For more details, see Declerck and Reed (2001:323-325).

6 This is also pointed out by Kuno (1973) and Masuoka (1993).
they are used in the examples taken from previous studies.

4.3. The Addressee-Orientedness of Japanese and English

In this section, I will discuss the addressee-orientedness of Japanese and English. The following discussion is based on Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000). Hirose claims that linguistic expression acts can be classified into two levels according to their functions: public expression act and private expression act. He refers to linguistic expressions for public expression acts and those for private expression acts as public expressions and private expressions, respectively. In what follows, on the basis of the distinction between the concepts public expression and private expression, I argue that Type 2 SACs are public expressions presupposing the presence of an addressee, and that they function as markers of public expressions.

4.3.1. Public and Private Expression (Act)

First of all, the concepts ‘public expression (act)’ and ‘private expression (act)’ should be defined.\(^7\) Let us review Hirose (1995). Hirose (1995) recognizes the dual nature of linguistic expressions: public expression and private expression. His definition of these concepts is as follows:

(15) By the concepts ‘public expression’ and ‘private expression’, I mean two levels of linguistic expression which correspond to two different functions

\(^7\) In the following discussion in this section, we are almost exclusively concerned with Japanese sentences as examples. The reason is that the distinction between public expression and private expression is more explicitly reflected in Japanese than in English. However, this does not mean that the distinction is never reflected in English expressions:

(i) Run!
(ii) * I think run.

Sentence (i) is imperative, and thus is a public expression. As will be seen below, verbs of thinking such as think cannot take public expressions as their reported-clause complement, as shown in (ii). In this way, the distinction between public expression and private expression is valid in English, too.
of language. Public expression is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the communicative function of language, whereas private expression is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language.

(Hirose (1995:226))

It goes without saying that language can be used to express our thoughts and communicate them to others. In this light, the act of communicating presupposes the act of expressing: the former may be characterized as a special case of the latter. In other words, communication of thoughts can be defined as expression of thoughts conveyed to others. Hirose (1995) refers to an act of linguistic expression with the intention of communication as a public expression act. Put differently, a public expression act is to express our thoughts in language with the intention of communicating them by using public expressions.

On the other hand, we can express our thoughts without intending to communicate something. For example, suppose you are alone somewhere, thinking that you are lonely. The thought *I am lonely* is not expressed to communicate in that case: you are just thinking in language, and you should not be thereby communicating with anyone. In this way, language can be used just for thinking. Hirose (1995) refers to an action of thinking in language without communicating to anyone as a private expression act. In other words, a private expression act is to express one’s thought without intending to communicate it to others, and linguistic expressions realizing one’s thoughts are private expressions.

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8 Note that this does not apply when you are talking to yourself or someone you have in your mind, in which case you are using the expression *I am lonely* for communication (cf. Hirose (1995:226)).
4.3.2. Public Expressions as Addressee-Oriented Expressions

Now let us turn to the notion of addressee-orientedness. Hirose (1995:226) points out that there are linguistic expressions that semantically presuppose the existence of an addressee. He refers to such expressions as addressee-oriented expressions. The following is the list of typical addressee-oriented expressions in Japanese presented in Hirose (1995:226-227):

(16) a. certain sentence-final particles: yo ‚I tell you’, ne ‚you know’, sa ‚let me tell you’, wa ‚I want you to know’, etc.
b. imperative expressions like hashire ‚Run!’
c. vocative expressions like ooi/oi ‚hey’
d. response expressions like hai/iie ‚yes/no’
e. pragmatic adverbials of various sorts: sumimasen ga ‚Excuse me, but’, zannenn desu ga ‚I regret to say’, kokodake no hanasi dakedo ‚between you and me’, sottyoku ni yuu to ‚frankly speaking’, etc.
f. polite verbs like desu/masu/(de)gozaimasu
g. hearsay expressions like (da)soda/(da)tte ‚I hear’

Now, the relationships between public/private expression (act) and addressee-oriented expressions should be considered. Hirose (1995:227) states that addressee-oriented expressions are, by definition, used only as public expressions. For example, as Hirose states, the polite verbs in (16f) can be said to be addressee-oriented because they show respect for the addressee: showing respect linguistically for the addressee is a public expression act. Thus, phrases and sentences containing addressee-oriented expressions function as public expressions.

For a better understanding of the relationship between public/private expressions
and addressee-orientedness, take the sentence *Ame da* ,It’s raining’ for example, taken from Hirose (1995). This sentence consists of the noun *ame* ,rain’ and the assertive copula *da*. The sentence can be used as a private expression unless it is used by the speaker with the intention of communicating the information *Ame da* ,It’s raining’ to another person, because it contains no addressee-oriented expression.

However, just because a sentence contains no addressee-oriented expression does not mean that it is exclusively used as a private expression. A sentence without addressee-oriented expressions can also be used as a public expression as long as the speaker utters it with the intention of communicating the information conveyed in it to others. For example, if one uses the sentence *Ame da* ,It’s raining’ without an addressee, whether s/he actually utters it or not, it functions as a private expression; because in this case, it is used exclusively to express what s/he thinks. On the other hand, if one utters the sentence, realizing that it is raining, to communicate that information to his/her addressees, it functions as a public expression, because in this case, it is used for the purpose of communication. It should be acknowledged, however, that it is more natural in conversational Japanese to say *Ame da yo* ,It’s raining, I tell you’ or *Ame da ne* ,It’s raining, you know’, using sentence final particles which serve to linguistically realize addressee-orientedness.

In the light of the discussion above, the relationship between the sentence *Ame da* and addressee-orientedness is schematically represented as follows:

(17) \( \langle \text{Ame da} \rangle + \text{addressee-orientedness} \rightarrow [\text{Ame da}] \)

(Hirose (1995:228))

In (17), the angled brackets \( \langle \text{ } \rangle \) represent private expression, and the square brackets \([\text{ }]\) public expression.\(^9\) Thus, \( \langle \text{Ame da} \rangle \) is a private expression, expressing a thought of

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\(^9\) In the subsequent discussion, I use these two brackets in the same fashion as (17).
the speaker or thinker, and [Ame da] is a public expression with the speaker’s intention to communicate the information (i.e. it’s raining) to others. The schematic representation in (17) is meant to indicate that the private expression 〈Ame da〉 turns into a public expression if it is given addressee-orientedness. Conversely, the public expression [Ame da] can be divided into two components: the private expression 〈Ame da〉 and addressee-orientedness. That is, the public expression [Ame da] contains the private expression 〈Ame da〉 in it.

As seen from the example Ame da, a single expression can be used not only as a public expression but also as a private expression. Therefore, it should be noted that the distinction between public and private expressions applies not to the distinction of linguistic expression per se, but to the distinction of language use.

If the addressee-orientedness given to the expression Ame da is linguistically realized via an addressee-oriented expression such as yo, its schematic representation is presented as follows:

(18) a. 〈Ame da〉 + [yo] → [Ame da yo]

b. 〈Ame da〉

   ↓

   [desu] → [Ame desu]

(Hirose (1995:228))

As argued above, addressee-oriented expressions are public expressions by definition. They serve to turn private expressions into public expressions, as shown in (18). In (18a), the sentence-final particle yo ‘I tell you’ renders the private expression 〈Ame da〉 a public expression. In (18b), on the other hand, the assertive marker da is replaced by the square-bracketed desu, as indicated by the downward arrow. The word desu in the square brackets is a polite verb, as shown in (16f). In this case, the
word *desu* makes the private expression *〈Ame da〉* a public expression.

So far, this subsection has dealt with Hirose’s (1995) notion of public/private expression. As seen above, private expressions are representations of the speaker’s/thinker’s thoughts. That is, if a speaker says to a hearer, “Ame da yo,” the latter gets from what the former says not only information about the external world, but also information about the speaker’s mental state.

The distinction between public and private expressions is relevant to the following grammatical constraint, proposed by Hirose (1995):

(19) A verb of thinking allows only a private expression in its reported-clause complement.

\[(Hirose \ (1995:229))\]

For a better understanding of the constraint in (19), let us observe the following examples:\(^{10}\)

(20) a.  Taro wa *〈ame da〉* to omotte-iru.

\[
\text{Taro TOP QUOT think-STAT}
\]

„Taro thinks it is raining.’


„Taro thinks “It is raining, I tell you.”‘

\[(Hirose \ (1995:229))\]

In sentence (20a), as indicated by the angled brackets, the private expression *〈ame da〉* is allowed in the reported-clause complement. Hence the grammaticality of sentence (20a). In (20b), on the other hand, the public expression [ame da yo] occurs as the reported-clause complement. Hence the ungrammaticality of sentence (20b). These examples show how well the constraint in (19) works in distinguishing public expressions and private expressions. As shown below, the distinction between public

\(^{10}\) In (20), QUOT stands for quotative particle and STAT for static morpheme.
and private expressions, together with the constraint in (19), plays a key role in analyzing Type 2 SACs.

4.3.3. Difference between Japanese and English in Terms of Communicativity

Let us move on to another significant issue pointed out by Hirose (1997): the difference between Japanese and English in terms of communicativity. By the term *communicativity*, I mean the degree to which an expression in a language or, by extension, the language per se lends itself to communication. Take the expressions *Ame da* „It’s raining” and *Ame da yo* „It’s raining, I tell you”, for example, again. As stated above, the expression *Ame da* can be used not only as a public expression but also as a private expression. In other words, the expression *Ame da* is ambiguous between public and private expressions. The distinction is pragmatically determined in the sense that it depends on the situation in which the sentence is uttered. In this sense, *Ame da* is not so well-suited to communication. The expression *Ame da yo*, on the other hand, is explicitly used as a public expression. The sentence-final particle *yo* is an addressee-oriented expression, and thus *Ame da yo* is distinctly a public expression. In this sense, *Ame da yo* is well-suited to communication. In other words, the expression *Ame da* is communicatively weak, while the expression *Ame da yo* is communicatively strong.

By the same token, languages can be divided into two classes: communicatively strong and weak. In this regard, Hirose (1997) argues that Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is private expression, that is, not communication but rather representation of thoughts; on the other hand, English is a communicatively strong language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is public expression, that is,
communication (see also Hirose (2000) and Hasegawa and Hirose (2005)).

Hirose’s (1997) claim is based on the following pieces of evidence. First, Japanese has a special word for private self (i.e. zibun ‘self’), but not any special word for public self, whereas English has a special word for public self (i.e. I), but not for any special word for private self. Second, as can be inferred from (16), Japanese, compared to English, has developed a wide variety of addressee-oriented expressions (i.e. expressions used exclusively for communication). In other words, it is such addressee-oriented expressions that render the Japanese language and its expressions appropriate for various communicative purposes. Without them, Japanese would not be communicative enough. On the other hand, English is communicative enough without such addressee-oriented expressions. That is, English sentences can be used in various communicative situations without recourse to addressee-oriented expressions. To put it metaphorically, just as people wear some clothes when going out, Japanese expressions „wear’ addressee-oriented expressions when they are used for communication; in contrast, English can go out without „wearing’ them, because the notion of addressee-orientedness is intrinsically included in it. Based on the pieces of evidence relevant to the characteristics above, Japanese is characterized as a private-self centered language, while English is characterized as a public-self centered language (see Hirose (2000) and Hasegawa and Hirose (2005) for related discussions).

The discussion so far can be summarized as follows:

(21) Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature, while English is a communicatively strong language by nature, because the former’s unmarked mode of expression is private expression, while the latter’s

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11 Hirose (1995) defines public self and private self as follows: the former is the subject of a public expression act, and the latter is the subject of a private expression act. For more details, see Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000).
unmarked mode of expression is public expression.

With the grammatical constraint in (19) and the difference between Japanese and English in terms of communicativity (or private/public-centeredness) in mind, I will now return to the issue to be considered in this chapter in (10).

4.3.4. Type 2 SACs as Public Expressions

In the previous subsections, I introduced the following notions: public/private expression (acts) and communicativity. As previously argued, the distinction between public expression and private expression deeply interacts with the notion of communicativity. In this subsection, I will consider how Type 2 J- and E-SACs can be analyzed in terms of those notions.

As their name shows, SACs, including Type 1 and Type 2, are public expressions with addressee-orientedness. Specifically, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the apodoses of Type 1 SACs realize efforts on the part of the speaker to get the hearer to do something, while most of the apodoses of Type 2 SACs are assertions or statements with little, if any, force to get the hearer to do something. Then, it is reasonable to say that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs are addressee-oriented by nature, while those of Type 2 SACs are not. To confirm this point, first of all, let us consider the examples in (6) and (7), repeated here as (22) and (23) respectively:

(22) a. If you want to know, I haven’t seen him.
    b. If you are interested, Gerald Ford’s real name is Leslie L. King.
    c. We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don’t know.

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12 By this statement, I do not mean that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs cannot be used as private expressions in any case. As already argued, a single expression can be used not only as a public expression but also as a private expression. Rather, I mean that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs are easier to interpret as public expressions than those of Type 2 SACs.
As argued above, speech-act conditionals are addressee-oriented by nature. However, in many cases, it is difficult to find some clear illocutionary forces (in the sense of representing some force to get the hearer to do something) in the (fake) apodoses of Type 2 SACs. Thus, it should be considered what parts or elements make Type 2 SACs addressee-oriented.

For a better understanding of this issue, let us apply the grammatical constraint in (19) to the apodoses of the examples in (22) and (23) as a test.\textsuperscript{13, 14} The results of the test are as follows:\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(23)] a. siri tai nara yuu ga, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai
   \begin{itemize}
   \item know want if \textit{tell} but, I-Top him-Dat see-Neg
   \end{itemize}
   „If you want to know, I haven’t seen him.”

b. kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no
   \begin{itemize}
   \item interest-Nom you-have if \textit{inform} but Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen
   \end{itemize}
   hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.
   \begin{itemize}
   \item real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop
   \end{itemize}
   „If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

b. anata-ga sira nai nara iimasu ga, ima wareware-wa
   \begin{itemize}
   \item you-Nom know not if \textit{tell} but now we-Top
   \end{itemize}
   kyoto eki-ni orimasu.
   \begin{itemize}
   \item Kyoto Station-Loc are (Pol)
   \end{itemize}
   „We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don’t know.’
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{13} I realize that it would be fair to conduct this test on the apodoses of Type 1 SACs, too. However, that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs are addressee-oriented is self-evident by the presence of sentence-ending particles like \textit{yo} (cf. Chapter 3), so I do not conduct this test on them.

\textsuperscript{14} Here, the apodoses refer to the fake apodoses.

\textsuperscript{15} In (25c), the original expression \textit{orimasu} „be/exist”, a polite form of \textit{iru}, is replaced by \textit{iru} „be/exist”
The angled brackets in these examples indicate that the expressions in them are private expressions. The results of the test with respect to (24) and (25) show that the apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs, as well as those of Type 2 E-SACs, can be used as private expressions. It is confirmed that the apodoses of Type 2 SACs are not addressee-oriented by nature. It can then be predicted that what makes Type 2 SACs addressee-oriented should be the antecedent clauses. This prediction is borne out, as shown below.\(^{16}\)

(26)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a.}& \quad \text{I think } \langle \text{if you want to know, I haven't seen him} \rangle . \\
\text{b.}& \quad \text{I think } \langle \text{if you are interested, Gerald Ford's real name is Leslie L. King} \rangle . \\
\text{c.}& \quad \text{I think } \langle \text{we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don't know} \rangle . 
\end{align*}

(27)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a.}& \quad \text{watasi-wa } \langle \text{siri tai nara yuu ga (zibun-wa) kare-ni atte-inai} \rangle \text{ to} \\
\end{align*}

\(^{16}\) Sentence (26c), in which the if-clause occurs in the sentence-final position, can be acceptable if the phrase I think is within the scope of the if-clause. In that case, the sentence is interpreted as a SAC conveying the speaker's thought, i.e. I inform you I think we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don't know.
omotte-iru.

‘I think if you want to know, I haven’t seen him.’

b. * watasi-wa 〈 kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da〉 to omotte-iru.

‘I think if you are interested, Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’


‘I think we are now at Kyoto Station if you don’t know.’

As shown in (26) and (27), all the examples are judged ungrammatical. This means that the clauses preceding the apodoses in Type 2 SACs make public expressions with addressee-orientedness, like the expressions listed in (16).

With regard to Type 2 J-SACs, however, the following question should be addressed: which part makes them public expressions, the nara-clause or the speech-act verb? The answer seems to be very simple: it is speech-act verbs such as yuu ‘tell’ and osieru ‘inform’ that make the whole of them public expressions. To confirm this, let us consider the following example:

(28) Mearii-ga kuru nara osieteageru-kedo, Zyon-wa dekakeru-nda.

Mary-Nom come if I tell you-but John-Top go out-Ep

‘If Mary comes, John will go out.’

Without any particular context, example (28) is interpreted as a Type 2 SAC. If we conduct the test with constraint (19) on (28), the result is as follows:

(29) * watasi-wa 〈 Mearii-ga kuru nara osieteageru kedo, Zyon-wa

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17 For the peculiarity of this example, see Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, wherein it is pointed out that this example is interpreted as a Type 1 SAC.
dekakeru) to omotte-iru.

‘I think if Mary comes, I tell you John will go out.’

Just as the examples shown in (27), sentence (29) is judged ungrammatical. Interestingly, if the phrase osieru kedo, ‘I inform you, but’ is deleted, the grammaticality of (29) is dramatically improved or impeccable:

(30) watasi-wa〈Mearii-ga kuru nara, Zyon-wa dekakeru〉to omotte-iru.

‘I think if Mary comes, John will go out.’

In (30), where the phrase osieru kedo is deleted, the most natural interpretation of the bracketed clause is the epistemic one. It goes without saying that epistemic conditionals can be used as private expressions, because they are representations of one’s mental states. From this observation, it is apparent that speech-act verbs contribute to the addressee-orientedness of Type 2 SACs.

In this subsection, I have shown that Type 2 SACs are public expressions. The following points have been clarified. In English, it is the if-clause that makes Type 2 SACs addressee-oriented. On the other hand, it is the speech-act verb that is relevant to the addressee-orientedness of Type 2 J-SACs.

In the next section, on the basis of the findings just above, I will give answers to the questions in (10), repeated here as (31) for ease of reference:

(31) a. Why are speech-act verbs obligatory in Type 2 J-SACs?

b. Why are speech-act verbs optional in Type 2 E-SACs?

18 To put it precisely, it is the presence of higher explication between the if-clause and the apodosis that renders Type 2 E-SACs public expressions. That is, the contrast between (24) and (26) means that the influence of higher explication is dependent on whether the if-clause is present or not. In this sense, ultimately, it is possible that the mechanism which guarantees the relevance between the if-clause and (fake) apodosis in Type 2 E-SACs is equivalent to, or at least in parallel with, that of Type 2 J-SACs in the sense that implicit higher explication in E-SACs and explicit speech-act verbs in J-SACs fulfill the same function as connectors.
4.4. From the Viewpoint of Addressee-Orientedness

4.4.1. On Type 2 J-SACs

4.4.1.1. Licensing Elements of Type 2 J-SACs

In this subsection, I will give an answer to the question in (31a) from the viewpoint of addressee-orientedness. From the discussion in the previous section, the following points are clarified:

(32) a. Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature.

b. The apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs are not well-suited to communication unless they have addressee-oriented expressions such as polite verbs and sentence-final particles with them.

As already discussed, compared with English, Japanese would not be well-suited to communication without any addressee-oriented expressions. In the light of (32), I give the following answer to the question in (31a):

(33) Speech-act verbs are used to indicate explicitly that the apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs are public expressions.

If (33) is correct, it can be predicted that speech-act verbs are not needed, if other addressee-oriented expressions clearly indicate that the apodoses of Type 2 SACs are public expressions. As shown below, this prediction is, to some extent, borne out:

(34) a. * siri tai nara, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai (= (8a))

   know want if    I-Top          him-Dat  see-Neg

   „If you want to know, I haven’t seen him.’

b. ? siri tai nara, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai yo.

   AOE

c. siri tai nara ne, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai yo.

   AOE         AOE
In (34b), the addressee-oriented expression (AOE) *yo* is added to the ungrammatical (a)-sentence. It is apparent that the expression *yo* improves the grammaticality of the sentence. Interestingly, sentence (34c), in which a further AOE (*ne*) is added to the protasis, is more acceptable than sentence (34b). The difference among the sentences in (34) is the number of AOE{s}, which suggests that addressee-orientedness is a matter of degree, i.e. a gradable notion.

In this connection, there is another interesting example:

(35) a. *sira nai nara ima wareware-wa Kyoto eki-ni iru.*

know not if now we-Top Kyoto Station-Loc be

„We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don’t know.”

b. *gozonzi nai yoo desi tara ima wareware-wa Kyoto eki-ni orimasu-yo.*

know (Pol) not seem Ass (Pol) if now we-Top Kyoto Station-Loc are (Pol)-AOE

Sentence (35a) is ungrammatical because of the absence of a speech-act verb such as *yuu* „tell”. Interestingly enough, (35b) is impeccable in spite of the absence of such a verb. Note that in (35b), the expressions of politeness *gozonzi* „know”, *desu*, (assertive copula), *orimasu* „be (existential)”, and the sentence-final particle *yo* are used. All of these expressions are addressee-oriented. In this case, too, it is safe to say that the degree of addressee-orientedness is high. These examples suggest that what licenses Type 2 SACs is not the linguistic form of conditional constructions per se, but addressee-oriented expressions such as speech-act verbs and sentence-final particles.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) This view is supported in terms of relevance theory, wherein both speech-act verbs and sentence-final particles are the linguistic realizations of higher-level explicatures (cf. Uchida (2011)). If higher-level explicatures convey what Blakemore (1987) refers to as *procedural meaning*, which
The discussion so far, including the discussion in Chapter 3, has made it clear that the obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs can be explained in part in terms of the following three aspects: causality, semantic relevance between their protases and (fake) apodoses, and addressee-orientedness. In the next subsection, I will briefly discuss the matter of the degree of addressee-orientedness.

4.4.1.2. Degree of Addressee-Orientedness and the Grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs

In the last subsection, I have shown that addressee-oriented expressions such as speech-act verbs, polite expressions and sentence-final particles influence the grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs. However, the comparison of (34) and (35) shows that their grammaticality is not the same. The next issue to be considered here is why sentence (35b) is more grammatical than sentence (35a). In this regard, I should admit that I am not in a position to give any clear answer to the issue. However, I would like to give a tentative solution in the following discussion.

First of all, as alluded to above, I would like to point out that addressee-orientedness is a matter of degree. That is to say, addressee-orientedness is a gradable notion. For a better understanding of this point, let us observe the following example:

(36) kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no interest-Nom you-have if inform but Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen hommyoo-wa Isida Taro da.

real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop

„If you’re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro

helps to make a processing effort smaller, it follows that speech-act verbs and sentence-final particles undertake that task, guaranteeing the relevance between the protasis and (fake) apodosis.
Ishida.’

(= (23b))

As previously demonstrated, sentence (36) is impeccable by virtue of the presence of the speech-act verb *osieru* ‘inform’. Without the verb *osieru*, sentence (36) would be ungrammatical, as shown below:

(37) * kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun’iti-no interest-Nom you-have if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen hommyoo-wa Ishida Taro da.
real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop

„If you’re interested, Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.’

(= (8b))

As already seen, the grammaticality of sentence (37) can be improved by virtue of addressee-oriented expressions other than speech-act verbs. Observe the following example:

(38) ?? kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu.

Sentence (38) consists of the addressee-oriented sentence-final particle *desu* added to the sentence in (37). As seen in this example, the particle *desu* clearly contributes to the grammaticality of (38). Interestingly, further addition of addressee-oriented expressions renders sentence (38) more felicitous. Let us examine the following examples:20

(39) a. ? kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu yo.
b. kyoomi-ga *o-ari* desi tara, Isida Zyun’ichi-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu yo.

20 See also footnotes 23 and 25 in Chapter 3.
Sentence (39a) consists of the sentence-final particle yo added to the example in (38). That is, two addressee-oriented expressions are used in (39a). In this sense, (39a) is more addressee-oriented than (38), so that the former is more acceptable than the latter. Furthermore, this view is more strongly supported by the example in (39b). In (39b), in addition to the addressee-oriented expressions in (38) and (39a), the politeness prefix o-, and the polite form of assertive copula desu are used in its antecedent clause. That is, in all, four addressee-oriented expressions are used in (39b). In this sense, example (39b) is more addressee-oriented than example (39a), and thus the former is impeccable.

The above observation clearly shows that the grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs has much to do with addressee-orientedness. However, it is worth noting that one should not use addressee-oriented expressions in an offhand manner. Let us observe the following pair:

\[(40) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & ??\text{kyoomi-ga aru nara iimasu ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{kyoomi-ga aru nara iimasu ga, Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu.}
\end{align*}\]

“If you are interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.”

In (40a), in spite of the presence of the speech-act verb iimasu, the grammaticality of this sentence is worse than that of sentence (40b). The only difference between the two sentences is their copulative verbs: da and desu. It should be noted that in (40a), the degree of politeness is different between the speech-act verb iimasu and the

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21 The speaker’s intention is not counted here.
22 This does not mean that the more addressee-oriented expressions are stated, the better the grammaticality of a sentence is. As the proverb goes, too much is as bad as too little.
assertive marker *da*: the former is more polite than the latter. In (40b), on the other hand, the degree of politeness is equal between the speech-act verb *iimasu* and the assertive marker *desu*. That is, the difference in grammaticality between (40a) and (40b) is not a matter of addressee-orientedness. Rather, it is a matter of the consistency of politeness: the degree of politeness must be consistent in a series of utterances.

With regard to the relationship between politeness and addressee-orientedness, the notion of *subjectivity* seems to be relevant. More specifically, what is relevant here is the notion of *intersubjectification* in the sense of Traugott (2003). On the basis of Traugott (2003), Nakau (2008:26) argues that intersubjectification means the grammaticalization of one’s mental attitudes toward others, and honorifics in Japanese are linguistic realizations of such attitudes. It seems that Nakau’s view on honorifics can be applied to polite expressions in general. Although the relationship between addressee-orientedness and (inter)subjectification per se is a tempting issue, I leave it open here. It suffices here to show that addressee-orientedness, including politeness, interacts with the grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs.

4.4.2. *On Type 2 E-SACs*

Let us turn to Type 2 E-SACs. From the discussion in Section 4.3, I make the following points:

(41) a. English is a communicatively strong language by nature.

b. Due to this communicative strength, the apodoses of Type 2 E-SACs can serve as public expressions without speech-act verbs.

The statements in (41) are the answers to the question in (31b). That is, the

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23 For more details, see Traugott (2003).
addressee-oriented nature of English renders the occurrence of speech-act verbs optional.

To sum up, this section has addressed the question why speech-act verbs are obligatory in Type 2 J-SACs, while they are optional in Type 2 E-SACs. It has been clarified that their difference in the necessity of speech-act verbs is attributed to the difference between the two languages in communicativity: Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature, while English is a communicatively strong language by nature.

Note here that the observation above gives rise to another question: why does the high-degree of addressee-orientedness guarantee the clause-linkage of Type 2 SACs? Even in Type 2 J-SACs, which require speech-act verbs to connect the protasis and (fake) apodosis in default cases, the linkage of the protasis and (fake) apodosis is fully possible without speech-act verbs by virtue of the high-degree of addressee-orientedness, as discussed above. The next section will address this issue in detail.

4.5. From the Viewpoint of Clause Linkage

4.5.1. Problem

In this section, I will reconsider the mechanism of the occurrence of speech-act verbs from the viewpoint of clause linkage. Specifically, the purpose of this section is to clarify the relationship between the public/private-self centeredness and clause linkage.

As discussed in detail in Section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3, speech-act verbs function as connectors connecting nara-clauses (i.e. protases) and main clauses (i.e. (fake) apodoses) in Type 2 J-SACs, as illustrated below:
As illustrated, speech-act verbs relate the *nara*-clause and main clause by intervening between the two clauses. Recall that there is no direct semantic connection between 
*nara*-clause and main clause. To put it in another way, the illustration in (42) shows that the “conjunction” *nara* does not work as a conjunction in Type 2 J-SACs: *nara* alone cannot connect two clauses with (almost) no relation to each other. On the other hand, in Type 2 E-SACs, the word *if* properly works as a conjunction: Type 2 E-SACs do not need speech-act verbs as connectors, even if two clauses with (almost) no semantic relation are conjoined.

So far I have addressed the difference between Type 2 J- and E-SACs from the viewpoint of communicativity. Specifically, the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs depends on the communicativity of the two languages: Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is private expression, that is, not communication but rather representation of thoughts; on the other hand, English is a communicatively strong language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is public expression, that is, communication. In other words, the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs depends on the degree of public/private self-centeredness: English is a public self-centered language, while Japanese is a private self-centered language.

This explanation is, to some extent, valid in that it can explain why Type 2 J-SACs require speech-act verbs: they are used to indicate explicitly that the fake apodosis is a public expression and to make relevance or a connection between the
In this sense, as far as Type 2 J-SACs are concerned, the weak communicativity and clause linkage are closely related with each other. As for Type 2 E-SACs, however, the explanation is not sufficient: just because English is a public self-centered language and is communicatively strong does not mean that two clauses with little relevance can be easily linked or conjoined with each other. The same is true for Type 2 J-SACs: the linkage of the protasis and (fake) apodosis is fully possible without speech-act verbs by virtue of the high-degree of addressee-orientedness. Thus, it should be clarified how the strength of communicativity (or addressee-orientedness) and that of clause linkage correlate with each other. In what follows, I will address this issue from the viewpoint of speaker involvement in the sense of Maat and Degand (2001) and the gravitation towards the speaker’s consciousness (C-gravitation, for short) proposed by Wada (2005, 2008, 2010).

4.5.2. Speaker Involvement in Clause Linkage

In this subsection, let us review Maat and Degand (2001) for a better understanding of the concept of speaker involvement (hereafter, SI).

Maat and Degand (2001) reanalyze Sweetser’s (1990) trichotomy concerning the cognitive domains of causal relations, i.e. the content domain, epistemic domain, and speech-act domain, from the viewpoint of a scale of SI, on which the inherent expressive power of connectives can be represented. SI is defined as the degree to which the present speaker is implicitly involved in the construal of the causal relation.

Two observations lay at the basis of their proposal. First, most connectives

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24 Although Maat and Degand (2001) do not deal with conditional constructions, I assume that their approach to causal sentences is applicable to conditionals.
25 Although Maat and Degand (2001) observe three languages contrastively, i.e. French, Dutch, and
that allow epistemic and speech-act uses may also express so-called volitional causal relations:

(43) a. The snow is melting, so the temperature is above zero.

b. You have been impolite, so leave the room immediately.

(Maat and Degand (2001:212))

(44) I felt tired, so I left.

(Maat and Degand (2001:213))

In example (43a), the connective so expresses the epistemic domain causality: the speaker draws the conclusion that the temperature is above zero from the fact that the snow is melting. In example (43b), so expresses the speech-act domain relation: it can be paraphrased into “Leave the room immediately. I demand that you do so because you have been impolite.” In (44), so expresses a volitional causal relation. In this way, as Maat and Degand claim, the connective so can express volitional causality as well as epistemic and speech act linkages.

According to Maat and Degand (2001), all previous studies concerning causal connectives unanimously state that volitional causality falls within the content domain, since it is concerned with state of affairs in the real world. However, they point out that the connective so cannot express non-volitional real-world relations:

(45) # There was a strong wind, so three tiles fell off the roof.

(Maat and Degand (2001:213))

In this example, so does not express volitional content causal relation; rather, it suggests that the consequence, i.e. *three tiles fell off the roof*, is entirely predictable from the cause *there was a strong wind*. This indicates that some epistemic and speech-act connectives such as so encroach upon the content domain, but only on the

English, here I focus on their English data.
volitional part of it.

Maat and Degand’s (2001) second observation is concerned with the behavior of the connective *that’s why*, which they claim specifically expresses volitional causality. While *that’s why* is not acceptable in epistemic and speech-act domain contexts (as in (46)), it becomes impeccable as soon as speech act (e.g. *I demand*) or modal (e.g. *I think*) operators are inserted (as in (47)):

(46)  
  a.  The snow is melting. *That’s why the temperature is above zero.
  b.  You have been impolite. *That’s why leave the room immediately.

(Maat and Degand (2001:213-214))

(47)  
  a.  The snow is melting. *That’s why I think the temperature is above zero.
  b.  You have been impolite. *That’s why I demand that you leave the room immediately.

(Maat and Degand (2001:213-214))

Based on the observation of (46) and (47), they conclude that *that’s why* takes an intermediate position between the content and epistemic/speech-act relations. On the one hand, it may express a certain type of relation in the content domain; on the other hand, it lends itself to use in epistemic and speech-act domain as long as the conclusions and speech acts are an explicit part of the proposition.

According to Maat and Degand (2001), the two observations above indicate that a scalar perspective should be applied to the spectrum reaching from non-volitional causality in the content domain to epistemic and speech-act causality. They

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26 The contrast between examples (46) and (47) is intriguing in that it seems to be in parallel with the case of Type 2 J-SACs. This means that speech-act verbs (and epistemic verbs) are obligatorily required, which cannot be seen in the case of English epistemic and speech-act conditionals. This phenomena is interesting in that it shows a decisive difference between causal connectives and conditional connectives, which are usually regarded as “two sides of the same coin (cf. Arita (2008)).” However, I leave this matter open for future research, for it is beyond the scope of the present study.
hypothesize that the different relational interpretations can be ordered along a scale from minimal to maximal SI. The criteria of SI are the following:

(48) a. The subjective involvement of a conscious participant (the speaker or the subject of a main clause) with causal relations.

b. The degree to which a given causal relation is isomorphic with a causal relation in the real world: the higher the degree is, the lower SI becomes.

c. The distance of a given causal relation from the present speaker and the moment of speaking: the closer the distance is, the higher SI becomes.

d. The explicitness of the involvement of a conscious participant: The more implicit the involvement is, the more subjectively (in the sense of Langacker (1990)) the participant is construed.

According to Maat and Degand (2001), the four criteria in (48) may enhance the prominence of speaker’s assumptions in the (causal) relation and hence enhance its level of SI. For a better understanding of the criteria in (48), let us examine them one by one with concrete examples. First, consider the following examples:

(49) a. I felt tired, so I left.                  (= (44))

b. The sun came up. As a result, the temperature went up.

(Maat and Degand (2001:213))

These examples illustrate the criterion in (48a). Example (49a) represents a volitional content domain relation, while example (49b) represents a non-volitional content domain relation. Both examples are in parallel with each other in that they represent real-world causality: the event described in the first sentence causes the

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27 See also Uno (2008:57).
event described in the second sentence. However, since conscious participants (i.e. the speaker and subject of a main clause) entertain assumptions which the speaker may share, volitional relations carry higher degrees of SI than non-volitional ones.

Let us turn our attention to the criterion in (48b). The causal relations encoded in linked clauses may be more or less isomorphic with those in the real world. Observe the following examples:

(50)  a. John loved her, so he came back.
     b. John loved her, so he probably came back.
     c. He came back, so he probably loved her.

(Maat and Degand (2001:215))
The volitional relation in (50a) represents a real-world causal relation, while the relation in (50b) does not: in example (50b) the cause-effect or reason-consequence relation in the real world is transposed to the mental domain of the speaker’s knowledge and inference. In this sense, the epistemic relation in (50b) carries a higher degree of SI than the content relation in (50a). Example (50c) takes this process one step further. In this example, the causal relation in the real world is turned around to yield an abductive inference relation. In this sense, example (50c) carries the highest degree of SI of the three examples.

The following examples explain the criterion in (48c):

(51)  a. I felt tired. I left.
     b. He felt tired. He left.
     c. I feel tired. I’m going home.

(Maat and Degand (2001:215))
First, let us compare examples (51a) and (51b). In (51a), the subjects in the two sentences are the same, i.e. the first person I. According to Maat and Degand,
because the speaker is more likely to accept the general assumptions underlying his/her own decisions than those underlying the decisions of others, the first person relation in (51a) exhibits a higher degree of SI than the third-person relation in (51b). Of the three examples, (51c) is highest in SI in that it is in the present tense: the distance of the causal relation from the moment of speaking is closest.

Let us turn our attention to the last criterion, i.e. (48d). Let us illustrate this dimension with reference to the presence of the speaker in an epistemic relation:

(52)  

a.  He is Hungarian.

b.  He is probably Hungarian.

c.  I think he is Hungarian.

(Maat and Degand (2001:216))

Note that sentence (52b) and sentence (52c) contain some explicit elements referring to the speaker’s perspective, while example (52a) does not. In this sense, the degree of SI is lowest in (52a). In (52b), the modal adverb probably invokes the present speaker as the source of the probability judgment. This is made even more explicit in (52c): as seen from the phrase I think, the speaker’s perspective is objectified or made part of the situation referred to in the utterance (cf. Langacker (1990)). This means that example (52b) is more subjective than (52c). In terms of SI, example (52b) ranks higher than (52c).

Besides the examples seen above, Maat and Degand (2001) analyze Dutch, French, and English connectives from the viewpoint of the criteria in (48). To summarize their conclusion, the relationship between the degree of SI and the cognitive domain can be illustrated as follows:

(53)  **The Degree of Speaker Involvement**

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28 For more details, see Maat and Degand (2001).
non-volitional content domain < volitional content domain < causal epistemic domain < non-causal epistemic domain < speech-act domain

In (53), the signs of inequality (<) indicate that SI increases rightward: SI increases from non-volitional content to volitional content to causal epistemic to non-causal epistemic to speech-act domains. That is, the degree of SI is lowest in the non-volitional content domain, while it is highest in the speech-act domain.\(^{29}\)

Maat and Degand’s (2001) research shows that SI and the interpretation of connectives or clause linkage are intimately related to each other. SI means the degree to which the speaker is involved in finding a causal relation between the two clauses connected by a connective: if the causal relation encoded in a pair of linked clauses is difficult to decode, then the speaker is intimately involved in the linkage.\(^{30}\)

Applying Maat and Degand’s (2001) analysis to conditional constructions, I expect that the degree of SI is highest in SACs, as can be inferred from (53). Here, let us consider which type of SACs carries a higher degree of SI. As far as J-SACs are concerned, Type 1 J-SACs seem to carry a higher degree of SI than Type 2 J-SACs, checked against the four criteria in (48). Checking against the criteria in (48a-c), we can see that the degree of SI in Type 1 J-SACs is as high as that in Type 2 J-SACs. In both types, the following points are obtained: (i) the speaker is subjectively involved in

\(^{29}\) Van Canegem-Ardijns and Van Belle (2008) take a similar view. They address what is referred to as conditional perfection or invited inference (cf. Geis and Zwicky (1971)) from the viewpoint of “speaker’s control over action/event in the consequent (apodosis)”, which seems to be equivalent, or at least close, to SI.

\(^{30}\) Uno (2008) analyzes the use of the Japanese causal connectives *kara* ‘because’ and *node* ‘because’ in terms of SI. She classifies SI into two types: Speaker Involvement Scale (SIS)-1 and SIS-2. According to Uno, Maat and Degand’s (2001) SI is equivalent to Uno’s SIS-1, which measures how much the speaker’s view is involved in detecting and reporting causality. SIS-2, on the other hand, has to do with the display of the intentionality of the speaker, i.e. how the speaker conceives the world (for more details, see Uno (2008) and Uno and Ikegami (2009)). However, it is not clear how valid Uno’s approach is to analyze English clause linkage, because she almost exclusively deals with the Japanese causal connective *kara* ‘because’. Thus, in what follows, whenever I use the term SI, it refers to Maat and Degand’s (2001) original notion.
causal relations, (ii) given causal relations are not isomorphic with those in the real world, and (iii) the distance of given causal relations from the present speaker and the moment of speaking is close. The criterion in (48d), however, distinguishes Type 1 J-SACs and Type 2 J-SACs. The obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs evokes the explicit involvement of the speaker, so that the degree of SI is higher in Type 1 J-SACs than in Type 2 J-SACs.

On the other hand, the degree of SI in Type 1 E-SACs is as high as that in Type 2 E-SACs in all the criteria in (48). In both types, the following points are obtained: (i) the speaker is subjectively involved in causal relations, (ii) given causal relations are not isomorphic with those in the real world, (iii) the distance of given causal relations from the present speaker and the moment of speaking is close, and (iv) the conscious participant (i.e. the speaker) is implicit by virtue of the non-occurrence of speech-act verbs. Therefore, it is safe to say that the degree of SI is equally high in both types in E-SACs.

4.5.3. C-Gravitation

4.5.3.1. The Notion of C-Gravitation

What I consider next is how SI has to do with the fact that Type 2 E-SACs do not require speech-act verbs to connect the protases and fake apodoses. I will explain this by using the semantic notion C-gravitation, the gravitation towards the speaker’s consciousness (a part of the brain activated when doing any cognitive activities including thinking and uttering), proposed by Wada (2005, 2008, 2010).

Wada (2005) investigates the difference between English and German, both of which are regarded as public-self centered languages, as to tense phenomena such as perfect and progressive. He points out that public-self centeredness is a scalar notion,
and clarifies that English carries a higher degree of public-self centeredness than German (cf. Wada (2005:126)).

To explain what differentiates English and German, he introduced a semantic concept referred to as *C-gravitation*, which is defined as follows:

(54) “C-gravitation” is defined as a grammatical phenomenon in which grammaticalized forms and their semantic content or functions conceptually gravitate through time towards the spatio-temporal center on which the speaker’s consciousness is fixed. (Wada (2005:121))

According to Wada (2010:79), when the existence of the speaker’s consciousness greatly influences the system of a language, the speech time or present time, wherein the speaker’s consciousness exists, produces a conceptual “magnetic field” in the language. As a result of the gravitation towards the “magnetic field (Gravitational Field in the terminology of Wada (2005:121))”, i.e. C-gravitation, a particular grammatical phenomenon, which is oriented towards the speaker’s consciousness, is linguistically realized. Wada (2008, 2010) divides grammatical phenomena caused by C-gravitation into two classes: the *C-gravitation of the form choice* and the *C-gravitation of the semantic range*.

Let us review the two types of C-gravitation in turn. According to Wada (2008:285), the C-gravitation of the form choice means that some special grammaticalized forms are developed in linguistic environments wherein they are not essentially required. Take, for example, the sentence *She said that she was sick*.

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31 For his analysis of English and German tense systems from the viewpoint of C-gravitation, see Wada (2005).
32 As seen from the definition, C-gravitation has to do with a diachronic or historical viewpoint. However, I will restrict myself to the synchronic phenomena of SACs. In fact, in Wada (2010), where he compares tense phenomena of English with those of Dutch, he does not seem to adhere to the diachronic aspect of this notion, but rather shows that it is useful for explaining the synchronic difference of tense phenomena between the two languages.
Note here that the verb in the reported clause, i.e. *was*, is expressed in the indicative mood, which indicates the viewpoint of the reporter (i.e. public self). As indirect speech is a quotation of private expression (cf. Hirose (1995, 2000)), the subordinate clause is not essentially relevant to the viewpoint of the reporter as a public self. That is, in English indirect speech, the viewpoint of public self is involved in the quotation of private expression. This means that English uses the indicative mood in the environment wherein it does not have to be used. In this sense, the grammar of English is influenced by the C-gravitation of the form choice.

Another type of C-gravitation, i.e. the C-gravitation of the semantic range, means that linguistic forms referring to speech situations have developed meanings or functions to focalize the speaker’s *‘now’* and *‘here’*. For a better understanding of this, let us take a tense phenomenon for example. As is well known, the present tense in English, in principle, does not refer to the future (e.g. *It rains tomorrow*). In Dutch, the present tense can refer to the future (e.g. *Morgen regent het ‘It rains tomorrow’.*). The reason is that the present tense in English focalizes the speaker’s *‘now’* and *‘here’*, i.e. the speech-time. That is, the C-gravitation restricts the semantic range of the simple present tense to the present time, where the speaker’s consciousness is situated. In Dutch, on the other hand, as the degree of C-gravitation is not so high as in English, the present tense can refer to the future.

4.5.3.2. Third Type of C-Gravitation

So far I have reviewed the notion of C-gravitation proposed by Wada (2005, 33 The simple present tense with future time reference can be used in what is referred to as futurate constructions (cf. Huddleston and Pullum (2002:132)). According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002), the futurate construction is subject to severe pragmatic constraints. To be specific, the construction must involve something that can be assumed to be known already in the present. The most common uses involve the following three situations: cyclic events in nature, scheduled events, and conditionals. For more details, see Leech (1971) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002).
In what follows, I will use the notion of C-gravitation from a slightly different point of view. Specifically, I will use the notion with a wider scope for the following reasons.

Firstly, in Wada (2005, 2008, 2010), it is assumed that C-gravitation is a notion peculiar to public-self centered languages such as English, Dutch, and German. Conversely, in his framework, C-gravitation is irrelevant to private-self centered languages like Japanese. That is, C-gravitation is introduced to measure the degree of public-self centeredness of public-self centered languages (cf. Wada (2005)).

However, I assume here that C-gravitation is relevant in private-self centered languages as well as public-self centered languages, especially when they are used in their marked modes of expressions, i.e. (highly) addressee-oriented expressions: just because a language is private-self centered does not mean that all of its linguistic phenomena always show private-self centeredness.

Recall that the SAC is a public expression, a marked mode of the Japanese language, presupposing the existence of the addressee. That is, SACs are exclusively used for public expression acts. In this environment, the speaker as the public self should necessarily be involved. The following examples provide evidence for this claim:

\[(55)\]
\begin{enumerate}
\item a. boku/watasi/zibun-wa kare-ni atte-inai.
\hspace{1cm} I. MALE/I/self-Top he-Dat see-Neg
\hspace{1cm} „I haven’t seen him.”
\item b. ??siri tai-nara yuu-kedo zibun-wa kare-ni atte-inai.
\hspace{1cm} know want-if say-but self-Top he-Dat see-Neg
\hspace{1cm} „If you want to know, (I tell you) I haven’t seen him.”
\item c. siri tai-nara yuu-kedo boku/watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai.
\end{enumerate}
know want-if say-but I. MALE/I-Top he-Dat see-Neg

‚If you want to know, (I tell you) I haven’t seen him.‘

In sentence (55a), not only the markers of public self boku „I (male)‘ and watasi „I‘ but also zibun „self‘, the marker of private self, can be used as the topic marker. This indicates that sentence (55a) is ambiguous between a public expression and a private expression, because the sentence does not contain any explicit addressee-oriented expression: the distinction between public and private expressions applies not to the distinction of linguistic expression per se but to the distinction of language use.

In (55b) and (55c), the same sentence is used as the main clause of a SAC. That is to say, the main clause should be interpreted as a public expression. Interestingly enough, in (55b), the use of zibun as the topic marker renders the sentence relatively odd.34 In (55c), on the other hand, the use of boku and watasi does not influence the grammaticality of the sentence. The contrast between (55b) and (55c) shows that SACs, as public expressions, require words for public self when the subject or topic in the main clause refers to the speaker, which in turn indicates that in SACs the private-self centered nature of Japanese shifts or draws near to the public-self centeredness. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that C-gravitation is relevant to private-self centered languages in a special linguistic environment like SACs.

Secondly, the original notion of C-gravitation is mainly concerned with the linguistic form and semantic range of tense phenomena, including mood (i.e. indicative vs. subjunctive). On the other hand, our main concern here is with modality in the sense of Nakau (1992, 1994), the definition of which is presented

34 This is not to say that zibun can never refer to the public self. For more details on the use of zibun in reference to the public self, see Hirose (2000).
MODALITY is defined, prototypically, as (i) a mental attitude (ii) on the part of the speaker (iii) only accessible at the time of utterance, where the time of utterance is further characterized as the instantaneous present (as opposed to the durational present and the past).

(Nakau (1992:5))

In Nakau’s (1992, 1994) framework, the if-clause of SACs is classified into the marker of D(iscourse)-Modality (or modality of speech act manner), which conveys the speaker’s subjective emotional, mental, or psychological attitude toward the message content or speech act itself. As already argued, in SACs, the if-clause expresses a felicity condition on a particular utterance or speech act in the main clause (see Section 3.2.1.3 of Chapter 3). In other words, the if-clause expresses the speaker’s mental attitude at the time of utterance indicating lack of confidence that the hearer shares the grounds (i.e. felicity condition) on which s/he makes the utterance. Thus, as Dancygier (1998:92) states, the SAC if p, q can be glossed as “I believe p and I communicate q on this ground. I admit that I am not certain if you believe p.” This means that it is not the hearer but the speaker who recognizes the protasis as the proper background on which s/he makes the utterance in the apodosis. It follows that, in principle, the speaker alone recognizes the relevance between the protasis and (fake) apodosis. In other words, it is the speaker’s consciousness that links the protasis and apodosis. Thus, there is a good reason to assume that C-gravitation is relevant to clause linkage as well.

To recapitulate, the notion of C-gravitation that I will use in the subsequent

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35 For other definitions of modality and related problems, see Klinge and Müller (eds.) (2005).
36 See also Maynard (1993) for a related discussion.
argument is slightly different from Wada’s (2005, 2008, 2010) original notion in scope: it is relevant to private-self centered languages and the clause linkage concerned with the modality of speech act manner. For a lack of a better term, I refer to this type of C-gravitation as the C-gravitation of clause linkage. Thus, in what follows, whenever I use the term C-gravitation, it refers to the C-gravitation of clause linkage.

4.5.4. Explanation: Interaction of Speaker Involvement and C-Gravitation

In Section 4.5.2, I reviewed Maat and Degand (2001) and showed that speaker involvement (SI) and the interpretation of causality are intimately related with each other. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the degree of SI is highest in speech-act causal relations.

Here I assume that the activation of the present speaker’s consciousness is also a scalar notion and that the degree of the activation of the present speaker’s consciousness correlates with the degree of SI: a low degree of SI means low activation of the present speaker’s consciousness, while a high degree of SI means high activation of the speaker’s consciousness. This means that if the degree of SI becomes high, then the “magnetic field” or Gravitation Field produced at the speech time also becomes strong. To put it differently, C-gravitation is highly activated in the speech-act domain relation.

Now I am in a position to explain the clause linkage of Type 2 J- and E-SACs in terms of SI and C-gravitation. Here I assume that the linkage of two clauses composing Type 2 SACs has a great deal to do with C-gravitation. To put it more precisely, it is the degree of C-gravitation that determines whether or not SACs require speech-act verbs. If the degree is high, it is not speech-act verbs but C-gravitation that links the two clauses. But if C-gravitation is weak or inert, it is not C-gravitation
but speech-act verbs that link the two clauses.\footnote{In epistemic conditionals in Japanese, wherein the degrees of SI and C-gravitation is lower than those in SACs, the sentence-ending particle \textit{noda} is required. That is, it is not C-gravitation but \textit{noda} that links the protasis and apodosis of epistemic conditionals in Japanese.}

Let us first deal with Type 2 J-SACs. As repeatedly stated, Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is private expression, i.e. representation of thoughts: the Japanese language is characterized as a private-self centered language. This means that C-gravitation is hardly, if ever, exerted in Japanese. As argued above, the notion of C-gravitation is intimately related with the degree of public-self centeredness. That is, the more linguistic phenomena relevant to C-gravitation a language has developed, the higher the degree of public-self centeredness is in that language (cf. Wada (2008:285)). If the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs is a linguistic phenomenon relevant to C-gravitation, the explanation based on public/private-self centeredness of a language can be reinterpreted in terms of C-gravitation: Type 2 J-SACs require speech-act verbs as connectors linking \textit{nara}-clauses and main clauses because of the low degree or inertness of C-gravitation.

A possible counterargument to this explanation is like the following. I have argued that the strength of the “magnetic field” may be relative to SI: when the degree of SI is high, C-gravitation is also highly exerted. Taking this into consideration, one may argue that the obligatory use of speech-act verbs, i.e. connectors, cannot be ascribed to the low degree or inertness of C-gravitation: C-gravitation should be highly activated in Type 2 J-SACs as well, wherein the degree of SI is high.

However, recall here that the degree of SI is lower in Type 2 J-SACs than in Type 1 J-SACs. That is to say, the degree of SI is not so high as to evoke C-gravitation in Type 2 J-SACs. Furthermore, note that the limitation of the degree
of C-gravitation varies from language to language: even if the degree of C-gravitation reaches the maximum point in Japanese, it is relatively low, compared with the maximum degree of C-gravitation in English. This can be graphically illustrated as follows:

![Graph showing the Degree of C-Gravitation](image)

The graph in (57) shows the correlation between the scale of C-gravitation and that of SI. English is a public-centered language and thus has a higher limit of C-gravitation (Max (E)). In contrast, Japanese, which is private-self centered, has a relatively low limit of C-gravitation (Max (J)). Thus, just because the high degree of SI correlates with the high degree of C-gravitation does not mean that the maximum limit of C-gravitation is high. In uttering speech-act domain causal relations, the degrees of SI and C-gravitation are relatively high; nevertheless, the maximum limit of C-gravitation in Japanese is low, so that C-gravitation is too weak to link the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs without speech-act verbs.

Now let us turn our attention to Type 2 E-SACs. English, as previously pointed out, is a communicatively strong language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is public expression, that is, communication: the English language is characterized as a public-self centered language. This means that C-gravitation works strongly in English. In uttering speech-act domain causal relations, the degrees of SI and C-gravitation are high. The maximum limit of the degree of C-gravitation in English is high, so that C-gravitation in English is strong
enough to link the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs without speech-act verbs.

The explanation above can be illustrated as follows:

\[(58)\]

a. Type 2 J-SACs

\[X\text{-}nara \text{ speech-act verb-ga/kedo} \quad Y\]

\[\text{Weak C-gravitation}\]

\[\text{Speaker’s Consciousness}\]

b. Type 2 E-SACs

\[\text{If } X, \quad \text{Strong C-gravitation} \quad Y\]

\[\text{Speaker’s Consciousness}\]

In figure (58), the dotted ellipse indicates that the “magnetic field” produced by the speaker’s consciousness is weak, while the solid ellipse indicates that the “magnetic field” produced by the speaker’s consciousness is strong. As shown in figure (58a), C-gravitation in Japanese is too weak to link the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs. In contrast, as shown in figure (58b), C-gravitation in English is strong enough to link the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs without speech-act verbs. Incidentally, the same is true for Type 1 J-SACs: C-gravitation in Type 1 J-SACs is strong enough to link the two clauses, although it is relatively weak, compared to C-gravitation in E-SACs.

In this connection, German SACs show an interesting behavior with regard to clause linkage, which seems to support my argument. Let us observe the following examples:

\[(59)\]

a. Wenn du durstig bist, ist Bier im Kühlschrank.

If you thirsty are is beer in-the fridge
„If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.’

b. Wenn du durstig bist, Bier ist im Kühlschrank.

If you thirsty are beer is in-the fridge

(Köpcke and Panther (1989:697))

The sentences in (59) are German SACs corresponding to Type 1 SACs (hereafter, Type 1 G-SACs). Here let us draw attention to the word orders in the apodoses of the examples in (59). In (59a), for example, the finite verb ist „is’ precedes the subject of the main clause Bier, i.e. VS order. In (59b), on the other hand, ist follows Bier, i.e. SV order. Köpcke and Panther (1989) refer to the former as integrative word order and the latter as non-integrative word order, following König and van der Auwera’s (1988) terminology. According to Köpcke and Panther (1989:686), the basic or unmarked word order in the apodosis of conditional constructions is the integrative word order, i.e. VS order.38 On the other hand, the non-integrative word order, i.e. SV order is the non-basic or marked word order. As seen from the pair in (59), Type 1 G-SACs allow both word orders according to the discourse.

Turning to G-SACs corresponding to Type 2 SACs (hereafter, Type 2 G-SACs), one may find an interesting contrast between Type 1 and Type 2 G-SACs as to the word order in the apodoses:


if you it yet not knew is Hans again in-the country

b. Wenn du es noch nicht wußtest, Hans ist wieder im Lande.

if you it yet not knew Hans is again in-the country

„If you didn’t know, Hans is back in town.’

38 In German, whenever a constituent, including a whole clause, is fronted, subject verb inversion generally takes place (Köpcke and Panther (1988:686)).
The only difference between the examples in (60) is the word order in the apodoses. The sentence in (60a) is judged ungrammatical because the finite verb *ist* ‘is’ precedes the subject of the main clause *Hans*. This is interesting in that Type 2 G-SACs like (60) never allow the basic, unmarked word order of the German conditional construction introduced by the conjunction *wenn* ‘if’. In other words, the non-integrative word order alone is permitted in Type 2 G-SACs.

I assume that this phenomenon can be regarded as a piece of supporting evidence for the argument in this section. As argued above, Wada (2005) concludes that the public-self centeredness of English is higher than that of German in terms of C-gravitation, because C-gravitation is not well-developed in German. Furthermore, recall that the degree of SI is lower in Type 2 J-SACs than in Type 1 J-SACs. If this is also true for G-SACs, it follows that Type 2 G-SACs, like Type 2 J-SACs, should require additional grammatical implements such as speech-act verbs to connect the protasis and (fake) apodosis. As shown in (60b), although speech-act verbs are not required in Type 2 G-SACs, the marked word order fulfills the same function.\(^{39}\)

One may argue that the contrast shown in (59) and (60) is insufficient as a piece of supporting evidence for the adequacy of the explanation of clause linkage in terms of SI and C-gravitation, because the obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs would serve as much better evidence for my argument than the marked word order. However, what I want to emphasize here is that both Type 2 G-SACs and Type 2

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\(^{39}\) Köpcke and Panther (1989) ascribe the difference of word order in G-SACs to two principles which they term *ego involvement* and *speaker’s degree of certainty*. In those cases in which the speaker of a content domain conditional intends to convey a strong ego involvement, s/he will resort to the marked order (non-integrative order); conversely, a SAC may be grammaticalized as the VS-order (integrative order) if the speaker wishes to communicate that the content of the apodosis does not constitute an item of factual knowledge, but rather his/her personal opinion about the truth of some proposition (cf. Köpcke and Panther (1989:685)). Although it is intriguing to investigate whether or not their approach is compatible with mine, I leave this issue open for future research.
J-SACs need marked grammatical means to establish the linkage of the protasis and (fake) apodosis. Recall that a grammatical means other than speech-act verbs can be employed in Type 2 J-SACs, i.e. a variety of addressee-oriented expressions like honorifics (see Section 4.4). In this sense, it is not unreasonable to assume that the marked word order is employed because of or at the cost of the low degree or inertness of C-gravitation.

4.5.5. *Summary*

In this section, I have investigated the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J- and E-SACs from the viewpoint of clause linkage. To sum up, it depends on the strength of C-gravitation whether the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs, i.e. protasis and (fake) apodosis, can be conjoined without speech-act verbs. That is, if C-gravitation is strong enough to link the two clauses, then speech-act verbs need not be required. In contrast, if C-gravitation is too weak to link the two clauses, then speech-act verbs or other marked grammatical means should be required as connectors.\(^{40}\) It has been shown that my approach is, to some extent, supported by the phenomenon of word order in German SACs.

4.6. *Appendix: Addressee-Orientedness and Metonymic Extensibility*

So far I have addressed the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-/E-SACs from the viewpoint of addressee-orientedness and related semantic concepts such as *speaker involvement* and *C-gravitation*. Here let me investigate the difference

\(^{40}\) The discussion in this subsection is expected to support or corroborate Kanetani’s (2007) argument about what he refers to as reasoning constructions, i.e. epistemic and speech-act *because* constructions. Kanetani hypothesizes that reasoning is a process in which the speaker subjectively connects two situations perceived separately. If my argument here is on the right track, it can give a principled explanation for his hypothesis in terms of SI and C-gravitation.
between Type 2 J- and E-SACs from a slightly different point of view. In this section, I will take up another linguistic phenomenon which differentiates the systems of grammar in Japanese and English: metonymic extensibility. In what follows, I will point out that the differences between Japanese and English in the communicativity and in the sensitivity to metonymic operations may be related to each other.

Note that the discussion below is intended as a “working draft” to provide a possibility to apply the purely semantic notions *metaphor* and *metonymy* to the explanation of grammatical or syntactic variations of a language. Thus, in what follows, I will use these notions in a slightly different manner from those in “main stream” cognitive semantic approaches such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Croft (1993), Kövecses (2002), among others.

### 4.6.1. Metonymic Extension Language and Analytic Extension Language

To begin with, let me introduce the notions of *analytic extension language* and *metonymic extension language*, proposed by Yasui (2005).

Yasui (2005:14) argues that languages can be classified into two categories according to how they expand their variations in expression: *analytic extension language* and *metonymic extension language*. According to Yasui, Japanese belongs to the former, whereas English belongs to the latter. For a better understanding of the two categories, let us observe the following examples:

(61) a. Cut the cooked potatoes into dice.

   b. Dice the cooked potatoes.

   (Yasui (2005:5))

In (61a), the process of cutting the potatoes and the resultant state of the potatoes are discretely stated. In (61b), on the other hand, the process of cutting and the resultant
state of the potatoes are “compressed” into a single verb, i.e. *dice*. In other words, the verb *dice* in (61b) covers not only the resultant state of the potatoes, but also the process of cutting them. It is reasonable to think that the verb *dice* is originally expanded or derived from the noun *dice*. Generally speaking, the extension process from noun to verb is referred to as *denominalization*, and the verbs derived from nouns are called *denominative verbs*. According to Yasui (2005), what makes this kind of word-formation possible is our basic cognitive ability to express/understand something via metonymy.

Metonymy is our basic cognitive capacity based on *contiguity*. Precisely, it is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain or idealized cognitive model (ICM), i.e. using one entity to refer to another related entity.\(^{41}\)

The metonymy which works in the derivation of the denominative verb *dice* is RESULT FOR ACTION, which allows us to mentally access an action via a resultant state (cf. Kövecses (2002)). Thus the resultant state *dice* is the vehicle, while the action of cutting is the target. This metonymy enables us to access the process of cutting food by referring to the resultant state *dice*. Incidentally, the noun *dice* per se is also derived from the noun denoting a small square like a dice, a small cube with a different number of spots (1 to 6, in general) on each side. This is an example of extension via metaphor.

Extensions via metonymy like (61b) are not uncommon in English, and there are numerous examples of the transition or conversion from nouns to verbs: *slice* „to cut something into slice”, *sugar* „to make something sweet by adding sugar”, *pocket* „to put something into one’s pocket”, *bag* „to put something in a bag” and so on (cf.

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\(^{41}\) For more details about metonymy and ICM, see Lakoff (1987) and Kövecses (2002).
Yumoto (2011)). It should be kept in mind that the characteristic of denominalization of this kind is that a single form (e.g. *dice*) can be used as a different part of speech. English is rich in variations of this kind via metonymic operations.

As seen above, English is very susceptible to metonymy. On the basis of the metonymy-sensitive characteristics of English, Yasui (2005) refers to a language which expands its variations in expression via metonymy as a *metonymic-extension language*.

Let us turn our attention to Japanese. In contrast to English, Japanese is not very susceptible to metonymic operations partly because of its morphological characteristics. Let us observe the following example, a counterpart to (61b).

(62)  * yudeta zyagaimo-o sainome-nasai/ro.
boiled potatoes-Acc dice-Imp
‘Dice the cooked potatoes.’

As is shown in (62), in Japanese, one cannot refer to the process of cutting via the resultant state *sainome* ,‘dice’. If one is to describe the same event (i.e. *to dice the cooked potatoes*) in Japanese, s/he has to describe the sub-events composing the whole event explicitly word by word. This is illustrated as follows:

(63)  yudeta zyagaimo-o sainome-ni kiri-nasai
boiled potatoes-Acc dice-into cut-Imp
‘Cut the cooked potatoes into dice.’

In example (63), the sub-events composing the whole process, i.e. the process of cutting the potatoes (i.e. *kiru* ,‘cut’) and the resultant state of the potatoes (i.e. *sainome-ni* ,‘into dice’), are described individually. As shown in (63), to describe an event that covers a process and result, one has to describe it *analytically*; that is, describing the process and result of the event separately. On the basis of the *analytic
characteristics of Japanese, Yasui (2005) refers to a language which expands its variations word by word as an analytic-extension language.

As seen above, English and Japanese are contrastive in their affectedness by metonymy; hence the former is metonymic, while the latter is analytic. One may argue that metonymy works in Japanese as well as in English, because there are many expressions in Japanese that seem to be affected by metonymy. Take the expression watasi-wa Foodo-o kat-ta ,I bought a Ford’ for example. In this example, the word Foodo ,Ford’ does not refer to a firm manufacturing automobiles; rather, it refers to a car manufactured by Ford via the metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:38)).

An argument of this sort seems to be quite to the point in a sense. It is true that Japanese are also affected by metonymy in terms of lexical meanings. However, it should be noted that the influence of metonymy on the morphology and syntax of Japanese is quite limited, at least in comparison with English. At least in my opinion, it seems that metonymy works almost exclusively on the word meaning level in Japanese. On the other hand, as seen above, the influence of metonymy on English is quite extensive. Its influence extends from the level of word meaning to the level of syntactic form. In fact, Lakoff (1987:77-78) argues that metonymy is one of the basic characteristics in human cognition and that since general principles that make our metonymic interpretation possible are not the same in all languages, one needs to

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42 It is true that one can find denominal verbs in Japanese such as gugu-ru ,to google/to search via Google’ and syame-ru ,to e-mail images or pictures from mobile phones’. These denominal verbs seem to be based on the metonymic operation TOOL FOR ACTION (cf. Kövecses (2002)). However, a conversion of this kind is not productive in Japanese. In this connection, Kageyama, ed. (2001:180) takes a similar view: Japanese has developed compound verbs (e.g. sainome-giri-ni suru ,cut something into dice’), instead of using other grammatical means such as conversion or semantic composition. This shows the analytic characteristics of Japanese. See Yumoto (2011:74), who also points out that the noun-to-verb conversion is not so productive in Japanese.

43 However, it cannot be denied that the influence of metonymy on the syntax level is an effect of the influence on the lexical meaning level.
distinguish which principles work for which languages. Lakoff’s remark suggests that the applicability of metonymy to the system of grammar or linguistic expressions varies language by language, which is quite compatible with my view. In addition, with regard to the applicability of metaphorical extension, including metonymy, to the system of grammar, the notion of grammatical metaphor proposed in the field of systemic functional grammar (Halliday (1994:340-367)) seems to be quite suggestive. I will return to this problem later.

Now let us return to the issue of Type 2 E-SACs and see how metonymy affects their form. As seen above, metonymy influences English in terms of its variation in expression. Then it is reasonable to think that the influence of metonymy extends to Type 2 E-SACs.

Here, I assume that an utterance or speech, i.e. something that you say, is a result of the act of saying: an utterance cannot be produced without the act of saying it. With this assumption, let us consider Type 2 E-SACs. As discussed in Chapter 3, the apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs can be regarded as complements or arguments of the speech-act verbs.

In the same fashion, the apodoses of Type 2 E-SACs can be regarded as the complements of the speech-act verbs, even though they are not linguistically realized in default cases. In this regard, English is more illustrative in that the phrases containing speech-act verbs (e.g. I tell you), if explicitly stated, make up the apodoses of Type 2 SACs with the reported clauses. In light of this, the relationship between speech-act verbs, which denote the act of saying something, and apodoses, which denote the product of the action, can be illustrated as follows:
If you want to know, I tell you I haven’t seen him.

ACT of SAYING  RESULT of SAYING (product)

In figure (64), it is assumed that the phrase I tell you denotes the act of saying, while the reported clause I haven’t seen him denotes the result or product of saying. From this perspective, a parallelism is found between the case of the verb dice in (61b) and the reported clause I haven’t seen him in (64): a metonymy like RESULT FOR ACTION works in Type 2 E-SACs. That is, the fact that the grammaticality of Type 2 E-SACs is not affected by the deletion of the phrase I tell you means that one can access the act of saying via its product or result, i.e. its reported clause. Conversely, from the speaker’s point of view, one can refer to the act of saying via its product without explicitly stating the act. This process can be illustrated as follows:

(65)  

The explanation goes as follows. As shown in figure (65), by virtue of the metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION, the reported clause of the speech-act verb tell is foregrounded, and as a result, the phrase containing the speech-act verb I tell you is relatively backgrounded. It goes without saying that addressee-orientedness is also involved in this process: by the interaction of the communicativity or public-self centeredness of English and the addressee-orientedness presupposed in Type 2 SACs, the addressee you need not be expressed.

Given that English is communicatively strong by nature, it is predictable that English is likely to be affected by the metonymic operation just stated: its communicativity is not impaired at all by the deletion or non-vocalization of the
speech-act verbs, especially when the presence of an addressee is presupposed.

Given this, in addition to the functional reasons given above (cf. Chapter 3 and (33) in this chapter), the obligatory occurrence of the speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs can also be captured in terms of metonymy: the mechanism illustrated in (65) never works in Japanese, because Japanese is an analytic-extension language and refuses such a metonymic operation on the syntax or grammar level. Put differently, the deletion or non-vocalization of the speech-act verbs of Type 2 E-SACs can be attributed to the strong communicativity (or public-self centeredness) and the disposition of English language to be a metonymic-extension language; on the other hand, the obligatory occurrence of the speech-act verbs of Type 2 J-SACs can be attributed to the interaction of the communicative weakness (or private-self centeredness) and the disposition of Japanese to be an analytic language.

Here, two further questions arise. The first question is: what about the functions fulfilled by the speech-act verbs? As revealed in Chapter 3, at least in Type 2 J-SACs, the functions to be fulfilled by the speech-act verbs are as follows:

(66) The speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs function as connectors: they semantically connect the protases and the fake apodoses, and their presence guarantees causality. (= (5a))

As stated in (66), in Type 2 J-SACs, the speech-act verbs must fulfill two functions: they semantically connect the protases and the fake apodoses, and their presence guarantees causality. It should be considered whether these functions need not be fulfilled in Type 2 E-SACs.

The answer is as follows. These functions should also be fulfilled, even if the speech-act verbs are not vocalized, because at least a causal relation must be guaranteed between the protases and the act of speech denoted by speech-act verbs.
Let us consider how the functions stated in (66) are fulfilled.

Recall here that metonymy has much to do with the syntax of Type 2 E-SACs, and the relevant metonymy is RESULT FOR ACTION. By virtue of this metonymy, the element designating a resultant or product can cover the action producing it. Given this, it stands to reason that those functions in (66) should be fulfilled by resultant phrases (i.e. apodoses in Type 2 E-SACs). That is, apodoses can cover the functions to be fulfilled by speech-act verbs via metonymy. It goes without saying that speech-act verbs fulfill those functions, if vocalized.

The second question is as follows: if the speech-act verbs and their concomitants (i.e. subjects and indirect objects) can be suppressed or backgrounded, does it mean that they are redundant, superfluous elements in the first place?

To answer this question, the effect if they are vocalized should be taken into account. In other words, we should consider what the meaning of the presence of speech-act verbs and their concomitants (i.e. subjects and indirect objects) is, when the presence of an addressee is presupposed.

What is brought to mind here is the effect of emphasis. Let us take the imperative *Be quiet* for example. An imperative is a form of expression that presupposes the existence of an addressee, and thus is a public expression. If the implicit, presupposed addressee *you* is vocalized in the imperative sentence, the expression *You be quiet* often implies the speaker’s irritation (cf. Quirk et al. (1972:403)). Furthermore, if the phrase *I ask* follows *You be quiet* (i.e. *You be quiet, I ask you*), the speaker’s emotion, such as irritation and sarcasm, is more clearly conveyed.

44 Conversely, it follows that the apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs cannot cover those functions, because a metonymy such as RESULT FOR ACTION does not work.
In this way, the vocalization of elements which are usually considered as superfluous reflects some emotional state of intention of the speaker. In the case of Type 2 E-SACs, it should be admitted that the effect of the vocalization of *I tell you* is obscure; however, it suffices for the moment to say that the speaker’s intention or emotion may be reflected on the vocalization of *I tell you*.45

In this subsection, I have shown that there is an intimate relationship between metonymy and Type 2 J- and E-SACs. Specifically, the omissibility of speech-act verbs in Type 2 E-SACs can be attributed to the communicative strength of English and the disposition to use metonymy actively; by contrast, the obligatory occurrence of the speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs can be attributed to the communicative weakness of Japanese and lack of the disposition to use metonymy on the syntax level.

Based on the above argument, I would like to propose the following hypothesis:

(67) The public/private-self centeredness and the extensibility via metonymy of a language may be two sides of the same coin: public-self centered languages like English are more sensitive to metonymic operations than private-self centered languages like Japanese.

Admittedly, more evidence is required to corroborate the hypothesis in (67). To confirm the hypothesis, I have to investigate other public-self centered languages and private-self centered languages from the viewpoint of metonymic extension. However, it is true that extensibility via metonymy has as much influence on the system of grammar as public/private-self centeredness does. If the two natures are in harmonious relation to each other, it would be possible that they are in implicational relation in terms of linguistic universals (cf. Greenberg (1963)). That is, if a

45 In this sense, the phrase *I tell you* can possibly be regarded as a modal expression like *I insist* in *I insist that you leave the room immediately* (cf. Nuyts (2005:9)).
language is public-self centered, then it is relatively sensitive to metonymic operations; if a language is private-self centered, then it is relatively insensitive to metonymic operations.

4.6.2. Grammatical Metaphor

It might be argued that it is too much to say that a semantic mechanism like metonymy works on the syntax or grammar level. However, I will show that such a view is, to some degree, supported in terms of grammatical metaphor (hereafter, GM) in Halliday’s (1994) terminology. In this subsection, I will take up GM as a support of my analysis of Type 2 E-SACs in terms of metonymy.

It is generally supposed that figures of speech such as metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche are matters of lexico-semantics.46 However, Halliday (1994:341) points out that lexical selection via METAPHOR (i.e. metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche) is just one aspect of lexicogrammatical selection, or wording; and that metaphorical variation is lexicogrammatical rather than simply lexical. He refers to the lexicogrammatical aspect of METAPHOR as GM.

4.6.2.1. Perspective of Grammatical Metaphor

For a better understanding of the difference between traditional METAPHOR and GM, let us take the sentence Protests flooded in for example, taken from Halliday (1994:341). In this sentence, the verb flood does not designate a moving mass of water; rather, what it means is a large number of people like a flood. Thus, according to Halliday (1994:341-342), the sentence can be interpreted or paraphrased

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46 Hereafter, I will use the term METAPHOR (in capitals) as a cover term to refer to a set of these three traditional ‘figures of speech’. 
as Protests came in in large quantities, Protests were received in large quantities, or even Very many people protested.

As seen from this example, traditional METAPHOR is defined as the means to understand something by reference to something else on the basis of similarity (metaphor), contiguity (metonymy), and whole-part relationship (synecdoche). Traditional METAPHOR in general is intrinsically a “second-order” phenomenon in language. In this regard, Halliday (1994:342) states that this is usually presented as a one-way relationship where to some metaphorical meaning of a word there corresponds another, non-metaphorical meaning that is said to be “literal”: a linguistic expression can only be labeled metaphorical by virtue of there being a comparable non-metaphorical expression (cf. Taverniers (2006:326)). To put it plainly, if a linguistic expression has some metaphorical meaning, then it necessarily has a core, primary meaning from which it is derived or extended. Metaphorical meanings always presuppose non-metaphorical meanings.

For example, the word flood above has at least two meanings: (i) a moving mass of water and (ii) a large number of people. In this case, the former meaning is referred to as the non-metaphorical or literal meaning of flood, while the latter meaning is referred to as metaphorical meaning of flood. This relationship is, as it were, looking at METAPHOR „from below”, which is illustrated as follows:

(68) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{seen „from below”} \\
\text{literally} & \text{metaphorically} \\
\text{„a moving mass} & \text{„a moving mass of feeling} \\
\text{of water”} & \text{or rhetoric”} \\
\text{flood} & \\
\end{array}
\]

(Halliday (1994:342))
Figure (68) represents the relationship between literal and metaphorical meanings of the word *flood*. As seen from the figure, the relationship is illustrated from the viewpoint of the word *flood*. The word literally denotes a moving mass of water; it metaphorically denotes a moving mass of feeling. That is, a single word has more than one meaning. This is the traditional view of METAPHOR. This ‘word to meaning’ relationship is referred to by Halliday as ‘from below’, looking at METAPHOR as variation in the meaning of a given expression.

On the other hand, Halliday (1994) claims that GM presents a quite different view of the relationship between linguistic expressions (including not only words but also larger units) and their meanings, looking at METAPHOR *from above*, as variation in the expression of a given meaning. To put it plainly, this means that a given meaning has more than one linguistic form.

With regard to the case of the meaning *many people*, for instance, the perspective of GM can be illustrated like the following:

(69) seen ‘from above’

*many people*

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>congruent</th>
<th>metaphorical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a large number</strong></td>
<td><strong>a flood</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

(Halliday (1994:42), with slight modifications)

In (69), to avoid confusion with the general term *literal*, Halliday uses the term *congruent*, which refers to the less metaphorical variant of expressions. Thus, in this figure, the expression *a large number* is regarded as the less metaphorical of the two candidates for expressions meaning *many people*. The relationship between the expressions (i.e. *a large number and flood*) and their target meaning (i.e. *many people*)
is illustrated from the viewpoint of the meaning. This “meaning to expression” relationship is referred to by Halliday (1994) as “from above”.

As has been evident from the discussion so far, the notion of GM presents us a new perspective to the relationship between a given word or expression and its meaning. In a word, traditional METAPHOR looks for meanings from a given word or expression, while GM looks for words or expressions from a given meaning.

4.6.2.2. Two Syntactic Forms of Type 2 SACs as Grammatical Metaphor

With the perspective given by GM in mind, let us return to Type 2 SACs. In what follows, I focus on Type 2 E-SACs for the convenience of explanation.

In the light of GM and its perspective, it is reasonable to think that the relationship between Type 2 SACs with speech-act verbs and ones without them can be understood from the viewpoint of GM. As Yasui (2008) states, when more than one expression stands as a candidate for expressions to convey a given meaning, it is difficult to distinguish which one is metaphorical and which one is congruent. In this regard, Yasui (2008) himself states that multiple possible expressions denoting a single meaning can be understood in terms of GM, as long as they can be paraphrased into one another. He interprets a congruent form as an expression that describes what one wants to say in a straightforward manner.47 On the basis of Yasui’s comment, I regard Type 2 SACs with speech-act verbs as congruent and ones without them as metaphorical, though I will not discuss the strict criteria to determine which is which. Here, it suffices to say that the analysis of Type 2 E-SACs via metonymy, to some extent, can be endorsed by GM.

As seen above, the Type 2 SACs with speech-act verbs and those without them

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47 For more details, see Yasui (2008:164-189).
can be related to each other via metonymy. From the viewpoint of GM, it is reasonable to assume that the former are congruent realizations and the latter are metaphorical (metonymical) realizations of Type 2 SACs. The following figure illustrates this point, taking the expression *If you want to know, (I tell you) I haven’t seen him* for example:

\[(70) \quad \text{If you want to know, then let us consider that I perform} \]

\[
\text{the following speech-act: I assert that I haven’t seen him.}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{If you want to know,} \\
\text{I tell you} \\
\text{I haven’t seen him.}
\end{array}
\]

In figure (70), the italicized phrase represents an abstract meaning to be conveyed by Type 2 E-SACs. As illustrated, the sentence *If you want to know, I tell you I haven’t seen him* is a congruent form in that it describes what the speaker wants to say in a straightforward manner by virtue of the phrase *I tell you*, which linguistically realizes the speech act of assertion in the apodosis. On the other hand, the sentence *If you want to know, I haven’t seen him* is a metaphorical form in that it describes what the speaker wants to say in a metaphorical or metonymic manner. In this way, my analysis of Type 2 E-SACs is quite compatible with the perspective of GM.

There is further evidence that my analysis is corroborated by GM. Recall what I have argued above: Japanese is an analytic-extension language which tends to

\[48\] In (68), the term *metaphorical* is used as a cover term for the three figures of speech, i.e. metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. As argued above, these three notions are treated uniformly in terms of GM.

\[49\] The meaning in (70) is based on the following paraphrase proposed by Sweetser (1990:121): If [protasis], then let us consider that I perform this speech act (i.e. the one represented as apodosis). Here I assume that this meaning should be regarded as the speaker’s intention or mental representation.
refuse metonymic operations on the syntax level. In other words, Japanese, as an analytic-extension language, is less subject to GM, at least in comparison with English. Although at present it is impossible to give exact data, it is predicted that Japanese prefers congruent forms to metaphorical forms because of its analytic characteristic. In this connection, the following statement by Yasui (2008) is quite compatible with my view:

(71) It is true that Japanese has both congruent and metaphorical forms. However, the proportion of metaphorical forms to congruent forms in Japanese seems to be much smaller in comparison with English, which will turn out to be an incontrovertible fact, no matter what statistics we may use.

(Yasui (2008:180) [English translation is mine])

In this way, to some extent, my claim that the difference between Type 2 J-SACs and E-SACs can be attributed to the difference in their affectedness by metonymic operations is supported by the notion of grammatical metaphor.

4.7. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I conducted a contrastive study of Type 2 J- and E-SACs in terms of addressee-orientedness or public/private-self centeredness, which is mainly based on Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000) and related studies such as Wada (2005, 2008, 2010). In addition, I showed on the basis of Yasui (2005) and Halliday (1994) that the difference between Type 2 J-SACs and E-SACs can possibly be related to the difference in their affectedness by metonymic operation.

I have made the following points. First of all, the obligatory occurrence of the speech-act verbs of Type 2 J-SACs can be attributed to the communicatively weak characteristics, i.e. private-self centeredness, of Japanese in combination with the
functional reasons given in Chapter 3. On the other hand, the optional occurrence of
the speech-act verbs of Type 2 E-SACs can be attributed to the communicative
strength, i.e. public-self centeredness of English. Specifically, it was shown that the
semantic notions speaker involvement (SI) and C-gravitation are significantly relevant
to the clause linkage of SACs. I also made the hypothesis that the public/private-self
centeredness and the extensibility via metonymy of a language may be two sides of the
same coin, although I admit that further pieces of evidence are required to verify it.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to a future direction of inquiry. With regard
to the obligatory/optional occurrence of speech-act verbs, it is expected that my
analysis can be applied to other conjunctions expressing causal relations such as
*because* and *since*. Observe the following examples:

(72) a. He works hard, because he’s at the office every morning at nine.

(Palmer (1988:154))

b. And since I must tell you every thing in great detail, we went out
together to send a telegram.                (Sakahara (1985:153))

It is widely known that *because* and *since* can also represent causal relations in the
speech-act domain (cf. Sweetser (1990), Kanetani (2007), among others). Thus, in
(72a), the *because*-clause does not represent the cause of the state *he works hard*;
rather, it explains why the speaker utters the preceding sentence. In the same fashion,
the *since*-clause in (72b) does not give the reason why the referent of *we* went together
to send a telegram; rather, it describes the reason why the speaker says “we went
together to send a telegram.” For want of a better term, let us refer to *because* and
*since* of this kind as speech-act *because* (SAB) and speech-act *since* (SAS),
respectively. As seen in (72), in English, speech-act verbs such as *tell* (and other
additional grammatical means to connect the two clauses) do not have to occur. Here
again, they are optional or unnecessary.

Now let us turn to SAB and SAS in Japanese. The counterparts to the sentences in (72) are exemplified below:

(73) a. kare-wa issyokenmei hatarai-teiru. to yuunomo mai asa he-Top hard work-AspV Quot say every morning kuzi niwa zimusyo-ni iru kara-da. 9 o’clock at office-Loc be because-Ass ‘He works hard, and I say this because he’s at the office every morning at nine.’

b. anata-ni-wa subete kotokomaka-ni hanasa nebanaranai you-Dat-Top all detail-in tell must izyoo, hanasi-masu ga wasitasitati-wa issyoni dempoo-o since tell-Pol but we-Top togethertelegram-Acc uti-ni itta no-desu. send-to (purpose) went nominalizer-Cop (Pol) ‘And since I must tell you everything in great detail, I tell you we went out together to send a telegram.’

(Sakahara (1985:153))

Sentence (73a) is a counterpart to (72a) and (73b) to (72b). The speech-act verbs are italicized in those sentences. As seen in (73), in the case of SAB and SAS, speech-act verbs are obligatory in Japanese. The parallelism of Type 2 SACs and SAB/SAS is evident. This suggests that the functional facets of the speech-act verbs of Type 2 SACs also work in the sentences in (73) and that they are analyzable in terms of the communicatively weakness and analytic characteristics of Japanese.

In concluding this chapter, one further remark should be made from a
crosslinguistic point of view. It is widely acknowledged that Japanese and Korean are similar in many respects. In light of the similarities between the two languages already pointed out in many studies, it is predicted that there is a parallelism between them in terms of the obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs. This prediction is supported by the fact that Korean counterparts to Type 2 J-SACs also obligatorily require speech-act verbs. Observe the following examples in Korean:

(74) a. * 혹시 알고 싶다면, 그의 본명은 킹이야.
   hoksi algo siptamyeon, geue bonmyeongeun kingiya
   Hyp know want-if he-Gen real name-Top King-Cop
   „If you want to know, his real name is King.’

b. 혹시 알고 싶다면 가르쳐 주겠는데, 그의 본명은 킹이야.
   hoksi algo siptamyeon gareuchyeo zugeonneunde, geue
   Hyp know want-if inform give-but he-Gen
   bonmyeongeun kingiya.
   real name-Top King-Cop
   „If you want to know, I inform you his real name is King.’

As in the case of Type 2 J-SACs, the phrase containing a speech-act verb * gareuchyeo zugeonneunde „I inform you, but’ must occur in the case of Korean Type 2 SACs.\(^{50}\)

This fact alludes to the possibility that this phenomenon serves as a point of reference for linguistic typology (including the case of German SACs discussed in Section 4.5.4).

If the argument in this chapter is on the right track, then Korean is classified into a

\(^{50}\) As will be discussed in the last chapter, the obligatory/optional occurrence of some linguistic expressions can also be observed in epistemic-domain conditionals: the epistemic marker *noda* is obligatory in Japanese epistemic conditionals, whereas its equivalents such as *must* and *it means (that)* are optional in English epistemic conditionals. It is intriguing to investigate whether this phenomenon can also be observed in Korean epistemic conditionals, which I leave open for future research.
private-self centered and metonymic insensitive language. A further direction of this study will be to provide more pieces of evidence for this prediction.
Part 2

Peripheral Conditionals in English and Japanese
Chapter 5

Introduction of Part 2

5.1. Introduction

In the following chapters, I will investigate conditional constructions that have been regarded as peripheral and thus have been left out of serious consideration: adnominal conditionals, if-cleft sentences, and N₁-nara N₂ conditionals.

(1) Adnominal Conditionals

a. The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not.

b. The location if it rains and the location if it doesn’t rain are within five miles of each other.

(2) If-Cleft Sentences

a. If anyone can help us, it is John.

b. If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the material.

(3) N₁-nara N₂ Conditionals

a. sake-nara Kosinokanbai

„When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.’

b. sikaku-nara Yuukyan

„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.’

In the following chapters, I will examine these conditional constructions in terms of
what I call semantic/pragmatic-based syntax, focusing on the relationship or mapping between linguistic form and meaning.

In the following sections, I will point out problems to be solved about the constructions exemplified in (1)-(3).

5.2. Organization

Part 2 consists of five chapters including the present chapter. The rest of Part 2 is organized as follows. In Chapter 6, I will be concerned with adnominal conditionals (ACs). Observe the examples in (1), repeated here as (4):

(4)  a. The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not.
   
   b. The location if it rains and the location if it doesn’t rain are within five miles of each other.

It is widely acknowledged that conditional if-clauses function as subordinate clauses modifying the main clauses. Note, however, that the if-clauses in (4) modify not the main clauses but the nominal expressions preceding them, i.e. the price and the location. In this sense, ACs have been considered as peripheral and thus have been ignored or overlooked. To the best of my knowledge, the only researcher that pays special attention to ACs to some degree is Lasersohn (1996), who addresses them from the viewpoint of possible world semantics in the sense of Lewis (1976). I will show that Lasersohn’s (1996) analysis is inadequate and propose the semantic/pragmatic licensing conditions of ACs.

Chapter 7 deals with if-cleft sentences in Meier’s (1988) terminology, investigating their discourse function. Let us observe the examples in (2), repeated here as (5):
(5) a. If anyone can help us, it is John.
   b. If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the material.

It is claimed that if-cleft sentences are peculiar in the following respects: (i) the clause order, i.e. \( if \ p, \ q \), cannot be reversed, i.e. *\( q, \ if \ p \), and (ii) the protasis and apodosis lack interdependencies such as causality, temporal sequentiality, and logical inclusion, which are recognized as semantic components of conditional constructions in general. In this connection, I will show that the fixed clause order reflects the construction’s discourse function, which differentiates it from other related constructions, i.e. general conditionals and *it/wh*-clefts.

Chapter 8 examines \( N_1\)-\textit{nara} \( N_2 \) conditional expressions like those exemplified below:

(6) a. sake-nara Kosinokanbai
   „When it comes to sake, Koshinokanbai is best."
   b. sikaku-nara Yuukyan
   „When it comes to qualifications, U-CAN is best."

\( N_1\)-\textit{nara} \( N_2 \) constructions are usually used as phrases of recommendation. To the best of my knowledge, no researchers have paid special attention to this construction.\(^1\) Thus, I will begin with a close observation of the semantics and pragmatics of the construction, and propose a licensing condition. Furthermore, I will address the question of how and why \( N_1\)-\textit{nara} \( N_2 \) constructions can be interpreted as phrases of recommendation.

Chapter 9 will investigate various conditionals from the viewpoint of

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\(^1\) The only study that deals with the \( N_1\)-\textit{nara} \( N_2 \) construction in detail is Shizawa (2011b), on which Chapter 8 is based.
specification. I will argue that conditional constructions can be dealt with in a unified manner in terms of the concept specification. Specifically, examining conditionals in terms of specification, I will show that conditionals and specificational copular sentences share some properties, emphasizing that they are similar in the mental process of the speaker: they both pick out or specify a possible item from a set.

As stated above, the constructions dealt with in Part 2 are all regarded as exceptional cases of conditional constructions. This means that very few, if any, previous studies have been concerned with these constructions. Therefore, the main purpose of Part 2 is to shed light on such overlooked constructions from my own perspective and to accumulate evidence for the hypothesis in (8) of Chapter 1: linguistic form is not independent of the meaning it conveys; it is well-motivated by semantic and/or pragmatic principles.
Chapter 6

Adnominal Conditionals and Their Licensing Conditions

6.1. Introduction

6.1.1. Overview of Typical Conditionals

As argued in Chapter 1, conditional constructions are roughly defined as complex sentences composed of a main clause (sometimes called $q$, or the apodosis) and a subordinate clause ($p$, or the protasis). In addition, it is generally acknowledged that there is interdependency between the protasis and apodosis such as cause-effect relation, premise-conclusion relation, and felicity condition-speech act relation. Typical conditional constructions are exemplified below:

(1) a. If Mary goes, John will go. (Sweetser (1990:115))
   b. If she’s divorced, (then) she’s been married. (Sweetser (1990:116))
   c. If you went to the party, did you see him? (Sweetser (1990:120))

The example in (1a) is referred to by Sweetser (1990) as a content-domain conditional. The relation linking $p$ and $q$ in content-domain conditionals is causality in the actual world. In (1a), the event described in the protasis, i.e. *Mary goes*, causes the event in the apodosis, i.e. *John will go*. Sentence (1b) is an epistemic-domain conditional in the same terminology. In epistemic-domain conditionals, the relation linking $p$ and $q$ is that of premise-conclusion. Specifically, the speaker in (1b) has concluded that she has been married from the premise that she is divorced. Sentence (1c) is a speech-act domain conditional as Sweetser calls it. In speech-act domain conditionals, causality holds at the speech-act level: protases express conditions which render speech acts in apodoses felicitous. In (1c), the question *did you see him* would be a felicitous
question under the condition that the hearer had been to the party.

In spite of the difference in their interpretations, all these conditionals have one feature in common: *if*-clauses usually serve as subordinate clauses adjoined to the main clauses, describing sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of surface apodoses or implicit ones.¹

6.1.2. *If*-Clauses Modifying Nominal Expressions

So far I have observed so-called typical conditional constructions and shown that the *if*-clauses in those examples serve as subordinate clauses modifying their main clauses. However, there are *if*-clauses serving, like relative clauses, as modifiers to noun phrases (NPs). Observe the following examples:

(2) a. No one at school knew of her birthday. Certainly, she trusted, none of the pupils did, although she sensed a slight reddening under her high cheekbones as just for a few seconds she contemplated her embarrassment if one of her classes broke out into “Happy Birthday, Mrs Stevens!” (Declerck and Reed (2001:369) [italics are mine])

b. Harry saw, in his mind’s eye, the expression on Hermione’s face if she ever heard about this abuse of house-elves, and decided never to mention it to her.

(J.K. Rowling. *Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince* [italics are mine])

In these examples, the *if*-clauses do not condition the realization of the events described in the main clauses. In (2a), the condition described in the *if*-clause does not serve as a condition of her contemplation. Rather, it conditions her

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¹ The term *implicit apodoses* refers to the unexpressed parts of main clauses in epistemic and speech-act conditionals such as *I conclude* and *I tell/ask you*, which relevance theorists refer to as *higher explicatures* (cf. Uchida (2001)).
embarrassment. Likewise, the if-clause in (2b) does not describe a sufficient condition for the realization of the event of Harry’s imagination; rather, it conditions the facial expression which Hermione would show. That is, sentence (2b) should be interpreted as “Harry imagined what expression Hermione would show if she ever heard about this abuse of house-elves.”

The main concern of this chapter is with conditionals of this sort, which is referred to as *adnominal conditionals* (hereafter, ACs) by Lasersohn (1996). Specifically, I reveal the semantic and pragmatic properties of ACs and propose their licensing conditions.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 takes up Lasersohn (1996) as the only previous study that has investigated ACs seriously. Section 6.3 points out a number of problems with Lasersohn’s formulation. Section 6.4 reveals the semantic and pragmatic properties of ACs that have been overlooked so far, and proposes two licensing conditions of ACs. Section 6.5 makes some concluding remarks and discusses related issues.

### 6.2. The Only Previous Study: Lasersohn (1996)

In this section, I review Lasersohn (1996). As discussed in Chapter 1, conditionals and related phenomena have been one of the most intriguing issues in the field of linguistics, as well as philosophy and psychology. However, little attention has been paid to adnominal conditionals. For example, standard reference books such as Quirk et al. (1985) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002) do not refer to ACs. Declerck and Reed (2001) deal with three examples of ACs including (2a), but they do not analyze them in detail. Bhatt and Pancheva (2006) briefly refer to ACs, but they

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2 They call ACs *Nominal-Q Conditionals* without referring to Lasersohn (1996).
only review Lasersohn’s analysis. It goes without saying that there is no mention of ACs in dictionaries such as OED or Webster’s. Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, Lasersohn (1996) is the only study that deals with ACs seriously.³

6.2.1. Lasersohn’s Analysis

Lasersohn (1996) presents three possible analyses of ACs as working drafts. Although his working drafts per se are not directly relevant to the analysis of mine to be presented below, they are worth reviewing for a better understanding of the semantics of ACs.

6.2.1.1. Possibility 1: Concealed Question Analysis

The first possible analysis Lasersohn (1996) offers treats nominal expressions modified by ACs as concealed questions. Observe the following examples:

(3) a. We all know the consequences if we fail.
   b. We all know what the consequences will be if we fail.

(Lasersohn (1996:156))

In (3b), the if-clause is realized as an ordinary or sentence-modifying conditional. It serves as a subordinate clause modifying the antecedent clause what the consequences will be. Apparently, the logical meaning of sentence (3a) and that of sentence (3b) are almost equivalent. In addition, analyzing NPs containing ACs as concealed questions enables us to treat sentence-modifying conditionals and ACs in a unified manner. Thus it seems plausible and attractive to assume that NPs with ACs are rewritten at logical form (LF) as concealed questions.

³ Fukuchi (1997) also deals with ACs and analyzes them in terms of selectional restriction without referring to Lasersohn (1996). I do not examine his analysis in this thesis, because he treats ACs as concealed questions, which, as will be seen, is rejected by Lasersohn.
However, Lasersohn rejects this analysis because not all nominal expressions modified by ACs appear as complements of verbs that take interrogative complements, as shown below:

(4) The outcome if John gets his way is sure to be unpleasant for the rest of us.

(Lasersohn (1996:155))

In (4), the NP the outcome if John gets his way occurs in the subject position of the sentence, not as a complement clause to a verb such as know, which could take an interrogative complement. Thus Lasersohn concludes that the concealed question analysis does not seem to be adequate.

### 6.2.1.2. Possibility 2: Analyzing ACs as Complements to Relational Nouns

The second approach that Lasersohn proposes is to treat nominal expressions modified by ACs as relational nouns and ACs as their complements. Observe the following examples:

(5) a. the consequences if we fail
   b. the consequences of our failure

(Lasersohn (1996:157))

The of-phrase in (5b) is the complement to the relational noun consequences. If we analyze ACs as complements to the NPs modified by them, we can easily grasp a synonymous relation between (5a) and (5b). However, if we do so, we can no longer treat ACs and sentence-modifying conditionals in a unified manner.

Unfortunately, although this idea has plausibility for some examples such as (5a), it is implausible for others. Let us consider the following example:

(6) The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not.

(Lasersohn (1996:155))
According to Lasersohn (1996:157), the if-clause in (6) does not describe a service for which the price is imposed, or any other sort of event which might plausibly be a term of the price relation. Thus, unlike the pair in (5), the expressions in (7) are not semantically equivalent:

(7) a. the price if you pay now  
    b. the price for paying now

The meaning of (7a) can be represented roughly as “the price that will be determined or required if you pay now,” while that of (7b) can be read as “the price imposed for your immediate payment.”

Furthermore, Lasersohn points out that relational nouns may appear with both overt complements and ACs, as shown below:

(8) the consequences of our failure if John is in charge

(Lasersohn (1996:157))

This example indicates that ACs should be treated not as complements but as adjuncts. Therefore, it is not plausible to regard ACs as clausal complements to relational nouns.

6.2.1.3. Possibility 3: Analyzing ACs as Free Relatives

Lasersohn takes another approach wherein the nominal modified by ACs could be treated as concealed free relatives:

(9) a. the consequences if we fail  
    b. what(ever) the consequences would be if we fail

(Lasersohn (1996:159))

However, note that the noun phrase in (8) is ambiguous in that the if-clause can possibly modify both consequences and our failure, which Lasersohn seems to overlook.
In this approach, we might analyze NPs containing ACs as being structured at the level of logical form. Specifically, we would assign the NP in (9a) a logical-form representation essentially like the free relative in (9b).

As with the first approach, i.e. concealed question analysis, the advantage of the third approach is to be able to treat ACs and sentence-modifying conditionals in a unified manner. However, it also has disadvantages like the following. According to Lasersohn, for one thing, the main cost in giving such an analysis is syntactic, not semantic: we must give superfluous rules for converting noun phrases containing ACs into free relative clauses in the mapping from surface syntactic representation to logical form – and we must try to justify such rules in the context of some well-developed syntactic theory (cf. Lasersohn (1996:159)). In addition, note that the free relative, i.e. whatever the consequences would be, replaces the NP the consequences. Lasersohn deems the structure of NP containing ACs as [Det [N if-clause]]. If the free-relative approach is valid, this means that the structure of NPs with ACs must be [[Det N] if-clause], and not [Det [N if-clause]] (cf. Bhatt and Pancheva (2006:676)). In this way, the third approach is proved to be invalid.

6.2.2. Lasersohn’s Solution: The Semantics of Adnominal Conditionals

From the above observations, Lasersohn (1996) concludes that the three attempts to analyze ACs are problematic both empirically and theoretically. Instead, he provides a semantic formulation to interpret [X if-clause] structures directly, as is shown below:\(^5\)

\[
(10) \quad [X \text{ if } S]_{M,w} = \{x \in U \mid \text{for all those worlds } w' \text{ closest to } w \text{ such that there}
\]

\(^5\) In (10), the abbreviations X, S, U, M and w stand for variable, sentence, a set of possible individuals (including events), model, and a set of possible worlds, respectively.
exists some \( y \in [S]'^M,w \), it holds that \( x \in [X]'^M,w \}

(Lasersohn (1996:162))

Roughly, the formulation in (10) can be interpreted as “the meaning of the structure \([X \text{ if } S]\) is that in all possible worlds closest to the actual world where \( S \) is true, \( X \) is also true.” If value \( S \) is assigned to variable \( X \), the semantic formulation is linguistically realized as a sentence-modifying conditional, while if value \( N \) is assigned to \( X \), the formulation is realized as an AC. By virtue of the semantic formulation in (10), Lasersohn claims, one can grasp the semantic parallelism between sentence-modifying conditionals and ACs, and handle them in a unified manner.

6.3. Problems with Lasersohn’s Formulation

In this section, I point out a few problems with Lasersohn (1996). As he claims, the semantic formulation given in (10) seems to be plausible and desirable as an abstract schema in that it enables us to capture the parallelism between sentence-modifying conditionals and adnominal ones without any special theoretical apparatus. However, it is insufficient in that it overlooks some facets of ACs on the usage level.

A few observations are in order. First of all, his formulation focuses on the co-occurrence of \( S \) and \( X \) (\( S \) or \( N \)), so that it overlooks basic semantic interdependency found in ordinary conditionals such as causality between \( S \) and \( X \). According to the formulation in (10), it seems to be sufficient for the referents of \( S \) and \( X \) to co-occur or coexist in possible worlds. This means that any combination of \( S \) and \( N \) can be allowed in ACs, regardless of whether or not they can be related semantically in terms of interdependency. This is not the case, however. Observe the following example:

(11) * The mammal if that’s a mouse must be smaller than the mammal if that’s a
This example is composed of two ACs derived from epistemic-domain conditionals, i.e. If that’s a mouse, then it’s a mammal and If that’s a dog, then it’s a mammal. The relationship between a mouse/dog and a mammal is inclusion: being a mouse/dog entails being a mammal (not vice versa). So the situation of being a mouse/dog and that of being a mammal can co-occur in any possible worlds closest to the actual world. Lasersohn’s formulation cannot account for the anomalous nature of sentence (11). This also means that Lasersohn takes no account of the polysemy of conditional constructions pointed out by Sweetser (1990). If, as the example in (11) shows, protases of epistemic conditionals cannot be used as ACs, it means that of the three types of conditional constructions, i.e. content, epistemic and speech-act domain conditionals, content-domain conditionals alone can be adnominalized. It seems that the adnominal use of if-clauses is possible if and only if causal relations are established between the if-clauses and nominal expressions modified by them. That is, ACs are specialized for expressing causal relations between events.

Second, the example shown below is also problematic for Lasersohn’s formulation:

(12) * Please let me know his arrival if he takes a taxi.

The intended meaning of sentence (12) is “Please let me know when he will arrive if he takes a taxi.” Although one can imagine a situation wherein the events his arrival

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6 The other type of conditionals, i.e. speech-act domain conditionals, cannot be used as ACs, either: the apodoses of speech-act conditionals have to express a speech act such as an offer, promise or warning by definition, but nominal apodoses cannot express such speech acts.

7 Kanetani (2011) takes a similar view, claiming that among adverbial clauses, sentence adjuncts in the sense of Quirk et al. (1985) alone can modify nominal expressions (for problems with his analysis, see footnote 15).

8 Sentence (12) can be acceptable if the if-clause modifies the main clause, interpreted as “The speaker asks the hearer to inform him/her of his arrival in case he takes a taxi; if he does not take a taxi, the hearer need not inform the speaker of his arrival.”
and *he takes a taxi* co-occur, sentence (12) is not acceptable. In other words, although sentence (12) seems to be quite compatible with Lasersohn’s formulation, it is not acceptable. To make sentence (12) acceptable without changing the intended meaning in a significant way, the phrase *the time of* must be added, as shown below:

(13) Please let me know *the time of* his arrival if he takes a taxi.

What the contrast between (12) and (13) means is neither that the phrase *his arrival if he takes a taxi* is never acceptable nor that the noun phrase *his arrival* is never compatible with the modification by ACs. In fact, the phrase at issue is fully acceptable in certain contexts, as illustrated by the following example:

(14) His arrival if he takes a taxi may be later than (his arrival) if he takes a train.

The sentence in (14) can be interpreted as “The time of his arrival if he takes a taxi may be later than (the time of his arrival) if he takes a train.” Although the NP *the time* is not explicitly stated, one can infer that the speaker of sentence (14) is interested in when *he* will arrive. The difference in acceptability between (12) and (14) cannot be fully accounted for by Lasersohn’s formulation. These examples show that not only semantics but also pragmatics should be taken into consideration to deal with ACs properly.

Furthermore, the following examples show that his attempt to treat ACs and standard conditionals in a unified manner ends up not being successful: 9

(15) a. *We know/imagine* no consequence if we fail.

   b. *We don’t know/can’t imagine* what consequences will follow if we fail.

   c. *We know/imagine* there will be no consequence if we fail.

According to my informant, sentence (15a) seems to be very odd and cannot be

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9 I am indebted to Takeo Kurafuji of Ritsumeikan University for example (15a).
interpreted properly. If one is to express the possible meaning of (15a), s/he has to express it either as (15b) or as (15c). Note here that the expressions corresponding to the NP no consequence in (15a) are expressed in clausal forms in (15b) and (15c). Contrary to Lasersohn’s view or expectation, this contrast indicates that ACs are not identical with sentence-modifying conditionals: ACs inherit some semantic features of sentence-modifying conditionals (e.g. causal relation at the content domain level) and are licensed by certain semantic and pragmatic factors.

The above observations show that the formal treatment given by Lasersohn (1996) is inadequate. To deal with ACs properly, not only semantic but also pragmatic viewpoint is required. In the next section, taking both semantic and pragmatic factors into account, I will propose two licensing conditions of ACs and show their validity using both attested and constructed examples.

6.4. Licensing Conditions of Adnominal Conditionals

6.4.1. Licensing Condition 1: Meanings of NPs Modified by ACs

6.4.1.1. Resultant-Event Type Nouns and Resultant-Value Type Nouns

To propose proper licensing conditions of ACs, I take into account the relationship between ACs and NPs modified by them. To put it more precisely, I will consider what kind of NPs go well with ACs. As the examples in (11)-(14) show, this is one facet of ACs that Lasersohn (1996) seems to overlook or neglect. For this purpose, let us observe the semantic characteristics of NPs modified by ACs by using examples found in the British National Corpus (BNC). Note that in this research I restrict myself to specific collocations, i.e. imagine X if Y and think of X if Y, and exclude examples containing NPs with prenominal modifiers (e.g. think of the usual responses if someone says…) and postnominal ones (e.g. imagining the effects on her
life if she had a daughter who was assaulted in this way) for convenience of searching. Let us observe two of the nineteen examples found in the BNC (the italics are all mine):

(16) a. Think of the outcry if that had been a nuclear accident.
    b. Imagine the reaction if David Owen had appeared at Labour’s 1989 conference.

It is worth noting that nouns such as outcry and reaction do not denote a spontaneous event: they need some causing events to occur. In fact, Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (CALD) defines the noun outcry as “a strong expression of anger and disapproval about something, made by a group of people or by the public,” and gives the example The release from prison of two of the terrorists has provoked a public outcry. As can be inferred from the definition (the phrase made by, in particular) and example, the referent of outcry does not occur autonomously without a trigger or causer. Likewise, CALD defines the noun reaction as “behavior, a feeling or an action that is a direct result of something else,” and gives the example I love to watch people’s reactions when I say who I am. As the definition (the phrase a direct result, in particular) and example clearly show, a reaction is usually construed as a result of something else. Now, let us observe the nouns found in the BNC examples:10

(17) Nouns with ACs found in the BNC (19 examples in total)

outcry (5), reaction (3), uproar (3), confusion (1), consequences (1), difficulties (1), furore (1), result (1), situation (1), scene (1), smile (1)

As the data in (17) show, nouns compatible with ACs tend to be ones referring to events that are induced or brought about by something. In other words, most of the

10 The numbers in parentheses represent the number of examples found in the BNC.
nouns in (17) can be construed as results or effects of something, i.e. resultant events. This fact is quite compatible with my view that ACs are specialized for expressing causal relations (i.e. cause-effect relations) between events/situations.

However, a closer examination reveals that some of the nominal expressions modified by ACs are difficult to construe as resultant-event nouns. Let us observe the following examples:

(18) a. The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not. (= (6))

b. The location if it rains and the location if it doesn’t rain are within five miles of each other. (Lasersohn (1996:156))

In (18), the NPs the price and the location are difficult to interpret as events or situations brought about by the fulfillment of the conditions in the if-clauses, because both the price and location exist in advance of the fulfillment of the conditions. Rather, what sentence (18a) means is that the price will be determined in accordance with the hearer’s decision as to whether s/he pays now or not. Likewise, sentence (18b) implies that at least two locations are prepared for some event, and one of them will be chosen according to the weather. In other words, the NPs in these examples contain unspecified variables (e.g. specific price and location) whose values are to be determined by the fulfillment of the conditions in the if-clauses.

On the basis of this observation, I classify nouns modified by ACs into two classes: resultant-event type (RE) and resultant-value type (RV) nouns, as in (19):

(19) Two Classes of Nouns Compatible with ACs

a. RE nouns: outcry, response, reaction, and the like.

b. RV nouns: location, price, time, and the like.

As discussed above, RE nouns can be construed as resultant events brought about by
the fulfillment of the conditions in ACs. RV nouns, on the other hand, have variables whose values are to be determined by the fulfillment of the conditions described in ACs.

In this way, two types of nouns compatible with ACs are recognized. However, a closer consideration reveals that RE nouns can be regarded as equivalent to RV nouns in a sense. To clarify this point, let us consider the example in (16a), repeated here as (20):

(20) Think of the outcry if that had been a nuclear accident.

As stated above, the noun outcry is classified as a RE noun. Now let us consider the interpretation of sentence (20). The sentence can roughly be interpreted as “Think of what an outcry would have happened if that had been a nuclear accident.” This interpretation suggests that the noun outcry in (20) implies some variable whose value is to be determined. Likewise, the expression the responses if X can be interpreted as what responses will be given if X. As clearly seen from these interpretations, RE nouns semantically contain variables represented by the word what. So, it is reasonable to deal with RE nouns as equivalent to RV nouns in that both types contain variables represented by wh-words. Taking this into consideration, I can arrive at the following generalization:

(21) The referent of a noun modified by an if-clause must be one that can be construed semantically as having a resultant value to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the if-clause.

Bearing the generalization in (21) in mind, let us return to the examples in

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11 This is not to say that nominal apodoses should be treated as concealed questions. As already seen, it is both theoretically and empirically problematic to treat them as concealed questions. Nevertheless, it is not deniable that ACs are related with wh-words. I leave this matter for future research.
(12)-(14), repeated here as (22a-c) respectively:

(22) a. * Please let me know his arrival if he takes a taxi.

       b. Please let me know the time of his arrival if he takes a taxi.

       c. His arrival if he takes a taxi may be later than (his arrival) if he takes a train.

The unacceptability of (22a) is attributed to the fact that the NP his arrival is difficult to construe as a resultant event brought about by the condition if he takes a taxi: it lacks some semantic information to satisfy the generalization. In (22b), on the other hand, the lacking information is supplied by the NP the time, because the noun time falls into RV nouns. So the NP the time of his arrival if he takes a taxi can be interpreted as “what time/when he will arrive if he takes a taxi.” Sentence (22b) is semantically compatible with the generalization, and thus is impeccable.

Sentence (22c) is the most interesting of the three examples, because the expression his arrival if he takes a taxi, which is unacceptable in (22a), is fully acceptable. It should be considered what element or factor renders sentence (22c) impeccable. Here let us focus on the adjective late. It goes without saying that the word late evokes time. Thus, with the help of the word late, the expression his arrival can be construed as an RV noun, whose resultant value (i.e. time) is determined by the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause: the adjective late plays the same role as time in (22b). In this case, the information to satisfy the licensing condition is pragmatically supplied by the predicative adjective late, and thus the sentence is fully acceptable.

From the above investigation, I revise the generalization in (21) and propose the following as a licensing condition of ACs:

(23) The Licensing Condition of Adnominal Conditionals
The referent of a noun modified by the *if*-clause must be one that can be construed either semantically or pragmatically as having a resultant value to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition in the *if*-clause.

6.4.1.2. The Distinction between Semantic and Pragmatic Licensing Mechanisms

Here I refer to the distinction between the semantic licensing (as in example (22b)) and pragmatic licensing (as in example (22c)). As discussed above, sentence (22a) is unacceptable because it lacks some semantic information to satisfy the licensing condition: the nominal expression *his arrival* can be construed neither as an RE noun nor as an RV noun. On the other hand, sentences (22b) and (22c) are fully acceptable with the help of other words such as *time* and *late*. Thus one may argue that their licensing mechanisms are identical in that the expression *his arrival if he takes a taxi* is licensed by the semantic information of other words; that is, both of the sentences are semantically licensed.

However, note the difference between (22b) and (22c) as to what element the *if*-clauses modify. In (22b), the element directly modified by the *if*-clause is *time*. That is, sentence (22b) is licensed because the noun *time* can be construed semantically as an RV noun whose resultant value is determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the *if*-clause. In a word, it is the semantics of the modified noun *time* that influences the grammaticality. In (22c), on the other hand, the element modified by the *if*-clause is *his arrival*, which is judged unacceptable in (22a). From the word *late*, one can infer that the phrase *his arrival* metonymically refers to the time of his arrival. In this case, it is the pragmatic inference invited by the word *late* that licenses the expression *his arrival if he takes a taxi*. In other words, the word *late* pragmatically supplies the unacceptable expression *his arrival if he takes a taxi* with
information needed to be licensed. In this way, the expression his arrival gains its status as an RV noun pragmatically.

6.4.2. Licensing Condition 2: The Desirability Principle

In the last subsection, I proposed a first licensing condition of ACs on the basis of the observation using the BNC and examples of my own. However, a closer investigation reveals that this condition alone is not enough to guarantee the acceptability of ACs:

(24) * Imagine the miserable situation if I get enough sleep every day.

At first glance, this example satisfies the licensing condition I have proposed: the NP the miserable situation can be construed as a resultant event/situation brought about by the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause. One can easily imagine such a situation; nevertheless, sentence (24) is judged as unacceptable or semantically odd without any special context. Behind the unacceptability of (24) is another pragmatic condition to be satisfied. What is relevant here is the Desirability Principle, proposed by Akatsuka (1998).

6.4.2.1. (UN)DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-(UN)DESIRABLE

Let us briefly review Akatsuka (1998). Although the same explanation has already been given in Section 3.4.2.1 of Chapter 3, I repeat it here for convenience of the subsequent argument.

In everyday life, we perform various speech acts such as orders, prohibitions, warnings, threats and promises by using conditional constructions. It should be considered what principle works behind performing such speech acts. Let us observe the following example:
(25) If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you.  

(Akatsuka (1998:13))

According to Akatsuka (1998:13), sentence (25) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a promise (or offer), as shown below:

(26) a. Don’t eat my cookies or I’ll whip you.  (prohibition reading)
    b. Eat my cookies and I’ll whip you.  (promise/offer reading)

The default interpretation of sentence (25) is (26a). On the basis of our background knowledge, we usually interpret example (25) as a prohibition, as in (26a): no ordinary person likes to be beaten with a whip as a punishment. However, in a certain situation, sentence (25) can also be interpreted as the speech act of promise or offer. If the hearer is disposed to be whipped, and the speaker utters (25) with the full knowledge of the hearer’s disposition, then such an interpretation as (26b) is quite natural.

Akatsuka (1998) assumes that there is a pragmatic principle behind the ambiguity of the sentence in (25). The pragmatic principle is what she calls the Desirability Principle:

(27) **The Desirability Principle**
    a. DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE
    b. UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE

(Akatsuka (1998:15))

As shown in (27), the Desirability Principle consists of two sub-principles. Briefly, the sub-principle in (27a) means that if the realization of the proposition described in the protasis is desirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the apodosis will also be desirable for him/her. As a result, the speech act intended in the conditional construction will be interpreted as desirable, too. The sub-principle in (27b), on the other hand, means that if the realization of the proposition described in
the protasis is undesirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the apodosis will also be undesirable for him/her. As a result, the speech act intended in the conditional construction as a whole will be interpreted as undesirable, too.

The relationship between the values of Desirability and the interpretation of conditional constructions can be diagrammatically represented as follows:

(28) Table of Desirability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p</th>
<th>q</th>
<th>if p, then q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DESIRABLE</td>
<td>DESIRABLE</td>
<td>DESIRABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDESIRABLE</td>
<td>UNDESIRABLE</td>
<td>UNDESIRABLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Akatsuka (1998:15), with slight modifications)

In table (28), p represents the proposition in the protasis and q the proposition in apodosis. Akatsuka considers that this principle is true of natural language in general. Note here that this principle lacks relationships such as DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE or UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE. In this connection, Akatsuka argues that there is a contingency/dependency relationship between the protasis and apodosis of a conditional construction, which blocks such combinations. In fact, neither of them can be described in the form of conditional constructions, at least in English, as shown below:12

(29) a. * If you do what I want, I will do what you don’t like.

[DESIRABLE]       [UNDESIRABLE]

b. * If you do what I don’t like, I will do what you want.

[UNDESIRABLE]       [DESIRABLE]

(Akatsuka (1998:14), with slight modifications)

With the Desirability Principle in mind, let us return to the example in (25),

12 In English, such combinations must be expressed in *even if* forms.
repeated here as (30) for convenience of reference:

(30) If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you.

As seen above, sentence (30) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a promise (or offer). When this sentence is interpreted as the prohibition Don’t eat my cookies, the values of Desirability are assigned as follows:

(31) If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you.

[UNDESIRABLE] [UNDESIRABLE] [UNDESIRABLE]

In (31), the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the speaker’s mental attitude UNDESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip you also reflects his/her mental attitude UNDESIRABLE. Thus the speaker’s mental attitude reflected on the whole sentence is UNDESIRABLE. The hearer reads the attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the prohibition Don’t eat my cookies.

When this sentence is interpreted as the promise I’ll whip you, the values of Desirability are assigned as follows:

(32) If you eat my cookies, I’ll whip you.

[DESIRABLE] [DESIRABLE] [DESIRABLE]

In contrast to (31), here the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the speaker’s mental attitude DESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip you also reflects his/her mental attitude DESIRABLE. Thus the speaker’s mental attitude reflected on the whole sentence is DESIRABLE. The hearer reads the speaker’s mental attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the promise I’ll whip you (if you do me a favor).

In this subsection, I have reviewed the Desirability Principle, which is
pragmatically relevant to the interpretation of conditionals in general. In what follows, I will show that the Desirability Principle serves as another licensing condition of ACs.

6.4.2.2. The Desirability Principle as a Licensing Condition of ACs

As argued above, the Desirability Principle is a general principle in conditional constructions. If this is the case, ACs must follow it. Let us observe the example in (24), repeated here as (33), from the viewpoint of the Desirability Principle:

(33) * Imagine the miserable situation if I get enough sleep every day.

In terms of lexical meanings, the adjective *miserable* tends to be interpreted as UNDESIRABLE. In fact, *OALD* defines it as “very unhappy or uncomfortable.” On the other hand, we usually interpret the proposition *I get enough sleep every day* as DESIRABLE, because, from our daily experience, not getting enough sleep leads to poor performance at work, risks for injury, and poor health. That is, the combination of the values of Desirability in (33) is DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE. As argued above, this combination is not allowed in conditional constructions. To represent this combination, we have to use concessive constructions with *even if*. However, the conjunction *even if* cannot be used as an ACs, as in (34):

(34) * Imagine the miserable situation even if I get enough sleep every day.

[UD] [D]

In (34), the capitals D and UD are the abbreviations of DESIRABLE and UNDESIRABLE, respectively. As shown in (34), *even if* cannot be used as an adnominal concessive clause. Furthermore, this seems to indicate that the concessive reading, which is possible in sentence-modifying *if*-clauses in certain contexts, is barred. From this observation, I assume that the values of Desirability assigned in
nominal apodoses and adnominal protases should be consistent with each other.

Note that the above observation and related discussion are concerned with lexical meanings, i.e. semantics. Pragmatic factors should be taken into consideration. In fact, as Akatsuka (1998:19) states, the Desirability Principle per se is a pragmatic notion, although it is closely related with semantics and syntax. It reflects the speaker’s mental attitude, rather than lexical meanings of items.

For example, consider the statement *I will kill you*. The default or lexical meaning conveyed by this statement is UNDESIRABLE: no ordinary person wishes to kill someone or to be killed by someone. However, in a situation where the speaker could get some benefit by killing the hearer, the statement should be interpreted as DESIRABLE. This means that the values of Desirability are more sensitive to contexts than to lexical meanings. In fact, pragmatics takes priority over semantics, at least as far as the Desirability Principle is concerned.

If so, it is expected that sentence (33) may be accepted in some contexts wherein the noun phrase *the miserable situation* can be interpreted as DESIRABLE or the event *I get enough sleep every day* as UNDESIRABLE. This expectation is borne out, as shown below:

(35) Of course I know it’s important for me to sleep well, but I have a lot of parts to play in this plan! Imagine the miserable situation if I get enough sleep every day.

The sentence in (33) is fully acceptable when embedded in a context like (35). As inferred from the first sentence, the speaker cannot sleep well now because of the business plan that he is engaged in. In this context, both *the miserable situation* and *I get enough sleep every day* should be interpreted as UNDESIRABLE events.

Let us observe another example for confirmation:
Imagine the awful consequences if we have a good time. I hope our boss’ll get really upset!

In terms of lexical meanings, the first sentence in (36) is expected to be unacceptable: the phrase awful consequences is UNDESIRABLE, while the statement we have a good time is DESIRABLE. However, as can be inferred from the second sentence, i.e. I hope our boss’ll get really upset, the speaker wants to bring about some awful consequences to bother his/her boss. In this context, the NP the awful consequences can easily be interpreted as DESIRABLE.

On the basis of the above observation, I propose a second licensing condition of ACs like the following:

(37) **The Pragmatic Licensing Condition of ACs**

ACs must strictly follow the Desirability Principle: the values of Desirability in the nominal apodosis and the if-clause must be consistent with each other.

Condition (37) implies that ACs never allow concessive readings (i.e. interpreting an if-clause as an even if-clause) in any contexts. Again, this shows that ACs and sentence-modifying if-clauses cannot be dealt with in a unified manner.

### 6.4.2.3. Possible Counterargument

One might argue that the Desirability Principle as a licensing condition of ACs is not reasonable in sentences describing objective events such as (38). For example, lexical items such as movie seem to be neutral as to the value of Desirability:

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13 By the word *objective*, I mean that the speaker is not involved with the event described in a sentence.

14 Example (38) is taken from the following web site: http://www.glamorati.com/celebrity/2008/20-actors-and-actresses-who-turned-down-important-or-popular-roles/
(38) John Travolta? Good thing he turned down the role of Forrest Gump…Tom Hanks was perfect for it, he was the one! I couldn’t imagine the movie if it was John Travolta!

However, recall that the principle of Desirability is pragmatic in nature: it reflects the speaker’s mental attitude, rather than lexical meanings of items, although there are cases where they accord with each other. As discussed above, it is a mistake to assume that lexical meanings directly reflect speakers’ evaluations. In this example, for instance, the statement *Tom Hanks was perfect for it, he was the one* clearly indicates that the speaker gives positive evaluation, i.e. DESIRABLE, to the actual movie *Forrest Gump*. Then, s/he thinks that if *John Travolta* had accepted the offer and played the role given to *Tom Hanks* in the movie, it would have been undesirable. That is, the combination of the values of Desirability given to the last sentence is UNDESIRABLE-UNDESIRABLE, as shown below:

(39) I couldn’t imagine the movie if it was John Travolta!

[UD] [UD]

In this way, the speakers’ evaluation as to desirability is reflected in ACs. It should be noted that the Desirability Principle is a pragmatic principle, and thus is dependent on the context, i.e. in what situation an utterance is given.

6.4.3. Summary

In this section, I have proposed licensing conditions of ACs as shown below:

(40) The Licensing Conditions of Adnominal Conditionals

Adnominal conditionals are licensed if the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The referent of a noun modified by the *if*-clause must be one that can be construed either semantically or pragmatically as having a resultant value
to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause.

b. ACs must strictly follow the Desirability Principle: the values of Desirability in the nominal apodosis and the if-clause must be consistent with each other.

Condition (40a) is a special condition imposed on ACs, while condition (40b) is based on a general pragmatic condition for conditional constructions in general. As argued above, ACs are properly licensed by the interaction of the two conditions.

6.5. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I was concerned with adnominal conditionals (ACs) and proposed their licensing conditions. I made the following points. First, ACs are extended from event level or content-domain level conditionals. That is, nominal expressions modified by ACs are construed as results brought about by the fulfillment of the conditions described in ACs. Second, if such a construal is impossible or difficult by semantic information alone, pragmatic information may fill in gaps. Furthermore, the Desirability Principle, which holds in conditional constructions in general, also affects the acceptability of ACs, which means that the objectivist view proposed by Lasersohn (1996) is inadequate.

In concluding this chapter, I would like to touch upon some related issues. Although this chapter has proposed semantic/pragmatic licensing conditions of ACs from the viewpoint of causality ((40a), in particular), the conjunction because cannot be used adnominally:

\[(41)\]
\[a. \text{ We know the consequences if we fail.} \]
\[b. * \text{ We know the consequences because we fail.} \]

As is widely acknowledged, because is a representative marker of causality in English.
Although the notion of causality is common between *if* and *because*, the former alone can be used as a marker introducing adnominal clauses, as shown in (41).\textsuperscript{15} That is, the unacceptability of (41b) implies that the licensing condition in (40a), which is based on the notion of causality, is a special condition imposed on ACs, and not a general condition for adnominalization of adverbial clauses. In other words, the notion of causality is not relevant to adnominalization per se. Admittedly, I am not in a position to give a clear solution to the problem. However, the difference between *if* and *because* at issue can possibly be attributed to the difference of their basic semantic characteristics: hypothetical vs. factual. The conjunction *if* is hypothetical in that it evokes hypothetical situations. Behind the hypothetical situation that *if* evokes or builds is another situation evoked by *if*-not. This contrastive nature of *if* seems to be quite compatible with the function of adnominal clauses, i.e. restriction. This is what is lacking in *because*, which is based on factual causality and does not evoke another hypothetical situation.

However, this does not mean that *if* is the only adverbial conjunction that can be used as a marker of adnominal clauses. Other factual conjunctions introducing adverbial clauses such as *when*, *before* and *after* may introduce adnominal clauses.

Let us observe the following examples (the italics are all mine):

\begin{itemize}
\item[(i)] Below the surface ran a current of intrigue that ended with the assassination of Abraham Lincoln *because* he was determined that the United States be free from the bondage of the inter-national bankers. \textup{(Kanetani (2011), with slight modifications)}
\end{itemize}

According to Kanetani, adverbial clauses can modify NPs under certain conditions. He claims that “adnominal” adverbial clauses in general are the products of analogy (in the sense of Blevins and Blevins 2009:2) based on the similarity between propositional phrases (PPs) and adverbial clauses. Kanetani argues that adverbial clauses having no PP semantically equivalent to them cannot modify NPs. However, this explanation cannot properly deals with ACs, because *if*-clauses do not seem to have PPs semantically equivalent to them. If his explanation is on the right track, it follows that *if*-clauses never allow adnominal use. This also holds true for *when*, which seems to have no PP semantically equivalent to it. In addition, it is problematic for his analysis that *even if* and *although*, which seems to have semantically equivalent PPs like *in spite of* or *despite*, do not allow adnominal use. I leave further confirmation of Kanetani’s analysis open for future research.

\textsuperscript{15} Although the adnominal use of *because* is not so productive as other conjunctions such as *if*, *when*, and *while*, Kanetani (2011) points out that *because*-clause can be used as an adnominal adjunct:
(42) he remembered Ron’s expression when he had seen her kissing Dean, …  
(J.K. Rowling, *Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince*)

(43) a. Just take it as a challenge, because some of them are very hard to get, but 
the satisfaction after you complete the stage is a very valuable prize.  
(http://www.gamefaqs.com/console/snes/file/563219/10476)

b. The storm after you left was terrifying.  
(Ross (1973:228))

(44) the interval before she spoke was appreciable, and that was against the 
rules of the game.  
(Haan (1989:106))

(45) the period while the animal remains alive  
(http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/while?region=us)

The adnominal use of *when*, *before* and *after* is not rare, although I cannot assert that it 
is established or conventionalized.  Note that all these conjunctions introduce time 
adverbial clauses.  It is often pointed out that the notion of time is contiguous with 
that of condition, and that they overlap each other and constitute a moderate 
continuum (cf. Tsubomoto (1998), Nishimitsu (2006), among others).  In fact, 
Declerck and Reed (2001:28-35) discuss time adverbial clauses with conditional 
connotations introduced by *when*, *before* and *after*.

A key concept shared by them is *case-specification*.  All of these conjunctions, 
including *if*, can specify cases where some events described in main clauses occur.  It 
is expected that the adnominalization of adverbial clauses can be treated in a unified 
manner in terms of case-specification.

Another key concept is *contrastiveness*.  As pointed out above, the conjunction 
*if* is contrastive in that behind the hypothetical situation that *if* evokes is another 
situation evoked by *if-not*.  The contrastive nature of this kind is observed in other 
conjunctions such as *after* and *before*.  In this connection, it is worth noting that the
acceptability of sentence (43b) is improved in contexts like the following:

(46) The storm after you left was more terrifying than the storm before you left.

In this example, the speaker compares two storms. Other adnominalizable conjunctions such as when, till/until, since, and while can be regarded as being contrastive in that they specify a particular range of time.

In this way, the concept of contrastiveness as well as that of case-specification may play a key role to licensing the adnominal use of adverbial clauses. I leave the confirmation of this view for future research.
Chapter 7

The Discourse Function of \textit{If}-Cleft Sentences

7.1. Introduction

The central concern of this chapter is with a particular type of conditional sentence and its use in discourse. Conditionals in general can roughly be defined as complex sentences composed of a main clause (sometimes called \textit{q}, or the apodosis) and a subordinate clause (\textit{p}, or the protasis) introduced by the subordinating conjunction \textit{if} or other equivalents such as \textit{assuming}, \textit{providing}, \textit{as long as} and \textit{in case} (cf. Dancygier (1998:1)). In addition, it is generally acknowledged that there is interdependency between the protasis and apodosis such as cause-effect relation (causality), temporal sequentiality, and logical inclusion. With this view in mind, let us observe the following expressions:

(1) a. If anyone can help us, it’s John. (Declerck and Seki (1990:19))
    b. If John left early, it was because he felt tired. (Declerck and Seki (1990:42))

These sentences are what Meier (1988) calls \textit{if}-cleft sentences (\textit{if}-clefts).\footnote{Declerck and Seki (1990) and Declerck and Reed (2001) refer to this construction as \textit{premodified reduced it-clefts} (PRICs). I adopt Meier’s (1988) term in this chapter, because Declerck and Seki’s terminology focuses on the characteristics of \textit{if}-clefts as variants of \textit{it}-cleft sentences and thus covers a wider range of constructions.} As can be inferred from its name, the \textit{if}-cleft sentence has an \textit{if}-clause followed by a truncated \textit{it}-cleft sentence (a cleft sentence whose \textit{that}/\textit{wh}-clause is deleted) as its main clause. It is typical of this construction that the \textit{if}-clause introduces a variable and that the
main clause specifies what the speaker thinks of as the only true, or at least the most suitable, value for that variable (cf. Declerck and Reed (2001:411)). In (1a), a variable *anyone* is introduced in the *if*-clause, and its value *John* is assigned in the main clause. Likewise, in (2a), an implicit variable such as *for any/some reason* is introduced in the *if*-clause, and its value *because he felt tired* is assigned in the truncated *it*-cleft.

Here, I point out two deviant or marked characteristics of *if*-cleft sentences. First, they are marked in the semantic relation established between their protases and apodoses. As stated above, the protases and apodoses of conditionals in general show interdependencies such as causality, temporal sequentiality, and logical inclusion. As can be understood from the above observation, no such relationship is found in *if*-clefts, though some relevance is clearly recognized. They are marked conditional constructions in this respect.

Second, it is widely known that although the unmarked order of protases and apodoses in conditionals in general is “*if* p, q,” the clause order can be reversed as long as the discourse allows it:²

(2) a. If it stops raining, I’ll take you to the park tomorrow morning.

   b. I’ll take you to the park tomorrow morning, if it stops raining.

   (Dancygier (1998:146))

However, as Declerck and Seki (1990) point out, *if*-clefts never allow the reversed order. That is, the *if*-clause cannot follow the main clause:

(3) * It’s John, if anyone can solve this problem.  (Declerck and Seki (1990:27))

In this way, the *if*-cleft construction is marked not only semantically but also syntactically as a conditional construction.

² For more details, see Dancygier (1998:145-159).
In what follows, with the characteristics just stated in mind, I will clarify the discourse function of *if*-clefts. The main claims are the following:

(4) a. The interdependency between the protasis and apodosis of an *if*-cleft is in parallel with that between a *wh*-question and its answer.

b. The discourse function of the *if*-cleft sentence is evoking a question in hearer’s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse.

As the name stands for, *if*-clefts are conditionals as well as clefts.3 That is, they have characteristics of both constructions. In what follows, I will refer to both characteristics as the need arises.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.2, as a preliminary discussion, reviews previous studies briefly and observes basic facts about *if*-clefts. Section 7.3 observes *if*-clefts from the perspective of form-meaning correspondence and points out the parallelism of *if*-clefts and *wh*-questions. Section 7.4 investigates the use of *if*-clefts and clarifies their discourse functions. Section 7.5 proposes the reasoning process model of the *if*-cleft sentence. Section 7.6 gives concluding remarks.

7.2. Preliminary Discussion

7.2.1. Previous Studies

Before going into a detailed discussion, let us briefly review previous studies regarding *if*-clefts. I use *briefly* because, few studies, if any, have taken up or paid

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3 In the discussion that follows, the term “(general) clefts” refers to both *it*-clefts and *wh*-clefts (pseudo-clefts).
much attention to *if*-clefts. More specifically, although I can refer to a few researchers such as Meier (1988), Declerck and Seki (1990), and Sawada (2004), their respective foci are different from each other. Thus, there is no standardized view of this construction. Furthermore, while the sentence-internal semantics of *if*-clefts is, to some extent, analyzed by Declerck and Seki (1990), almost no research has been conducted on their discourse function. Therefore I will develop the argument that follows without referring to those previous studies unless necessary.

7.2.2. **Basic Observations**

In this subsection, I will observe basic facts about *if*-clefts including what I have already taken up above, quoting Declerck and Seki (1990). Here I restrict myself to data which will be significantly relevant to the discussion that follows.

7.2.2.1. **Formal Aspects of If-Clefts**

According to Declerck and Seki (1990), there are two types of *if*-clefts. They are distinguished on the basis of whether or not what they call *pre-forms*, i.e. nonassertive indefinite pronouns such as *anyone* and *anything*, are present in the *if*-clause. Let us first observe the *if*-clefts with pre-forms:

(5) a. If *anyone* can help us, it’s John.  
    (= (1a))

    b. If he has proved *anything*, it is that we are all vulnerable.

    c. If there is *one thing* that he is not, it is intelligent.

    d. If God wants *anything*, it is for you to be happy, successful, and fulfilled as a spiritual being.

Although it is typical of this type to have a definite NP such as *John* as the value to the variable (as in (5a)), other classes such as a *that*-clause (as in (5b)), an AP (as in (5c))
and even a to-infinitive clause (as in (5d)) can occur as values. As for variable NPs, the use of non-affirmative forms such as anybody and anything is typical, but that of positively-oriented forms like one thing (as in (5c)) or something is not unusual.4

Let us turn our attention to the second type. If-clefts like the following, at least superficially, do not contain pre-forms:

(6)  
   a. If she was twenty-six and still unmarried, it was not from lack of suitors.
   b. If such programmes travel abroad, it is invariably to Hollywood…
   c. If we receive good treatment, it is by accident rather than design.

Examples like those in (6) can be thought to have implicit variables. In (6a), the implicit variable refers to a reason and can be represented as for some/any reason. In (6b), the implicit variable refers to a direction, e.g. some/anywhere. In example (6c), the implicit variable refers to a manner and can be represented as in some way. In this way, it is likely that implicit variables in this type can refer to a wide range of adverbials such as reason, purpose, place, manner and time.

Let us move on to the next data. The clauses that specify values for variables introduced by if-clauses are not restricted to truncated it-clefts. According to Declerck and Seki (1990:21-22), there are at least seven variations, as exemplified below:

(7)  
   a. If anyone can do that, John can.
   b. If anyone can do that, that person is John.
   c. If anyone can do that, John is that person.
   d. If he needs anything, what he needs is love.
   e. If he needs anything, love is what he needs.

---

4 The terms non-affirmative and positively-oriented are taken from Huddleston and Pullum (2002:423). Although the choice of them itself, i.e. whether one should use non-affirmative forms or positive-oriented forms, is an interesting issue, I will not go further into the matter here.
f. If he needs anything, love is what it is.

g. If anyone can do that, John is the one.

(Declerck and Seki (1990:21-22))

Since, in a strict sense, none of these constructions is an \textit{if}-cleft, I will not pay much attention to examples like these in what follows. However, it is worth noting that in any case, naturally, the type of main clause is limited to so-called specificational sentences (cf. Declerck (1988)). In other words, the type of main clause is limited to that which specifies the value of a variable introduced in the preceding \textit{if}-clause.

Finally, as pointed out above, \textit{if}-clauses never follow main clauses:

(8) * It’s John, if anyone can solve this problem. (= (3))

Declerck and Seki (1990:27) attribute the ungrammaticality of (8) to the fact that the variable is assigned a value before it is even introduced.

7.2.2.2 The Semantics of \textit{If}-Clefts

Now, let us turn our attention to the semantics of \textit{if}-clefts. As pointed out above, it is typical of this construction that the \textit{if}-clause introduces a variable and that the main clause specifies what the speaker thinks of as the only true, or at least the most suitable, value for that variable. Taking these characteristics into consideration, Declerck and Seki (1990:41) propose logical structures like the following:

(9) a. If John goes somewhere, it is often to Madrid.

    b. Often, if \( x = \text{John} \) and if \( x \) goes to \( y, y = \text{Madrid} \).

(10) a. If John left early, it was because he felt tired. (= (1b))

    b. If \( x = \text{John} \), if \( x \) left early, and if \( x \) did so for reason \( y \), then \( y = \text{because} x \) felt tired.

Declerck and Seki claim that representations like those in (9b) and (10b) stand for the
logical structures of if-clefs. It seems that the representations successfully capture the characteristics of if-clefs. However, they neither predict nor explain the discourse functions of if-clefs, which will be discussed and analyzed in detail below. Thus I do not adopt those representations in what follows.

7.3. The Form-Meaning Correspondence in If-Clefs

This section investigates the relationship between the form and meaning of if-clefs. As already pointed out above, if-clefs are marked semantically and syntactically as conditional constructions. Seeing if-clefs from the viewpoint of the form-meaning correspondence, I assume that there should be some correlation between their semantic and syntactic markedness. I will investigate this issue in more detail below.

7.3.1. The Number of Propositions Relevant to If-Clefs

7.3.1.1. The Case of It-Clefs

Before going into a detailed discussion of if-clefs, let us briefly focus on general it-clefs in terms of the number of propositions relevant to them. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1414), ‘cleft’ is a process term: the idea behind it is that a cleft sentence is formed by dividing a more elementary clause into two parts. Take the sentence It was a red wool sweater that I bought for example. This sentence can be thought to be formed from the sentence I bought a red wool sweater by dividing it into two parts, i.e. a red wool sweater and I bought. The former part is foregrounded and the latter part is backgrounded. In other words, a cleft sentence is formed from a single proposition by foregrounding a particular part of it and by backgrounding the residue. Thus the number of propositions relevant to general
The Case of If-Clefts

Now let us return to if-clefts. As seen above, unlike the protasis and apodosis of general conditionals, those of an if-cleft sentence do not show interdependencies such as causality, temporal sequentiality and logical inclusion. The reason for this, I assume, is closely related to the fact that the respective functions of the if-clause and main clause are to introduce a variable and to assign its value. Let us consider sentence (5a), repeated here as (11).

(11) If anyone can help us, it’s John. (= (5a))

In sentence (11), the foregrounded element is the NP John, which is the value assigned to the variable anyone in the if-clause. To put it differently, the if-clause contains the open proposition $x$ can help us (or there is $x$ such that $x$ can help us), and the value of $x$ is John. Therefore, the proposition relevant to (11) is John can help us. This is the only proposition relevant to (11). Thus the number of propositions relevant to if-cleft sentences is also one. If-clefts are in parallel with general it-clefts in this respect.

One may argue that sentence (1b), i.e. If John left early, it was because he felt tired, is not compatible with this line of argument, because the number of propositions relevant to it is two: one is John left early and the other is he felt tired. Note, however, that it is not an independent proposition but the subordinated, non-independent clause because he felt tired that is foregrounded. What can be foregrounded in an it-cleft sentence is not a proposition per se but an element (i.e. word or phrase) that constitutes a single proposition (cf. Nakau (1994:151)). The following contrast illustrates this point:

(12) a. He left early because he felt tired.
b. It is because he felt tired that John left early.

(13) a. He felt tired and he left early.

b. * It is (and) he felt tired that John left early.

The cleft sentence in (12b) is formed from the sentence in (12a) by foregrounding the subordinate clause because he felt tired. In this case, the formation of a cleft sentence is easily performed. On the other hand, sentence (13a) cannot be transformed into a cleft sentence, as shown in (13b). This seems to be odd, because sentence (13a) is semantically similar to (11a) in that the event he felt tired can be interpreted as the cause of the event he left early: it is generally acknowledged that and-paratactic constructions like sentence (13a) can express causality (cf. Sweetser (1990:86-93)). It follows that the ungrammaticality of (13b) should not be ascribed to semantics.

A crucial difference between sentence (12a) and sentence (13a) is found in the status of the clauses composing the respective sentences: the former is composed of a main clause and a subordinate clause, while the latter is composed of two independent clauses conjoined by and. Therefore, the foregrounded element because he felt tired in (12b) should be regarded as a part of the larger independent proposition John left early because he felt tired. To put it the other way around, the proposition he felt tired loses its status as an independent proposition by the adjoining of the subordinating conjunction because. In contrast, the foregrounded element in (13b), i.e. he felt tired, is an independent proposition. In this way, the contrast between (12) and (13) corroborates that the number of independent propositions in (12b) is one, while it is two in (13b).

Sentence (1b) can be analyzed in the same way as (12b). Observe sentence (1b) again, repeated here as (14):

(14) If John left early, it was because he felt tired. (= (1b))
In (14), the phrase *because he felt tired* is interpreted as the value assigned to the unexpressed variable. To put it differently, the *if*-clause contains the open proposition *John left early for reason x*, and the value of *x* is *because he felt tired*. As with (12), *because he felt tired* does not have the status of an independent clause/proposition. Therefore, the independent proposition relevant to (14) is *John left early because he felt tired*. At this point, it can be seen that sentence (14) is in parallel with sentence (12): the number of propositions relevant to (14) can be regarded as one in terms of the number of larger, independent propositions.

If this line of argument is on the right track, then it stands to reason that *if*-clefts show no such interdependencies between “propositions” as causality or temporal sequentiality: there is just one proposition relevant to a single *if*-cleft sentence. Conditional constructions in general, on the other hand, represent interrelationships between more than one proposition, i.e. *p* and *q*. From this, I conclude as follows: compared with the interconnection between the protasis and apodosis of general conditionals, that of *if*-clefts is much stronger in that general conditionals are formed from two independent propositions, while *if*-clefts are formed from a single proposition.

### 7.3.2. The Parallelism between *If*-Clefts and Wh-Questions

This subsection will point out an interesting parallelism between *if*-clefts and *wh*-questions from a semantic viewpoint. Here let us summarize the markedness of *if*-clefts pointed out above:

(15) **The markedness of *if*-clefts as conditional constructions**

a. Semantic markedness:

1) The *if*-clause introduces a variable, while the main clause assigns its
value.

2) Formed from a single proposition

b. Formal markedness:

Fixed clause order: the *if*-clause must precede the main clause (*if* p, q vs. *q, if* p).

As summarized in (15), the *if*-cleft sentence is concerned with a single proposition with a variable, and the variable must be introduced before its value. This shows that the relationship between protases and apodoses of *if*-clefts is very close to that between *wh*-questions and their answers.

Let us observe the following simple dialogue for confirmation:

(16) A: Who saw John?

B: It was Mary (that saw John).

In this dialogue, speaker B answers speaker A’s question by using an *it*-cleft sentence. According to Dryer (1996:448), the use of the *it*-cleft (i.e., *It was Mary (that saw John).* ) shows that both speakers A and B pragmatically presuppose a single proposition, i.e. *someone saw John.* This is the only proposition relevant to this dialogue. In addition, a variable must be introduced first in a *wh*-question and its value must be assigned second in an answer. In this respect, it is evident that this dialogue is in parallel with the *if*-cleft sentence *If anyone saw John, it was Mary.* On the basis of this observation, I claim that an *if*-clause is to its main clause in an *if*-cleft

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5 The term *pragmatic presupposition* here follows Levinson’s (1983:205) definition:

(i) An utterance A *pragmatically presupposes* a proposition B iff A is appropriate only if B is mutually known by participants.

6 This means that both of the participants in the dialogue presuppose the existence of the value to the variable *someone.* Dryer (1996:488) states that one cannot answer *wh*-questions with *it*-clefts if there is no value applicable to the variable:

(i) A: Who saw John? B: *It was nobody (that saw John).*

In this case, speaker B must answer, “Nobody did. / Nobody saw John.”

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what a *wh*-question is to its answer.\(^7\)

Sawada (2004) takes a similar view of the expression *If X, it is because Y* from a different perspective:\(^8\)

\[(17) \quad \text{What occurs in X in } \text{If X, it is because Y} \text{ is likely to be a proposition about which the speaker has some doubt.}
\]

(Sawada (2004:178) [English translation is mine])

As shown in (17), Sawada states that the use of the *If X, it is because Y* construction expresses the speaker’s doubt regarding the proposition X. Assuming that a *why*-question is hidden in the *if*-clause, Sawada (2004:178) proposes the following paraphrase.

\[(18) \quad \text{If X, it is because Y.}
\]

\[= \text{If you ask me why X, I’ll answer it is because Y.}\]

Although Sawada’s proposal and mine are different from each other (for more details, see Section 7.4.2.), I agree to some degree with him on the paraphrase shown in (18) in that *why*-questions are semantically contained in *if*-clauses. Taking Sawada’s view for the present, let me assume that *wh*-questions in general are contained in *if*-clauses and that main clauses manifest themselves as their answers. Thus, I propose the following paraphrase for *if*-clefts:\(^9\)

\[(19) \quad \text{If X, it is Y.}
\]

\[= \text{If you ask me WH, I’ll answer it is Y.}\]

Then the examples in (1) can be paraphrased like the following:

\[(20) \quad \text{a. If anyone can help us, it is John.}\]

\(^7\) Declerck (1988) takes a similar view in terms of the specificational copular sentences.  
\(^8\) To be fair, Sawada (2004) focuses not on *if*-clefts per se but on the phrase *it is because*.  
\(^9\) In what follows, paraphrases such as (19) do not claim that *if*-clefts and paraphrased counterparts are the same constructions. I use such paraphrases to make intelligible the semantic relationship between the *if*-clause and the truncated *it*-cleft.
= If you ask me who can help us, I’ll answer it is John.

b. If John left early, it was because he felt tired.

= If you ask me why John left early, I’ll answer it is because he felt tired.

In this way, by assuming that the relationship between the protasis and apodosis of if-clefts is equivalent to that between a wh-question and its answer, one can properly capture the markedness of if-clefts as conditional constructions.

7.4. The Use and Function of If-Clefts in Discourse

In the previous section, I claimed that the interconnection between the protasis and apodosis of if-clefts is in parallel with the relationship between wh-questions and their answers. Then, the question is: why should the relation be expressed not directly by means of genuine question-answer pairs but indirectly by means of conditional forms? In addition, it matters what differentiates if-clefts from general cleft constructions, i.e. it-clefts and wh-clefts. These questions can be reduced to the question of why the speaker may prefer to use if-clefts rather than related constructions according to context. In a way, this question is significantly relevant to the raison d’être of if-cleft sentences.

7.4.1. The Difference in Use between If-Clefts and Related Constructions

In dealing with the question just raised above, I will make clear the difference between if-clefts and related constructions, i.e. general clefts and wh-question-answer pairs, in terms of contexts wherein they are used.

As is evident from the linguistic form, if-clefts have a great deal to do with cleft constructions as well as conditional constructions. In this connection, Meier (1988:57) points out that there is a close affinity between it-clefts like (21a) and
*if*-clefs like (21b):

(21) a. It was a book that they gave him.
    b. If they gave him something, it was a book.

(Meier (1988:57))

This observation induces Meier (1988:57) to claim that the two constructions are identical except for the ordering of the two clauses (i.e. *if*-clauses and *that*-clauses) that make up the respective constructions. In addition, Meier (1988:58) compares *if*-clefs like (22a) and *wh*-clefs like (22b):

(22) a. If I get anything from the Rowses…, it is only a certain pugnacity…
    b. What I get from the Rowses is only a certain pugnacity.

(Meier (1988:58))

Meier states that the *if*-clause, the „relative clause“ and the *what*-clause are functionally equivalent.\(^\text{10}\) If Meier is right, that is, if all three constructions are identical except for their clause orders and if the *if*-clause, *that*-clause and *wh*-clause are equivalent in their functions, then their difference is just a matter of the speaker’s preference. But in fact, neither *it*-clefs nor *wh*-clefs can be used in contexts wherein *if*-clefs should be used, as shown below:\(^\text{11}\)

(23) a. Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively. *If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the material.* The book is divided into four main blocks, […]

(bnc [italics and omission are mine])
    b. Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively. #It is in the rather erratic organization of the material that

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\(^{10}\) By the term *relative clause*, Meier refers to *that*-clauses in *it*-clefs sentences.

\(^{11}\) The reverse is also true; that is, *if*-clefs cannot be used in contexts wherein *it*-clefs and *wh*-clefs should be used.
I am to find a criticism. The book is divided into four main blocks, […]
c. Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively. #The place where I am to find a criticism is in the rather erratic organization of the material. The book is divided into four main blocks, […]

From this contrast, one can infer that these three constructions are functionally distinct, although they seem to be correlated with each other. It should then be considered where we can find a decisive difference among them.12

As argued above, that-clauses of it-clefts are backgrounded, which is true of wh-clauses of wh-clefts. In terms of information packaging or structuring, the effect of backgrounding in clefts is to mark the background information as pragmatically presupposed (cf. Prince (1978), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), to name a few). Information is regarded as presupposed when (the speaker assumes) it is shared by both the speaker and hearer (cf. Levinson (1983)). That is, it-clefts and wh-clefts are accepted as felicitous if information conveyed by the that-clause and wh-clause is shared by both the speaker and hearer as a presupposition (cf. Dryer (1996:479)). With this in mind, let us examine the contrast in (23) in more detail.

The passage in (23) is part of a review article on Abraham Pais’s book titled Subtle is the Lord: the Science and the Life of Albert Einstein. In (23), a possible presupposition of the clefts is the open proposition I find a criticism somewhere. Thus, as a rule, the reviewer and reader should share the proposition I find a criticism somewhere as presupposition in order to use the it-cleft in (23b) and the wh-cleft in (23c). Here let us focus on the preceding sentence Pais weaves together the strands

12 The main concern here is with the difference between if-clefts and the other two clefts, i.e. it-clefts and wh-clefts. Thus, I will not deal with the difference in context between it-clefts and wh-clefts.
of Einstein's life skillfully and objectively. From the word skillfully, one can infer that the reviewer praises the author. Conversely, at least from this sentence, the reader cannot infer that the reviewer intends to criticize the author or point out some defects of the book. This means that the proposition I find a criticism somewhere is not shared between the reviewer and reader, or at least the reviewer does not suppose that it is shared. This is the reason that neither it-clefts nor wh-clefts can be used in (23).

If this is the case, then what differentiates if-clefts from the other clefts is whether there exists presupposed information or not. In other words, the background information conveyed by that/wh-clauses in general clefts should be shared by speakers and hearers, but the information in if-clauses in if-clefts do not have to be shared in advance. More specifically, since the apodosis of the if-cleft sentence is a truncated it-cleft, it is reasonable to assume that the if-clause introduces a presupposition necessary to use it as a main clause. This means that if-clauses guarantee or license the existence of it-clefts as apodoses, which corroborates the strong connectedness between the protasis and apodosis pointed out in Section 7.3.1.

Incidentally, the criterion whether or not any presupposition is required in advance also differentiates if-clefts and wh-question-answer pairs. Observe the dialogue in (16) again, repeated here as (24), for confirmation:

(24) A: Who saw John?

B: It was Mary (that saw John).

In this dialogue, speakers A and B share the proposition someone saw John or there is x such that x saw John. Otherwise, as already shown, it-clefts cannot be used as answers to wh-questions. Thus question-answer pairs cannot be used in contexts such as (23), wherein the reviewer and the reader do not share the proposition I find a criticism somewhere:
(25) # Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively. Where do you find a criticism? It is in the rather erratic organization of the material. The book is divided into four main blocks, [...]

The discussion so far has made it clear that if-clauses in if-clefts introduce presuppositions necessary to use truncated it-clefts as apodies.\textsuperscript{13} Owing to this function, truncated it-clefts in the construction do not need any presupposition out of if-clauses, i.e. in the preceding contexts. This makes a decisive difference between if-clefts and it/wh-clefts and is the raison d’être of the former.

Here let us reconsider the paraphrase for if-clefts proposed in (18). Considering that general wh-question-answer pairs need presuppositions, I assume that the wh-question hidden in the if-clause also needs a presupposition. Then, it is more reasonable to assume that there is another covert if-clause containing a wh-question than to assume that the overt if-clause per se is a hidden wh-question. That is, the overt if-clause introduces a presupposition of both the covert if-clause containing a wh-question and the main clause. Thus, the paraphrase in (18) should be revised as follows:

(26) If X, it is Y

= If X and if you ask me WH, I’ll answer it is Y

Furthermore, on the basis of the above argument and the paraphrase in (26), the relation among the three elements, i.e. the overt if-clause, covert if-clause containing a wh-question, and main clause, can be illustrated as follows:

\textsuperscript{13} Declerck and Reed (2001:411) state that the if-clause of if-clefts is “a device for heightening textual coherence: it links up with the preceding context by resuming something that has already been said or implied,” drawing attention to its linking with the preceding context. However, this comment is too obscure to explain the difference in the acceptability of the examples in (23).
To sum up, as illustrated in (27), the if-clause of the if-cleft construction provides the presupposition of the wh-question in the covert if-clause and the truncated it-cleft. The truncated it-cleft cannot be used without the overt if-clause. In this sense, the existence of if-clauses licenses the truncated it-clefts.

7.4.2. The Discourse Function of If-Clefts

7.4.2.1. Problems

The discussion so far has clarified the function of (overt) if-clauses of if-clefts: they introduce presuppositions of covert if-clauses containing wh-questions and main clauses. More specifically, if-clauses license truncated it-clefts as main clauses. Now I am in a position to examine the discourse function of if-clefts per se, which is the main concern of this chapter.

As pointed out in Section 7.2, the discourse function of if-clefts has been left almost untouched by previous studies. Sawada (2004:178) briefly refers to the discourse function of if-clefts, though he restricts his observation to the specific expression If X, it is because Y:

(28) The expression it is because Y, which co-occurs with if X, has the discourse function of effectively making salient the statement after it is because by showing a certain amount of the speaker’s doubt as to proposition X.

(Sawada (2004:178) [English translation is mine])

As argued above, Sawada’s view in (28) is compatible with mine in that wh-questions
are hidden in *if*-clauses. However, his approach is untenable for several reasons.

First, I disagree with him in that he regards proposition X as the object of the speaker’s doubt. Consider the following example:

(29) Donna didn’t love anyone. If she had loved someone, it would have been Bill.

Note that the *if*-cleft in (29) is counterfactual. This example seems to be incompatible with Sawada’s view: as the counterfactual form (*had* + past participle) indicates, the speaker knows, or at least firmly believes, that Donna did not love anyone.\(^\text{14}\) This is confirmed by the preceding sentence *Donna didn’t love anyone*. By this sentence, the speaker does not doubt whether Donna loved someone or not; rather, s/he asserts that Donna loved no one. Furthermore, if, as Sawada states, the conjunction *if* shows a certain amount of the speaker’s doubt regarding the proposition *she had loved someone*, then the speaker cannot assign the value *Bill* to the variable *anyone* by using the assertive form *it would have been Bill*.\(^\text{15}\) At least in the speaker’s mind, the value *Bill* is prepared in advance, which means that the speaker believes that Bill is the person who Donna could have loved. Lastly, it is not clear what discourse function he refers to by the “function of effectively making salient the statement after *it is because*.”

\subsection*{7.4.2.2. Switching the Flow of Discourse and Presenting a New Topic}

As opposed to Sawada (2004), I make the following assumption as to the discourse function of *if*-clefts:

\(^\text{14}\) To be fair, Sawada (2004) does not take counterfactuals into consideration, because his primary concern is not with *if*-clefts but with *it is because* constructions.

\(^\text{15}\) Modal expressions such as *probably*, *may/might*, and *can/could*, which weaken assertion to some degree, can occur. However, even if such expressions occur, the phrase *it is* \(\mathcal{X}\) is still assertion.
The if-cleft sentence challenges a discourse presupposition made in the preceding context, intending to switch the flow of discourse and provide a new topic for the following discourse.

To illustrate, let us observe the example in (23) again, repeated here as (31).

Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively. If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the material. The book is divided into four main blocks, each dealing with one of the four principal contributions that Einstein made to physical theory – statistical mechanics, special relativity, general relativity and the quantum theory. Unfortunately for chronology, these pursuits were in some cases contemporary with each other, which means that the author has to jump back and forth between different epochs of Einstein’s life. This is done methodically, with elaborate cross referencing, but nevertheless fragments Einstein’s personal history and diminishes the reader’s empathy.

In (31), the omitted part of (23) is recovered. Let us first focus on the context preceding the if-cleft. From the sentence Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively, as already pointed out above, one can see that the reviewer praises the writer of the book.

Now let us turn our attention to the discourse after the if-cleft, wherein the reviewer criticizes the author for the organization of the book. That is, the flow of discourse switches from praise to criticism. More specifically, after giving the value in the rather erratic organisation of the book to the implicit variable, e.g. some/anywhere, the reviewer develops a criticism of the organization of the book. The contexts make a sharp contrast before and after the sentence If I am to find a
criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the material. This clearly shows that it is the if-cleft sentence that switches the discourse flow from praise to criticism and gives the new topic erratic organization to the following critical discourse. That is, if-clefts reverse presuppositions made in the preceding discourse and provide new topics to the following discourse. To put it more precisely, if-clefts switch presuppositions negative regarding the existence of the variable (¬X) into positive ones (X).

For a better understanding of the explanation above, let us examine (31) more closely in accordance with the claim in (30). To begin with, the first sentence Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively makes the discourse presupposition there is nothing to criticize about the book (or there is no x such that the reviewer criticizes x about the book in another representation). Second, the if-cleft sentence If I am to find a criticism is introduced to challenge the presupposition, which makes the readers evoke the existence of a possible object of criticism: a new presupposition, i.e. the reviewer finds a criticism somewhere (or there is x such that the reviewer criticizes x about the book) is made at this point. In other words, the former presupposition that there is nothing to criticize about the book is reversed. Next, taking the new presupposition, the reviewer introduces the implicit wh-question if you ask me where I find a criticism and the explicit answer it is in the erratic organization. Then, the answer (in) the erratic organization serves as a topic of the following discourse, and criticisms on the organization of the book are developed, as shown in the expressions jump back and forth between different epochs

Note here that neither the representation X nor ¬X is relevant to the truth condition of the relevant proposition. The positive representation X means that the relevant proposition is positive as to the existence of the relevant variable x, while the negative representation ¬X means that the relevant proposition is negative as to the existence of x.
of Einstein’s life and fragments Einstein’s personal history and diminishes the reader’s empathy.

In terms of rhetorical strategy, developing discourse in this way seems to be more effective than developing criticism from the beginning of the passage. By reversing the presupposition made in the preceding context and then giving a new topic in the assertive form it is Y, if-clefts can express the speaker’s mental attitude I dare to say.\textsuperscript{17} In doing so, if-clefts increase the saliency of focus elements in truncated it-clefts. In the case of (31), the reviewer uses the if-cleft to make a sharp contrast between the contexts before and after the if-cleft, and succeeds in increasing the saliency of the focus element in the erratic organization.\textsuperscript{18} In this way, the focus element can draw much attention from the hearer/reader, so that it serves as the topic of the following context.

Now let us return to the example in (29), repeated here as (32):

\begin{align*}
\text{(32) } \text{Donna didn’t love anyone. If she had loved someone, it would have been Bill.}
\end{align*}

As shown in (17) and (28), Sawada (2004) claims that the use of an if-clause indicates the speaker’s doubt regarding the proposition in the if-clause. Thus, on the basis of his claim, the if-clause in (32) is roughly interpreted as “I doubt whether she loved someone.” As pointed out above, this interpretation cannot explain the use of if-clefts in a sufficient way.

\textsuperscript{17} This suggests that if-clefts might be classified as what is called speech-act conditionals (cf. Sweetser (1990)). As we will see below (Section 7.4.3.2), it is also true that the if-clause should be regarded as a modal expression expressing the speaker’s mental attitude toward a speech act in the apodosis. However, if-clefts are not identical with speech-act conditionals in the sense of Sweetser. Recall that the protasis of a speech-act conditional serves as a kind of introductory remarks (cf. Chapter 3). In this sense, the connection between protases and apodoses in speech-act conditionals is not very strong: the apodoses can perform intended speech acts without if-clauses. If-clefts, on the other hand, could not perform intended speech acts without if-clauses, because, as discussed in the previous section, if-clauses license apodoses.

\textsuperscript{18} In fact, the focus position of if-clefts is always heavily stressed, unlike that of it-clefts.
In my framework, however, the use of the *if*-cleft sentence can be fully explained. The explanation goes as follows. In (32), the sentence prior to the *if*-cleft makes the contextual presupposition *there was no x such that Donna loved x* (¬X). The *if*-cleft *If she had loved someone, it would have been Bill* reverses the former presupposition (switching ¬X into X), and asserts that *Donna would have loved Bill*. To put it plainly, the *if*-cleft means, “So far, I have talked about the present topic under the presupposition (or based on the fact) that Donna didn’t love anyone. But if she had loved someone and if you ask me who it would have been, I dare to say it would have been Bill.”

On the basis of the above observations regarding (31) and (32), the functions of *if*-clefts can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:

**(33) The Discourse Functions of *If*-Clefts**

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Preceding Context} & \text{*If*-Cleft} & \text{Succeeding Context} \\
\text{Old Presupposition (¬X)} & \text{If } X \text{, it is } Y & \text{Discourse adopting } Y \text{ as Topic} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[F_1: \text{Switching } ¬X \text{ into } X \quad F_2: \text{Introducing new topic } Y\]

As illustrated in figure (33), *if*-clefts have two functions: (i) switching an old presupposition (¬X) into a new presupposition (X) and (ii) introducing a new topic (Y) for the following context.

What the figure in (33) means is as follows. In order to use an *if*-cleft, the speaker first gives a presupposition negative as to the existence of the variable *x* (¬X). Then, by introducing an *if*-cleft, s/he switches the presupposition into a new, positive one (X) and assigns the value Y to the variable contained in the new presupposition.

---

19 Here no context following the *if*-cleft is given, but we can expect that a story related to *Bill* will be developed.
To put it more plainly, the meaning of if-clefts is “So far, we have discussed the present topic under the presupposition ¬X. But if X and if you ask me WH, I answer it is Y.” The value Y, which is given as an answer to the implicit wh-question, is presented by reversing the preceding, old presupposition. Y draws much attention and thus can serve as a new topic in the following discourse.

Let us confirm the appropriateness of this explanation by examining the following example:

(34) A: I found she was texting him 3 times a day and hoping our marriage would break up. She is a whore as far as I am concerned.

B: If she was texting him, it was because he set it up. He gave her the number, didn’t he? Keep your hate and discontent at home and direct it to the responsible party, HIM! She is just as victimized as what he did to you.

The dialogue in (34) is based on a personal advice column on a website. Speaker A is troubled about her husband’s repeated extramarital affairs, and she is asking for advice. Here let us draw attention to speaker A’s utterance. As can be inferred from the utterances “(she is) hoping our marriage would break up” and “she is a whore,” speaker A ascribes her husband’s extramarital affairs to his lover (the referent of she). At this point, the presupposition relevant to the use of the if-cleft is that there is no cause of speaker A’s husband’s extramarital affairs other than his lover, i.e. there is no x other than his lover such that x causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs. With this presupposition in mind, let us note speaker B’s reply. Clearly, speaker B ascribes the affairs to speaker A’s husband, not to his lover. From speaker B’s utterance, it can be inferred that s/he reverses the presupposition.

20 http://www.2-in-2-1.co.uk/forums/showthread.php?t=5804
If Sawada’s (2004) view is correct, it means that speaker B casts some doubt on the proposition expressed in the if-clause. However, as can be read from the dialogue, it is not the proposition she was texting him but the contextual presupposition there is no x other than his lover such that x causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs that speaker B casts doubt on. Certainly, speaker B does not have certain knowledge that the lover was texting speaker A’s husband. But this does not mean his/her doubt. In fact, the if-clause used by speaker B indicates that the information expressed in the if-clause is what s/he has just received from speaker A, i.e. newly acquired information (cf. Akatsuka (1985, 1998)). That is, the information she was texting him has just entered the consciousness of speaker B at the discourse site. In this case, the if-clause just represents the speaker’s mental attitude I don’t know whether it is true or not. It should be noted that this function is not limited to the protasis of if-clefts and is different from the discourse functions of if-clefts per se.

In addition, if speaker B really doubts the proposition she was texting him, then s/he cannot give such advice as “Keep your hate and discontent at home and direct it to the responsible party, HIM.” In order to give such advice, speaker B needs to tentatively accept speaker A’s allegation as true, leaving aside the question whether it is true or not. Thus, it is evident that speaker B holds an idea or opinion different from speaker A’s.

Now let us see how the framework in (33) can explain the dialogue in (34). First, as already argued, speaker A’s utterance makes the contextual presupposition there is no x other than his lover such that x causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs. As is inferred from the dialogue, speaker B disagrees with speaker A, who exclusively blames her husband’s lover for his extramarital affairs. So speaker B uses the if-cleft sentence to reverse the presupposition, i.e. switching ¬X (there is no x other than his
lover such that \( x \) causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs) to \( X \) (there is \( x \) other than his lover such that \( x \) causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs). To put it plainly, speaker B intends to say, “You have discussed your husband’s extramarital affairs under the presupposition that there was no cause of them other than his lover, but if there was any other cause and if you ask me what it was, I dare to say it was because he set it up.” The if-cleft switches the topic of the discourse from the lover to A’s husband. In this way, the framework proposed here can explain not only the discourse structure of dialogue (34) but also the mental attitudes of the participants.

7.4.3. Re-examination of the Discourse Function of If-Clefts

7.4.3.1. Putative Counterexamples

So far, I have examined the discourse functions of if-cleft sentences, arguing that if-clefts have the following two functions:

(35) a. Switching an old presupposition (¬X) into a new presupposition (X).

b. Introducing a new topic for the following context.

However, a closer observation reveals that the situation is more complex than (35) suggests. Let us investigate the following text:

(36) If anyone understands how important it is to keep in close contact with family members, it’s John Scialdone. As Donald Nichols’ service coordinator, John made sure Donald kept in close contact with his mother in Utica. When Donald’s mother died a few years ago, John was concerned about the void her death would leave in John’s life. He encouraged Donald to reconnect with his sister, Roxanne. This proved to be more difficult than either of them expected. (http://www.omr.state.ny.us/hp_johnscialdone.jsp)

In (36), the if-cleft sentence, i.e. If anyone understands how important it is to keep in
close contact with family members, it's John Scialdone, is used as a discourse opener. In this case, naturally, the if-cleft cannot be expected to reverse any preceding presupposition, because there is no such context. It seems that the function in (35a) is not performed in this case. On the other hand, the function in (35b) is performed, because the focalized NP John Scialdone functions as the topic for the following context.

Furthermore, the following pair seems to show that if-clefts do not always reverse the preceding presupposition:

(37) a. Donna was pretty sure she couldn’t love anyone. (But) If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill.
   b. Donna was pretty sure she could love someone. (And) If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill.

In (37a), the presupposition in the sentences is there is no x such that Donna could love x, which is reversed in the following if-cleft. In this sense, the if-cleft in (37a) fulfills the two functions in (35). In (37b), on the other hand, the presupposition in the sentences is there is x such that Donna could love x, which is shared by the following if-cleft. That is, the if-cleft in (37b) does not reverse the presupposition, and thus does not fulfill the function in (35a). On the basis of this contrast, one may well argue that the functions of if-clefts proposed in (35) are wide of the mark.

It is true that if-clefts do not necessarily reverse the preceding presupposition, as shown in (36) and (37b). Nevertheless, it is equally true that if-clefts can reverse the preceding presupposition, as shown in (34) and (37a). To reconcile this contradiction, there are at least two possibilities to be considered:

(38) There are two types of if-cleft sentences: one reverses the preceding presupposition, while the other does not.
(39) The function of reversing the preceding presupposition should be attributed not to *if*-clefs per se but to other elements such as coordinate conjunctions. The possibility in (38) is problematic in that there seems to be no clear criterion to classify *if*-clefs into two types (or more).

With regard to the possibility in (38), take the examples in (37), for instance. As seen above, the expression *If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill* is used to reverse the preceding presupposition, i.e. *Donna couldn’t love anyone* in (37a), while the same expression does not reverse the presupposition, only giving a new topic (i.e. *Bill*) to the discourse in (37b). At least in the surface linguistic form, any difference cannot be found between the two types.

Let us turn to the possibility in (39). Note that the conjunctions, i.e. *but* in (37a) and *and* in (37b), are parenthesized. This means that they are optional in the sense that their occurrence does not significantly alter the meanings intended in those sentences. Therefore, the functional difference between (37a) and (37b) cannot be ascribed to those parenthesized conjunctions. In this way, neither of the possibilities is appealing.

7.4.3.2. *If*-Clause as a Marker of Modality

Here let us draw attention to the semantic function of the *if*-clause. I assume that the contrast in (37) should be attributed to the modal characteristics of the *if*-clause: the *if*-clause, as a modal expression, expresses the speaker’s mental attitude.

According to Nakau (1994), modal expressions such as *in my opinion* and *in all probability* cannot be focalized by clefting:

(40) a. * It is in all probability that John disagrees with you.
cf. * In all probability, John disagrees with you.

b. * It is in my opinion that Bach is unsurpassed as a composer.

cf. * In my opinion, Bach is unsurpassed as a composer.

c. * It is because his wife told me that he’s not coming to class.

cf. He’s not coming to class, because his wife told me.

(cf. Nakau (1994))

The ungrammaticality of the sentences in (40) arises from the fact that the focalized elements are modal expressions: the prepositional phrases in my opinion and in all probability are expressions of “S-Modality” in Nakau’s (1994) term and the because-phrase in (40c) is an expression of “D-Modality” in the same terminology.\(^{21}\)

If it is the case that the if-clause is a modal expression, then the focalization of it would be impossible. This expectation is borne out:

(41) a. If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill.

b. * It is if she had loved someone that it would have been Bill.

As shown in (41b), the if-clause cannot be focalized by clefting.\(^{22}\) One may argue

\(^{21}\) Roughly speaking, the terms S-Modality and D-Modality correspond to what Sweetser (1990) refers to as epistemic domain and speech-act domain, respectively. See also Chapter 4 for Nakau’s (1992) definition of Modality.

\(^{22}\) I admit that if-clauses in general do not readily occur as focus in cleft sentences, as pointed out in Huddleston and Pullum (2002:760):

(i) a. If Herbert is appointed, I foresee trouble.

b. It’s if Herbert is appointed that I foresee trouble.

Although Huddleston and Pullum (2002) do not refer to the acceptability of the sentence in (ib), they argue that cleft sentences like (ib) tend to be avoided. They also point out that the acceptability of (ib) can be greatly improved by the addition of only:

(ii) a. It’s only if Herbert is appointed that I foresee trouble.

The contrast between (ii) and (iii) indicates that it is the content domain if-clause alone which can be focused by clefting. The following examples further support my view:

(iii) a.*It is only if she had loved someone that it would have been Bill. (cf. (41b))

b.*It is only if anyone can do that that John can. (cf. (42b))

The addition of only does not improve the acceptability at all, as in:

(iv) a. If it rains tomorrow, the match will be cancelled.

b. If I drink too much, I get dizzy.

c. If I catch the 11:30 train, I will get to the meeting on time.

(v) a. It is if it rains tomorrow that the match will be cancelled.

(Wada (2011:94))
that the reason for the ungrammaticality of sentence (41b) is that *it would have been Bill* is embedded in the *that*-clause: a cleft sentence (*it would have been Bill*) is further embedded in another cleft sentence. However, this is not the case:

(42) a. If anyone can do that, John can.  

b. * It is if anyone can do that that John can.

As argued in Section 7.2.2.1, sentence (42a) is regarded as a variant of *if*-clefts. In this sentence, the main clause is not a truncated *it*-cleft sentence. Nevertheless, the *if*-clause cannot be focalized by clefting, as seen in (42b). Therefore, the ungrammaticality of sentence (42b) shows that it is not the form of the embedded clause that renders the sentence ungrammatical. In this way, the phenomena in (41) and (42) reflect the modal status of the *if*-clauses.

7.4.3.3. True Discourse Function of *If*-Clefts

If this line of argument is on the right track, then I should reconsider the function in (35a), taking into account the modal status of the *if*-clause. As a modal expression, the *if*-clause expresses the mental attitude of the speaker. With this in mind, let us examine the examples in (38) again:

(43) a. Donna was pretty sure she couldn’t love anyone.  
    (But) If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill.

b. Donna was pretty sure she could love someone.  
    (And) If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill.

b. It is if I drink too much wine that I get dizzy.

c. It is if I catch the 11:30 train that I will get to the meeting on time.  

(Wada (2011:96))

The sentences in (v) are all derived from the content-domain conditionals in (iv). In this way, it is true, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002) state, that the clefting of *if*-clauses should be avoided, but it is also true that there is an evident difference in acceptability between the sentences in (41b) and (42b) and those in (v).
Note that the first sentences in (43) describe Donna’s mental attitude. In this sense, the proposition *she couldn’t love anyone* belongs to the domain of Donna’s belief. The second sentences, on the other hand, do not belong to the domain of Donna’s belief: they describe the mental attitude of the speaker. In this sense, the second sentences belong to the domain of speaker’s belief. It follows that *if*-clefts express the speaker’s (personal) opinion about the preceding presupposition.

In (43a), for example, the presupposition *there is no* x such that *she could love x* is reversed. This means that the presupposition and the speaker’s personal opinion about it are different from each other: contrary to Donna’s belief, the speaker thinks or imagines that there was someone that Donna loved. In this context, the speaker cannot provide a new topic such as Bill unless s/he reverses the presupposition, because the presupposition clearly denies the existence of the specified value for the variable anyone.

In (43b), on the other hand, Donna’s belief and the speaker’s opinion are compatible with each other, so that the presupposition *there is* x such that *she could love x* need not be reversed. In this case, the speaker can provide the focalized element Bill without reversing the preceding presupposition. If this is the case, then the function in (35a) should be regarded as the secondary effect of providing a speaker’s personal opinion.

However, here arises a question: why does the speaker have to provide a new presupposition even if the preceding presupposition is not incompatible with the new one? The reason is that *if*-clefts are used to evoke the hearer’s expectation or prediction about the value for a valuable introduced in the *if*-clause. Recall here that the *if*-clause implies a *wh*-question, as proposed in (26): the implicit question works on the hearer to answer the question. In other words, the *if*-clause induces the hearer
to make inference regarding the focalized element provided by the main clause. By
doing this, *if*-clefts attract much attention of the hearer to the focalized element.

Let us examine the following text for confirmation:

(44) Tomorrow, Harry would have to deal with a rather delicate situation. Harriet
Arkwright, of the St. Joseph Arkwrights, was visiting a friend in Omaha, and
she had telephoned him to come on and take her to a dance. He had carried
things along pretty far with Miss Arkwright. Her favour was flattering to a
small-town man. She was a person of position in St. Joe. Her father was
president of the oldest banking house, and she had a considerable fortune of
her own, from her mother. *If she was twenty-six years old and still
unmarried, it was not from lack of suitors.* She had been in no hurry to tie
herself up. She managed her own property very successfully, travelled a
good deal, and liked her independence.

(http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200481.txt [italics are mine])

The italicized sentence in (44) has already been exemplified in (6a). Let us first
focus on the context preceding the *if*-cleft. From the statement *her father was
president of the oldest banking house, and she had a considerable fortune of her own,
from her mother*, the reader infers that *Harriet Arkwright* would be a rich person.
The next phrase *if she was twenty-six years old and still unmarried* evokes the
question of why she was unmarried, which makes the reader pay much attention to its
answer. The preceding context leads or helps the reader to predict that the lack of
suitors might prevent her from getting married: *she was so rich and blessed that no
ordinary men could propose to her*. However, the answer given by the main clause,
i.e. *it was not from lack of suitors*, betrays this kind of prediction: *it was not from
lack of suitors but for other reasons that she was unmarried*. As inferred from the
context that follows, the true reason is that she was enjoying her single life. By evoking questions in the reader’s/hearer’s mind and providing unexpected answers to those questions, if-clefts attract much attention of the reader/hearer to the new topic.

So far, I have made the following points:

(45) In if-cleft sentences,

a. The if-clause is a modal marker, expressing the speaker’s mental attitude: the focalized element in the main clause reflects the speaker’s personal opinion.

b. If-clefts are used to evoke questions, attracting the hearer’s attention to the answers, i.e. the focalized element.

Whether or not if-clefts reverse the preceding presupposition depends on whether the speaker’s personal opinion agrees with the presupposition. That is, if the speaker’s opinion is incompatible with the preceding presupposition, the function in (35a) arises; on the other hand, if the speaker’s opinion is compatible with the preceding presupposition, the function in (35a) does not arise. In either case, what is important is the function of evoking questions in the hearer’s/reader’s mind. By virtue of this function, if-clefts succeed in making the focalized element salient, so that the element serves as the topic for the context that follows.

One may argue that if if-clefts are used to evoke questions in hearer’s mind, it means that the distinction between if-clefts and wh-questions is more obscure than I argued in Section 7.4.1. It is true that if-clefts and wh-questions are closely related to each other, as pointed out in Section 7.3. However, recall here that wh-questions require the interlocutors to share pieces of information as presuppositions, while if-clefts do not. Therefore, it does not undermine the raison d’être of if-clefts at all to claim that the discourse function of if-clefts is evoking questions in hearer’s mind.
7.4.3.4. The Question of Where the Presupposition-Reversing Function Comes from

Note here that the presupposition-reversing function is limited to the case where the preceding presupposition clearly denies the existence of the value for a variable. One of the key factors lies in the fact that the main clause of an if-cleft is a truncated it-cleft sentence: it cannot be used unless the existence of the relevant variable \( x \) in the open proposition, i.e. the deleted that-clause, is presupposed. In terms of truth conditions, a presupposition is an unaffected, constant element or proposition (cf. May (2001:27), Huddleston and Pullum (2002:40), to name a few). It follows that the truth condition of the existence of \( x \) is constant whether the relevant proposition is true or false. For example, in the sentence *It is John (that saw Mary)*, the relevant open proposition is \( x \text{ saw Mary} \) or *there is x such that x saw Mary*. Even if one negates the sentence (e.g. *It is not John (that saw Mary)*.), the truth of the existence of \( x \) is unaffected. In this way, the use of it-clefts always requires that \( x \) should exist.

In this connection, it crucially matters what guarantees the truth of the existence of \( x \): another key factor is the existence of the if-clause. As stated above, the if-clause licenses the use of the truncated it-cleft (cf. Section 7.4.1 and figure (27)): it is the if-clause that introduces information or a proposition that can serve as a presupposition of the truncated it-cleft. In the case of (43a), for example, the cleft *it would have been Bill (that she had loved)* cannot be used without the if-clause *if she had loved someone*, as in:

(46) Donna was pretty sure she couldn’t love anyone.  # It would have been Bill.  

(cf. (43a))

Conversely, because the if-clause licenses the proper use of the truncated it-cleft, the proposition in the if-clause must always be positive as to the existence of \( x \). This
means that *if*-clefts, by virtue of the *if*-clause, necessarily reverse the presupposition negative as to the existence of $x$.

In this way, the presupposition-reversing function of *if*-clefts is a kind of pragmatic effect. The primary function of *if*-clefts is evoking questions and attracting much attention of the hearer to the focalized elements.

### 7.4.3.5. Summary

In this subsection, I argued that the presupposition-reversing function of *if*-clefts proposed in the last subsection is a pragmatic effect. From the above argument, I revise the assumption in (30) and propose the following as the discourse function of *if*-cleft sentences:

(47) **The Discourse Function of *If*-Cleft Sentences**

The discourse function of the *if*-cleft sentence is evoking a question in hearer’s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse.

On the basis of (47), I revise the figure in (33) as follows:

(48) Preceding Context *If*-Cleft Succeeding Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Presupposition</th>
<th><em>If X, it is Y</em></th>
<th>Discourse adopting $Y$ as Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$F_1$: Evoking a question</td>
<td>$F_2$: Introducing new topic $Y$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As argued above, the function of switching the flow of discourse is not a primary but a secondary effect of *if*-clefts. Thus it comes as no surprise that the *if*-cleft can be used as a discourse opener as in (36) or used without switching the flow of discourse. What I would like to emphasize here is that the *if*-cleft sentence is a very effective
device, because its form is particularly appropriate for providing a new topic for the following discourse. For one thing, as argued above, by evoking a wh-question in hearer’s mind, the if-cleft sentence successfully attracts his/her attention to the focalized element in the following it-cleft; for another, by putting the focalized element in the end position of the sentence, its form rigidly observes what is called the end-focus principle.

7.5. A Reasoning Process Model: The Conditional Construction as an Epitome of Human Rational Capacity

This section deals with a related issue, challenging the validity of the paraphrase in (26), repeated here as (49):

(49) If X, it is Y

= If X and if you ask me WH, I’ll answer it is Y

It should be noted that the main clause of an if-cleft is not necessarily manifested as a declarative sentence, i.e. the assertive form of it is Y, as exemplified below:

(50) a. If anyone can solve this problem, is it John?
    b. If someone gave her that money, who is it?

(Declerck and Seki (1990:27))

In the sentences in (50), the main clauses manifest themselves as interrogatives. In the discussion above, I have claimed that the main clause is an answer to a covert wh-question in the if-clause and proposed the paraphrase in (49). Clearly, the paraphrase does not take cases like (50) into consideration. In this sense, the paraphrase is invalid. Thus I need to reconsider the meaning of if-clefs.

In this connection, the following examples may shed light on the matter:

(51) a. Does anyone out there actually like Hinder? If so, I bet it is all women.
b. Do you have a home intrusion system? If so, why? It is because you fear that someone may try to enter your home without your permission.

The first thing to note is that the pro-form so occurs in each if-clause in (51). In example (51a), the so refers to the yes/no-question “Does anyone out there actually like Hinder?” Likewise, in example (51b), the so refers to “Do you have a home intrusion system?” This means that the so can be substituted for the questions, as exemplified below:

(52) a. If anyone out there actually likes Hinder, I bet it is all women.

b. If you have a home intrusion system, why? It is because you fear that someone may try to enter your home without your permission.

From this observation, I assume that yes/no-questions are hidden in (or linguistically embodied as) if-clauses in if-clefts. Not only so-substitution in (51) but also the use of it-clefts as main clauses shows that hidden yes/no-questions are always answered positively; otherwise one cannot use truncated it-clefts as main clauses (see Section 7.4). In other words, if-clauses always hypothesize about the relevant questions positively.

Second, note that in (52b) the second sentence answers the why-question in the main clause of the first sentence. It is not off the mark to assume that the why-question is the linguistic embodiment of the implicit wh-question. In fact, like (52b), the implicit question in (52a) can be linguistically expressed, as in:

(53) If anyone out there actually likes Hinder, who is it? I bet it is all women.

Though admittedly one should not draw an overly far-reaching conclusion from these
relatively few examples, one may be justified in suggesting as a possibility that an if-cleft semantically contains at least the following four steps: *yes/no*-questioning, positively-oriented hypothesization (P-Hypothesization, for short), *wh*-questioning, and answering. To put it differently, *if*-clefts seem to reflect a pattern of human rational thinking process. Let us demonstrate this point:

(54) They say that nobody can do it. If anyone can do it, it is John.

(55) Preceding Presupposition: $\neg X$  (Nobody can do it.)

\[ \text{If-Cleft} \]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Yes/No-Questioning: } & \neg X \text{ or } X? \quad (\text{Can anyone do it?}) \\
P-\text{Hypothesization: } & \text{If } X \quad (\text{If so.../ If anyone can do it,}) \\
\text{Wh-Questioning: } & \text{wh.. is it?} \quad (\text{who is it?}) \\
\text{Answering: } & \text{it is } Y \quad (\text{it is John})
\end{align*}
\]

Succeeding Discourse

Figure (55) illustrates the four reasoning steps relevant to the discourse in (54). To begin with, the speaker questions or challenges the presupposition *nobody can do it*, because s/he does not intend to accept it (*Yes/No*-Questioning). Then, s/he presents a new presupposition opposing the old one (P-Hypothesization). These steps are responsible for the function of reversing the flow of discourse. Thirdly, under the new presupposition, the speaker searches for the appropriate value of $x$ (*Wh*-Questioning). Lastly, s/he gives the final answer in the form of *it is Y*.

However, recall that the presupposition preceding *if*-clefts is not always negative about the existence of $x$, as discussed in the previous section. In this case, too, the reasoning process illustrated above holds true:

(56) Donna was pretty sure she could love someone. If she had loved anyone, it
would have been Bill. 

(57) Preceding Presupposition: X 

\[ \text{Yes/No-Questioning: } \neg X \text{ or } X? \]

\[ \text{P-hypothesization: } \text{If } X \]

\[ \text{Wh-Questioning: } \text{wh.. is it?} \]

\[ \text{Answering: it is Y} \]

Succeeding Discourse

One may argue that if the preceding presupposition and the speaker’s opinion are not contradictory with each other, then the speaker need not follow the reasoning process in (57) because s/he need not question or challenge the preceding presupposition. However, note that if-clefs represent the speaker’s personal opinion or mental attitude. To express his/her own attitude, the speaker needs to accept the presupposition tentatively and to think of it from his/her own viewpoint. To think of the presupposition from his/her own viewpoint, the speaker needs to follow some reasoning steps like those shown in (57).

Admittedly, the validity of this assumption is still open to discussion, but it has some advantages in analyzing if-clefs. Firstly, the assumption that the process of yes/no-questioning is contained in if-clauses can easily and plausibly explain why if-clefs contain polarity items such as any or some in many cases. It is also compatible with the fact that the semantic affinity of conditional if-clauses and polar questions is repeatedly pointed out (cf. Bolinger (1978), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), to name a few).

Secondly, this assumption is quite compatible with the discourse functions of
if-clefts. Recall that the purpose of the use of if-clefts is to evoke a question in hearer’s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse. For that purpose, the speaker first of all needs to question or challenge the old presupposition. Thus it stands to reason that the step of questioning the plausibility of the old presupposition is an essential part of the semantics of if-clefts.

Lastly, setting up the four steps in the meaning of if-clefts is more desirable from the viewpoint of a colloquial discourse:

(58) A: It is said that today’s computers can do everything from sending us to the moon to beating us at chess.
B: If there is anything they cannot do, what is it?
A: It’s thinking and acting at their will.
B: That makes a lot of sense. In fact, it’s rather difficult even for us human beings!

The paraphrase in (49) above does not take colloquial discourse into consideration, so that it cannot explain dialogues. In actual conversations like dialogue (58), the speaker of an if-cleft does not always give its answer by him/herself. On the other hand, the reasoning process model proposed here can explain such dialogues, if the four steps can be shared by each participant. Admittedly, it is difficult to verify empirically that such a psychological or mental process is contained in if-clefts as semantic substance. However, implicit in the analysis I have presented here is the long-standing assumption that the conditional construction is an epitome of Man’s rational capacity (Akatsuka (1997:323)), which is the reason why conditionals have been taken up in philosophy and psychology, as well as linguistics. From this perspective, it is not unreasonable to posit a psychological reasoning process model...
like those in (55) and (57).

7.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I was concerned with if-cleft sentences and investigated their discourse functions. I made the following points: (i) the interdependency between the protasis and apodosis of an if-cleft is in parallel with that between a wh-question and its answer, and (ii) the discourse function of the if-cleft sentence is evoking a question in hearer’s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse. In addition, I proposed a reasoning process model behind the use of if-cleft sentences and our rational thinking.
Chapter 8

The Semantics and Pragmatics of $N_1$-$nara$ $N_2$ Conditionals

8.1. Introduction

Although Japanese conditional constructions in general have attracted the attention of many researchers (cf. Arita (1993)), conditional expressions such as those exemplified below have been regarded as exceptional and thus have been left out of consideration: ¹, ²

(1) a. sake-nara Kosinokanbai
     sake-if Kosinokanbai
     „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Kosinokanbai.’

b. sikaku-nara Yuukyan
     qualification-if U-CAN
     „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.’

(2) a. otoko-nara issyoo-no sigoto-o motu beki da
     man-if lifelong-R work-Acc have should Part
     „If you are a man, you should have lifelong work.”

b. sensei-nara yame-ro to yuu beki da

¹ Here I treat the marker no as a postposition (P), following Nishiyama (2003). According to Nishiyama (2003), the postposition no in $N_1$-no $N_2$ constructions such as issyoo-no sigoto „life-long work” only indicates some pragmatic relation between $N_1$ and $N_2$: $N_1$-no $N_2$ means “the $N_2$ that has relationship R with $N_1.”$ Thus, in what follows, I will use R as the abbreviation of Relation to represent the meaning of no in the glosses of examples.

² The abbreviations used in the glosses of examples are as follows: Acc = accusative case, App = apposition marker, AspV = aspectual verb, Comp = comparative marker, Cop = copulative verbs, Ex = exclamation marker, Imp = imperative marker, Neg = negative marker, Nom = nominative case, Part = sentence ending particle, Pred = predicate marker, Pol = politeness marker, Quot = quotation marker, R = relation marker, Top = topic marker. In what follows, English translations in the single quotations represent the intended meaning of $N_1$-$nara$ (wa/no) $N_2$ and related constructions.
If you are a teacher, you should say “Stop it.”

In (1) and (2), the nominal expression (hereafter, N) is directly attached to the conditional marker nara. Let us refer to those conditionals as N-nara conditionals. N-nara conditionals can be further divided into two subclasses: N$_1$-nara N$_2$ conditionals such as those in (1) and N-nara S(entence) conditionals such as those in (2).

N$_1$-nara N$_2$ conditionals like those in (1) are composed of two nominal expressions and an expression connecting them, i.e. the conditional conjunction nara. They are often used in advertisements and commercial messages as sales messages or phrases of recommendation: N$_2$ is presented as the best or most desirable example relevant to N$_1$. Thus, the sentences in (1) are roughly interpreted as “When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai (Koshinokanbai is best)” and “When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN (U-CAN is best),” respectively.

In N-nara S conditionals like those in (2), on the other hand, a nominal expression is adjacent to nara, followed by a sentence (i.e. apodosis). In many cases, the apodosis of N-nara S conditionals expresses the speaker’s judgment or assessment (for more details, see Takanashi (1995)). In the literature, the conjunction nara in N-nara S conditionals has been regarded as a topic marker, and thus has been investigated in comparison with wa (cf. Mikami (1960), Morita (1990), Nihongo Kizyutu Bunpoo Kenkyuukai (ed.) (2009), among others).

This chapter examines N$_1$-nara N$_2$ conditional constructions used as phrases of recommendation, focusing on their semantics and pragmatics. The purpose is to propose a licensing condition of N$_1$-nara N$_2$ conditionals and to clarify how they can be interpreted as phrases of recommendation. The main claims are the following:
(3) a. The N₁-nara N₂ construction is licensed if the relation between N₁ and N₂ can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject and if the candidates for N₂ can be compared with each other by a single criterion common to them.

b. The recommendation reading arises from the incompatibility between the logical meaning of the linguistic form and that of the semantic relation of N₁ and N₂.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 discusses previous studies and the scope of this chapter. Section 8.3 gives basic facts about N₁-nara N₂ constructions, and propounds problems relevant to their licensing condition and interpretation. Section 8.4 proposes a licensing condition of the constructions, investigating the difference between N₁ and N₂, i.e. that the former is non-referential, while the latter is referential. Section 8.5 explains why N₁-nara N₂ constructions allow the recommendation reading. Section 8.6 points out that part of the analysis here is applicable to other phrases of recommendation such as N₁-wa N₂ constructions and N₁-no N₂ constructions. Section 8.7 offers concluding remarks.

8.2. Previous Studies and the Scope of this Chapter

8.2.1. Previous Studies

As already argued, N₁-nara N₂ constructions have been treated as exceptional conditional expressions, and thus have been left out of consideration. A few researchers such as Mikami (1960), Morita (1990), Suzuki (1991), Masuoka and Takubo (1992), and Takanashi (1995) pay attention to N-nara constructions in general.³ To put it precisely, they focus on N-nara S constructions such as those in

³ Mikami (1960), Morita (1990), and Masuoka and Takubo (1992) treat the conjunction nara as a
(2) without distinguishing them from N₁-nara N₂ constructions.⁴ To the best of my knowledge, no researchers have investigated N₁-nara N₂ constructions in detail.⁵ Therefore I will develop the argument that follows without referring to those previous studies unless necessary.

8.2.2. Scope

The scope of this chapter should be mentioned. The following fact shows that N₁-nara N₂ constructions have subclasses, which have not been pointed out so far:

(4) sake-nara sake. nigorizake-nara nigorizake. meigara-o yuu sake-if sake unrefined sake-if unrefined sake brand-Acc say hituyoo-wa ari mas en. necessity-Top be Pol Neg „All you have to say is “Sake” or “Unrefined sake,” if you want to drink them. You don’t have to specify a brand.’

(5) (Talking about something to eat with one’s drink)

nihonsyu-nara surume, syootyuu-nara yakko.
Japanese sake-if dried cuttlefish shochu-if chilled tofu
“If you drink sake, dried cuttlefish is best as a snack; if you drink shochu, chilled tofu is best.’

In (4), the N₁S and N₂S are in a tautological relationship with one another. The nara in (5) seems to correspond to contrastive nara (cf. Akatsuka (1986:347-348)) in sentential conditionals, as can be understood from the intended meaning. Although it

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⁴ For the grounds to distinguish between N-nara S and N₁-nara N₂ constructions, see footnote 11.
⁵ The only exception is Shizawa (2011b, e), on which this chapter is based.
would be interesting and significant to depict all of the characteristics of $N_1$-$nara$ $N_2$ constructions, I restrict myself to the case wherein the constructions are used as phrases of recommendation.\(^6\)

Here I refer to the relationship between sentential $nara$-conditionals and $N_1$-$nara$ $N_2$ constructions. Some previous studies such as Mikami (1960) regard $N_1$-$nara$ $N_2$ constructions as being derived from ordinary sentential conditionals by the truncation or deletion of parts of the sentence. However, as Suzuki (1991:6) points out, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restore the deleted parts:

(6) sikaku-nara Yuukyan

„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‘

(7) a. sikaku (o toru)-nara Yuukyan (ga ii).

qualification (Acc get)-if U-CAN (Nom good)

„If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is a good choice.‘

b. sikaku (o toru)-nara Yuukyan (wa yoku nai).

qualification (Acc get)-if U-CAN (Top good Neg)

„If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is not a good choice.‘

If $N_1$-$nara$ $N_2$ constructions like expression (6) were derived from “full” or sentential conditional constructions such as those in (7) by deleting the parts in the parentheses, then expression (6) would be ambiguous, allowing both of the interpretations in (7) according to the context.\(^7\) Interestingly enough, however, it is not (7b) but (7a) that is

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\(^6\) Contrastive $N_1$-$nara$ $N_2$ constructions like (5) will be discussed in Section 8.4 in terms of the licensing condition of $N_1$-$nara$ $N_2$ constructions with the recommendation reading.

\(^7\) Note here that different subject markers are used in the parenthesized parts in (7): the nominative marker $ga$ is used in (7a), while the topic marker $wa$ is used in (7b). Interestingly enough, they cannot be replaced with each other, as shown below:

(i) a. ?? sikaku-o toru nara Yuukyan wa ii.

„If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is a good choice.‘

b. * sikaku-o toru nara Yuukyan ga yoku nai.

„If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is not a good choice.‘

Unfortunately, I am not in a position to give any sufficient explanation for the contrast. However, the
chosen as the unmarked, natural interpretation of example (6) by native speakers of Japanese. It is impossible to interpret example (6) as (7b). If $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions are derived from “full” conditional constructions, then one cannot properly explain why (7b) is never accepted as a possible interpretation of expression (6). Therefore, I do not regard $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions as truncated constructions but as independent, distinct constructions.

8.3. Basic Observations and Problems

8.3.1. Basic Observations

This section will investigate the semantics and function of $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions. As is stated in Section 8.1, they are often used in advertisements as sales messages or phrases of recommendation: $N_2$ is presented as the best or most desirable example relevant to $N_1$. Let us observe the following examples:

(8) a. sake-nara Kosinokanbai                        (= (1a))
    sake-if Kosinokanbai
    „When it comes to sake, Koshinokanbai is best.’

b. densi zisyo-nara Kasio-no Ekusuwaado
    electronic dictionary-if Casio-R Ex-word
    „When it comes to electronic dictionaries, Casio’s Ex-word is best.’

The expression in (8a) presents Kosinokanbai as the representative of Japanese sake and recommends it. Likewise, the expression in (8b) presents Ekusuwaado as the representative of electronic dictionaries and recommends it. In many cases, $N_1$ refers to categories or groups such as sake or densi zisyo, „electronic dictionary’. $N_2$ such as contrast may be ascribed to the difference between categorical and thetic judgments (cf. Kuroda (1972)): $wa$ has to do with the former and $ga$ with the latter. For more details about the relationship between the two judgments and the use of $wa/ga$, see Kuroda (1972).
Kosinokanbai or Ekusuwaado, on the other hand, is an element belonging to the set referred to by $N_1$. That is, as far as the examples in (8) are concerned, the relationship between $N_1$ and $N_2$ can be formalized as follows:

$$ (9) \ N_2 \in N_1 $$

However, closer observation reveals that the relationship between $N_1$ and $N_2$ cannot necessarily be reduced to the relationship in (9). Let us examine the following examples:

(10) a. ee kaiwa-nara Berurittu

English conversation-if Berlitz

„When it comes to English conversation, Berlitz is the best school.”

b. nihon syu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo

Japanese sake-if Daishichi Sake Brewery

„When it comes to Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is the best brewer.”

c. chuukaman-nara Yamazaki

Chinese style steamed bun with a filling-if Yamazaki

„When it comes to Chinese steamed buns, Yamazaki is the best company.”

d. ryokoo-nara Kyooto

travel-if Kyoto

„When it comes to travels, Kyoto is the best tourist spot to visit.”

In the examples in (10), clearly, $N_1$ and $N_2$ are semantically or pragmatically related to one another, but the relationship cannot be reduced to (9). For example, the expression in (10a) does not present Berurittu as the best example of ee kaiwa „English conversation”; rather, it represents Berurittu as the best school or means for learning
English conversation. In this case, it is more natural to regard the relationship between *ee kaiwa* and *Berurittu* as that of a purpose and its means or that of business and a company. From this perspective, the relationships between N₁ and N₂ in the examples in (10) can be captured as follows:

(11) a. *ee kaiwa-nara Berurittu* (N₁ = purpose; N₂ = means)
    b. *nihon syu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo* (N₁ = product; N₂ = producer)
    c. *chuukaman-nara Yamazaki* (N₁ = product; N₂ = producer)
    d. *ryokoo-nara Kyoto* (N₁ = event; N₂ = place)

As far as the examples in (11) are concerned, N₁ and N₂ are intimately related and conceptually contiguous with each other. N₂ is presented as what the speaker thinks is the most salient or outstanding thing related to N₁. This indicates that N₁ and N₂ belong to the same ICM in Lakoff’s (1987) terminology. That is, N₁-nara N₂ constructions explicitly express the metonymic relation between N₁ and N₂.

From this viewpoint, I recapture the relationship between N₁ and N₂ in the examples in (8). Since the relationship between N₁ and N₂ is that of a set and its element, the examples in (8) explicitly express synecdochic relations. That is say, in both types of N₁-nara N₂ constructions, i.e. metonymic type and synecdochic type, N₁ and N₂ are in a mapping relation with each other in terms of Fauconnier’s (1985, 1997)

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8 The idea of explicit metonymic/synecdochic relations is borrowed from Mori (2002). What Mori refers to as *explicit metonymic/synecdochic expressions* is exemplified below:

(i) a. *Komati-wa bizin-no daimesi da*
    Komachi-Top beautiful woman-R pronoun Cop
    ‘Komachi is the pronoun of a beautiful woman.’
    b. *Nagashima-wa Kyozin-no sinboru da*
    Nagashima-Top Giants- R symbol Cop
    ‘Nagashima is the symbol of the Giants.’

In (ia), a synecdochic relation holds between *Komati* (part) and *bizin, a beautiful woman* (whole). In (ib), a metonymic relation holds between *Nagashima* (a baseball player) and *Kyozin* (team). As seen in these examples, the metonymic/synecdochic relations are explicitly represented by the expressions *daimesi, pronoun* and *sinboru, symbol*. Although N₁-nara N₂ constructions have no phrases equivalent to *daimesi* and *sinboru*, they are in parallel with Mori’s explicit metonymic/synecdochic expressions in that reference points and targets are explicitly realized.
Access Principle, i.e. $F(N_1)=N_2$.\textsuperscript{9} In (11a), for example, the $N_2$ *Berurittu* works as the trigger or reference point to access the target *ee kaiwa* ,‘English conversation’. Through this indirect identification procedure, $N_2$ is recognized as the best or most desirable individual with regard to $N_1$.

8.3.2. Problems

In the previous subsection, I have pointed out that metonymic and synecdochic relations hold between $N_1$ and $N_2$. However, this does not fully explain the semantic characteristics of $N_1$-*nara* $N_2$ constructions.

First, there are some cases wherein $N_1$-*nara* $N_2$ constructions cannot be licensed even if metonymic and synecdochic relations hold between $N_1$ and $N_2$:

(12) a  # Doraemon-nara dorayaki.

Doraemon-if round cake filled with bean jam

„When it comes to Doraemon, nothing is better than dorayaki.’

b. # interia-nara sofaa

furniture-if sofa

„When it comes to furniture, nothing is better than sofas.’

In (12a), *Doraemon* is a popular comic character in Japan. *Dorayaki* ,’round cake filled with bean jam’ is *Doraemon*’s favorite food. In this sense, *dorayaki* and *Doraemon* have an intimate relationship with each other (at least for those who know about the comic). In addition, one can use the word *dorayaki* to refer to *Doraemon* by saying “Dorayaki yaroo (lit. *You, dorayaki!*),” which shows that a metonymic

\textsuperscript{9} The Access Principle (also called the Identification Principle) is defined as follows (cf. Fauconnier (1997:41)):

If two elements $a$ and $b$ are linked by a connector $F (b=F(a))$, then element $b$ can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a.
relation can hold between *dorayaki* and *Doraemon*. However, as is shown, the expression in (12a) cannot be interpreted as a phrase of recommendation. In (12b), on the other hand, the N₁ *interia* „furniture” can be construed as the categorical property of the N₂ *sofaa* „sofa”.¹⁰ In this sense, expression (12b) is in parallel with the expression in (8a), which is impeccable as a phrase of recommendation. Nevertheless, expression (12b) is not acceptable in the intended sense. The examples in (12) show that the mapping relation in (9) does not work as the licensing condition of the N₁-*nara* N₂ construction.

In addition, let us observe the following example:

(13) uwaki-*nara* iPhone
    (FLASH, March. 1, 2011)
    love affair-*if* iPhone
    „When it comes to love affairs, nothing is better than iPhone.’

At first glance, in (13) it is difficult to recognize an intimate relationship (such as those in (8) and (10)) between *uwaki* „love affair” and *iPhone*. However, the preceding context, which is omitted in (13), enables us to recognize a close relationship between *uwaki* and *iPhone*:

(14) keetai meeru hukugendo chekku „uwaki-*nara* iPhone”
    mobile phone mail restorability check love affair-*if* iPhone
    „Compare mobile phones in terms of the restorability of deleted e-mails:
    iPhone is best for love affairs.’

From the preceding expression *keetai meeru hukugendo chekku* „checking the restorability of deleted e-mails”, those who read the expression in (14) can understand that the expression *uwaki-*nara *iPhone* recommends iPhone from the viewpoint of the

¹⁰ The meaning of the Japanese word *interia* is slightly different from that of the English word *interior* in that the former is usually used as the synonym of *kagu* „furniture”. Thus *furniture* is used as the literal meaning of *interia* in the glosses.
restorability of deleted e-mails. By the preceding expression, one can recognize a purpose-means relationship between uwaki and iPhone.

The above observation indicates that the metonymic/synecdochic relation (or mapping relation) between N₁ and N₂ is not a crucial factor for guaranteeing or licensing the N₁-nara N₂ construction; such relationships are no more than effects. In other words, even if two nominal expressions have metonymic/synecdochic relations with each other, it is not necessarily possible to use them as N₁ and N₂ (cf. (12)). It follows that there is another different semantic/pragmatic relationship between N₁ and N₂ which produces metonymic or synecdochic relationships. Investigating the “true” semantic/pragmatic relationship between N₁ and N₂ will enable us to propose a licensing condition for the N₁-nara N₂ construction.

Second, it should be considered how one can interpret N₁-nara N₂ constructions as phrases of recommendation. As already argued, they are often used as sales messages in advertisements: N₂ is presented as the best or most desirable example relevant to N₁. However, the interpretation is not compositional in that the recommendation meaning of N₁-nara N₂ constructions is not strictly predictable from its immediate constituents. Consider, again, the expression in (10a), repeated here as (15) here:

(15) ee kaiwa-nara Berurittu

English conversation-if Berlitz

„When it comes to English conversation, nothing is better than Berlitz.’

The example in (15) is composed of three linguistic units: N₁ ee kaiwa „English conversation’, the conditional marker nara „if’, and N₂ Berurittu. It is obvious that the expression has no element which directly corresponds to the recommendation meaning.
As pointed out in the previous subsection, $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions explicitly express metonymic/synecdochic relationships between $N_1$ and $N_2$. This means that $N_2$ *stands for* $N_1$ or things conceptually contiguous to $N_1$. In this sense, $N_2$ typifies $N_1$. In this light, one can assume that the recommendation reading should be attributed to the function of *standing for/ typifying something*. However, *standing for/typifying something* is not always associated with being good or desirable.

Consider the following example:

(16) kee  hanzai-no daihyoo  dearu  manbiki-o  maikai
minor  offense-R representation Cop  shoplifting-Acc  every time
kurikaesi  sai  han  si-teiru onna-ga  ikani  ooi  kotoka
repeatedly again  offense do-AspV woman-Nom how many Ex
‘How many women there are who repeatedly do shoplifts, which typifies minor offenses!’

(http://hissi.org/read.php/newsplus/20060305/VEVvMjhMMy9P.html)

In this example, *manbiki* ‘shoplifting’ is treated as the typical case of *kee hanzai* ‘minor offense’: *manbiki* stands for or typifies *kee hanzai*. However, *Manbiki* would never be interpreted as desirable. As is evident from this example, standing for something does not always imply being desirable.

One may argue that *manbiki* and *kee hanzai* are never interpreted as desirable because ordinary people have background or encyclopedic knowledge that they are undesirable. However, this is not the case. Let us examine the following examples:

(17) kee  hanzai-nara  manbiki
minor  offense-if  shoplifting

(18) a. If you commit a minor offense, shoplifting is desirable.

b. If you commit a minor offense, shoplifting is undesirable.
In (17), *kee hanzai* and *manbiki*, which are interpreted as undesirable in (16), are used in the N<sub>1</sub>-*nara* N<sub>2</sub> construction, substituted for N<sub>1</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>, respectively. Interestingly enough, although there is almost no opportunity to see expressions like (17), native speakers of Japanese choose (18a), not (18b), as the unmarked interpretation of the expression in (17). This means that the function of recommendation does not arise from the lexical meaning of the nouns occurring in the positions of N<sub>1</sub> and N<sub>2</sub> but from the constructional meaning. However, ascribing the recommendation meaning to the constructional meaning does not fully explain how N<sub>1</sub>-*nara* N<sub>2</sub> constructions are interpreted as such. Thus, its mechanism should be investigated and clarified.

From the above argument, the problems to be addressed in this chapter can be summarized as follows:

(19) a. What is the true relationship between N<sub>1</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>?
   b. What licenses the N<sub>1</sub>-*nara* N<sub>2</sub> construction?
   c. How is the N<sub>1</sub>-*nara* N<sub>2</sub> construction interpreted as a phrase of recommendation?

In the following sections, I will address the three questions in (19) in turn.

### 8.4. The Licensing Condition of N<sub>1</sub>-*nara* N<sub>2</sub> Constructions

#### 8.4.1. The True Relationship between N<sub>1</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>: Attribute and Its Subject

This subsection deals with question (19a), examining the relationship between N<sub>1</sub> and N<sub>2</sub> in more detail. Observe the following examples:

(20) a. sake-nara Kosinokanbai
   „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.’

   b. sikaku-nara Yuukyan
   „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.’
Let me first investigate the nature of N₁. What should be pointed out here is that NPs occurring in the N₁ position are non-referential in that they have no token reference identifiable to both the speaker and hearer. To put it differently, non-referential NPs alone can occur in the position of N₁ in N₁-nara N₂ constructions. Let us focus on the nominal expressions in the N₁ positions in (20). Note here that they do not seem to refer to specific referents. In this connection, Takanashi (1995) points out that the N in the N-nara conditional construction (including N₁-nara N₂ constructions like those in (20)) is generic and refers to a category, class, or group.

According to Nishiyama (2003), generic noun phrases are referential in that they refer to types to which token entities belong. However, it is not the case that one regards the N₁ as referential. Let us consider the following example:

(21) zoo-wa  hana-ga  naga-i
    elephant-Top  nose-Nom  long-Pred.

   „Elephants have long trunks.‘

Sentence (21) is what is called a generic sentence. The subject or topic NP zoo „elephant’ is generic in that it does not refer to a specific elephant; rather, it refers to a type or group to which elephants belong. In this sense, the NP zoo is referential. Note here that the phrase to yuu mono „that which is called’ or to yuu syu „the species/class called’ can be added to the subject NP of generic sentences:

(22) a. zoo  to yuu mono-wa  hana-ga  naga-i
elephant  that which is called-Top  nose-Nom  long-Pred.
„That which is called an elephant has a long trunk.’

b.  zoo  to yuu syu-wa  hana-ga  naga-i

elephant  the species called-Top  nose-Nom  long-Pred.
„The species called elephant has a long trunk.’

In contrast, the addition of those phrases, i.e. * to yuu mono and to yuu syu, to the N₁ renders the examples in (20) unacceptable:

(23) a. * sake {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara Kosinokanbai
„When it comes to {that which is called sake/the class called sake}, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.’

b. * sikaku {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara Yuukyan
„When it comes to {that which is called qualification/the class called Japanese sake}, nothing is better than U-CAN.’

c. * nihonsyu {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara Daisiti Syuzoo
„When it comes {that which is called Japanese sake/the class called Japanese sake}, nothing is better than Daishichi Sake Brewery.’

d. * uwaki {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara iPhone
„When it comes to {that which is called love affair/the class called love affair}, nothing is better than iPhone.”

The unacceptability of (23) shows that N₁ of N₁-nara N₂ constructions is different from the subject or topic NP of generic sentences in that the former does not refer to a type or group.

The non-referentiality of N₁ is further corroborated by the following data:

(24) a. * sono sake-nara Kosinokanbai
„When it comes to that sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.’
b. * ano sikaku-nara Yuukyan

„When it comes to that qualification, nothing is better than U-CAN.’

c. * sanbon-no nihonsyu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo

„When it comes to three bottles of Japanese sake, nothing is better than Daishichi Sake Brewery.’

d. * nikai-no uwaki-nara iPhone

„When it comes to two love affairs, nothing is better than iPhone.”

In (24a-b), the deictic expressions *sono „that’ and *ano „that’ are added to the N1’s, which renders the examples ungrammatical. Literature-wise, in (24c-d), the addition of quantifiers such as *sanbon-no „three (bottles of)’, *nikai-no „twice’ to the N1’s makes the examples ungrammatical. It is generally acknowledged that deictic expressions and quantifiers are essentially referential (cf. Nishiyama (2003:125)). The facts shown in (23)-(24) confirm that nominal expressions that can occur in the position of N1 are essentially non-referential.

Now let us turn our attention to N2. Let us examine the examples in (20), repeated here as (25):

(25) a. sake-nara Kosinokanbai

„When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.’

b. sikaku-nara Yuukyan

„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.’

c. nihonsyu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo

„When it comes to Japanese sake, nothing is better than Daishichi

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11 As understood from examples such as *sono otoko-nara wakaru hazu da „That man should know about it.’ and *kimi-nara doo suru „What would you do?’, this restriction is not relevant to N—nara constructions. In this respect the approaches taken by the previous studies, i.e. Mikami (1960), Suzuki (1991), and Takanashi (1995), are inadequate.
Sake Brewery.’

d.  uwaki-nara iPhone

ʻWhen it comes to love affairs, nothing is better than the iPhone.’

In the examples in (25), the N₂s (i.e. Koshinokanbai, Yuukyan, Daisiti Syuzoo, and iPhone) refer to particular, substantial entities in the real world. In this sense, they have token referents and thus are referential by nature. In other words, N₂ is the position wherein referential nominals can occur.

This is further confirmed by the fact that deictic expressions such as kono ‘this’ and koko ‘here’ can occur in the position of N₂:

(26) a.  sikaku-nara koko/soko
qualification-if here/there

ʻWhen it comes to qualifications, this/that is the best.’

b.  ee kaiwa- nara kono kyoozai.
English conversation-if this teaching material

ʻWhen it comes to English conversation, this is the best teaching material.’

c.  umai gyooza-nara kono omise
delicious gyoza-if this shop

ʻWhen it comes to delicious gyoza, this is the best shop.’

From the above observations, I conclude that N₂, as opposed to N₁, is the position where referential nominals can occur.

Now I am in a position to consider the true relation between N₁ and N₂. In this section, I have clarified that N₁ is the position wherein non-referential nominals should occur, while N₂ is the position wherein referential nominals can occur. It is well known that non-referential nominal expressions denote attributes (cf. Kuno (1970)).
On the other hand, the nominals in $N_2$, which have particular token referents, should be interpreted as individuals. Thus the relation between $N_1$ and $N_2$ can be schematically represented as follows:

\[(27) \quad N_1[\text{attribute}] - nara \quad N_2[\text{individual}]\]

Clearly, the representation in (27) shows that the relation between $N_1$ and $N_2$ should be interpreted as that between an attribute and its subject.

For a better understanding of the attribute-subject relation, let us observe the following examples:

\[(28) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. sake-nara} & \quad \text{Kosinokanbai} \\
& \quad (= (25a)) \\
& \quad \text{„When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.”}
\end{align*} \]

\[\text{b. aka-i} \quad \text{hana-nara} \quad \text{manzyusyage} \]

\[\quad \text{red-Pred} \quad \text{flower-if} \quad \text{cluster amaryllis} \]

\[\quad \text{„When it comes to red flowers, cluster amaryllises are the best.”} \]

In (28) the $N_2$s $\text{Kosinokanbai}$ and $\text{manzyusyage}$, „cluster amaryllis” are members of Japanese sake and red flowers, respectively: the $N_1$s denote the categories to which the referents of $N_2$s belong. To put it in another way, $N_1$ denotes a categorical attribute (cf. Masuoka (2005)) of $N_2$.

Let us turn our attention to some of the other examples:

\[(29) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. sikaku-nara} & \quad \text{Yuukyan} \\
& \quad (= (25b)) \\
& \quad \text{„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.”}
\end{align*} \]

\[\text{b. nihonsyu-nara} \quad \text{Daisiti Syuzoo} \]

\[\quad (= (25c)) \]

\[\quad \text{„When it comes to Japanese sake, nothing is better than Daishichi Sake Brewery.”} \]

In the expressions in (29), the nominal expressions in $N_1$ do not denote the categories to which the referents of the nominals in $N_2$ belong. In the case of (29a), $\text{Yuukyan}$ is
a company which provides correspondence courses for lifelong learning, including sikaku „qualification”. In other words, sikaku is one of the company’s justifications for existence. In this sense, sikaku is equivalent to the telic role of qualia structure (cf. Pustejovsky (1995)). Needless to say, qualia structure encodes information about particular properties and activities associated with lexical items. In this way, there is sufficient reason to think of sikaku „qualification” as an attribute of the company Yuukyan.

The example in (29b) can be explained in almost the same way as the case of (29a). Nihonsyu „Japanese sake” is a product made by the brewery named Daisiti Syuzoo. Conversely, Daisiti Syuzoo, as the name Syuzoo „brewery” indicates, is a company exclusively producing sake, and thus cannot exist without sake. That is, nihonsyu can be construed as the raison d’être of Daisiti Syuzoo. In this sense, nihonsyu can be construed as an essential attribute or at least a defining characteristic of Daisiti Syuzoo.

At first glance, the following examples may be problematic for my claim in that it is difficult to construe the N₁s as the attributes of the N₂s.

(30) a. ame-nara Tutiya Keeiti.

   rain-if Tsuchiya Kei-iti

   „When it comes to rainy conditions, Kei-ichi Tsuchiya is the fastest driver.’

b. uwaki-nara iPhone (= (25d))

   „When it comes to love affairs, nothing is better than iPhone.’

Let us first examine the expression in (30a). It is true that ame „rain” cannot be an

---

12 In the generative lexicon theory, the term telic role is defined as the essential function and purpose of the referent of a lexical item.
attribute of human beings. However, if one has encyclopedic knowledge about Keeiti Tutiya, a famous racing driver, it is fully possible to regard rain as a kind of attribute for him: he has been famous for his exceptional driving skills in rainy conditions. He began competing in the Le Mans 24 hour races in 1994. In 1999, he was in the second place overall, driving a car named Toyota GT-One TS020. In this race, his time during the night session was the fastest, because he excels at driving during nighttime and in rainy conditions. Since then he has been called ame-no Tutiya, ‘In rainy conditions, Tsuchiya is the fastest driver,’ or yoru-no Tutiya, ‘In night sessions, Tsuchiya is the fastest driver.’ In this way, one can recognize an intimate relationship between his driving skills and rainy conditions. Rain can be recognized as an attribute, or at least a defining characteristic of Keeiti Tutiya.

In the case of (30b), one cannot straightforwardly construe uwaki, ‘love affair’ as an attribute of iPhone, either. In the actual world, love affairs are not recognized as what characterizes the iPhone. Thus the existence of the iPhone would not be affected by the non-existence of love affairs. So, why is this expression used on the cover of a magazine?

The answer is that uwaki is, or at least can be construed as, an attribute of iPhone. Let us observe the example in (14) again:

(31) keetai meeru hukugendo chekku ,uwaki-nara iPhone’
    mobile phone mail restorability check love affair-if iPhone
    ‘Check the restorability of deleted e-mails: iPhone is most suitable for love affairs.’

As argued earlier, the expression keetai meeru hukugendo chekku ,‘checking the restorability of deleted e-mails’ enables us to understand easily that the phrase

---

The similarity between the $N_1$-nara $N_2$ construction and $N_1$-no $N_2$ will be argued in Section 8.6.
uwaki-nara iPhone recommends iPhone from the viewpoint of the restorability of deleted e-mails. It goes without saying that if it is difficult to restore deleted e-mails of a mobile phone, the phone is suitable for love affairs; if it is easy to do so, the phone is not suitable for love affairs. The magazine has a report on the match-fixing scandal in sumo wrestling: during an investigation into sumo wrestlers’ illegal gambling (baseball betting), the police scrutinized mobile phones confiscated from suspected wrestlers; as a result, they found that some sumo wrestlers arrange outcomes and even detail the moves to be used. The report says that iPhone’s deleted e-mail is very difficult to restore, compared to those of other mobile phones. The phrase uwaki-nara iPhone presupposes this report. Under the presupposition, uwaki is associated with the restorability of deleted e-mails and the mail system of mobile phones. That is, uwaki can be construed as an attribute of iPhone through inference: if the restorability of deleted e-mails is low, the possibility of “inappropriate relationships” being discovered is also low. From that viewpoint, iPhone is suitable for love affairs.

It should be noted here that in the examples in (30), the attribute-subject relation holds not semantically but pragmatically. That is, in N₁-nara N₂ constructions, the relation between N₁ and N₂ can be construed either semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject. Conversely, the constructions are not accepted unless the attribute-subject relation holds between N₁ and N₂ either semantically or pragmatically.

Construing the relationship between N₁ and N₂ as that of an attribute and its subject enables us to understand why metonymic/synecdochic mapping relations are established between N₁ and N₂: since attribute is defined as a quality or feature of something, i.e. subject, a part-whole relationship in a broader sense necessarily holds
between \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \).

From the discussion so far, I extract the following generalization:

(32) The \( N_1 \)-nara \( N_2 \) construction is licensed if the relation between \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject.

Now let me explain the unacceptability of the examples in (12) on the basis of the generalization in (32):

(33) a. # Doraemon-nara dorayaki.
    Doraemon-if round cake filled with bean jam
    „When it comes to Doraemon, nothing is better than dorayaki.’

b. # interia-nara sofaa
    furniture-if sofa
    „When it comes to furniture, nothing is better than sofas.’

(= (12))

Let us first examine example (33a). In this case, the \( N_1 \) \emph{Doraemon} is a referential NP, while the \( N_2 \) \emph{dorayaki} „round cake filled with bean jam’ is ambiguous between referential and non-referential. If it is interpreted as referential, it refers to a class of confectionery called \emph{dorayaki}. On the other hand, if it is interpreted as non-referential, it refers to no substantial entity, only representing a property of being a \emph{dorayaki}. In either case, it is difficult to construe the \( N_1 \) as an attribute of the \( N_2 \). Hence, the example is judged unacceptable. In the case of (33b), on the other hand, things are not that simple: the \( N_1 \) \emph{interia} „furniture’ denotes the category to which the \( N_2 \) \emph{sofaa} „sofa’ belongs, which means that the \( N_1 \) can be construed as the categorical attribute of \emph{sofaa}. In this sense, example (33b) is in parallel with the impeccable examples in (28). Nevertheless, example (33b) is unacceptable as a phrase of
recommendation. This phenomenon requires a more detailed explanation, which will be given in the following subsection.

8.4.2. Comparability of $N_2$

Before going into a detailed discussion of the unacceptability of example (33b), let us observe the following examples:

(34) ? interia-nara kono sofa

"When it comes to furniture, nothing is better than this sofa."

(35) tokaitekina interia-nara kono sofa

"When it comes to furniture designed for urban life, this sofa is best."

(33b) (http://store.shopping.yahoo.co.jp/sofarld/a4aaa4b9a4.html)

Compare these examples with example (33b). In (34), the deictic word kono "this" is added to the $N_2$ sofa. In (35), the modifier tokaitekina "urban" is adjoined to $N_1$ interia "furniture", besides the addition of kono to the $N_2$. Interestingly enough, both examples are more acceptable as phrases of recommendation than example (33b). It should be investigated why this difference in acceptability arises. To answer this question properly, let us consider the function of $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions, i.e. recommending $N_2$ as the best or most desirable example relevant to $N_1$.

Recommending something necessarily requires the process of selecting it from more than one candidate; selecting something requires comparing the candidates with one another by some measure. That is, a particular $N_2$ is presented as a result of comparing the candidates for $N_2$ by a single measure relevant to or common to $N_1$.\footnote{14 The example in (33a), whose unacceptability has already been explained by the generalization in}
In other words, the $N_1$-*nara* $N_2$ construction is an expression wherein the speaker is interested in selecting an individual ($N_2$), using a given attribute ($N_1$) as a clue.

Take, for example, *sake-nara Kosinokanbai* „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Kosinokanbai”. In this case, there are many different candidates for $N_2$ (i.e. subjects having *sake* as the categorical attribute) besides *Kosinokanbai*, such as *Kubota, Zyuuyondai, and Isoziman*. They share a certain measure or criterion, like taste or quality, on the basis of which they are evaluated. As a result of the evaluation, *Koshinokanbai* is selected as $N_2$. In the case of *sikaku-nara Yuukyan* „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN’, the candidates for $N_2$ share criteria such as the probability of success and the number of qualifications or courses. On the basis of such criteria, the candidates for $N_2$ are compared and evaluated. In fact, in addition to the candidate finally selected as $N_2$, other candidates, i.e. the objects of comparison or evaluation, can be linguistically realized:

(36) a. sake-*nara* *Kubota-yori* Kosinokanbai

    sake-if Kubota-Comp Kosinokanbai

    „When it comes to sake, Kosinokanbai is better than Kubota.’

b. sikaku-*nara* *Nitii-yori* Yuukyan

    qualification-if Nichii-Comp U-CAN

    „When it comes to qualifications, U-CAN is better than Nichii.’

Furthermore, NPs denoting comparison criteria can occur in the position of $N_1$, as shown below:

(37) a. oisisa-*nara* Kosinokanbai

    deliciousness-if Kosinokanbai
„When it comes to taste, Koshinokanbai is best.’

b. \{gookaku ritu / sikaku-no syurui\}-nara Yuukyan
\{pass probability / qualification-R kind\}-if U-Can

„When it comes to \{the probability of success/the variety of qualifications\}, U-CAN is best.’

Incidentally, the example in (31) is one of the cases wherein comparison criteria are explicitly given in context.

Now let us return to the anomalous example in (33b). In the case of (33b), one can enumerate many possible candidates for \(N_2\): sofa, table, wardrobe, chair, and the like. Note here that they all belong to the same category, i.e. *interia* „furniture’ or „movables’, but are different from one another in terms of function. That is, one cannot compare candidates for \(N_2\) by a single measure common to them. Take a sofa and a table, for example. A sofa is roughly defined as a long comfortable seat with a back and arms, for two or more people to sit on. A table, on the other hand, can be defined as a piece of furniture that consists of a flat top supported by legs, usually used for dining. As these definitions show, they are different from each other in their functions. They do not share any inherent comparison criterion. A sofa and a table cannot be compared with each other any more than height and weight can in terms of a single common criterion.

Now, let us consider why reinforcing the degree of referentiality of \(N_2\) improves the acceptability of the \(N_1\)-*nara* \(N_2\) construction, as shown in (34). The explanation is as following. The deictic word *kono* „this’ renders it easier to construe the \(N_2\) as an individual, which in turn makes it easier to construe the \(N_2\) as the subject of the attribute denoted by the \(N_1\). Moreover, *kono* differentiates a particular sofa from other sofas. To put it another way, the addition of *kono* reinforces the interpretation
that the candidates for N₂ are limited to sofas, which makes it possible to compare the candidates for N₂ in terms of a single common criterion such as comfortableness or design. The same effect can be seen when N₂ is a trade name, as shown below:\(^{15}\)

(38) a. interia-nara kaiteki sofaa-no esuta
furniture-if comfortable sofa-App Esta
„When it comes to furniture, Esta, a comfortable sofa, is best."

b. gakki-nara Yamaha-no Kurabinooba
musical instrument-if Yamaha-R Clavinova
„When it comes to musical instruments Yamaha’s Clavinova is best."

In (38), the trade name of a sofa Esta and the trade name of an electronic piano Clavinova are presented as N₂. In the same way as the deictic word kono „this’ in (34) and (35), trade names differentiate particular products from other products of the same kind. In (38a), the name Esta reinforces the interpretation that the candidates for N₂ are limited to sofas. In (38b), the name Clavinova reinforces the interpretation that the candidates for N₂ are limited to electronic pianos.\(^{16}\) Furthermore, as shown in (35), the manifestation of the expression tokaitekina „urban’ evokes a specific comparison criterion such as the design suitable for urban life.

If the above argument is on the right track, then the following condition can be obtained, besides the generalization in (32):

(39) The N₁-nara N₂ construction is licensed if the candidates for N₂ can be compared with one another by a single criterion.

It is crucial for N₁-nara N₂ constructions whether or not the candidates for N₂ can be

\(^{15}\) I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers of Nihongo Bunpoo (Journal of Japanese Grammar) for providing me with the example in (38b).

\(^{16}\) In the case of (38b), another interpretation is possible: the candidates for N₂ are other kinds of instruments such as guitars, (classic) pianos, and trumpets. The reason is that musical instruments have an internal comparison criterion, i.e. timbre or tone color.
compared with one another by a single criterion.

8.4.3. Conclusion: the Licensing Condition of $N_1$-nara $N_2$ Constructions

In this section, I have been concerned with the licensing condition of $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions, investigating the nature of nominal expressions in the position of $N_1$ and $N_2$. Now I am in a position to answer the question in (19b). From the above discussion, the following licensing condition can be obtained as follows:

(40) The Licensing Condition of $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions

The $N_1$-nara $N_2$ construction is licensed if the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The relation between $N_1$ and $N_2$ can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject.

b. The candidates for $N_2$ can be compared with one another by a single criterion.

8.5. The Question of Why $N_1$-nara $N_2$ Constructions Can Be Interpreted as Phrases of Recommendation

This section deals with the question in (19c): How is the $N_1$-nara $N_2$ construction interpreted as a phrase of recommendation?

In the previous section, I argued that the comparability of candidates for $N_2$ is one of the key factors to license $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions: it is crucially important whether or not the candidates for $N_2$ can be compared with one another by some criteria inherent to them. Taking this into consideration, I rephrase question (19c) as “Why is $N_2$ always selected as desirable or best, never as undesirable or worst?” Here, I will investigate the mechanism of the recommendation reading in terms of
logic expressed by conditional constructions, based on the traditional view that conditional sentences have been regarded as an epitome of human rational capacity.

Let me first introduce the logic expressed by general conditionals. Generally speaking, the conditional sentence in human language has been typically compared to the mathematical conditional “p→q”, which means that if p is true, then q is also true. In this case, p expresses a sufficient condition for q, while q expresses a necessary condition for p. When “p→q” and “q→p” are spontaneously established, p is the necessary and sufficient condition for q. The symbol → is regarded as semantically equivalent to the linguistic expression nara (or nara-ba) „if then”. Thus, according to this formulation, N₁ linguistically expresses a sufficient condition for N₂, while N₂ is a necessary condition for N₁.

As argued above, the N₁-nara N₂ construction is an expression wherein the speaker is interested in selecting an individual (N₂), using a given attribute (N₁) as a clue. To put it differently, the speaker selects a particular individual as N₂ from among the candidates in terms of the attribute expressed by N₁. Needless to say, this means that there is more than one candidate that has an attribute denoted by N₁. Take for example the expressions sake-nara Kosinokanbai „Koshinokanbai is best with regard to Japanese sake’ and uwaki-nara iPhone „iPhone is most suitable for love affairs’:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{N₁(attribute)} & \text{Candidates for N₂} & \text{Candidates for N₂} \\
\hline
\text{sake} & \text{Kosinokanbai} & \text{iPhone} \\
& \text{Hakkaisan} & \\text{etc.} \\
& \text{Kubota} & \text{au} \\
& \text{Zyuuyondai} & \text{Softbank} \\
\end{array}
\]
As illustrated in Figure (41), Kosinokanbai and iPhone are not the only candidates for N₂. What is selected as N₂ depends on the speaker’s taste and intention. Thus the logical relation between N₁ and N₂ can be represented as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(42) \quad & \quad \text{a. } p(\text{Kosinokanbai}) \rightarrow q(\text{sake}) \\
& \quad \text{‘If something is Kosinokanbai, then it has sake as an attribute.’} \\
& \quad \text{b. } p(\text{iPhone}) \rightarrow q(\text{uwaki}) \\
& \quad \text{‘If something is iPhone, then it has love affairs (= the low restorability of deleted e-mails) as an attribute.’}
\end{align*}
\]

That is, in terms of their semantic relation, N₁ is a necessary condition for N₂, while N₂ is a sufficient condition for N₁.

To summarize the discussion so far, an incompatibility or conflict can be seen between the logical meaning of the linguistic form and that of the semantic relation of the referents of N₁ and N₂. Observe the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
(43) \quad & \quad \text{a. Logical Meaning of the Linguistic Form: } N₁ \rightarrow N₂ \\
& \quad \text{b. Semantic Relation of the Referents of N₁ and N₂: } N₂ \rightarrow N₁
\end{align*}
\]

In terms of the linguistic forms, N₁ represents a sufficient condition for N₂, while N₂ represents a necessary condition for N₁. In terms of the semantic relationship, on the other hand, N₁ is a necessary condition for N₂, while N₂ is a sufficient condition for N₁. Here let me assume that the incompatibility or conflict between the logical meaning of the linguistic form and that of the semantic relation of N₁ and N₂ give rise to the recommendation reading.

The explanation goes as follows. A closer look at the representations in (43) reveals that the combination of the representations (43a) and (43b) shows a so-called biconditional relationship: N₁ is the necessary and sufficient condition for N₂. To put it more precisely, the N₁-\textit{nara} N₂ construction expresses the logical relation (N₁→
N_2) \land (N_2 \rightarrow N_1) \) by putting N_1, which is intrinsically a necessary condition for N_2, into the slot of sufficient condition in the linguistic form, and by putting N_2, which is intrinsically a sufficient condition for N_1, into the slot of necessary condition in the linguistic form.

For a better understanding of this explanation, take for example the expressions sake-nara Kosinokanbai and uwaki-nara iPhone again. In the former example, the logic *If something is Kosinokanbai, then it has sake as its attribute* is always true, while the reversed logic, i.e. *If something has sake as its attribute, then that something is Kosinokanbai*, is not always true. As shown in figure (41), there are many other candidates for something that has sake as its attribute. The latter case, i.e., uwaki-nara iPhone, can be dealt with in the same way. As argued above, uwaki ‘love affairs’ pragmatically refers to an attribute of mobile phones in general, i.e. the low restorability of deleted e-mails. The low restorability of deleted e-mails is shared, though different in degree, by all mobile phones. Therefore, the logic *If something is iPhone, then it has the low restorability of deleted e-mails as its attribute* is always true, but the reversed logic *If something has the low restorability of deleted e-mails as its attribute, then that something is iPhone* is not always true.

However, the N_1-nara N_2 construction forcibly establishes or coerces the reversed logic by its linguistic form. By doing so, against the intrinsic relationship established between N_1 and N_2, the construction establishes the logic *If something has N_1 as its attribute, then that something is N_2, and if something is N_2, then that something has N_1 as its attribute*, i.e. \((N_1 \rightarrow N_2) \land (N_2 \rightarrow N_1)\). In this way, establishing the relation “N_1 ≡ N_2” logically excludes other candidates for N_2. This gives rise to the recommendation reading. That is, although there are many other candidates for N_2, the speaker selects only one candidate by excluding other candidates logically,
which generates the interpretation that the selected $N_2$ is the only and best candidate of all.

8.6. Toward the Whole Picture of Phrases of Recommendation

This section addresses the characteristics of other expressions used as phrases of recommendation, i.e. $N_1$-wa/no $N_2$ constructions. Specifically, I will point out that these constructions share the main characteristics of $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions. Unfortunately, the conclusion drawn here is tentative, but it is enough to show that there is a possibility of dealing with a variety of phrases of recommendation in a unified manner.

In Section 8.4, I argued that $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions have the following characteristics:

(44) a. Nominal expressions occurring in the $N_1$ position must be non-referential.

b. Nominal expressions occurring in the $N_2$ position are referential.

c. The relation between $N_1$ and $N_2$ can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject.

In what follows, I will show that other phrases of recommendation, i.e. $N_1$-wa $N_2$ constructions and $N_1$-no $N_2$ constructions, share these characteristics.

8.6.1. Non-Referentiality of $N_1$

To begin with, let us consider the nature of $N_1$ in $N_1$-wa $N_2$ and $N_1$-no $N_2$ constructions. As discussed above, a non-referential NP alone can occur in the position of $N_1$ of $N_1$-nara $N_2$ constructions. To determine whether this is also true of $N_1$-wa/no $N_2$ constructions, let us investigate the following examples:
Recall here that I used two tests to differentiate whether nominal expressions refer to type or group: (i) adding to yuu mono „that which is called” and to yuu syu „the species/class called” to N₁ and (ii) adding deictic/quantifier expressions to N₁. Let us first see whether the phrase to yuu mono „that which is called” and to yuu syu „the species/class called” can be added. As in the case of N₁-nara N₂ constructions, the addition of these phrases to the N₁ renders the examples in (45) unacceptable:

(46) a. * sikaku {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-wa/no Yuukyan
   „When it comes to {that which is called qualification/the class called qualification}, U-CAN is best.’

   b. * ee kaiwa {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-wa/no Berurittu
   „When it comes to {that which is called English conversation/the class called English conversation}, Berlitz is best.’

   c. * nihon syu {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-wa/no Daisiti Syuzoo
   „When it comes to {that which is called Japanese sake/the class called Japanese sake}, Daishichi Sake Brewery is best.’

The unacceptability of (46) shows that the N₁ of these constructions is also
Now let us turn to the second criteria, i.e. the addition of deictic/quantifier expressions. As shown below, the addition of deictic/quantifier expressions to $N_1$ results in unacceptable expressions:

(47) a. * sono sikaku-wa/no Yuukyan
    that qualification-Top/R U-CAN
    „When it comes to that qualification, U-CAN is best.’

b. * ano ee kaiwa-wa/no Berurittu
    that English conversation-Top/R Berlitz
    „When it comes to that English conversation, Berlitz is best.’

c. * kono nihon syu-wa/no Daisiti Syuzoo
    this Japanese sake-Top/R Daishichi Sake Brewery
    „When it comes to this Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is best.’

(48) a. * mittu-no sikaku-wa/no Yuukyan
    three-R qualification-Top/R U-CAN
    „When it comes to three qualifications, U-CAN is the best.’

b. * takusan-no ee kaiwa-wa/no Berurittu
    many-R English conversation-Top/R Berlitz
    „When it comes to many English conversation, Berlitz is best.’

c. * ooku-no nihon syu-wa/no Daisiti Syuzoo
    much-R Japanese sake-Top/R Daishichi Sake Brewery
    „When it comes to much Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is best.’

In (47), the deictic expressions *sono* „that’, *ano* „that’, and *kono* „this’ are added to $N_1$,
which renders the examples ungrammatical. Likewise, in (48), the addition of quantifiers such as mittu-no ‘three’, takusan-no ‘many’ and ooku-no ‘much’ to the N₁s makes the examples ungrammatical. The facts shown in (46)-(48) confirm that in all the three constructions nominal expressions that can occur in the position of N₁ are essentially non-referential. In this way, they share the characteristic given in (44a).

8.6.2. Referentiality of N₂

Now let us turn our attention to N₂, i.e. the characteristic in (44b). Let us examine the examples in (45), repeated here as (49):

(49) a. sikaku- wa/no Yuukyan
qualification-Top/R U-CAN
„When it comes to qualifications, U-CAN is best.’

b. ee kaiwa-wa/no Berurittu
English conversation-Top/R Berlitz
„When it comes to English conversation, Berlitz is best.’

c. nihon syu-wa/no Daisiti Syuzoo
Japanese sake-Top/R Daishichi Sake Brewery
„When it comes to Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is best.’

In (49), as in the case of N₁-nara N₂ constructions, the N₂s (i.e. Yuukyan, Berurittu and Daisiti Syuzoo) are proper nouns referring to particular, actual companies in the real world. In this sense, they have token referents and thus are referential by nature. Furthermore, deictic expressions such as kono ‘this’ and koko ‘here’ also can occur in the position of N₂:

(50) a. ee kaiwa- wa kono kyoozai.
English conversation-Top this teaching material
„When it comes to English conversation, nothing is better than this teaching material.’

b. umai gyooza-no kono omise
delicious gyoza-R this shop

„When it comes to delicious gyoza, nothing is better than this shop.’

From the above observation, I conclude that N₂ of N₁-wa/no N₂ constructions is in the position where referential NPs can occur, as is the case of N₁-nara N₂ constructions. In this way, the three constructions share the characteristic given in (44b).

8.6.3. Attribute-Subject Relation

The above observation has shown that N₁-wa/no N₂ constructions share the characteristics in (44a-b) with N₁-nara N₂ constructions. This leads us to conclude that N₁ can be construed as an attribute of N₂ in N₁-wa/no N₂ constructions as well as in N₁-nara N₂ constructions.

With regard to N₁-no N₂ constructions, it is worth noting that Koya (2010) takes a similar view. On the basis of Nishiyama’s (2003) classification of no, Koya examines N₁-no N₂ constructions in detail, pointing out that N₁ serves as a merkmal or salient characteristic of N₂. His term merkmal, a German word, means salient characteristics of N₂. In this sense, Koya’s view is, to some extent, compatible with mine. It is safe to say that all three constructions share the characteristic in (44c).

8.6.4. For Future Research

As just argued, I have shown that N₁-nara/wa/no N₂ constructions share the characteristics in (44). However, just because the three constructions are similar from such a viewpoint, it does not mean that they are parallel in all aspects. It should
be noted that \( N_1\)-\( nara/wa/no \) \( N_2 \) constructions are different from each other in structure: they seem to be based on conditional sentences (i.e. complex sentences composed of a main clause and a subordinate clause introduced by a conjunct), copular sentences (i.e. simple sentences wherein two grammatical elements are connected by copular verbs such as \( be \)), and noun phrases composed of a head (\( N_2 \)) and a modifier (\( N_1 \)), respectively. With this in mind, I will discuss in what follows some remaining problems and present a future direction.

8.6.4.1 The Peculiarity of \( N_1\)-no \( N_2 \) Constructions

First of all, although I have pointed out that the relation between \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject, this also differentiates \( N_1\)-no \( N_2 \) constructions from \( N_1\)-\( nara/wa \) \( N_2 \) constructions in some cases:

(51) a. # sake-no Kosinokanbai

„Koshinokanbai, the best sake.”

b. # densi zisyo-no Ekusuwaado

„Ex-word, the best e-dictionary.’

(52) a. sake-nara/wa Kosinokanbai

„Koshinokanbai is the best sake.”

b. densi zisyo-nara/wa Ekusuwaado

„Ex-word is the best e-dictionary.’

In (51) and (52), the \( N_1 \)s refer to categories to which the referents of \( N_2 \)s belong. In other words, the \( N_1 \)s denote categorical attributes of the \( N_2 \)s. It should be noted here that, as shown in (51), such a relation cannot be allowed in \( N_1\)-no \( N_2 \) constructions. Interestingly enough, however, the examples below show that the addition of modifiers
to $N_1$ improves their acceptability:

(53) a. **tuka-eru** densi zisyo-no Ekusuwaado
    use-able electronic dictionary-R Ex-word
    „Ex-word, the useful e-dictionary.”

b. **oisi-i** osake-no Kosinokanbai
    delicious-Pred. sake- R Koshinokanbai
    „Koshinokanbai, the delicious sake.”

In this connection, Koya (2010:198-199) points out that $N_1$ must be informative enough in order to serve as a *merkmal*. However, as shown in the contrast between (51) and (52), his statement does not hold true for $N_1$-nara/wa $N_2$ constructions. It should be investigated why this “informative constraint’ operates on $N_1$-no $N_2$ constructions alone.

Second, it is worth noting that it is difficult for deictic pro-forms such as *koko* „here’ and *kore* „this’ to occur as $N_2$ in the $N_1$-no $N_2$ construction in many cases:

(54) a. sikaku-nara/wa/#no koko
    „When it comes to qualifications, this is the best place.’

b. umai sake-nara/wa/#no kore
    „When it comes to good sake, this is the best.”

One finds this anomalousness mysterious, taking into consideration the acceptability of the following example:

(55) umai gyooza-no kono omise
    delicious gyoza-R this shop
    „When it comes to delicious gyoza, this is the best shop.’

This example is impeccable, although the deictic expression *kono* „this’ occurs. The only difference between (54) and (55) lies in function: in (54) the deictic expressions
are used as pronominally, while in (55) *kono* is used as a determiner or pronominal modifier.

Unfortunately, I am not in a position to give any clear explanation for these phenomena. However, a clue to the answer may lie in their difference in structure, as alluded to above.

In N₁-*no* N₂ constructions, N₂ is the head and N₁-*no* serves as an adjunct, i.e. modifier PP (Postpositional Phrase) (cf. Nishiyama (2003:18)); that is, the whole expression is an NP. More precisely, N₁ serves as a modifier or classifier of N₂. Thus, it may be that deictic expressions used as pronouns such as those in (54) are restrictive enough, so that further classification is rejected.

With regard to N₁-*nara* N₂ constructions and N₁-*wa* N₂ constructions, the former are intimately related to *nara*-conditionals (i.e. complex sentences) and the latter to copular sentences (i.e. NP-*wa* NP-*da* „NP be NP”). That is to say, N₁ and N₂ are, to some extent, independent of each other in that N₁ serves neither as a modifier nor as a classifier of N₂ in these constructions. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that this perspective does not provide a sufficient explanation of the difference in acceptability between (54) and (55). This is a problem that remains for future research.

8.6.4.2. *From the Viewpoint of Specification*

Lastly, I would like to point out the close relationship of N₁-*nara/wa* N₂ constructions and another construction, i.e. specificational copular sentences. As discussed in Section 8.3, N₁ is the position where non-referential nominal expressions alone can occur, while N₂ is the position where referential nominal expressions can

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17 In this subsection I will not deal with N₁-*no* N₂ constructions, because it is not clear at all whether they can be analyzed as a variation of specificational sentences.
occur. This means that the relation between \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) of the constructions at issue can be regarded as in parallel with that between \( B \) (non-referential) and \( A \) (referential) of the copular sentence \( B\text{-}wa \ A\text{-}da \, ,B \text{ is } A \), which Nishiyama (2003) refers to as \textit{inverted specificational sentences}. To put it differently, the parallelism suggests that \( N_1\text{-}nara/\text{wa} \ \ N_2 \) constructions can be investigated in a unified manner from the viewpoint of specification.

A specificational sentence is defined as one whose semantic function is to specify a value for a variable (Declerck (1988:2)). In many cases, specificational sentences are linguistically realized as simple copular sentences. Take, for example, the sentence \textit{The bank robber is John Thomas}. This sentence is specificational because it specifies a value (John Thomas) for the variable \( \textit{the } x \text{ who is a bank robber} \).

In the cases of \textit{sake-nara Koshinokanbai} and \textit{sake-wa Koshinokanbai}, both of them can roughly be interpreted as “The best sake is Koshinokanbai.” This interpretation is specificational in that it specifies the value \( Koshinokanbai \) for the variable \( \textit{the } x \text{ which is the best sake} \). In this sense, they can be regarded as variations of specificational sentences in a broader sense.

The same is true for other cases such as \textit{sikaku-nara/wa Yuukyan} and \textit{ame-nara/wa Tutiya Keeiti}. They are pragmatically interpreted in such a way that “U-CAN offers the best correspondence courses for qualifications” and “Kei-ichi Tsuchiya is the best driver in rainy conditions,” respectively. They are specificational because they specify the values \( Yuukyan \) and \( Kei-ichi Tsuchiya \) for the variables \( \textit{the } x \text{ which offers the best correspondence courses for qualifications} \) and \( \textit{the } x \text{ who is the best driver in rainy conditions} \).

Recall that the relation of \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) constructions can be construed as that of an
attribute and its subject, and note that this relation can be reinterpreted in terms of synecdoche and metonymy. If \( N_1 \) denotes a category to which \( N_2 \) belongs, then a synecdochic relation holds between them. If, on the other hand, \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) are semantically contiguous with each other, a metonymic relation holds. As argued in Section 8.3.1, such relations can be understood from the viewpoint of a mapping relation or the Access Principle (Fauconnier (1997)), as shown below:

\[
(56) \quad F(N_1) = N_2
\]

The formula in (56) shows that if the value for \( N_1 \) is input, then the value for \( N_2 \) is output by virtue of a pragmatic function mapping. To put it differently, \( N_1 \)-nara/wa \( N_2 \) constructions linguistically represent the relation \( \text{if } N_1 \text{ is specified, then } N_2 \text{ is also specified} \). This leads us to the conjecture that nara-conditionals in general can be investigated in terms of specificalional meaning. This view is not so misdirected, if one takes the etymology of conditional markers into consideration: the conjunct nara „if” is derived from the copular nari „be” (Traugott (1985:291)). A related issue will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

8.7. Concluding Remarks

This chapter was concerned with \( N_1 \)-nara \( N_2 \) constructions as phrases of recommendation and their licensing condition. I made the following points. First, I clarified that \( N_1 \) is in the position wherein non-referential NPs occur, while \( N_2 \) is in the position where referential NPs can occur. Second, on the basis of the fact just pointed out, I claimed that \( N_1 \) denotes an attribute and \( N_2 \) its subject: the relationship between \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) is that of an attribute and its subject. Furthermore, it was clarified that the comparability of candidates for \( N_2 \) affects the licensing of the construction. Third, I pointed out that the recommendation reading comes from the
incompatibility between the logical meaning of the linguistic form (i.e. \( N_1 \) is the sufficient condition for \( N_2 \), while \( N_2 \) is the necessary condition for \( N_1 \)) and that of the semantic relation of \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) (i.e. \( N_2 \) is the sufficient condition for \( N_1 \), while \( N_1 \) is the necessary condition for \( N_2 \)): the combination of the two logics produces the equivalent relation between \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \).

In conclusion, I would like to touch very briefly on an interesting phenomenon related to a subclass of \( N_1\)-\( nara \) \( N_2 \) constructions. As argued in Section 8.4, the comparability of candidates for \( N_2 \) is one of the key factors to license \( N_1\)-\( nara \) \( N_2 \) constructions: it is crucially important whether or not the candidates for \( N_2 \) can be compared with one another by some criteria inherent to them. Hereafter I will refer to such comparing criteria as *internal criteria*.

Taking this into consideration, one may expect that infelicitous examples like (33b), i.e. *interia-nara sofa* can be rendered acceptable if *external criteria* are introduced by context, which makes it possible to compare candidates for \( N_2 \). This expectation is borne out, as shown below:

(57) (kore made sita taka-i kaimono-wa) interia-nara sofa.(cf. (33b))
(this until did high-Pred purchase-Top) furniture-if sofa
’(Talking about expensive purchases one has made) As for furniture, a sofa is the most expensive purchase.’

In this example, the price of purchases is introduced as a comparison criterion. The unacceptable expression in (33b) is rendered fully acceptable. Interestingly enough, the \( N_1\)-\( nara \) \( N_2 \) constructions licensed by external criteria lose recommendation readings: the \( N_1 \) *sofa* ‘sofa’ is not presented as the most desirable example of movables. In this case, the \( N_1 \) restricts the topic, i.e. the most expensive purchase one
has ever made, to *interia* ‚furniture‘. The *N₁-nara N₂* construction in (57) is most likely to be used as an answer to questions like “What is the most expensive purchase you have ever made?” It is possible that the speaker might answer the question by just saying “Sofaa.” However, expressing the phrase *interia-nara* evokes the presence of other expensive purchases. The following dialogue illustrates this:

(58) A: kore made sita itiban taka-i kaimono-wa nani.

this until did most high-Pred purchase-Top what

„What is the most expensive purchase you have ever made?”

B: interia-nara sofaa. kuruma-nara Biiemdaburyuu.

furniture-if sofa car-if BMW

„As for furniture, it is a sofa; as for cars, it is a BMW.”

In the dialogue in (58), *sofa* ‚sofa‘ and *Biiemdaburyuu* ‚BMW‘ are presented contrastively as the answers to the question given by speaker A. Neither of the *N₁-nara N₂* constructions are interpreted as phrases of recommendation in this example. That is, whether or not *N₁-nara N₂* constructions are interpreted as phrases of recommendation may depend on whether comparison criteria are internal or external. A more detailed and careful study is certainly needed to substantiate such a claim.

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18 Morita (1990) takes a similar view, although he does not distinguish *N₁-nara N₂* constructions with recommendation readings and those with contrastive meanings.
19 Example (5) may be categorized into this class.
Chapter 9

Conditional Constructions as Seen from the Viewpoint of Specification

9.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I investigated conditional constructions that have been regarded as peripheral in the literature: adnominal conditionals, *if*-cleft sentences, and $N_1$-*nara* $N_2$ conditionals.

In this chapter, I will briefly touch on the concept of specification. Specifically, I will show that those conditional constructions which appear to have no relationship with one another except that they are classified as conditionals can be captured in a unified manner from the viewpoint of the semantic concept of specification. The main claim in this chapter is as follows: conditional constructions can, to some extent, be captured in parallel with specificational copular sentences. That is, conditionals have the function of specifying values for variables. As such, the concept of specification plays an important role in investigating conditional constructions.

Before going into a detailed discussion, let us review the concept of specification. Observe the following examples:

(1) a. The bank robber is John Thomas.

   b. The only people that can help you are the Prime Minister and the Queen herself.

   (Declerck (1988:5))

The copular sentences in (1) are referred to as specificational sentences.
Specificational sentences are roughly defined as follows: a specificational sentence is one whose semantic function is to specify a value for a variable (Declerck (1988:2)). Thus, sentence (1a) is specificational because it specifies a value (John Thomas) for the variable the X who is the bank robber. Likewise, sentence (1b) specifies the two values (the Prime Minister and the Queen herself) that satisfy the variable the only X-es that can help you.

As pointed out by Higgins (1976), specifying values for a variable is very similar to enumerating the items on a list. That is, sentence (1b) enumerates the two items that figure on the list whose heading is people that can help you. The same is true of sentence (1a), wherein the list in question has only one item on it. With regard to specificational sentences in Japanese, a similar view is found in Nishiyama (2003), who argues that (inverted) specificational sentences, i.e. A-wa B-da ‘A is B’, represent the speaker’s interest in looking for or searching for B, which is fitting for the variable in A, and enumerate the candidates. In any case, the purpose of a specificational sentence is to make it possible for the speaker to pick out the referent(s) from a set (Declerck (1988:10)).

9.2. Observations

Let us first review the conditional constructions examined in Part 2:

(2) Adnominal Conditionals

a. The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not.

b. The location if it rains and the location if it doesn’t rain are within five miles of each other.

(3) If-Cleft Sentences
a. If anyone can help us, it is John.

b. If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the material.

(4) \text{nara} \text{ Conditionals}

a. sake-nara Kosinokanbai
   „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.’

b. sikaku-nara Yuukyan
   „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.’

In the preceding chapters, I have examined these constructions from the viewpoint of semantic/pragmatic-based syntax, focusing on the relationship between linguistic form and meaning. In what follows, I will investigate these constructions in turn in terms of specification, showing that the specification can be seen as one of the important functions of conditional constructions.

9.2.1. Adnominal Conditionals as Seen in Terms of Specification

To begin with, let me investigate adnominal conditionals (ACs). Let us see the examples in (2), repeated here as (5):

(5) a. The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not.

b. The location if it rains and the location if it doesn’t rain are within five miles of each other.

As argued in Chapter 6, sentence (5a) represents the following relation: the price will be determined or specified if the hearer decides to pay it now. Likewise, sentence (5b) implies the relationship wherein the location will be decided according to the weather. Recall here that NPs modified by ACs should be construed as having
resultant values to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the
if-clause; that is, unspecified variables are included in the NPs modified by ACs.
This means that AC (the) $X$ if $Y$ represents a specification relation as follows:

(6) Variable $X$ is specified if condition $Y$ is fulfilled.

(7) If $Y$

\[ X_1 \xleftarrow{\text{specified}} X_2 \]
\[ X_3 \]
\[ \vdots \]
\[ X_n \]

Figure (7) shows that the value of $X$ is specified by the fulfillment of condition $Y$.
Note here that, as can be inferred from (6) and figure (7), the specification relation
ACs represent is slightly different from that of copular sentences. In the copular
specificational sentence $A$ is $B$ (e.g. The bank robber is John Thomas.), the NP in the
position of $B$ (e.g. John Thomas) directly specifies the variable the $X$ that is $A$. It
follows that the specificational sentence $A$ is $B$ can be paraphrased as the $X$ that is $A$ is
$B$ (cf. Declerck (1988:5)). In ACs, however, the specific value specified by the
fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause is not explicitly stated. Rather, they
metalinguistically represent the relation of variable $X$ being specified if condition $Y$ is
fulfilled. In this sense, ACs can be termed as metalinguistic specificational sentence.

9.2.2. If-Cleft Sentences as Seen in Terms of Specification

Let us turn our attention to if-cleft sentences. Let us examine the examples in
(3), repeated here as (8):

(8) a. If anyone can help us, it is John.

b. If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the
material.

One can easily recognize specificational meanings in if-cleft sentences. In (8a), the variable introduced by the pronominal anyone is specified by the focalized element in the it-cleft sentence, i.e. John. Likewise, in (8b), an implicit variable like in x is specified by the focalized element in the it-cleft sentence, i.e. in the rather erratic organisation of the material. Recall that the interdependency between the protasis and apodosis of an if-cleft is in parallel with that of a wh-question and its answer. In this sense, sentence (8a) is in parallel with the pair Who can help us? and It’s John. With regard to copular sentences with specification meaning, Declerck (1988:6) argues that specifying a value (or values) for a variable (or enumerating the items on the list) is very similar to providing an answer to a question. Thus, the sentence The bank robber is John Thomas is naturally felt to provide an answer to the question Who is the bank robber? In this respect, a parallelism can be recognized between if-cleft sentences and copular sentences with specification meaning.

One difference between them is, however, whether the question-answer relation is linguistically manifested or not. In if-cleft sentences, the if-clause is the realization of a wh-question, as argued in Chapter 7. Furthermore, recall that the if-clause also functions as the presupposition to use the main clause (it-cleft). In specificational copular sentences, on the other hand, wh-questions are not necessarily realized linguistically. Nevertheless, wh-questions are implied in such cases. A consequence of this is that specificational copular sentences have exactly the same presuppositions as question-answer pairs (Declerck (1988:6)). That is, if-cleft sentences explicitly express the (part of) contextual information that specificational copular sentences requires. In this sense, if-cleft sentences can be regarded as extended specificational sentences.
9.2.3.  \( N_1 \)-nara \( N_2 \) Constructions as Seen in Terms of Specification

Lastly, I would like to point out the close relationship of \( N_1 \)-nara \( N_2 \) constructions and specificational copular sentences. Let us investigate the examples in (4), repeated here as (9a) and (9b), and related construction, i.e. the \( N_1 \)-wa \( N_2 \) construction ((9c) and (9d)):

\[(9) \quad \begin{array}{l}
a. \quad \text{sake-nara} \quad \text{Kosinokanbai} \\
\quad \text{„When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.”} \\
b. \quad \text{sikaku-nara} \quad \text{Yuukyan} \\
\quad \text{„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.”} \\
c. \quad \text{sake-wa} \quad \text{Kosinokanbai} \\
\quad \text{„When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.”} \\
d. \quad \text{sikaku-wa} \quad \text{Yuukyan} \\
\quad \text{„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.”} \\
\end{array}\]

As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, \( N_1 \) is the position where non-referential nominal expressions alone can occur, while \( N_2 \) is the position where referential nominal expressions can occur. I also pointed out that the relation between \( N_1 \) and \( N_2 \) of the \( N_1 \)-nara \( N_2 \) construction at issue can be regarded as in parallel with that between B (non-referential) and A (referential) of the copular sentence B-wa A-da „B is A”, which Nishiyama (2003) refers to as inverted specificational sentences. Furthermore, note here that \( N_1 \)-wa \( N_2 \) constructions are closely related to the copular sentence B-wa A-da (cf. Morita (1990:108)). In this sense, it is not irrelevant to assume that \( N_1 \)-nara/wa \( N_2 \) constructions and specificational copular sentences form a natural class.

To repeat, in the cases of (9a) sake-nara Kosinokanbai and (9c) sake-wa
Kosinokanbai, both of them can roughly be interpreted as “The best sake is Kosinokanbai.” This interpretation is specificational in that it specifies the value Kosinokanbai for the variable ‘the x which is the best sake’. In this sense, they can be regarded as variations of specificational sentences in a broader sense. The same is true for (9b) sikaku-nara Yuukyan and (9d) sikaku-wa Yuukyan. These expressions are pragmatically interpreted as “U-CAN offers the best correspondence courses for qualifications.” Expressions (9b) and (9d) are specificational in that they specify the value Yuukyan for the variable ‘the x which offers the best correspondence courses for qualifications’.

Furthermore, recall that by using N₁-nara N₂ constructions, the speaker selects a particular individual as N₂ among the candidates in terms of the attribute expressed by N₁ (see Chapter 8, Figure (41)). In other words, the purpose of a N₁-nara N₂ construction is to make it possible for the speaker to pick out the referent(s) from a set. In this respect, N₁-nara N₂ constructions are quite in parallel with specificational copular sentences.

9.3. Conditionals Are Specificational

So far I have shown that the conditional constructions taken up in Part 2 can be recaptured from the viewpoint of specification: they can, to some degree, be regarded as variants of specificational sentences. Then, how about other, typical conditionals? To go one step further, one may notice that conditionals in general are, to some extent, specificational. Let us take English conditionals for instance.

9.3.1. Predictive Conditionals

Let us first examine the following example:
Example (10) is a predictive conditional in Dancygier’s (1998) terminology. As inferred from its name, example (10) describes the speaker’s prediction of the cancellation of the match in case of rain. It is widely acknowledged that in this kind of conditional construction, the protasis expresses a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of the apodosis (Sweetser (1990:115)), i.e. \( p \rightarrow q \), in a mathematic or logic formula. With regard to example (10), this relationship can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(11) & \quad p \text{ (it rains)} \rightarrow q \text{ (the match will be cancelled)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

As this kind of relation is often called *inclusion* or *material implication*, \( p \) implies \( q \). As Ferguson et al. (1986:5) point out, since material implication has a long history and is the most worked-over and best known logical relation between propositions that corresponds to the conditional sentences of natural languages, linguists are often tempted to use it as the defining basis for conditionals. However, this explanation is quite incompatible with our intuition: if the figure in (11) is the case, then \( p \) presupposes \( q \). To put it differently, \( p \) is established on the basis of \( q \).

In contrast, example (10) states that the speaker predicts the cancellation of the match on the basis of the truth of rain. In other words, the speaker picks out a possible result (or specifying a result) as the apodosis from a set, presupposing the truth of the protasis. This can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\end{align*}
\]

---

1 Besides open conditionals like example (10), Dancygier (1998) classifies so-called counter-factual conditionals (e.g. If it rained, the match would be canceled/If it had rained, the match would have been canceled.) as predictive conditionals.
As illustrated, in saying “If it rains, the match will be cancelled,” the speaker picks out or specifies a probable result, presupposing the truth of rain. As seen above, the process of picking out a candidate is indispensable for specificational meaning.

Furthermore, recall here that specifying a value (or values) for a variable is very similar to providing an answer to a *wh*-question (Declerck (1988:6)). For example, the specificational sentence *It is John who loves Mary* is in parallel with the following question-answer pair: *Who loves Mary? It is John.* This semantic characteristic seems to be shared by conditional constructions in general. Observe the following examples for confirmation:

(13) a. If it rains, we’ll cancel the picnic.
    b. What will happen if it rains? — (Then) We’ll cancel the picnic.
    c. What if it rains? — (Then) We’ll cancel the picnic.

As shown in (13b) and (13c), the apodosis in (13a) is quite similar to providing an answer to a *wh*-question. In this sense, conditional constructions contain variables in the apodosis. Thus, there is sufficient reason to regard predictive conditionals as a variation of specificational sentences.

9.3.2. **Non-Predictive Conditionals**

Let us turn to what Daneygier (1998) refers to as non-predictive conditionals, i.e. epistemic conditionals, speech-act conditionals, and rhetorical conditionals. Consider
the following examples:

(14) If John went to that party, (then) he was trying to infuriate Miriam.

(Sweetser (1990:116))

(15) If I haven’t already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.

(Sweetser (1990:118))

(16) a. If they are Irish, I’m the Pope.

b. He’s ninety if he’s a day.

(Greenbaum and Quirk (1990:319))

Example (14) is an epistemic domain conditional. Epistemic conditionals like (14) can be explained in almost the same way as predictive conditionals, except that the apodosis of epistemic conditionals cannot be directly questioned by *wh*-phrases. Epistemic-domain conditionals state that the speaker draws a conclusion from or on the basis of the protasis. As in the case of predictive conditionals, the speaker picks out a possible conclusion from a set in his/her mind. In this sense, the speaker specifies the apodosis.

Particularly interesting is the case of speech-act conditionals, exemplified in (15). In speech-act conditionals, the specifying relation is reversed. This means that the speaker picks out or specifies the protasis, presupposing the apodosis. For a better understanding of this, recall that the *if*-clause of speech-act conditionals is used as a kind of introductory remarks to make the utterance more polite or appropriate: the speaker is making it clear why s/he believes what s/he communicates to be appropriate, but admitting the possibility for the hearer to see the situation differently (see Section 3.5.5 in Chapter 3 and Dancygier (1998:90-91)). That is, the focus of

---

2 If we replace the apodosis in (14) with a *wh*-phrase, we gain the content-domain reading alone. Note, however, that the apodosis in epistemic conditionals can be paraphrased into *I conclude that x*, wherein the phrase *he was trying to infuriate Miriam* can be regarded as the value for the variable *x*. 

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the speaker is put on the apodosis rather than on the protasis. To put it another way, the speaker picks out a possible condition to make what s/he intends to communicate felicitous. This may be illustrated as follows:\(^3\)

\[
(17) \quad \text{if I may ask,} \\
\text{if you don’t mind my asking,} \\
\text{please sign the guest book if I haven’t already asked you to do so,} \\
\text{before you go. if you like,} \\
\text{if you’re interested, …etc.}
\]

Set of p

In this sense, the relation of speech-act conditionals and other conditionals like predictive and epistemic conditionals is in parallel with that of specifying sentences (A is B) and inverted specificational sentences (B is A).

Lastly, let us investigate the examples in (16), i.e. rhetorical conditionals. According to Quirk et al. (1985) and Greenbaum and Quirk (1990), sentence (16a) is interpreted as “Since I’m obviously not the Pope, they’re certainly not Irish.” In this type of rhetorical conditional, the speaker strongly asserts the falsehood of the protasis by presenting an obviously false proposition in the apodosis. That is, for effective communication, the speaker should pick out a false proposition to make it easy for the hearer to understand that the proposition in the if-clause is false or absurd. In this sense, rhetorical conditionals like (16a) are in parallel with predictive and epistemic-domain conditionals. The speaker specifies what s/he thinks is the most effective apodosis at least to communicate the intended rhetorical meaning, as shown below:

\[^3\] Figure (17) does not mean that the clause order in (14) is reversed. It shows that the speaker specifies a possible protasis on the basis of what s/he wants to communicate (i.e. the speech act conveyed by the apodosis).
Example (16b), on the other hand, strongly asserts the truth of the apodosis (he’s ninety), presenting an obviously true proposition (he’s a day). To put it another way, the speaker picks out what s/he thinks is the most effective protasis to communicate the intended rhetorical meaning “p is patently true, hence q must be true.”\(^4\) In this sense, rhetorical conditionals like (16b) are in parallel with speech-act conditionals.

9.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have investigated various conditionals from the viewpoint of specification. I have shown a possibility that conditional constructions can be dealt with in a unified manner in terms of the concept specification.

One may argue that conditionals, non-predictive conditionals in particular, are different from specificational copular sentences and not specificational in that they don’t specify values for variables. I admit that this is the case. However, what I am claiming here is not that conditionals are equivalent to specificational copular sentences in every respect, but rather that they are similar in the mental process of the speaker, i.e. picking out or specifying a possible item from a set.

In this respect, I assume that the linguistic category “specification sentence”

\(^4\) Note that rhetorical conditionals like those in (16) are recognized as grammaticalized or idiomatic expressions. In the actual use, the content of the protasis is determined according to the content of the apodosis. Thus, if the content refers to someone’s age, then if he’s a day is used; if the content refers to the worth of something in terms of money, then if it’s worth a cent is used (e.g. The painting must be worth a thousand dollars if it’s worth a cent (Quirk et al. (1985:1095))).
shows a prototype effect (cf. Lakoff (1987)). Thus, prototypical specificational sentences like those in (1) show the following characteristics: (i) a simple sentence consisting of two nominal phrases and a copular connecting them, i.e. $A \text{ be } B$, (ii) the nominal phrase in the position of A semantically contains a variable, (iii) the nominal phrase in the position of B represents a value for the variable contained in A, and (iv) B is picked out from a set. On the other hand, conditional sentences like (14) show the following characteristics: (ii) a complex sentence consisting of two propositions and a conjunction connecting them, i.e. $\text{If } X, \ Y (Y \text{ if } X)$, (ii) the position of Y may contain a variable (cf. (13)), (iii) the apodosis may represent a value for the variable contained in the position of Y, and (iv) Y is picked out from a set. There is a close affinity between specificational copular sentences and conditional constructions: the difference is whether the specificational relation (variable-value) is realized in a simple sentence or a complex sentence. In addition, even in specificational copular sentences, the variable-value relation can be realized between two independent sentences as in *Who loves Mary? It is John*. It stands to reason that specificational sentences show prototype effects and that conditionals can be regarded as non-prototypical, peripheral cases in specificational sentences.

For the present, I cannot go further in detail, because the data considered here covers just a part of the issue. It is enough to state here that without such a viewpoint, one would overlook the following similarities found between conditionals and copular sentences: (i) In many languages such as Japanese, Russian, Swahili, and Bengali, conditional markers are etymologically derived from copular verbs (Traugott (1985:291)), and (ii) In many languages, conditional markers function as topic markers: the *if*-clause (and its equivalents) is a topic, and the main clause is a comment (Haiman (1978, 1985)).
Chapter 10

Summary

Before concluding this thesis, let me review what I discussed in the preceding chapters. Part 1 of this thesis was concerned with speech-act domain conditionals (SACs) in Japanese and English. In Chapter 3, I mainly investigated Japanese SACs and classified them into two types according to the obligatory/optional occurrence of speech-act verbs and their differences in interpretation. In Chapter 4, based on the findings of Chapter 3, I conducted a contrastive study of Japanese and English SACs.

Chapter 3 made the following points. With regard to Type 1 SACs, which do not require speech-act verbs, their apodoses serve as reference points (cf. Langacker (1993, 2008)) to access implicit conclusions. Put differently, in interpreting Type 1 SACs, one goes through a chain of inferences, using the reference point ability step by step, to reach an implicit illocutionary force. In combination with the reference point ability, the Desirability Principle (cf. Akatsuka (1998)) plays an important role in restricting the number of possible conclusions or illocutionary forces intended in Type 1 SACs. More specifically, the consistency of the values of desirability (i.e. DESIRABLE/UNDESIRABLE) through a chain of inferences facilitates the extraction of appropriate illocutionary forces. Type 2 SACs, on the other hand, obligatorily require speech-act verbs for functional reasons: one is to explicitly express or guarantee the causal relation with the protases, and the other is to indirectly connect the protases and fake apodoses. Conversely, without speech-act verbs, Type 2 SACs could not maintain the causal relation and would lose semantic relations between the protases and fake apodoses. In the last section of Chapter 3, I pointed out that
Japanese conditionals have developed special markers for the three domains (i.e. content, epistemic, and speech-act), while English conditionals can be ambiguous among the three domains without changing their forms. Specifically, in English, an alleged typical content domain conditional can be interpreted as an epistemic and even as a speech act conditional; in Japanese, on the other hand, the forms of content, epistemic and speech-act conditionals are different from one another with the help of specialized markers such as four conditional markers (i.e. tara, reba, to, and nara), epistemic markers (e.g. noda), and speech-act verbs (e.g. yuu ‘tell’).

In Chapter 4, I conducted a contrastive study of Japanese and English Type 2 SACs (Type 2 J- and E-SACs) in terms of addressee-orientedness mainly based on Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000) and related studies such as Wada (2005, 2008, 2010). I elaborated further on the discussion in Chapter 3 to show that Type 2 J-SACs need speech-act verbs because Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature. On the other hand, Type 2 E-SACs do not need speech-act verbs because English is a communicatively strong language by nature. In terms of clause linkage, I showed that the characteristics of the two languages are attributed to or motivated by the semantic concepts of speaker involvement (cf. Maat and Degand (2001)) and C-gravitation (cf. Wada (2005)), which is further corroborated by German SACs. Furthermore, as a working draft for future research, I argued that public/private-self centeredness may correlate with the degree of extensibility via metonymic operations (cf. Yasui (2005)). In this connection, I developed my argument on the basis of the working hypothesis that metonymy works not only on the lexicosemantic (i.e. word meaning) level but also on the lexicogrammatical (i.e. syntax) level, which is supported by the notion of grammatical metaphor (cf. Halliday (1994)). In the last section, I discussed related issues, pointing out that in particular the possibility that my
analysis is applicable to other conjunctions such as *because* and *since* and to other languages such as Korean.

In Part 2, I investigated the conditionals which have not been dealt with in detail in the literature: adnominal conditionals, *if*-cleft sentences, and $N_1$-*nara* $N_2$ constructions. In the last chapter of this part, I observed those conditionals in terms of specification, contrasting them with specificalional copular sentences.

Chapter 6 dealt with adnominal conditionals (ACs). I clarified that ACs are allowed under the condition that (i) the referent of a noun modified by an *if*-clause must be one that can be construed either semantically or pragmatically as having a resultant value to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the *if*-clause, and (ii) the values of Desirability in nominal apodoses and ACs must be consistent with each other. Nominal expressions modified by ACs are construed as results brought about by the fulfillment of the conditions described in the *if*-clause, and if such a construal is impossible or difficult from semantic information alone, pragmatic information may fill in the gaps.

In Chapter 7, I discussed the discourse function of *if*-cleft sentences, focusing on the form-meaning mapping of the construction. I made the following points: (i) the interdependency between the protasis and apodosis of an *if*-cleft is in parallel with that between a *wh*-question and its answer, and (ii) the discourse function of the *if*-cleft sentence is evoking a question in hearer’s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse.

In Chapter 8, I was concerned with $N_1$-*nara* $N_2$ constructions and their licensing condition. I made the following points: (i) the $N_1$-*nara* $N_2$ construction is licensed if the relation between $N_1$ and $N_2$ can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that
of an attribute and its subject and if the candidates for $N_2$ can be compared with each other by a single criterion common to them, and (ii) the recommendation reading of the construction arises from the incompatibility between the logical meaning of the linguistic form and that of the semantic relation of $N_1$ and $N_2$. Furthermore, I pointed out that the attribute-subject relation of $N_1$ and $N_2$ holds true for related expressions, i.e. $N_1$-$wa$ $N_2$ and $N_1$-$no$ $N_2$ constructions.

Chapter 9 attempted to account for conditional constructions in terms of the semantic concept specification on the basis of the investigations from Chapters 5 to 8. Pointing out that conditional constructions and specificational copular sentences share some characteristics, I showed that a variety of conditional constructions, which appear to have no relationship except that they are classified as conditionals, can be captured in a unified manner from the viewpoint of the semantic concept of specification.

Through the discussion, this thesis has corroborated the hypothesis that linguistic form is not independent of the meaning it conveys: it is well-motivated by semantic and/or pragmatic principles. It is expected that the discussion in Part 1 will theoretically contribute to Hirose’s (2010, 2011) framework referred to as the Three-Tier Model of Language Use. Furthermore, I hope that the investigation of peripheral conditionals in Part 2 will support Konno’s (2005) generalization to the effect that marked linguistic forms correlate with their specialized functions.

In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on a few related issues. First, let us observe the following example:

(1) "If it were not for the fact that I never speak ill of my colleagues –" Professor McGonagall broke off, and they saw that her nostrils had gone white. She went on, more calmly, "Divination is one of the most imprecise
branches of magic. I shall not conceal from you that I shall have very little patience with it. True Seers are very rare, and Professor Trelawney…”

(J. K. Rowling, *Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban* [italics are mine])

The passage in (1) includes a speech-act conditional sentence, i.e. *If it were not for the fact that I never speak ill of my colleagues, Divination is one of the most imprecise branches of magic.* In this example, *Professor McGonagall*, one of the main characters in the Harry Potter series, criticizes a branch of magic called *Divination*. The *if*-clause expresses a condition that makes felicitous the utterance “Divination is one of the most imprecise branches of magic.” What is interesting about this example is that the *if*-clause is expressed in counterfactual form. As far as I know, no researchers concerned with speech-act conditionals have noticed the existence of *counterfactual speech-act conditionals* like (1).

I assume that the tense form in the *if*-clause has to do with what Fillmore (1990) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) refer to as *epistemic stance*. According to Fillmore, epistemic stance refers to the speaker’s mental association with or dissociation from the world of the protasis. The conjunction *if* and the counterfactual past form (*distant verb form* in the terminology of Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)) in the protasis stands for the negative epistemic stance of the speaker. This means that the speaker psychologically distances him/herself from belief in the mental space set up by the *if*-clause (*the speaker’s dissociation from belief* in the same terminology). The most likely explanation of the counterfactual use of speech-act conditionals is that it has the function of evading the speaker’s responsibility for his/her utterance. For example, Professor McGonagall avoids responsibility for her criticism of Divination, or *Professor Trelawney*, who teaches the subject at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and
Wizardry. If this perspective is correct, then the contents of the apodosis of counterfactual speech-act conditionals is limited to or at least likely to be what the speaker finds hard to say: criticisms, reproaches, or accusations. Unfortunately, since I have no other example, I cannot go into this issue any further. I leave the verification of this prediction for future research.

Let us turn our attention to a second issue. Let us examine the following examples:

(2) If Mary is late, she went to the dentist. (Dancygier (1998:86))

Sentence (2) is an example of epistemic conditionals in English. In this sentence, the speaker draws the conclusion she went to the dentist from the premise Mary is late. According to Dancygier (1998), the sentence in (2) can be rephrased in two ways as follows:

(3) a. If Mary is late, it means she went to the dentist.  
    b. If Mary is late, she must have gone to the dentist.  

(Dancygier (1998:88))

In (3a), the phrase it means is used to explicitly state the epistemic character of the link between the if-clause and the main clause of the epistemic conditional sentence. In (3b), in place of the phrase it means, the epistemic modal must is used for the same reason. From the comparison of (2) with (3), it can be understood that the occurrence of epistemic markers (i.e. must/it means) is optional in English epistemic conditionals. The grammaticality of epistemic conditionals in English is not significantly affected by the presence or absence of epistemic markers such as must and it means.

As Arita (2006) points out, Japanese epistemic conditionals, on the other hand, obligatorily require epistemic markers such as ni tigainai ‘must’ and noda. Let us observe the following examples:
(4) * mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni itta.
   Hyp Mary-Nom late do-AspV if she-Top dentist-Loc went
   „If Mary is late, she went to the dentist.’

   (Arita (2006:141))

(5) a. mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni
   Hyp Mary-Nom late do-AspV if she-Top dentist-Loc
   itta  nda
   went Ep
   „If Mary is late, it means she went to the dentist.’

   (Arita (2006:141))

b. mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni
   Hyp Mary-Nom late do-AspV if she-Top dentist-Loc
   itta  ni-tigainai
   went  must
   „If Mary is late, she must have gone to the dentist.’

The ungrammatical sentence in (4) is a literal counterpart to sentence (2), where no epistemic marker occurs. In (5a), the epistemic marker *nda* (an abbreviated form of *noda*) occurs, which renders the sentence grammatical. In the same way, in (5b), the epistemic modal *ni-tigainai* „must’ occurs, and thus the sentence is impeccable. As Arita (2006:142) points out, English epistemic conditionals and Japanese ones are the same in that some inference processes are included in them, but they are quite different as to whether the inference processes should be obligatorily expressed or not.

Note that the phenomenon just observed is in parallel with the phenomenon of Type 2 SACs dealt with in Chapter 4. It should be considered what mechanism works behind the occurrence of the epistemic markers at issue, although I am not in a
position to give any clear answer. However, it may be reasonable to assume that the obligatory/optional occurrence of epistemic markers and that of speech-act verbs are related to each other in some way or other.

What is brought to mind here is *causality*. As discussed in this thesis, the notion of causality is indispensible in conditionals. In Chapter 3, I revealed that speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs guarantee causality. Specifically, the causality in Type 2 J-SACs is guaranteed between the *nara*-clause and speech-act verb. This leads me to conjecture that causality in the epistemic domain, as well as that in the speech-act domain, must be explicitly stated in Japanese conditionals: the former is linguistically realized as epistemic markers such as *noda* or *ni-tigainai*, while the latter is linguistically realized as speech-act verbs such as *yuu* or *osieru*.

In this connection, Tsunoda’s (2004) analysis of *noda* seems suggestive. Tsunoda (2004:73-74) assumes that a certain reasoning process of human beings is involved with the occurrence of *noda*. The reasoning process involved with the occurrence of *noda* is schematically represented as follows:¹

(6) **A Model of Reasoning Process of Human Beings**


(Tsunoda (2004:73) [English translation is mine])

According to Tsunoda, the epistemic marker *noda* appears at the last step of this process (4. Answer). For a better understanding of the reasoning process, take the following dialogue as an example (cf. Tsunoda (2004:74)).²

(7) A: kinoo rensyuu yasun-da-ne. [1. Awareness]

---

¹ Although I will not discuss the reasoning process of *noda* in detail, the validity of the process per se is also an intriguing issue. For more details, see Tsunoda (2004:69-128).

² It should be noted that as shown in dialogue (6), the reasoning process is not always in a single person’s territory.
yesterday practice absent-PAST-tag
„You were absent from practice yesterday, weren’t you?”
Doo sita-no. [2. Question]
how did-Interrogative
„Why?”
mata sabot-ta-no. [3. Inference]
again skip-PAST-Interrogative
„Did you skip it again?”
B: onaka-ga ita-katta nda-yo. [4. Answer]
belly-Nom ache-PAST Ep-AOE
„I had a stomach ache.”

Tsunoda’s explanation of this dialogue is as follows. At the first step (Awareness), speaker A comes to be aware that speaker B was absent from the practice on the previous day. Speaker A wonders why speaker B was absent (Question), and infers that speaker B might have skipped the practice (Inference). Receiving these utterances (or reasoning process) of speaker A, speaker B gives the answer onaka-ga ita-katta nda-yo „I had a stomach ache.”.

As shown in this dialogue, the epistemic marker nda (the allomorph of noda) appears at the last step of the process. In other words, noda represents the result or effect of a reasoning process. In the same way, the first step can be regarded as a cause or premise of the reasoning process. This can be more clearly shown if the process in (7) is rephrased in a conditional construction. Observe the following example:

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3 Tsunoda (2004:73) states that not all the steps in a reasoning process are realized as sentences or utterances. She argues that even if some parts of the process are not realized, the occurrence of noda makes us notice the implicit existence of the reasoning process.

---
(8) kinoo rensyuu yasun-da nara, (kimi-wa) onaka-ga ita-katta *nda*-ne.

‚If you were absent from the practice yesterday, it means that you felt a pain in the belly, did you?’

It is not clear yet whether Tsunoda’s reasoning process is valid or not, and I will not challenge its validity here. However, the point is that *nda*, as well as *ni-tigainai ‚must’*, can be thought to guarantee the causality at the epistemic level.

In addition, I must refer to another study concerning the occurrence of *nda*: Ikarashi’s (2011b) argument is also suggestive and noteworthy. Ikarashi (2011b) regards *no(nda)* as a linguistic marker showing that the speaker’s conclusion is drawn from *abductive reasoning*. What Ikarashi refers to abductive reasoning is based on the formulation of abduction by Peirce (1940):

(9) The surprising fact, C, is observed;

But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,

Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.

(Peirce (1940:151))

Peirce’s (1940) abduction refers to the inference process of arriving at an explanatory hypothesis. In other words, it is the reasoning process wherein one seeks a hypothesis plausible enough to give the explanation of an observed fact. Let us reexamine the example in (5a), repeated here as (10), from the viewpoint of abductive reasoning:

(10) mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni

Hyp Mary-Nom late do-AspV if she-Top dentist-Loc

*nda*

ita  went  Ep

‚If Mary is late, it means she went to the dentist.’
In (10), what Peirce (1940) calls the surprising fact $C$ is Mary’s lateness (marii-ga tikoku si-teiru ,Mary is late’). Accepting the fact, the speaker seeks a plausible hypothesis to explain why Mary is late. In the speaker’s belief, if it is the case that Mary went to the dentist, then it is a matter of course that she is late. Then the speaker concludes that Mary went to the dentist.

As seen above, both Tsunoda’s (2004) and Ikarashi’s (2011b) approaches seem successful in dealing with the occurrence of noda (nda) in epistemic conditionals in Japanese.\(^4\) Although it is intriguing to investigate which approach is more plausible,

\(^4\) In addition, Ikarashi (2011a) recognizes another type of noda, claiming that noda is also used as a linguistic marker of a deductive reasoning process, formulated as follows:

(i) If A then C

A

Therefore C

(cf. Hirose (1991:20))

According to Ikarashi (2011a), when noda is involved in deductive reasoning, it marks not the conclusion but the premise of the reasoning process, i.e. A in (i). The deductive noda (D-nda, in his terminology) shows that the speaker recognizes a proposition containing noda as a fact.

If Ikarashi’s (2011a) analysis is on the right track, it is applicable for the explanation of the difference between -nara and no-nara. In fact, Noda et al. (2002:90-91) point out that the occurrence of no-nara shows the speaker’s recognition of a fact. Let us examine the following dialogue, wherein $n$ is treated as the allophone of no:

(i) (Speaker B does not know that it is raining outside.)

A: soto-wa ame-da yo.
outside-Top rain-Cop AOE
,It’s raining outside.’

B$_1$: ame-ga fut-teru n-nara, soto-ni deru -no -wa yame yoo.
rain-Nom fall-Asp Ep-if outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop will
,If it’s raining, I won’t go out.’

B$_2$:?? ame-ga fut-teru nara, soto-ni deru -no -wa yame yoo.
rain-Nom fall-Asp if outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop will
,If it’s raining, I won’t go out.’

From the contrast between B$_1$ and B$_2$, we can infer that the occurrence of no in B$_1$ renders the sentence more acceptable than the utterance in B$_2$. In this dialogue, speaker B recognizes the fact that it is raining outside by speaker A’s utterance. Note here the following points: (i) both no-nara and noda are decomposed into no + copular (nari ,be’ and da ,be’, respectively) and (ii) nari and noda is closely related to each other diachronically (cf. Fukuda (1998)). Considering these points, we can expect that no-nara and noda show similar behaviors. In fact, the nara-clause in (iB$_1$) can be replaced with a noda-sentence without changing its meaning in any very significant way:

(ii) B$_3$: ame-ga fut-teiru n-da, soto-ni deru -no -wa yame yoo.
rain-Nom fall-Asp Ep-Cop outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop will
,If it’s raining, I won’t go out.’

The following dialogue further confirms that no-nara marks the speaker’s recognition of a fact. In contrast to the dialogue in (i), no-nara cannot be used in contexts like the following:

(iii) A$_2$: tenki-wa doo ka-na.
I have to leave the matter open for future research.

Lastly, I would like to refer to the grammatical status of the sentence-ending particle *da* in Japanese. Traditionally, *da* has been treated as copular verb especially when it is used in NP1-wa NP2-*da* ,NP1 is NP2’ constructions (cf. Masuoka and Takubo (1992), Nishiyama (2003), Niwa (2004), Imada (2010, 2011), among others). So far, I have also followed this traditional view for convenience. However, the examination of N1-wa N2 constructions in Chapter 8 leads me to speculate that *da* is not a copular. If *da* is a copular, then one faces the question of why it can be freely deleted as long as the context allows. Observe the following pair:

(11) a. sake-wa Kosinokanbai-*da*
    sake-Top Kosinokanbai-Cop
    Lit. „Japanese sake is Kosinokanbai.‘

b. sake-wa Kosinokanbai.
    sake-Top Kosinokanbai
    Lit. „Japanese sake, Kosinokanbai.‘

Leaving aside the question of whether or not expression (11b) is derived from sentence

weather-Top how Q-Part
„How is the weather?‘

B4:* ame- ga fut-teru **n-nara**, soto- ni deru- no-wa yame yoo.
    rain-Nom fall-Asp Ep-if outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop will
    „If it’s raining, I won’t go out.‘

B5: ame- ga fut-teru **nara**, soto- ni deru- no-wa yame yoo.
    rain-Nom fall-Asp if outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop will
    „If it’s raining, I won’t go out.‘

In (iii), neither speaker A nor speaker B knows that it is raining outside. In this case, the proposition *ame- ga fut-teru ,It’s raining‘ cannot be recognized as a fact, which bars the use of *n(o)-nara*. In this way, the above examples not only support Ikarashi’s (2011b) claim to some extent, but also challenge the traditional view that *nara* and *no-nara* can be replaced with each other in many cases (cf. Suzuki (1993)). In this connection, Tanomura’s (1990) argument is suggestive. He classifies *no-nara* into two types, i.e. Situation-Setting *no-nara* and Actual-State-Hypothesizing *no-nara*, pointing out that the former cannot be replaced with -nara. Although it is intriguing to investigate whether or not his classification is valid to explain the contrast between (i) and (iii), I leave the issue open for future research.

Another traditional view regards -*da* as a particle (cf. Yamaguchi (2011)).

The English expressions in the single quotation marks are the literal translations of the examples.
(11a) by deleting da, the pair in (11) shows that the (non-)occurrence of da does not seem to influence either the grammaticality or interpretation of the two examples. On the other hand, the deletion of the topic marker wa significantly influences the grammaticality of the two expressions:

(12) a. sake *(-wa) Kosinokanbai-da
    b. sake *(-wa) Kosinokanbai.

The contrast between (11) and (12) indicates that -da alone is not sufficient to connect the two NPs; rather, it is -wa that connects the NPs and establishes a predicate relation between them. In my view, the combination “X-wa Y-da” should be regarded as a sort of correlative expressions like “either X or Y” and “so X that Y”. Thus, the “X-wa Y-da” combination can be termed as correlative copular. Although I should admit that it would be premature to go into this matter any further here, it is worthwhile to challenge the traditional view that da is a copular.

As seen above, there is a long way to go to depict the whole picture of conditionals and related phenomena in Japanese and English. The issue of the interaction of linguistic form, meaning, and discourse is an everlasting theme in my research.
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