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Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00157672
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00157672bdb136d7-2be5-43df-b341-83dfa02b82d5
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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JME_78-96 (378.7 kB)
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Item type | Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2019-09-09 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
澤, 亮治
× 澤, 亮治× Wu, Jiabin |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper investigates stochastic stability of noisy best response dynamics with reference-dependent preferences. We define a strategy as super-dominant in a 2×2 coordination game if it is the maximin strategy in terms of monetary returns and the state that all players play it constitutes an equilibrium which Pareto-dominates all other equilibria. If such a strategy exists, the corresponding equilibrium, which we call the super-dominant equilibrium, is uniquely stochastically stable for the BRM choice rule (the best response choice rule with uniform random errors) given any model of reference-dependent preferences. However, for any 2×2 coordination game with a super-dominant strategy, there exists a model of reference-dependent preferences with which the super-dominant equilibrium fails to be stochastically stable for the logit choice rule. | |||||
書誌情報 |
Journal of mathematical economics 巻 78, p. 96-104, 発行日 2018-10 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 03044068 | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA00252858 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.002 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | author | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Elsevier |